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[2016] ZAGPPHC 761
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Boshoff N.O v Carenet Properties (Pty) Ltd (57562/13) [2016] ZAGPPHC 761 (26 August 2016)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE GAUTENG DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT, PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 57562/13
DATE:
26 AUGUST 2016
In
the matter between:
GUDRUN
HANS BOSHOFF
N.O
..............................................................................................
Plaintiff
And
CARENET
PROPERTIES (PTY)
LTD
.................................................................................
Defendant
JUDGMENT
J
W LOUW. J
[1]
The plaintiff is the executor in the estate of the late Hendrina
Margrietha Hall ("the deceased"). On 9 September
2010, the
deceased and the defendant concluded a written agreement in terms
whereof the deceased acquired the right to occupy (described
in the
agreement as a
"lewensreg")
Unit no. 4 in the De Groenkloof retirement complex, against the
advance of a loan by the deceased to the defendant in the amount
of
R360 000.00. The date of occupation is stated in the agreement to be
"so
gou moontlik nie later as
16-9-2010".
The deceased passed away on 30 November 2011.
[2]
The plaintiff claims repayment of the loan from the defendant in
terms of the provisions of the agreement referred to below.
The
deceased is referred to in the agreement as
"die
Okkupeerder"
and the defendant as ’We
Eienaar"
The relevant provisions are the following:
"
11.18
Ontbinding: Ontbinding van die werking van hierdie ooreenkoms
onderworpe aan die verkoop en transport van die Okkupeerder
se
bestaande woning te 4 Marinet Berarivier. Kempton Park voor of op 9
November 2010
.
(The
underlined words were inserted in manuscript in the spaces provided
for in the agreement.)
2.5
Die Lewensreg van die Okkupeerder word outomaties beeindig by sy
afsterwe met die voorbehoud
f
dat waar twee persone die Eiendom okkupeer in terme van die kontrak,
die Lewensreg siegs beeindig saf word by die afsterwe van
die
langslewende, sowel as in die gevai van die kanseliasie of beeindig
(sic)
van
die ooreenkoms as gevoig van die Okkupeerders se kontrakbreuk of op
'n ander skriftelike wyse soos hierin gestipuleer.
10.1
Die
Eienaar onderneem om die bed rag betaalbaar ten opsigte van die
Leningsbedrag aan die Okkupeerder of sy boedei terug te betaai
ten
(sic)
nie
iater nie as 30 (dertig) dae vanaf die datum dat hy die eenheid
ontruim het na datum van beeindiging of kanseiiasie, maar spesifiek
onderworpe daaraan dat 'n nuwe lewensregooreenkoms aireeds met
7?
nuwe
Okkupeerder vir die eenheid gesluit is as teenprestasie vir 'n nuwe
iening vasgestei deur die Eienaar, en dat die voile bed
rag van
sodanige nuwe iening aireeds deur die Eienaar ontvang is.
10.2
Nieteenstaande
enige iets tot die teendeel in hierdie ooreenkoms vervat, kom die
partye ooreen dat sou die datum van beeindiging
binne 2 (twee) jaar
vanaf die datum van hierdie ooreenkoms wees, slegs 93% (drie en
negentig present) van die kapitale bedrag van
die Iening aan die
Okkupeerder terugetaal sal word en die balans van 7% (,sewe persent)
deur die Eienaar behou sal word en aangewend
sal word om aanvanklike
koste te dek. Die bepaiing in hierdie klousule sal nie van toepassing
wees ingeval van kanseiiasie weens
kontrakbreuk deur die Eienaar nie.
15.
ONTBINDING
15.1
Die
bepalings van hierdie klousule in sy geheel is slegs van toepassing
indien en tot die mate dat die bepalings van Ontbinding
na verwys in
1.18 hierbo, volgens die voorsiening daarvan voliedig voitooi is.
15.2
Die
partye bevestig dat indien kfousule 1.18 hierbo van toepassing is,
die Leningsbedrag deur die Okkupeerder gefinansier sai word
uit die
opbrengs van die verkoop van sy bestaande woning. Hierdie ooreenkoms
is gevolglik ontbindend onderworpe aan die verkoop
en transport van
die Okkupeerder se bestaande woning voor of op die datum na verwys in
die Ontbinding hierbo.
15.3
Hierdie
voorwaarde word gestipuleer ten gunste van die Okkupeerder wat
geregtig sai wees om, voigens die uitsfuitiike diskresie
van die
Okkupeerder; onvoorwaardeiik skrifteiik daarvan afstand te doen.
Indien onvoorwaardelike skrifteiike bevestiging deur die
Okkupeerder
dat die Okkupeerder se woning verkoop en getransporteer is of dat die
Okkupeerder afstand doen van hierdie reg tot
Ontbinding, nie deur die
Eienaar ontvang word voor of op die datum na verwys in die bepa lings
van Ontbinding in kiousuie 1.18
hierbo nie, sai enige een van die
partye geregtig wees om hierdie ooreenkoms te ontbind en te
kanseiieer by wyse van 14 (VEERTIEN)
dae vooraf skrifteiike
kennisgewing per aangetekende pos tot daardie effek aan die ander
party.
15.4
In die
geval van kansellasie van hlerdle ooreenkoms in terme van hierdie
ontbindende voorwaarde, sal die Eienaar verplig
wees
om alle
kapitale betalings wat dan reeds van die Okkupeerder ontvang is op
die Trustrekening, binne 14 (VEERTIEN) dae vanaf datum
van
skriftelike aanvraag daarvan deur die Okkupeerder
,
na
Ontbinding aan die Okkupeerder terugbetaal word en benewens soos
voormefd, sal geeneen van die partye enige verdere eise hoegenaamd
teen die ander he voortspruitend uit hierdie ooreenkoms of
kansellasie daarvan nie."
