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[2016] ZAGPPHC 753
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Chemical, Energy, Paper,Printing, Wood And Allied Workers Union and Others v Seathlolo and Others (06046/2016) [2016] ZAGPPHC 753 (29 August 2016)
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
DATE:
29 AUGUST 2016
CASE
NO:
06046/2016
CHEMICAL,
ENERGY, PAPER, PRINTING,
WOOD
...............................................
First
Applicant
AND
ALLIED WORKERS’ UNION
SIMON
MOFOKENG
.................................................................................................
Second
Applicant
THAMSANQA
MHLONGO
.........................................................................................
Third
Applicant
And
SAMUAL
CHIEF
SEATHLOLO
................................................................................
First
Respondent
THULASIZWE
SIBANDE
......................................................................................
Second
Respondent
SCOTCH
MPONENG DIBETSO
N.O
.....................................................................
Third
Respondent
JOHANNES
DUBE
N.O
...........................................................................................
Fourth
Respondent
LAWRENCE
NZELE
N.O
..........................................................................................
Fifth
Respondent
SAMUEL
XABA
..........................................................................................................
Sixth
Respondent
JACKSON
MAKHUBELA
....................................................................................
Seventh
Respondent
CHARLES
MATULUDI
.............................................................................................
Eight
Respondent
PETJE
MASHEGOANE
............................................................................................
Ninth
Respondent
THERESA
PILUSA
....................................................................................................
Tenth
Respondent
LEMMY
MOKOENA
...........................................................................................
Eleventh
Respondent
MATHEWS
SOHOPU
.............................................................................................
Twelfth
Respondent
JUDGMENT
AC
BASSON, J
[1]
This application is for the setting aside
of an interim interdict granted by Modiba, J on 15 April 2016. The
application is brought
by the Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood
and Allied Workers’ Union (hereinafter referred to as “the
union”).
The second applicant is Mr Simon Mofokeng (the General
Secretary of the union - hereinafter referred to as “Mofokeng”).
Mofokeng is the deponent to the founding affidavit. The third
applicant is Mr Thamsanqa Mhlongo (the elected president of the union
- hereinafter referred to as “Mhlongo”). (Where
appropriate, I will refer to the three applicants collectively as
“the applicants”.)
[2]
The first respondent is Mr Seatlholo. He is
the union’s former General Secretary. The second respondent is
the union’s
former treasurer. The first respondent was
summarily dismissed on 21 April 2016. The second respondent was
expelled from the union
on 1 June 2016. Seatlholo’s dismissal
(according to Mofokeng) is a direct result of a resolution taken at
an NEC meeting
of the union on 14 January 2016 to institute
disciplinary action against Seathlolo and others. The third, fourth,
seventh, eight,
tenth, eleventh and twelfth respondents have also
been expelled from the union. The sixth respondent was suspended on 1
June 2016.
The ninth respondent was dismissed. Of the 12 respondents
only the fifth respondent therefore remains a member in good
standing.
[3]
In essence this application is for an order
to set aside the order made by Modiba, J (dated 15 April 2016)
interdicting the union
from convening a meeting of its National
Executive Committee (hereinafter referred to as “the NEC”)
pending the determination
of the relief sought in Part A of the main
application. The application is opposed.
[4]
The applicants are seeking to discharge the
order primarily on the basis that, as a result of material changes in
circumstances
that occurred subsequent to the granting of the order
on 15 April 2016, the balance of convenience no longer favours the
interim
interdict. As will be pointed out hereinbelow, it is the
respondents’ submission that this allegation is false and
without
any merit. With reference to the judgment of Modiba, J, the
respondents submitted that the interim order was granted on the
premise
that fraud was committed by Mofokeng at the time when the
resolutions were taken.
Interlocutory
applications
[5]
Before I turn to the merits of this
application, brief reference should be made to the four interlocutory
applications that also
served before the court. The first was an
application brought by 12 individuals to intervene as respondents in
the present urgent
application. Despite the fact that the papers in
that application were filed on 5 August 2016, they sought to
intervene and then
only thereafter be granted an opportunity to
oppose the urgent application. Effectively the applicants sought an
indulgence from
this court to file their answering papers only on 19
August 2016. This would have had the effect of delaying the present
urgent
application. No persuasive reason was advanced in the papers
as to why opposing papers could not have been filed timeously in the
present urgent application. I have considered the application and
dismissed the application to intervene with costs which costs
include
the costs of two counsel.
