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[2016] ZAGPPHC 788
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Chemical,Energy,Paper,Priting,Wood and Allied Workers Union and Others v Seathlolo and Others (06046/2016) [2016] ZAGPPHC 788 (29 August 2016)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 06046/2016
DATE:
29/8/2016
CHEMICAL,
ENERGY, PAPER, PRINTING,
WOOD
...........................
............
First
Applicant
AND
ALLIED WORKERS' UNION
SIMON
MOFOKENG
….........
Second Applicant
THAMSANQA
MHLONGO
….............
Third Applicant
and
SAMUAL
CHIEF
SEATHLOLO
…..........
First Respondent
THULASIZWE
SIBANDE
…....
Second Respondent
SCOTCH
MPONENG DIBETSO N.O.
…......
Third Respondent
JOHANNES
DUBE
N.O.
…...
Fourth Respondent
LAWRENCE
NZELE
N.O.
…......
Fifth Respondent
SAMUEL
XABA
…....
Sixth Respondent
JACKSON
MAKHUBELA
...
Seventh Respondent
CHARLES
MATULUDI
….....
Eight Respondent
PETJE
MASHEGOANE
…....
Ninth Respondent
THERESA
PILUSA
…....
Tenth Respondent
LEMMY
MOKOENA
...
Eleventh Respondent
MATHEWS
SOHOPU
…....................................................
Twelfth Respondent
JUDGMENT
AC
BASSON, J
[1]
This application is for the setting aside of an interim interdict
granted by Modiba, J on 15 April 2016. The application is
brought by
the Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood and Allied Workers' Union
(hereinafter referred to as "the union").
The second
applicant is Mr Simon Mofokeng (the General Secretary of the union -
hereinafter referred to as "Mofokeng").
Mofokeng is the
deponent to the founding affidavit. The third applicant is Mr
Thamsanqa Mhlongo (the elected president of the union
- hereinafter
referred to as "Mhlongo"). (Where appropriate, I will refer
to the three applicants collectively as "the
applicants".)
[2]
The first respondent is Mr Seatlholo. He is the union's former
General Secretary. The second respondent is the union's former
treasurer. The first respondent was summarily dismissed on 21 April
2016. The second respondent was expelled from the union on
1 June
2016. Seatlholo's dismissal (according to Mofokeng) is a direct
result of a resolution taken at an NEC meeting of
the union on
14 January 2016 to institute disciplinary action against Seathlolo
and others. The third, fourth, seventh, eight,
tenth, eleventh and
twelfth respondents have also been expelled from the union. The sixth
respondent was suspended on 1 June 2016.
The ninth respondent was
dismissed. Of the 12 respondents only the fifth respondent therefore
remains a member in good standing.
[3]
In essence this application is for an order to set aside the order
made by Modiba, J (dated 15 April 2016) interdicting the
union from
convening a meeting of its National Executive Committee (hereinafter
referred to as "the NEC") pending the
determination of the
relief sought in Part A of the main application. The application is
opposed.
[4]
The applicants are seeking to discharge the order primarily on the
basis that, as a result of material changes in circumstances
that
occurred subsequent to the granting of the order on 15 April 2016,
the balance of convenience no longer favours the interim
interdict.
As will be pointed out herein below, it is the respondents'
submission that this allegation is false and without any
merit. With
reference to the judgment of Modiba, J, the respondents submitted
that the interim order was granted on the premise
that fraud was
committed by Mofokeng at the time when the resolutions were taken.
Interlocutory
applications
[5]
Before I turn to the merits of this application, brief reference
should be made to the four interlocutory applications that
also
served before the court. The first was an application brought by 12
individuals to intervene as respondents in the present
urgent
application. Despite the fact that the papers in that application
were filed on 5 August 2016, they sought to intervene
and then only
thereafter be granted an opportunity to oppose the urgent
application. Effectively the applicants sought an indulgence
from
this court to file their answering papers only on 19 August 2016.
This would have had the effect of delaying the present urgent
application. No persuasive reason was advanced in the papers as to
why opposing papers could not have been filed timeously in the
present urgent application. I have considered the application and
dismissed the application to intervene with costs which costs
include
the costs of two counsel.
[6]
The three remaining applications dealt with applications to discover.
