Keweesa v S (A902/2015) [2016] ZAGPPHC 966 (4 November 2016)

80 Reportability
Criminal Law

Brief Summary

Criminal Law — Sentencing — Appeal against sentence — Appellant convicted of murder and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment — Appellant argued trial court misdirected itself in assessing personal circumstances and failed to find substantial and compelling circumstances for a lesser sentence — Court held that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in imposing the sentence, considering the brutal nature of the crime and absence of remorse — Appeal dismissed.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The matter concerned an appeal against sentence following a conviction for murder in the Regional Court, Lydenburg, Mpumalanga Province. The appellant, Nelson Ronald Keweesa, had been convicted of murdering his girlfriend by stabbing her multiple times. The respondent was the State.


The appellant was legally represented throughout the trial proceedings. He was convicted on 8 June 2015 and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment, and he was additionally declared unfit to possess a firearm. The Regional Court refused leave to appeal against conviction, but it granted leave to appeal against sentence, with the appeal thus limited to the propriety of the sentence imposed.


The general subject-matter of the dispute on appeal was whether the trial court, in sentencing the appellant to 20 years’ imprisonment, misdirected itself in evaluating the appellant’s personal circumstances and in concluding that there were no substantial and compelling circumstances justifying a lesser sentence, and whether further investigations (such as a probation officer’s report) were required before sentence was imposed.


Material Facts


It was accepted on the record, and treated by the appeal court as material, that the deceased (the appellant’s girlfriend) was killed after the appellant, having seen her earlier in the company of another man, acted in a jealous rage. The appellant armed himself with a knife and stabbed the deceased 33 times, causing extensive injuries that resulted in her death. The appeal judgment characterised the attack as gruesome, heinous, and brutal, and treated the number of stab wounds and the manner of killing as central to sentence.


The appeal court further relied on the fact that the appellant had pleaded not guilty and, on the trial court’s view as reflected in the appeal judgment, had fabricated a defence. This was treated as demonstrating an absence of appreciation of the wrongfulness of his conduct and an absence of remorse, which the appeal court regarded as relevant to sentence.


As to personal circumstances, the appeal court relied on what emerged from mitigation proceedings. It noted, in particular, that on the appellant’s own version he did not know the age of his alleged minor child and did not establish that he had a bond with the child. The appeal court also treated as present, but not decisive, the factors that the appellant was relatively young, employed, and a first offender.


A disputed aspect raised on appeal was the contention that the trial court failed properly to take account of personal circumstances and failed to conduct further investigation (for example, by calling for a probation officer’s report or hearing additional witnesses). The appeal court addressed this by relying on the record that the trial court engaged with the appellant’s legal representative and that the appellant testified in mitigation of sentence.


Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether the trial court committed a misdirection in its approach to sentencing, particularly in its consideration of the appellant’s personal circumstances and its conclusion that there were no substantial and compelling circumstances warranting a lesser sentence than 20 years’ imprisonment.


A further legal question was whether, in the circumstances of the case, the trial court’s failure to obtain additional material (such as a probation officer’s report or further witness testimony on personal circumstances) amounted to an irregularity or otherwise undermined the sentencing process.


The dispute primarily concerned the application of legal principles governing appellate interference in sentence to the facts of the case. It required an evaluative assessment of whether the trial court properly exercised its sentencing discretion and whether the sentence was so inappropriate as to justify appellate interference.


Court’s Reasoning


The appeal court approached the matter by emphasising that sentencing is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. It stated that a court of appeal should be cautious about interfering with that discretion unless it is satisfied that the discretion was not exercised properly and judicially. In this regard, the appeal court referred to authority that appellate interference is justified where the sentence is affected by irregularity or misdirection, or where the sentence is so inappropriate that it induces a sense of shock.


Applying these principles, the appeal court considered the nature and seriousness of the offence and the appellant’s conduct. It relied on the fact that the appellant inflicted 33 stab wounds on the deceased, describing this as heinous and heartless. The appeal court treated the brutality of the killing, together with the suffering implied by repeated stabbing, as a strong aggravating feature informing the appropriate level of punishment.