[6]
The three remaining applications dealt with
applications to discover. I do not intend dealing with them in
detail. Suffice to point
out that all three applications have been
granted and discovery of the documents have been made on the same
day.
[7]
I should also briefly mention that the
respondents sought to formally introduce the relief sought in Part A
as a counter-application
in this application. I have indicated to the
parties that I will not entertain Part A as part of this application
and that the
parties should approach the Deputy Judge President for a
special allocation of Part A. I have likewise refused to entertain
the
counter-applications filed by the various individual respondents
relating to their expulsions or dismissals. These applications
can be
set down in the normal course.
[8]
I do not intend dealing with the issue of
urgency in detail. Suffice to point out that I am of the view that
this application is
sufficiently urgent to be dealt with on the
urgent role.
Chronology
[9]
The present urgent application is preceded
by an acrimonious history of litigation between the parties. It is
not necessary to deal
with this history in detail but in order to
place the
interim
order granted by Modiba, J in context it is necessary to briefly
refer to the chronology that preceded this urgent application.
It is
also necessary to deal in some detail with the findings made by
Modiba, J in her judgment in so far as those findings are
relevant to
decide the question before this court.
[10]
The
Registrar of Labour Relations addressed a letter to Mofokeng in 2014
advising him of the fact that the union was not operating
as
envisaged in the Labour Relations Act (“the LRA”)
[1]
and that the union had failed to prepare audited financial statements
since 2009 and that the union had failed to comply with its
statutory
obligations under the LRA regarding the filing of audited financial
statements.
[11]
On 9 October 2015 Van Niekerk, J of the
Labour Court ordered the union,
inter
alia,
to submit its annual audited
financial statements to the Registrar of Labour Relations for the
years 2010 – 2013 and
to do so within 90 days of its
order failing which the registrar may approach the Labour Court
for an order placing the union
under administration.
[12]
On 14 January 2016 the union’s NEC
took a number of resolutions. These resolutions form the crux of the
dispute between the
parties (which dispute is not before this court).
In brief it is the respondents’ submission that Mofokeng and
Mhlongo fraudulently
created a number of fictitious resolutions after
the NEC meeting of the union. The respondents allege that Mofokeng
fraudulently
created fictitious resolutions in terms of which the NEC
purportedly (i) approved the draft audited financial statements of
the
union for the years 2010 – 2013; (ii) suspended some of the
respondents from attending NEC meetings and to institute disciplinary
proceedings against them; and (iii) allowed the NEC, and more
particularly Mofokeng, to take over complete control of unspecified
regions of the union.
[13]
On 19 January 2016 the respondents launched
the main application which is referred to as “Part A”. An
amended Notice
of Motion was filed on 24 February 2016 together with
a supplementary affidavit in respect of Part A. In Part A the
respondents
claim urgent relief suspending the implementation of the
disputed resolutions and interdicting certain meetings of the NEC. In
Part B the respondents seek declaratory relief directed at undoing
the resolutions taken by the NEC on 14 January 2016.
[14]
On 25 February 2016 Part A was struck from
the role for lack of urgency.
[15]
On 24 March 2016 Mofokeng sent out a notice
convening a special NEC meeting for 18 and 19 April 2016.
[16]
On 31 March 2016 the respondents served an
application for urgent interim relief.
[17]
On 11 April 2016 the respondents set down
Part A for hearing on 16 May 2016. Part A was therefore set down for
hearing prior to
the hearing of the urgent application by Modiba, J.
[18]
On 13 and 14 April 2016 the urgent
application was argued before Modiba, J. She delivered her judgment
on 15 April 2016.
[19]
The
respondents (the applicants in the urgent application before Modiba,
J) approached the court on an urgent basis to interdict
the NEC
meeting called by Mofokeng or “any other NEC meeting of the
first respondent [the union], pending the determination
of part A of
the main application set down for hearing on 16 May 2016”.
[2]
[20]
At the time 12 NEC members, including
regional representatives were disqualified from attending the
intended meeting. It was
submitted to Modiba, J that, had the
resolutions not been taken, they would have enjoyed a right not to
have the NEC meeting held
in their absence.
