Potch Boudienste Bk v Van Der Hoff Park Extension 39 Home Owners Association NPC; Strendi Cast Properties CC h/a Habiplan Estates v Altivex 174 NPC (A859/2014) [2015] ZAGPPHC 246 (10 March 2015)

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[2015] ZAGPPHC 246
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Potch Boudienste Bk v Van Der Hoff Park Extension 39 Home Owners Association NPC; Strendi Cast Properties CC h/a Habiplan Estates v Altivex 174 NPC (A859/2014) [2015] ZAGPPHC 246 (10 March 2015)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
Case
Number: A859/2014
Date:
10 March 2015
Not
reportable
Not
of interest to other judges
In
the matter between:
POTCH
BOUDIENSTE
BK
.................................................................................................
1
st
Appellant
Registration
Number:
1997/003362/23
.......................................................................
(1
st
Applicant
a quo
)
and
VAN
DER HOFF PARK EXTENSION 39
HOME
...........................................................
2
nd
Appellant
OWNERS
ASSOCIATION
NPC
............................................................................
(2
nd
Applicant
a quo
)
Registration
Number: 2012/087892/02
and
STRENDI
CAST PROPERTIES CC h/a
HABIPLAN
...................................................
1
st
Respondent
ESTATES
..................................................................................................................
(1
st
Defendant
a quo
)
Registration
Number: 2010/042334/23
and
ALTIVEX
174
NPC
...........................................................................................................
2
nd
Respondent
Registration
Number:
2005/037682/08
....................................................................
(2
nd
Defendant
a quo
)
JUDGMENT
POTTERILL
J
[1]
The appellants are appealing against the order of the court
a quo
which reads as follows:
“
1.
Die aansoek teen die Eerste Respondent word van die hand gewys.
2. Die Eerste
Applikant en Tweede Applikant, gesamentlik en afsonderlik die een
betaal die ander om vrygestel te word, word gelas
om die Eerste
Respondent se koste van die aansoek te betaal op die prokureur en
kliënt skaal, watter koste insluit die koste
van ‘n
advokaat op die verhoogde skaal volgens die Pretoria Vereniging van
Advokate se fooie parameters, in die diskresie
van die
takseermeester.
3.
Die tussentydse bevel-nisi word bekragtig.
4.1 Die Tweede
Respondent, of enige ander persone in hulle diens, tender om nie die
sekuriteitshek aangebring tussen Van Der Hoff
Park Uitbereiding 16 en
Van Der Hoff Park Uitbereiding 39 toe te sluit nie
tensy en
behalwe in die geval waar:-
4.2 sleutel van
die slot daarvan aan alle
permanente inwoners
van Van Der Hoff
Park Uitbereiding 39 verskaf is wat daardie permanente inwoners van
Van Der Hoff Park Uitbereiding 39 in staat
stel om die hek self
onmiddellik oop te sluit en die hek dus deur die permanente inwoners
van Van Der Hoff Park Uitbereiding 39
self oopgemaak kan word sodra
enige permanente inwoner van Van Der Hoff Park Uitbereiding 39
daardeur wil loop of ry.
4.3 die klokkie
reeds geïnstalleer by die sekuriteitshek wat aangebring is
tussen Van Der Hoff Park Uitbereiding 16 en Van
Der Hoff Park
Uitbereiding 39, waarmee die sekuriteitsbeamptes in diens van die
Tweede Respondent en aan diens te Van Der Hoff
Park Uitbereiding 16,
geroep kan word om die sekuriteitshek aangebring tussen Van Der Hoff
Park Uitbereiding 16 en Van Der Hoff
Park Uitbereiding 39 te kom
oopmaak, in ‘n werkende toestand gehou word.
5.
Elke ander party is verantwoordelik vir hul eie kostes.”
[2]
The chronology of events set out the background to this appeal:
2.1 “Tuscany
Ridge” (Extension 6) and “Lifestyle” (Extension 39)
are two distinct security complexes, although
sharing one gate to
gain entry and a single security boundary wall. The two estates are
separated by a water canal, but joined
by a road, over the canal,
which is a servitude road over Tuscany Ridge in favour of Lifestyle
to gain entry and exit from the
main gate.