I do not intend dealing with them in detail. Suffice to
point out
that all three applications have been granted and discovery of the
documents have been made on the same day.
[7]
I should also briefly mention that the respondents sought to formally
introduce the relief sought in Part A as a counter-application
in
this application. I have indicated to the parties that I will not
entertain Part A as part of this application and that the
parties
should approach the Deputy Judge President for a special allocation
of Part A. I have likewise refused to entertain the
counter-applications filed by the various individual respondents
relating to their expulsions or dismissals. These applications
can be
set down in the normal course.
[8]
I do not intend dealing with the issue of urgency in detail. Suffice
to point out that I am of the view that this application
is
sufficiently urgent to be dealt with on the urgent role.
Chronology
[9]
The present urgent application is preceded by an acrimonious history
of litigation between the parties. It is not necessary
to deal
with this history in detail but in order to place the
interim
order granted by Modiba, J in context it is necessary to briefly
refer to the chronology that preceded this urgent application. It
is
also necessary to deal in some detail with the findings made by
Modiba, J in her judgment in so far as those findings are relevant
to
decide the question before this court.
[10]
The Registrar of Labour Relations addressed a letter to Mofokeng in
2014
advising
him of the
fact
that
the
union
was
not
operating
as
envisaged
in the
Labour
Relations
Act
("the
LRA")
[1]
and
that
the
union
had failed
to
prepare
audited
financial statements since 2009 and that the union had failed to
comply with its statutory obligations under the LRA regarding
the
filing of
audited
financial
statements.
[11]
On 9 October 2015 Van Niekerk, J of the Labour Court ordered the
union,
inter
alia,
to submit its annual
audited financial statements to the Registrar of Labour Relations for
the years 2010 - 2013 and to do so within
90 days of its order
failing which the registrar may approach the Labour Court for an
order placing the union under administration.
[12]
On 14 January 2016 the union's NEC took a number of resolutions.
These resolutions form the crux of the dispute between the
parties
(which dispute is not before this court). In brief it is the
respondents' submission that Mofokeng and Mhlongo fraudulently
created a number of fictitious resolutions after the NEC meeting of
the union. The respondents allege that Mofokeng fraudulently
created
fictitious resolutions in terms of which the NEC purportedly (i)
approved the draft audited financial statements of the
union for the
years 2010 - 2013; (ii) suspended some of the respondents from
attending NEC meetings and to institute disciplinary
proceedings
against them; and (iii) allowed the NEC, and more particularly
Mofokeng, to take over complete control of unspecified
regions of the
union.
[13]
On 19 January 2016 the respondents launched the main application
which is referred to as "Part A". An amended Notice
of
Motion was filed on 24 February 2016 together with a supplementary
affidavit in respect of Part A. In Part A the respondents
claim
urgent relief suspending the implementation of the disputed
resolutions and interdicting certain meetings of the NEC. In
Part B
the respondents seek declaratory relief directed at undoing the
resolutions taken by the NEC on 14 January 2016.
[14
On 25 February 2016 Part A was struck from the role for lack of
urgency.
[15]
On 24 March 2016 Mofokeng sent out a notice convening a special NEC
meeting for 18 and 19 April 2016.
[16]
On 31 March 2016 the respondents served an application for urgent
interim relief.
[17]
On 11 April 2016 the respondents set down Part A for hearing on 16
May 2016. Part
A was
therefore set down for hearing prior to the hearing of the urgent
application by Modiba, J.
[18]
On 13 and 14 April 2016 the urgent application was argued before
Modiba,
J.
She delivered her judgment on 15 April 2016.
[19]
The respondents (the applicants in the urgent application before
Modiba, J) approached the court on an urgent basis to interdict
the
NEC meeting
called by
Mofokeng or "any other NEC meeting of the first respondent [the
union],
pending the determination of part A of the main application set down
for hearing on 16 May 2016".
[2]
[20]
At the time 12 NEC members, including regional representatives were
disqualified from attending the intended meeting. It was
submitted to
Modiba, J that, had the resolutions not been taken, they would have
enjoyed a right not to have the NEC meeting held
in their absence.
[21]
In respect of urgency, Modiba, J was of the view that the respondents
may not be afforded substantial relief at a hearing in
due course in
light of the fact that, should the meeting be allowed to proceed in
the respondents' absence,
they
will suffer prejudice that cannot be remedied by substantial relief
at a hearing in due course.