The appeal court further treated the appellant’s plea of not guilty coupled with what it described as the fabrication of a defence as indicative of a lack of appreciation of wrongdoing and lack of remorse. It regarded these considerations as part of the broader sentencing inquiry, linked to the purposes of punishment, including deterrence and rehabilitation. In this context, it endorsed the proposition (citing authority) that punishment should be reasonable and reflect the offender’s moral blameworthiness and the seriousness of the offence.


The appellant’s submission that a lesser sentence (proposed as 15 years’ imprisonment) should have been imposed because of personal circumstances was rejected. The appeal court noted that the trial court had engaged with the appellant’s legal representative and that the appellant testified in mitigation, and it therefore did not accept that the sentencing court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into personal circumstances in the manner alleged on appeal.


In relation to the contention that substantial and compelling circumstances existed, the appeal court held that the appellant’s youth, employment, and first-offender status did not, on their own, constitute substantial and compelling circumstances warranting a lesser sentence. The appeal court also relied on the appellant’s evidence regarding his alleged minor child, noting that he did not know the child’s age and did not establish a bond, which weakened reliance on this factor for mitigation.


In assessing the appropriateness of the sentence, the appeal court held that a 20-year sentence was not inappropriate and did not reflect an improper exercise of discretion. It also noted the trial court’s observation that the appellant was fortunate not to have been charged with premeditated murder, in which event life imprisonment would have been imposed. The appeal court further observed that the trial magistrate imposed the maximum sentence permitted by law, and held that this was not shocking given the brutal manner of the killing.


Outcome and Relief


The appeal court dismissed the appeal against sentence and upheld the sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment imposed by the Regional Court.


No separate order as to costs was made in the judgment.


Cases Cited


Rex v Dhlumayo 1948 (2) SA 677 (A)


S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A)


S v Thonga 1993 (1) SACR 365 (V)


Legislation Cited


No legislation was expressly cited in the judgment.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The High Court held that there was no basis to interfere with the sentence imposed by the trial court because sentencing is primarily within the trial court’s discretion and interference is warranted only where there is misdirection, irregularity, or a sentence so inappropriate that it induces a sense of shock.


The High Court held that the trial court did not misdirect itself in concluding that there were no substantial and compelling circumstances justifying a lesser sentence, and that the appellant’s personal circumstances relied upon in mitigation, including being a first offender, being employed, and being relatively young, did not in themselves warrant a reduction.


The High Court held that the brutality of the offence, including the fact that the deceased was stabbed 33 times, together with the absence of remorse as found by the trial court, justified the sentence, and that the sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment was not inappropriate.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A court of appeal should be slow to interfere with a sentence imposed by a trial court because sentencing is a discretionary function. Interference is justified only where the sentencing discretion was not exercised properly and judicially, including where there was a misdirection or irregularity, or where the sentence is so inappropriate that it induces a sense of shock.


In determining sentence, punishment should be reasonable and should reflect both the degree of moral blameworthiness of the offender and the seriousness of the offence. Considerations such as deterrence and rehabilitation form part of the broader purposes of sentencing.


Factors commonly advanced in mitigation, including relative youth, employment, and first-offender status, do not per se amount to substantial and compelling circumstances warranting a lesser sentence, particularly in the face of severe aggravating features such as extreme violence and the absence of remorse.