2.2 The first
appellant is the developer of the property and the second appellant
is the home owners association of Lifestyle.
2.3 The first
respondent is the management agent of Tuscany Ridge and the second
respondent is the home owners association of Tuscany
Ridge.
2.4 On the 6
th
of March 2014 the appellants obtained an
ex parte
order which
reads as follows:
“
1.
Dat die Applikante se nie-nakoming van die Reëls met betrekking
tot vorm, tyd en betokening gekondoneer word;
2. Dat die
Respondente opgeroep word om op 31 Maart 2014 om 09:00 of so spoedig
moontlik daarna as wat die aansoek aangehoor kan
word, redes aan te
voer, indien enige, waarom die volgende bevel nie finaal gemaak moet
word nie:
2.1 Dat die
Respondente en enige persone wat in hulle opdrag en/of namens hulle
optree, verbied word om engisins verder inbreuk
te maak op die
Applikante en hulle lede se vrye en ongestoorde besit van die pad
omskryf in bede 2.2, deur die oprig van ‘n
hek of enige
versperring van die pad;
2.2 Dat die
Respondente die Applikant en hul lede se besit van die teerpad geleë
tussen die grens van erf 873 op uitbreiding
16 en erf 944 op
uitbreiding 39 van Van der Hoffpark, Potchefstroom en wat die enigste
toegan tot uitbreiding 39 is en soos blyk
uit die foto, aanhangsel
“A” hiertoe aangedui en op die kaart, aanhangsel “B”
hiertoe aangedui (die pad)
herstel;
2.3 Dat die
Respondente alle obstruksies verwyder en welke insluit die hek, ten
einde die pad begaanbaar vir motorvoertuie te maak;
2.4 Dat die
Respondente sodanige besit herstel deur op eie koste enige hek en/of
obstruksies op die pad af te breek en te verwyder;
2.5 Enige
uitgrawings op die pad op te vul en te kompakteer;
2.6 Die pad te
herstel in die toestand waarin dit was voor Respondente se
besitsontneming;
2.7 Dat die
Respondente die koste van die aansoek betaal op ‘n prokureur en
kliënt skaal, die een betaal die ander vrygestel
te word;
2.8 Dat die
Respondente of enige persone in hulle diens verbied word om die hek
soos omskryf in bede 2.2 toe te maak of toe te sluit
tensy die hek
onmiddelik oopgemaak kan word sodra enige reghebbende daardeur wil
loop of ry.  Onmiddelik is oombliklik en
nie bv. Iemand wat eers
van ‘n ander plek af soontoe moet kom nie.  In die sin
moet die hek of oopstaan of beman wees.
2.9 Verder en/of
alternatiewe regshulp.
3. Dat bedes 2.8
tussentydse onmiddellike werking en regskrag sal hê, hangende
die keerdatum;
4.
Dat die Respondente die keerdatum met 24 uur kennis kan vervroeg;
5.
Dat hierdie aansoek en bevel op die Respondente beteken word.”
2.5
The matter was argued on 14 and 15 March 2014.
2.6 On 16 April 2014
the court
a quo
was to deliver judgment.  Just prior to
delivery thereof the respondents applied to hand up further
affidavits.  The matter
was postponed
sine die
.
2.7
Further affidavits were exchanged between the parties.
2.8
On 26 June 2014 the respondents argued that the rule
nisi
had lapsed. The matter was again
postponed to 1 July 2014.
2.9 On 1 July 2014
the respondents argued that the rule
nisi
should be relaxed.
The matter is postponed to 23 July 2014.
2.10 On 23 July 2014
the matter is postponed to 31 July 2014 due to the applicants’
attorney being a victim of robbery.
2.11
On 31 July 2014 the court delivered judgment. The court did not rely
on any of the new affidavits that were exchanged in coming
to his
judgment.