[3]
In coming to this finding Modiba, J also took
into
account the fact that some of the respondents, have been elected by
the regions
of the union to represent the respective regions in the NEC.
She
concluded
that -
"Prima
facie
the adoption of a resolution to suspend the applicants
taken under circumstances alleged by the applicants is a
violation
of the Constitution of the first respondent [the union].
Therefore, their disqualification to attend NEC meetings is also
prima facie ultra
vires
the first respondent's
Constitution."
[22]
In respect of irreparable harm Modiba, J held that, because the
regions are represented by some of the respondents, their interests
will not be heard as a result of their disqualification. This,
according to Modiba, J, is not in the broad interest of the union
as
required by section 42(3) of the union's constitution. Should
resolutions be taken under these circumstances, such resolutions
will
not only create irreparable harm to the respondents, but also
to
the regions represented by some of the respondents.
[4]
[23]
In respect of the balance of convenience the court took into account
that
the
NEC was not involved in the day to day functioning of the union and
that
the
union was only required to meet three times a year. In light of the
fact
that
Part
A
was set
down
for 16
May
2016,
the
Court
concluded
that
-
[5]
"The
balance of convenience strongly favours the [respondents]. I do not
see how delaying the holding of a NEC meeting for
one month [the
approximate period between the date of her judgment and 16 May 2016]
can cause more inconvenience to the [applicants]
than it will cause
to the [respondents], especially as the NEC is not involved in the
day to day functioning of the first (applicant].
In terms of the
first (applicant's] Constitution, the NEC is required to meet three
time a year. In the intervening period the
first [applicant]
continues to function. In the month leading to the hearing of the
main application, if the interim interdict
is grated, the first
(applicant] will continue to function."
[24]
On 16 May 2016 Part A was postponed
sine die
by agreement
between the parties. There is a dispute as to who is responsible for
the postponement as both parties blame the other
for the
postponement. According to the respondents, although they agreed to
the postponement, they did not initiate the postponement.
[25]
On 24 May 2016 the applicants' attorneys in a letter recorded that it
is imperative that Part B be set down without delay and
set out the
reasons as to why the applicants are of the view that it is no longer
apposite to prosecute Part A whilst failing to
prosecute Part B. More
in particular, the applicants contended that the respondents have
wilfully failed to prosecute Part B for
final relief and that their
dilatory approach to having Part A heard constitutes good grounds on
which to find that they (the respondents)
have
now
forfeited their right to interim relief
pendente
lite.
[6]
The respondents replied to this letter stating that the respondents
intend approaching
the Deputy
Judge President once they have finalised their
supplementary
founding affidavit.
[26]
On 10 June 2016 the respondents filed a further supplementary
affidavit in respect of Part A. In this affidavit it is alluded
to
that an action is to be instituted.
[27]On
14 July 2016 the applicants launched this urgent application to have
the
interim
order of Madiba, J set aside.
[28]
On 20 July 2016 the respondents made a proposal in writing to the
applicants that a joint approach to the Deputy Judge President
be
formulated for an expedited hearing of Part A of the main application
and that the joint approach should be made by no later
than 27 July
2016. On 22 July 2016 the applicants rejected the proposal. This,
according to the respondents, demonstrates the ma/a
fides
of
the applicants and illustrates that the applicants do not wish Part A
to be heard.
[29]
On 10 August 2016 the combined summons in the action referred to in
the supplementary affidavit of 10 June 2016 in respect
of Part A is
served on the union.
[30]
On 12 August 2016 the respondents gave notice of their intention to
amend the Notice of Motion in the main application and
afforded the
applicants 10 days to object to the proposed amendment.
Interim
interdict
[31]
As already pointed out, the purpose of the application for interim
relief was to interdict a special meeting of the union's
NEC
scheduled to be held on 18 and 19 April 2016 as well as any further
meetings of the NEC pending the determination of Part A.
[32]
It is clear from the judgment of Modiba, J that the fact that the
hearing of Part A was merely a month away was considered
by her as
relevant in deciding the balance of convenience at the time. More in
particular, as already pointed out, Modiba, J was
of the view that
the union was able to function in the intervening period in light of
the fact that the hearing of Part A was only
a month away.