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[2016] ZAGPPHC 966
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Keweesa v S (A902/2015) [2016] ZAGPPHC 966 (4 November 2016)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
4 November 2016
CASE NO: A902/2015
NOT REPROTABLE
NOT OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES
REVISED
NELSON RONALD
KEWEESA
Appellant
and
THE
STATE
Respondent
JUDGMENT
MBONGWE,
AJ:
[1]
The appellant stood
trial in the Regional Court in Lydenburg, Mpumalanga Province, on a
charge of murder. The State alleged that
the appellant had, out of a
jealous rage, stabbed his girlfriend with a knife 33 times causing
her extensive injuries which caused
her death. The appellant was
legally represented throughout the proceedings. He was convicted of
murder on the 8 June 2015 and
sentenced to 20 years imprisonment. The
appellant was further declared unfit to possess a firearm. On
application for leave to
appeal, the trial court turned down the
application in respect of the conviction, but granted the appellant
leave to appeal against
the sentence.
[2]
The argument presented
on behalf of the appellant on appeal was that the trial court, in
determining an appropriate sentence, erred
in its consideration and
assessment of the appellant's personal circumstances and, therefore,
misdirected itself in its finding
that there were no substantial and
compelling circumstances justifying a lesser sentence than that it
imposed. An alternative argument
that was advanced in motivation for
a lesser sentence was that the trial court failed to conduct
necessary investigations such
as calling for a probation officer's
report or calling witnesses to testify on the appellant's personal
circumstances. The overall
submission made was that a sentence of 15
years imprisonment would be appropriate in this case. I do not agree
with this argument.
In
casu
the court a
quo
dealt with
the question of substantial and compelling circumstances by engaging
the appellant's legal representative and the appellant
also testified
in mitigation of sentence (record p78).
[3]
In considering an
appeal against a sentence imposed by a trial court, the court hearing
an appeal has first to bear in mind that
sentencing is discretionary
to the trial court and should guard against interfering with the
exercise of such discretion, unless
it is convinced that the trial
court had not exercised its discretion properly and in a judicial
manner (
See Rex v Dhlumayo 1948(2) SA 677 (A)
or where the
sentence imposed is vitiated by irregularity or misdirection or is so
inappropriate that it induces a sense of shock.(
See S v Rabie
1975 (4) SA 855
(A).
[4]
It is on record in
the present case that the appellant's gruesome stabbing and the
resultant murder of the deceased, his girlfriend,
was precipitated by
his jealous rage, having earlier seen her in the company of another
man. Arming himself with a knife and stabbing
the deceased 33 times
was heinous and heartless, to say the least. The appellant's plea of
not guilty and his fabrication of a
defence constituted a display of
the absence of the appreciation of the wrongfulness of his conduct
and remorse. These two elements
form part of a number that are
crucial considerations in the determination of an appropriate
sentence to be imposed, bearing in
mind, of cause, the purpose of
sentence, namely, to deter and to rehabilitate, amongst others.
This principle was aptly stated
thus in
S
v
Thonga
1993 (1) SACR 365
(V):
"In my view
the punishment must first be reasonable, ie, it should reflect the
degree of moral blameworthiness attaching to
the offender as well as
the degree of reprehensibleness or seriousness of the offence."
Taking into account the appellant's actions and the absence of
the elements I have alluded to, a lesser sentence than that imposed

by the trial court would mark a failure of the justice system to seek
to achieve the desired effect of punishment and may result
in an
encouragement of societal disrespect for the system itself.
[5]
I cannot find that
the sentence of imprisonment of the appellant to a period of twenty
years is inappropriate, nor that the trial
court had not exercised
its sentencing discretion properly and in a judicial manner. In fact,
as was correctly pointed out by the
trial court, the appellant was
indeed lucky that the State did not charge him with the premeditated
murder of the deceased, in
which case life imprisonment would have
been imposed. It is noted that the trial magistrate nonetheless
handed down the maximum
sentence permitted by the law. This is in no
way shocking considering the brutal manner in which the appellant
murdered the deceased
and the pain she had to endure as each of the
33 stabbings was inflicted on her body.
[6]
I can find no merit
in the argument that the trial court failed to find that substantial
and compelling circumstances existed in
this case. On his own
version, the appellant did not know the age of his alleged minor
child nor to establish that he has a bond
with it. The appellant's
relatively young age, the fact that he was employed and was a first
offender do not
per se
constitute substantial and compelling
circumstances warranting the imposition of a lesser sentence. In my
view, the sentence of
twenty years imprisonment is reasonable,
justified in line with the exposition of the law stated in the Thonga
case referred to
above.
[7]
I, therefore, propose that the following order be made:
The appeal is dismissed.
______________________
M MBONGWE
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
_____________________
D S MOLEFE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
I
AGREE. AND IT IS SO ORDERED
.