[3]
The first point of appeal is against the finding of the magistrate
that the first appellant was misjoined because it could not
be
spoliated.  On the facts it was common cause that:
3.1 The first
appellant at its cost was responsible for the construction of the
road as well the registration of the servitude;
3.2 It was also not
denied that the first appellant at the very least utilised the road
on the 20
th
of February 2014 and on the 5
th
and
6
th
of March 2014.
3.3
The first appellant also owns property in extension 39; Lifestyle.
[4]
The court
a quo
found
that a developer could in principle be spoliated. A person or entity
can also be spoliated although not permanently on the
premises. The
court however found that there was no indication what the necessity
was for the first appellant to specifically be
on the premises.
There was also no indication that the first appellant was spoliated.
In the reasons for his judgment
the magistrate expressed that the
court did not find that the first appellant had no
locus
standi
but that she was not spoliated;
“
My gevolglike bevinding was dat
Me De Klerk as lid van die eerste applikant en verteenwoordiger van
Potch Boudienste CC nie gespolieer
was nie.  Ek meen egter nie
dat sy geen locus standi gehad het nie.  Die eerste applikant
het bloot nie in sy aansoek
geslaag nie.”
I am thus satisfied that the point
in
limine
needs no further address because
the court did in fact not uphold the point
in
limine
, but on the merits found that
the first appellant was not spoliated.  The first appellant did
indeed have
locus standi
because the first appellant is a servitude holder and thus had
possession.  Whether the first appellant was spoliated will
be
addressed later on in the merits.
[5]
A further point
in limine
was
raised that the first respondent was misjoined; this is so because
the first respondent was just the managing agent of the second

respondent and as an agent did not commit spoliation.
[6]
The court
a quo
upheld
this point
in limine
because
the first respondent did not take the decision to erect a gate on the
road.  The first respondent thus could not be
held responsible
for the conduct of the second respondent to erect a gate and the
method in which the gate was locked.  The
appellants also did
not prove that the first respondent had exceeded his mandate as
representative of the second respondent.
[7]
The appellants submitted that the court
a
quo
erred because the first respondent
as the agent executed the instructions of the second respondent and
therefore the second respondent
was not misjoined.  The first
respondent thus in fact partook in the spoliation.  In fact the
first respondent launched
an application in its own name to amend the
rule
nisi
.
[8]
On behalf of the respondents it was submitted that the first
respondent is only a provider of administrative services as agent
to
the second respondent and did not make any independent decisions.
The appellants had only speculated and had no facts
to sustain their
theory that the first respondent was actively involved in the
construction and closure of the gate.
[9]
A person is a necessary party and should be joined if such party has
a direct and substantial interest in any order the court
can make, or
if such order cannot be sustained or armed into effect without
prejudicing that party.  The agent may not have
made the
decisions, but most certainly has the mandate to execute the
decisions.  If the second respondent took the decision
and then
instructed its agent to execute the decision, the agent partook in
the spoliation.  In its opposition to the application
the first
respondent in paragraph 4 sets out its duty as follows:  “…
first respondent is simply a service provider/managing agent
contracted by the Second Respondent to provide some administrative
services relating to the financial administration of levies raised by
the Second Respondent.”
Issuing the letter (M) is a
far cry from rendering financial administration of levies.  The
first respondent on behalf
of the directors of the second respondent
informed the first applicant as follows:
“
SEKURITEITSHEK
BY KANAAL
Die
sekuriteitshek by die kanaal word môre in werking gestel.
Daar is bordjies aangebring wat aandui dat die klokkie
gedruk moet
word sodat die sekuriteitsmaatskappy van Tuscany Ridge die hek kan
gaan oopmaak.
Laat
weet asseblief of ons ook moet reël dat die afleweringshek aan
die Oostekant oop- en toegesluit moet word soos in my vorige
skrywe.”
[M]
It
is quite ludicrous that this letter is written to the first
applicant, while the respondents argued that the first applicant
had
no
locus standi
and
no business being on the premises; that aside, this letter clearly
has nothing to do with administrative functions of levies.