[21]
In
respect of urgency, Modiba, J was of the view that the respondents
may not be afforded substantial relief at a hearing in due
course in
light of the fact that, should the meeting be allowed to proceed in
the respondents’ absence, they will suffer
prejudice that
cannot be remedied by substantial relief at a hearing in due
course.
[3]
In coming to this
finding Modiba, J also took into account the fact that some of the
respondents, have been elected by the regions
of the union to
represent the respective regions in the NEC. She concluded that –
“
Prima
facie
the adoption of a resolution to
suspend the applicants taken under circumstances alleged by the
applicants is a violation of the
Constitution of the first respondent
[the union]. Therefore, their disqualification to attend NEC meetings
is also
prima facie
ultra vires
the first respondent’s Constitution.”
[22]
In
respect of irreparable harm Modiba, J held that, because the regions
are represented by some of the respondents, their interests
will not
be heard as a result of their disqualification. This, according to
Modiba, J, is not in the broad interest of the union
as required by
section 42(3) of the union’s constitution. Should resolutions
be taken under these circumstances, such resolutions
will not only
create irreparable harm to the respondents, but also to the regions
represented by some of the respondents.
[4]
[23]
In
respect of the balance of convenience the court took into account
that the NEC was not involved in the day to day functioning
of the
union and that the union was only required to meet three times a
year. In light of the fact that Part A was set down for
16 May 2016,
the Court concluded that -
[5]
“
The
balance of convenience strongly favours the [respondents]. I do not
see how delaying the holding of a NEC meeting for one month
[the
approximate period between the date of her judgment and 16 May 2016]
can cause more inconvenience to the [applicants] than
it will cause
to the [respondents], especially as the NEC is not involved in the
day to day functioning of the first [applicant].
In terms of the
first [applicant’s] Constitution, the NEC is required to meet
three time a year. In the intervening period
the first [applicant]
continues to function. In the month leading to the hearing of the
main application, if the interim interdict
is grated, the first
[applicant] will continue to function.”
[24]
On 16 May 2016 Part A was postponed
sine
die
by agreement between the parties.
There is a dispute as to who is responsible for the postponement as
both parties blame the other
for the postponement. According to the
respondents, although they agreed to the postponement, they did not
initiate the postponement.
[25]
On
24 May 2016 the applicants’ attorneys in a letter recorded that
it is imperative that Part B be set down without delay
and set out
the reasons as to why the applicants are of the view that it is no
longer apposite to prosecute Part A whilst failing
to prosecute Part
B. More in particular, the applicants contended that the respondents
have wilfully failed to prosecute Part B
for final relief and that
their dilatory approach to having Part A heard constitutes good
grounds on which to find that they (the
respondents) have now
forfeited their right to interim relief
pendente
lite
.
[6]
The respondents replied to this letter stating that the respondents
intend approaching the Deputy Judge President once they have
finalised their supplementary founding affidavit.
[26]
On 10 June 2016 the respondents filed a
further supplementary affidavit in respect of Part A. In this
affidavit it is alluded to
that an action is to be instituted.
[27]
On 14 July 2016 the applicants launched
this urgent application to have the
interim
order of Madiba, J set aside.
[28]
On 20 July 2016 the respondents made a
proposal in writing to the applicants that a joint approach to the
Deputy Judge President
be formulated for an expedited hearing of Part
A of the main application and that the joint approach should be made
by no later
than 27 July 2016. On 22 July 2016 the applicants
rejected the proposal. This, according to the respondents,
demonstrates the
mala fides
of the applicants and illustrates that the applicants do not wish
Part A to be heard.
[29]
On 10 August 2016 the combined summons in
the action referred to in the supplementary affidavit of 10 June 2016
in respect of Part
A is served on the union.
[30]
On 12 August 2016 the respondents gave
notice of their intention to amend the Notice of Motion in the main
application and afforded
the applicants 10 days to object to the
proposed amendment.
Interim
interdict
[31]
As already pointed out, the purpose of the
application for interim relief was to interdict a special meeting of
the union’s
NEC scheduled to be held on 18 and 19 April 2016 as
well as any further meetings of the NEC pending the determination of
Part A.