[33]
On behalf of the applicants it was submitted that the interim order
should be reconsidered in light of the material changes
in the
circumstances which is primarily the fact that Part A has not been
heard and because Part A has not yet been set down for
hearing.
Moreover, it was submitted that the respondents failed to prosecute
their challenge to the NEC resolutions of 14 January
in Part B of the
main application in a diligent and timeous manner. It was that the
respondents are now using the order of Modiba,
J to render the union
dysfunctional for an indeterminate period of time and that it has now
become vital to the union that NEC
meetings be held. In summary
therefore, apart from the fact that circumstances have changed,
preventing the union for an indeterminate
period of time to hold
meetings have now accordingly to the applicants materially affected
the balance of convenience as it was
before Modiba, J and therefore,
the basis on which urgent relief was granted, are now materially
different.
[34]
The respondents disputed that there was a strategy to render the
union dysfunctional and submitted that the union was already
dysfunctional as a result of Mofokeng's refusal to comply with the
union's constitution and his complicity in manufacturing fraudulent
resolutions.
NEC
meetings
[35]
It is accepted that the union's constitution entrusts the union's
national executive
functions
to
the
NEC.
[7]
The
constitution
further
requires
the
NEC
to meet
three times a year.
[8]
From the
papers it is clear the NEC has only
met once
this year
having been interdicted
to meet
pending
the
outcome of Part A. I have already referred to the applicants
'submission that, as a result
of the
interim
order
and in light of the fact that Part A has not been enrolled, the union
has now effectively been paralyzed from holding any
NEC meetings: Had
Part A been heard on 16 May 2016, the order of Modiba, J would have
been discharged and the present application
would not have
been
necessary.
[36]
In support of the submission that it is vital for the union that an
NEC meeting be called, the union referred to the following
consequences flowing from an inability to hold NEC meetings: Firstly,
the union is unable to use its Nedbank internet banking facilities;
secondly, the union is unable to comply with its obligations as per
the Labour Court order and thirdly, an NEC meeting is necessary
in
order to call for a National Congress.
Bank
account
[37]
It was submitted on behalf of the union that by not being able to
hold an NEC meeting, the union is effectively hamstrung from
operating the union's internet banking facilities with Nedbank. In
this regard it is common cause that the employees who are authorised
to operate the internet banking facilities have been suspended. These
suspended employees are not only in possession of the Nedbank
devises
that enable them to operate the internet banking facilities, they are
the only individuals that have been authorised to
operate the
internet banking facilities. As a result of their suspension and
their refusal to hand over the Nedbank devices, the
union is unable
to transact on the internet. The union has been advised by Nedbank to
remove the employees who are on record at
Nedbank as the authorised
users of the Nedbank devises and to replace them with new authorised
users. This the union can only do
pursuant to the adoption of an NEC
resolution. Because the union is interdicted from holding NEC
meetings pending the outcome of
Part A, they are unable to hold an
NEC meeting.
[38]
The respondents dispute the applicants' contentions in respect of the
bank account and submitted that there is no need to pass
a resolution
to nominate new internet banking administrators. Furthermore, the
respondents dispute that the issue of access to
internet banking
renders this application urgent in light of the fact that the
applicants have been aware of this issue as far
back as April 2016.
In this regard the court was referred to the fact that the union in
an email to Nedbank stated that salaries,
rentals and other payments
to service providers were not paid since April 2016. Despite having
been advised by Nedbank on
more than one occasion - the last
time on 31 May 2016 - the applicants have made no attempt as a matter
of urgency to approach
the court. Furthermore, although two of the
employees authorised to make electronic transfers have been
suspended, both of them
remain willing and have in fact tendered
their services to make the electronic transfers upon receipt of
instructions to
do so. Mofokeng, however, states that he no
longer trust the employees. Lastly, the respondents submitted that
the union
can in any event transact by giving instructions to Nedbank
to do the necessary payments.
[39]
With reference to the respondents' replying affidavit in the main
application it was further submitted on behalf of the respondents
that, in any event, for the most part of Mofokeng's tenure, he has
failed to schedule meetings as required by the constitution
and more
in particular, he has failed to schedule at least three effective NEC
meetings annually as required by section 44(1) of
the constitution.