If
this was the first respondent’s duty it would have exceeded its
powers in sending “M” to the first appellant.
The
fact of the matter is that the first respondent was executing the
plan of the second respondent and therefore was not misjoined;
it
partook in the spoliation.  The magistrate thus erred in
upholding this point
in limine
.
[10]
The applicants had to prove possession of the road.  The
appellants had possession of the road and in fact undisturbed

possession of the road i.e. they never had a gate across the road
where the gate was now erected.  The fact that they always
had
to enter a security gate at the entrance of the estate is of no
consequence; controlled access to a security estate is par
for the
cause.  The argument on behalf of the respondents that the
initial controlled access is a factor to consider is clearly

untenable and has no bearing on the fact that the servitude road now
has a gate which was not previously there.  This is an

uncreditworthy denial by the respondents and the court is justified
in rejecting such a version.  The applicants had proven
that the
road is a servitude road registered in their favour.  In
Firstrand Limited t/a Rand Merchant
Bank v Scholtz NO and Another
2008
(2) SA 503
(SCA)
at paragraph 13 the
court found the following:
“
[13]
The mandament van spolie does not have a ‘catch-all function’
to protect the quasi-possessio of all kinds of rights
irrespective of
their nature.  In cases such as where a purported servitude is
concerned the mandament is obviously the appropriate
remedy, …”
The
appellants thus have a “gebruiksreg” over the road and
clearly had possession of the road.
[11]
The next question is whether the appellants were despoiled.  The
answer thereto is simple; yes.  The appellants had
undisturbed
access and now there was a gate erected without their permission and
without resort to legal process.  The court
a
quo
erred in looking to the
reasonableness of the method of spoliation, i.e. whether a bell was
reasonable or whether a remote was reasonable
to gain access to the
erected gate.  There is no test of reasonableness in deciding
spoliation, there is either spoliation
or not.  The Magistrate
thus confused the act of spoliation with the determination of the
rights of a servitude holder.
[12]
Counsel for the respondents relied heavily on the
dictum
of
Malan
v Green Valley Farm Portion 7 Holt Hill 434 CC
2007
(5) SA 114
(ECD).
It was argued
that the facts are totally akin to the matter
in
casu
and that there the court found
that erecting a fence and supplying a remote and a keyboard did not
amount to spoliation.
[13]
Firstly this is a judgment of a single Judge in another division and
I am not bound by it.  Secondly, the set of facts
differ
materially in a very important aspect.  In paragraph [7] Dlodlo
J sets out the following:
“
[7]
It is important to mention that there is presently no servitude/right
of way in favour of the two applicants.”
This
is a material difference as a servitude holder immediately had
quasi-possession of the road.  In paragraph [34] Dlodlo
J found
as follows:
“
[34]
In my view the owner of a right of way also has a duty to display
reasonableness whenever he exercises such right.  When
an owner
of such right proceeds to enforce the right in question, I would also
expect nothing short of absolute good faith on his
part.  I am
aware that in the instant case the applicants are not armed with the
usual servitude providing them with a right
of way.  They do
have a right to gain access to their property.
The
question of servitude is not part of this litigation and does not
fall to be pronounced upon.
But despite that, it may illustrate the reasonableness I have alluded
to supra to refer to the words of Innes CJ in Texas
CO (SA) Ltd v
Cape Town Municipality
1926 AD 467
at 474-475 …”
[My
emphasis]
The
court in the
Malan
matter
supra
clearly
knew that it was not to confuse the question of the reasonableness of
the actions of a servitude holder with a
mandament
but proceeded to do so anyhow.
The court
a quo
also
defined the question of spoliation as follows:
“
[30]
… Can it be said that the applicants have been spoliated? I
say so because it seems that they have rather chosen not
to have
access to the road in question.”
[14]
The question of the
mandament
was
thus confused with the determination of the rights of the servitude
holder.  Reliance can accordingly not be placed on
this matter.