[32]
It is clear from the judgment of Modiba, J
that the fact that the hearing of Part A was merely a month away was
considered by her
as relevant in deciding the balance of convenience
at the time. More in particular, as already pointed out, Modiba, J
was of the
view that the union was able to function in the
intervening period in light of the fact that the hearing of Part A
was only a month
away.
[33]
On behalf of the applicants it was
submitted that the interim order should be reconsidered in light of
the material changes in the
circumstances which is primarily the fact
that Part A has not been heard and because Part A has not yet been
set down for hearing.
Moreover, it was submitted that the respondents
failed to prosecute their challenge to the NEC resolutions of 14
January in Part
B of the main application in a diligent and timeous
manner. It was that the respondents are now using the order of
Modiba, J to
render the union dysfunctional for an indeterminate
period of time and that it has now become vital to the union that NEC
meetings
be held. In summary therefore, apart from the fact that
circumstances have changed, preventing the union for an indeterminate
period
of time to hold meetings have now accordingly to the
applicants materially affected the balance of convenience as it was
before
Modiba, J and therefore, the basis on which urgent
relief was granted, are now materially different.
[34]
The respondents disputed that there was a
strategy to render the union dysfunctional and submitted that the
union was already dysfunctional
as a result of Mofokeng’s
refusal to comply with the union’s constitution and his
complicity in manufacturing fraudulent
resolutions.
NEC
meetings
[35]
It
is accepted that the union’s constitution entrusts the union’s
national executive functions to the NEC.
[7]
The constitution further requires the NEC to meet three times a
year.
[8]
From the papers it is
clear the NEC has only met once this year having been interdicted to
meet pending the outcome of Part A.
I have already referred to the
applicants ‘submission that, as a result of the
interim
order and in light of the fact that Part A has not been enrolled, the
union has now effectively been paralyzed from holding any
NEC
meetings: Had Part A been heard on 16 May 2016, the order of Modiba,
J would have been discharged and the present application
would not
have been necessary.
[36]
In support of the submission that it is
vital for the union that an NEC meeting be called, the union referred
to the following consequences
flowing from an inability to hold NEC
meetings: Firstly, the union is unable to use its Nedbank internet
banking facilities; secondly,
the union is unable to comply with its
obligations as per the Labour Court order and thirdly, an NEC meeting
is necessary in order
to call for a National Congress.
Bank
account
[37]
It was submitted on behalf of the union
that by not being able to hold an NEC meeting, the union is
effectively hamstrung from operating
the union’s internet
banking facilities with Nedbank. In this regard it is common cause
that the employees who are authorised
to operate the internet banking
facilities have been suspended. These suspended employees are not
only in possession of the Nedbank
devises that enable them to operate
the internet banking facilities, they are the only individuals that
have been authorised to
operate the internet banking facilities. As a
result of their suspension and their refusal to hand over the Nedbank
devices, the
union is unable to transact on the internet. The union
has been advised by Nedbank to remove the employees who are on record
at
Nedbank as the authorised users of the Nedbank devises and to
replace them with new authorised users. This the union can only do
pursuant to the adoption of an NEC resolution. Because the union is
interdicted from holding NEC meetings pending the outcome of
Part A,
they are unable to hold an NEC meeting.
[38]
The respondents dispute the applicants’
contentions in respect of the bank account and submitted that there
is no need to
pass a resolution to nominate new internet banking
administrators. Furthermore, the respondents dispute that the issue
of access
to internet banking renders this application urgent in
light of the fact that the applicants have been aware of this issue
as far
back as April 2016. In this regard the court was referred to
the fact that the union in an email to Nedbank stated that salaries,
rentals and other payments to service providers were not paid since
April 2016. Despite having been advised by Nedbank on more
than one
occasion – the last time on 31 May 2016 - the applicants have
made no attempt as a matter of urgency to approach
the court.
Furthermore, although two of the employees authorised to make
electronic transfers have been suspended, both of them
remain willing
and have in fact tendered their services to make the electronic
transfers upon receipt of instructions to do so.
Mofokeng, however,
states that he no longer trust the employees. Lastly, the respondents
submitted that the union can in any event
transact by giving
instructions to Nedbank to do the necessary payments.
[39]
With reference to the respondents’
replying affidavit in the main application it was further submitted
on behalf of the respondents
that, in any event, for the most part of
Mofokeng’s tenure, he has failed to schedule meetings as
required by the constitution
and more in particular, he has failed to
schedule at least three effective NEC meetings annually as required
by section 44(1) of
the constitution.