Compliance
with the Labour Court order
[40]
I have already referred to the order of the Labour Court dated 9
October 2015 in terms of which the union was ordered to submit
its
annual audited financial statements to the Registrar failing which
the Registrar is granted leave to approach the Labour Court
for an
order placing the union under administration. According to the
applicants they are unable to comply with this obligation
without a
meeting of the NEC.
[41]
In respect of the submission that an NEC meeting must be called in
order to ensure that it complies with its obligations in
terms of the
LRA and to approve the financial and auditing reports it was
submitted on behalf of the respondents that, in light
of the common
cause fact that the financial statements have already been approved
and have been submitted to the Registrar (in
compliance with the
order of the Labour Court), there is no need to call an NEC meeting
for this purpose.
National
Congress
[42]
In respect of the
submission
that
an
NEC meeting
must be
called
as
this
is
the
only
entity
that
can
determine
the
place
and
date
of
the
next
National
Congress,
[9]
it was
submitted
on
behalf
of the
respondents
that
it is
common cause that no steps have been taken by Mofokeng to call a
National
Congress. In this regard reference was made to the fact that that a
National
Congress should have been called two years ago but that no steps
have been
taken to do so. The court was also referred to the fact that
Mofokeng
offers no explanation in the papers as to why a National Congress was
not
convened in September 2014 or any date subsequent
thereto.
Non-prosecution
of Part A and Part B
[43]The
respondents disputed that it failed to prosecute the hearing of part
A and furthermore disputed that circumstances have
changed
significantly to the extent that the balance of convenience no longer
favours them.
[44]
In respect of the postponement of the hearing of part A, it was
submitted on behalf of the respondents that the hearing was
postponed
at the instance of the applicants. If the hearing had not been
postponed, the need for this urgent application would
not have been
necessary. It was further submitted that, when the hearing of part A
was postponed, the applicants were fully aware
of the fact that the
interim
interdict would remain operative for a significant
period of time. Moreover, if the union was of the
view
that
the respondents were delaying the enrolment of Part A, nothing
prevented them from approaching the Deputy Judge President for
directions relating to the management of the matter.
Merits
[45]
Although reference in some detail have been made to the events
that culminated in this urgent application, only
the events
after
the granting of the order by Modiba, J on 15 April 2016
and especially after 16 May 2016, are important in considering the
question
whether circumstances have changed significantly as alleged
by the applicants to the extent that the balance of convenience no
longer favours the respondents. The applicants, as already pointed
out, contended that the changed circumstances shifted the balance
of
convenience in their favour and that the order of Modiba, J should
therefore be set aside.
[46]
At the outset I should point out that, although the balance of
convenience is an important consideration in this application,
it is
but one of the factors that has to be taken into account in
considering whether to set aside the order of Modiba, J.
[47]
I have already referred to the judgment of Modiba, J in some detail.
For purposes of evaluating the merits of this application
the
following three damning findings by Modiba, J remain, in my view
important: Firstly, the applicants are likely to succeed in
establishing that their version is more probable. More in particular,
her finding that the resolutions of 14 January 2016 are,
prima
facie,
fraudulent remain extant. Secondly, the adoption of the
resolutions to suspend the respondents are
prima
facie
ultra
vires
in terms of the union's
constitution. Thirdly, the resolutions had the potential to
perpetuate an environment of abuse of power
and poor governance. In
this regard I have already referred to the fact that Modiba, J has
placed great emphasis on the fact that
some of the 12 NEC members who
were suspended at the time of the hearing of the urgent application
are the elected representatives
of certain regions and excluding them
from an NEC meeting would not be in the broad interests of the union.
[48]
T
hese findings of Modiba, J stand and they remain relevant.
The court cannot overlook the fact that a
prima facie
case has
been made out before Modiba, J that the resolutions taken on 14
January 2016 were fraudulent.
The
court also cannot ignore the fact that it was not (at the time) in
the interest of the union to allow meetings to take place
in
circumstances where the representatives of some regions have been
suspended and therefore disqualified from attending such meetings.
[49]
It is common cause that the NEC consists of 48 members. Also
common cause is the fact that 25 NEC members form part of
the
so-called "dissenting faction". The 12 applicants before
the court in this application are part of the so-called
"dissenting
faction". At the time of the hearing before Modiba, J 12 NEC
members including regional representatives were
disqualified from
attending meetings pursuant to a resolution taken under circumstances
that are not in the broad interest of the
union.