The question before the court
a quo
was
not whether the servitude holder was acting reasonably but whether
the possessor of the servitude road was being despoiled.
There
was previously no gate and erection of the gate did spoliate the
respondents in that they do not have undisturbed possession
of the
road anymore.
[15]
The
mandament of spolie
is
a final ruling on possession and does not bar a servitude holder from
bringing an interdict,
mandamus
or
action to establish the reasons as to why a gate would be necessary
and what measures in erecting such gate would be reasonable
to the
holder of the servitude right.  Reliance on
Roeloffze
NO and Another v Bothma NO and Others
2007
(2) SA 257
(C)
is thus bad in law as
this relates to the ambit of a servitude right of way and the
reasonableness pertaining thereto.  I am
thus satisfied that the
Magistrate erred in finding “some spoliation”, but then
tempering the spoliation by ordering
reasonable relief.
[16]
The general rule is that a successful party is entitled to its
costs.  The appellants should thus in the court
a
quo
have been successful with their
costs and must also be successful with the appeal costs.  The
appellants requested that the
costs be granted on a punitive scale.
It was argued that the respondents should pay the costs on an
attorney and client scale
because they proceeded to erect the gate
despite the appellants’ objections.  The respondents were
also forewarned that
the applicants would proceed with an urgent
application if the respondents proceeded with the action.  The
respondents then
proceeded to file further affidavits minutes before
judgment was to be handed down.  The court
a
quo
postponed the matter but did not
take cognisance of the affidavits.  These affidavits
unnecessarily burdened the papers and
lengthened the hearing.
It was also argued that the respondents without just cause opposed
the application.
[17]
A court has a discretion to grant a punitive costs order and must do
so in order to mark its disapproval of the conduct of
the losing
party.  The true explanation of awards of attorney and client
costs are derived from special considerations from
the circumstances
which gave rise to the application or from the conduct of the losing
party.  The court would then considering
it just to ensure more
effectually that it can grant the successful party a costs order
enabling the successful party not to be
out of pocket in respect of
the expenses caused to him by the litigation.  I find that on
the papers the respondents acted
unreasonable in its conduct of the
litigation, deserving of a punitive costs order for the reasons as
set out above.
[18]
I accordingly make the following order:
18.1 Dat die
Applikante se nie-nakoming van die Reëls met betrekking tot
vorm, tyd en betekening gekondoneer word;
18.2 Dat die
Respondente die Applikante en hul lede se besit van die teerpad geleë
tussen die grens van erf 873 op uitbreiding
16 en erf 944 op
uitbreiding 39 van Van der Hoffpark, Potchefstroom en wat die enigste
toegang tot uitbreiding 39 is en soos blyk
uit die foto, aanhangsel
“A” hiertoe aangedui en op die kaart, aanhangsel “B”
hiertoe aangedui (die pad)
herstel;
18.3 Dat die
Respondente alle obstruksies verwyder en welke insluit die hek, ten
einde die pad begaanbaar vir motorvoertuie maak;
18.4 Dat enige
uitgrawing gemaak ten einde die hek op te rig, opgevul en te
gekompakteer word;
18.5 Dat die
padoppervlak op die ligging van die hek herstel word na die toestand
waarin dit was voor die besitsontneming; en
18.6 Dat eerste en
tweede respondente gelas word om eerste en tweede appellante se koste
van die aansoek te betaal op ‘n prokureur
en kliëntskaal,
die een betaal die ander vrygestel te word.
__________________
S.
POTTERILL
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
I
agree
__________________
M.F.
KGANYAGO
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
CASE
NO: A859/2014
HEARD
ON: 10 March 2015
FOR
THE APPELLANTS: ADV. J.J. PRETORIUS
INSTRUCTED
BY: Jan Ellis Attorneys
FOR
THE RESPONDENTS: ADV. J.C. KLOPPER
INSTRUCTED
BY: E VAN DER WESTHUIZEN ATTORNEY
DATE
OF JUDGMENT: 27 March 2015