Compliance
with the Labour Court order
[40]
I have already referred to the order of the
Labour Court dated 9 October 2015 in terms of which the union was
ordered to submit
its annual audited financial statements to the
Registrar failing which the Registrar is granted leave to approach
the Labour Court
for an order placing the union under administration.
According to the applicants they are unable to comply with this
obligation
without a meeting of the NEC.
[41]
In respect of the submission that an NEC
meeting must be called in order to ensure that it complies with its
obligations in terms
of the LRA and to approve the financial and
auditing reports it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that,
in light of the
common cause fact that the financial statements have
already been approved and have been submitted to the Registrar (in
compliance
with the order of the Labour Court), there is no need to
call an NEC meeting for this purpose.
National
Congress
[42]
In
respect of the submission that an NEC meeting must be called as this
is the only entity that can determine the place and date
of the next
National Congress,
[9]
it was
submitted on behalf of the respondents that it is common cause that
no steps have been taken by Mofokeng to call a National
Congress. In
this regard reference was made to the fact that that a National
Congress should have been called two years ago but
that no steps have
been taken to do so. The court was also referred to the fact that
Mofokeng offers no explanation in the papers
as to why a National
Congress was not convened in September 2014 or any date subsequent
thereto.
Non-prosecution
of Part A and Part B
[43]
The respondents disputed that it failed to
prosecute the hearing of part A and furthermore disputed that
circumstances have changed
significantly to the extent that the
balance of convenience no longer favours them.
[44]
In respect of the postponement of the
hearing of part A, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that
the hearing was postponed
at the instance of the applicants. If the
hearing had not been postponed, the need for this urgent application
would not have been
necessary. It was further submitted that, when
the hearing of part A was postponed, the applicants were fully aware
of the fact
that the
interim
interdict would remain operative for a significant period of time.
Moreover, if the union was of the view that the respondents
were
delaying the enrolment of Part A, nothing prevented them from
approaching the Deputy Judge President for directions relating
to the
management of the matter.
Merits
[45]
Although reference in some detail have been
made to the events that culminated in this urgent application, only
the events
after
the granting of the order by Modiba, J on 15 April 2016 and
especially after 16 May 2016, are important in considering the
question
whether circumstances have changed significantly as alleged
by the applicants to the extent that the balance of convenience no
longer favours the respondents. The applicants, as already pointed
out, contended that the changed circumstances shifted the balance
of
convenience in their favour and that the order of Modiba, J should
therefore be set aside.
[46]
At the outset I should point out that,
although the balance of convenience is an important consideration in
this application, it
is but one of the factors that has to be taken
into account in considering whether to set aside the order of Modiba,
J.
[47]
I have already referred to the judgment of
Modiba, J in some detail. For purposes of evaluating the merits of
this application the
following three damning findings by Modiba, J
remain, in my view important: Firstly, the applicants are likely to
succeed in establishing
that their version is more probable. More in
particular, her finding that the resolutions of 14 January 2016 are,
prima facie
,
fraudulent remain extant. Secondly, the adoption of the resolutions
to suspend the respondents are
prima
facie
ultra
vires
in terms of the union’s
constitution. Thirdly, the resolutions had the potential to
perpetuate an environment of abuse of
power and poor governance. In
this regard I have already referred to the fact that Modiba, J has
placed great emphasis on the fact
that some of the 12 NEC members who
were suspended at the time of the hearing of the urgent application
are the elected representatives
of certain regions and excluding them
from an NEC meeting would not be in the broad interests of the union.
[48]
These findings of Modiba, J stand and they
remain relevant. The court cannot overlook the fact that a
prima
facie
case has been made out before
Modiba, J that the resolutions taken on 14 January 2016 were
fraudulent. The court also cannot ignore
the fact that it was not (at
the time) in the interest of the union to allow meetings to take
place in circumstances where the
representatives of some regions have
been suspended and therefore disqualified from attending such
meetings.
[49]
It is common cause that the NEC consists of
48 members. Also common cause is the fact that 25 NEC members form
part of the so-called
“dissenting faction”. The 12
applicants before the court in this application are part of the
so-called “dissenting
faction”. At the time of the
hearing before Modiba, J 12 NEC members including regional
representatives were disqualified
from attending meetings pursuant to
a resolution taken under circumstances that are not in the broad
interest of the union.