[50]
Since the hearing before Modiba, J nine of the respondents before
this court have either been dismissed or expelled. Only the
fifth
respondent appears to remain to be a member in good standing.
Therefore, of the 12 applicants only one applicant remains
a member
in good standing.
[51]
The subsequent expulsions and dismissals constitute in my view a
significant change in circumstances and one that has to be
taken into
account together with the findings of Modiba, J.
[52]
Turning now to the requirements for an interim interdict. As far as
the applicant's prospects of success is concerned, nothing
has
changed and the finding of Modiba, J that the respondents have
prospects of success remains. More in particular, the finding
that
the resolutions taken on 14 February 2016 are
prima
facie
fraudulent also remain extant. As far as the balance of
convenience is concerned, I am not persuaded that the examples of
circumstances
that have, according to the applicants, materially
changed, are supportive of the applicants' case: Briefly, the union
can operate
its bank account albeit by giving instructions to the
bank. Moreover, as already indicated, the union has been aware of
this fact
as far back as April 2016. In respect of the need to call a
National Congress, I am likewise of the view that in light of the
union's
history of inaction in calling a National Congress, there is
no pressing need for an NEC meeting.
[53]
In conclusion, the fact that all the respondents (except for one)
have since the order of Modiba, J either been dismissed or
expelled,
has, in my view, only served to aggravate the potential prejudice to
the respondents and especially to those who represent
certain
regions. It is not only the potential prejudice to the respondents
that must be considered, it is also the potential prejudice
to the
regions and to the union that should be considered should decisions
and resolutions be taken on issues in which the regions
are entitled
to participate.
[54]
Unions are by their very nature democratic institutions and should
therefore be seen to act democratically and in the interest
of all
its members and not only in the interest of a selected few. By
excluding the respondents from participation in NEC meetings
by
virtue of their expulsion and/or dismissal, especially against the
background of resolutions that have been found to have
(prima
facie)
been taken fraudulently, is not in the broader interest of
the union and its members. The balance of convenience therefore
remain,
in my view, in favour of the respondents. I am therefore of
the view that there exists no persuasive reason to set aside the
order
of Modiba, J at this stage.
[55]
Lastly, I am not persuaded by the allegation that it is the
respondents that are delaying the enrolment of Part A. To the extent
that it is necessary, I have made it part of my order that the
parties jointly on an expedited basis approach the Deputy Judge
President for a preferential date.
[56]
In the event the following order is made:
1.
The application to set aside the order of this court dated 15 April
2016 interdicting the first applicant from convening a meeting
of its
National Executive Committee, is dismissed.
2.
The parties are directed to jointly approach the Deputy Judge
President on an expedited basis for a special allocation of the
hearing of Part A.
3.
The applicants are ordered to pay the costs of this application
jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved,
such costs to include the costs of two counsel.
AC
BASSON
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances:
For
the applicants
…......................
:
….....
Adv CE Watt-Pringle SC
…
.................................................................
Adv
HM Viljoen
Instructed
by
:
.........
.Cowan - Harper Attorneys
For
the respondents
…
:
….....
Adv.
MM
Antonie SC
…
..................................................................
Adv.
M V-J Chauke
Instructed by
..
:
…......
Mpoyana Ledwaba Inc.
[1]
Act 66 of 1995.
[2]
Page 1-2 of the Modiba, J judgment.
[3]
Ibid at page 6.
[4]
Ibid at page 14.
[5]
Ibid at page 15.
[6]
Juta & Co Ltd v Legal & Financial Publishing Co (Ply) Ltd
1969 (4) SA 443
{C) at 445A - B: "Relief
pendente
lite is a special remedy: it grants relief between the time of the
order and the final determination of the dispute between
the parties
in order to avoid undue prejudice while proceedings are pending."
Further at 445E - F: "There is such a
thing as the tyranny of
litigation, and a Court of law should not allow a party to drag out
proceedings unduly. In this case
we are considering an application
for an interdict pendente lite, which, from its very nature,
requires the maximum expedition
on the part of an applicant.
[7]
Clause 42 of the constitution.
[8]
Ibid
clause 44.1.
[9]
Section 51(1) of the constitution.