[50]
Since the hearing before Modiba, J nine of
the respondents before this court have either been dismissed or
expelled. Only the fifth
respondent appears to remain to be a member
in good standing. Therefore, of the 12 applicants only one applicant
remains a member
in good standing.
[51]
The subsequent expulsions and dismissals
constitute in my view a significant change in circumstances and one
that has to be taken
into account together with the findings of
Modiba, J.
[52]
Turning now to the requirements for an
interim interdict. As far as the applicant’s prospects of
success is concerned, nothing
has changed and the finding of Modiba,
J that the respondents have prospects of success remains. More in
particular, the finding
that the resolutions taken on 14 February
2016 are
prima facie
fraudulent also remain extant. As far as the balance of convenience
is concerned, I am not persuaded that the examples of circumstances
that have, according to the applicants, materially changed, are
supportive of the applicants’ case: Briefly, the union can
operate its bank account albeit by giving instructions to the bank.
Moreover, as already indicated, the union has been aware of
this fact
as far back as April 2016. In respect of the need to call a National
Congress, I am likewise of the view that in light
of the union’s
history of inaction in calling a National Congress, there is no
pressing need for an NEC meeting.
[53]
In conclusion, the fact that all the
respondents (except for one) have since the order of Modiba, J either
been dismissed or expelled,
has, in my view, only served to aggravate
the potential prejudice to the respondents and especially to those
who represent certain
regions. It is not only the potential prejudice
to the respondents that must be considered, it is also the potential
prejudice
to the regions and to the union that should be considered
should decisions and resolutions be taken on issues in which the
regions
are entitled to participate.
[54]
Unions are by their very nature democratic
institutions and should therefore be seen to act democratically and
in the interest of
all its members and not only in the interest of a
selected few. By excluding the respondents from participation in NEC
meetings
by virtue of their expulsion and/or dismissal, especially
against the background of resolutions that have been found to have
(
prima facie
)
been taken fraudulently, is not in the broader interest of the union
and its members. The balance of convenience therefore remain,
in my
view, in favour of the respondents. I am therefore of the view that
there exists no persuasive reason to set aside the order
of Modiba, J
at this stage.
[55]
Lastly, I am not persuaded by the
allegation that it is the respondents that are delaying the enrolment
of Part A. To the extent
that it is necessary, I have made it part of
my order that the parties jointly on an expedited basis approach the
Deputy Judge
President for a preferential date.
[56]
In the event the following order is made:
1.
The application to set aside the order of
this court dated 15 April 2016 interdicting the first applicant from
convening a meeting
of its National Executive Committee, is
dismissed.
2.
The parties are directed to jointly
approach the Deputy Judge President on an expedited basis for a
special allocation of the hearing
of Part A.
3.
The applicants are ordered to pay the costs
of this application jointly and severally, the one paying the other
to be absolved,
such costs to include the costs of two counsel.
AC
BASSON
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances:
For
the applicants : Adv CE Watt-Pringle SC
Adv
HM Viljoen
Instructed
by : Cowan – Harper Attorneys
For
the respondents: Adv. MM Antonie SC
Adv.
M V-J Chauke
Instructed
by : Mpoyana Ledwaba Inc.
[1]
Act
66 of 1995.
[2]
Page
1-2 of the Modiba, J judgment.
[3]
Ibid
at page 6.
[4]
Ibid
at page 14.
[5]
Ibid
at page 15.
[6]
Juta
& Co Ltd v Legal & Financial Publishing Co (Pty) Ltd
1969 (4) SA 443
(C) at 445A – B: ”
Relief
pendente
lite
is a special remedy: it grants relief between the time of the
order and the final determination of the dispute between
the parties
in order to avoid undue prejudice while proceedings are pending
.”
Further at 445E – F: “
There
is such a thing as the tyranny of litigation, and a Court of law
should not allow a party to drag out proceedings unduly.
In this
case we are considering an application for an interdict
pendente
lite
,
which, from its very nature, requires the maximum expedition on
the part of an applicant.
[7]
Clause
42 of the constitution.
[8]
Ibid
clause 44.1.
[9]
Section
51(1) of the constitution.