[3]
The parties have agreed that the matter
be adjudicated on the basis of a stated case which reads as follows:
"7fte
parties
being ad idem:
1.
That
registration of transfer of the property referred to in clause 1.18
of the agreement between the Defendant and the deceased,
as contained
in annexure "B' to the particulars of claim ("the
agreement"), did not pass from the deceased to a
purchaser on or
before 9 November 2010.
2.
That
the deceased had not notified the Defendant in writing that she
waives the resolutive condition in terms of clause 15.3 of
the
agreement.
3.
That
the defendant received the Plaintiff's notices of termination and
demand as contained in annexure "C" and "D"
of
the particulars of claim.
4.
That
the Defendant, prior to the passing of the deceased, had alienated
its rights to conclude a new agreement with a third party
to award a
life right in respect of unit 4 De Groenkloof after the said unit
becomes vacant.
5.
That
the deceased passed away on 30 November 2011.
6.
The
deceased advanced the loan amount of R360 000,00 in cash for the life
right to the unit and occupied the unit in terms of such
life right
which automatically terminated upon her death.
7.
That
the unit, as part of the property, was transferred to Par Excellence
finance in terms of an agreement between the Defendant
and Par
Excellence Finance and which transfer is evidenced by a printout of
the relevant electronic records of the Registrar of
Deeds, attached
hereto as annexure "A". For purposes of this Stated Case it
is assumed that neither the Defendant nor
Par Excellence Financing
concluded an agreement with a third party in respect of the life
right registered over the unit.
8.
For
purposes hereof it is assumed that the title deed of the property
has, and currently continues to be endorsed in terms of Section
4C(3)
of Act 65 of 1988, the statutory encumberment of the life right
thereon having been transferred together with ownership of
the
property.
NOW
THEREFORE the parties agree that the following be adjudicated as a
stated
case:
1.
Whether
the provisions of clause 1.18, read with clause 15 of the agreement,
are applicable.
2.
Whether
the resolutive condition was fulfilled as a result of registration of
transfer of the property referred to in clause 1.18
not having been
effected in name of a purchaser thereof on or before 9 November 2010.
3.
If the
resolutive condition referred to in paragraph 2 supra is found not to
have been fulfilled, whether the Plaintiff is entitled
to its
alternative claim on the basis that there was fictional fulfillment
of the provision as contained in clause 10.1 of the
contract, as a
result of the Defendant, prior to the passing of the deceased, having
alienated its right to conclude a new agreement
with a third party
for a right of occupation of the property."
[4]
The first question to be decided is therefore whether the provisions
of clause 1.18 read with clause 15 of the agreement are
applicable.
It is common cause that the deceased's property ("
Marinet
")
was not transferred on or before 9 November 2010 and that the
deceased did not waive her rights in terms of clause 1.18.
It is also
common cause that the plaintiff, on 5 June 2013, gave fourteen days'
notice of his intention to terminate the agreement
and that he gave
notice of cancellation of the agreement on 30 September 2013 and
claimed repayment of the loan within 15 days
after delivery of the
demand.
[5] It
was pleaded, and argued, on behalf of the defendant that the
dissolution of the agreement was conditional on the sale and
transfer
of Marinet on or before 9 November 2010. Therefore, so it was argued,
the agreement continued to exist until the death
of the deceased
because Marinet was not sold and transferred before 9 November 2010.
It was further argued that, in terms of clause
10.1 of the agreement,
the amount of the loan is not yet repayable because a new agreement
with a new occupier of the unit has
not yet been concluded in
consideration of a new loan to the defendant.
[6] It
is clear from paragraph 2 of the issues which the parties agreed in
the stated case to be adjudicated, that both parties
regard clause
1.18 as a resolutive condition. It was submitted on behalf of the
defendant that a resolutive condition is a condition
which, if
fulfilled, would have the effect of terminating the agreement. The
agreement would therefore remain in full force and
effect unless a
certain event happens. Only then will the agreement terminate. It was
therefore argued that the agreement was not
dissolved because the
unit was not sold and transferred on or before 9 November 2010.
[7]
This argument confuses a positive resolutive condition with a
negative resolutive condition. A positive condition is fulfilled
when
an uncertain future event actually takes place. A negative condition
is fulfilled if it becomes certain that the event will
not happen or
did not happen by a specified time. Although not eleganly worded,
clause 1,18 can only, in the context of the agreement,
be interpreted
as a negative resolutive condition, i.e. that the agreement will
dissolve if the unit was not sold on or before
9 November 2010. This
is clearly what was intended if regard is had to the wording of
clauses 15.1 and 15.2. In terms of clause
15.2, it was contemplated
that the amount of the loan would be financed from the proceeds of
the sale of Marinet. If non-fulfillment
of clause 1.18 by the
stipulated date would have the result of the agreement continuing to
exist, as contended for by the defendant,
the deceased would have
been bound to advance the loan to the defendant despite her not
receiving the proceeds of the sale of the
Marinet.
[8] In
terms of clause 15.3, the resolutive condition was stipulated for the
benefit of the deceased and she was entitled to waive
it in writing.
The clause further provides that either party was entitled to cancel
the agreement with 14 days' notice if the defendant
does not before
the stipulated date receive notice that the unit has been sold and
transferred, or that the deceased has waived
the right to terminate.
On the defendant's interpretation, the deceased would have been
entitled to terminate the agreement after
giving the defendant notice
before 9 November 2010 that Marinet had been sold and transferred.
That would not have made any commercial
sense. There would have been
no need to have such a condition inserted into the agreement for the
benefit of the deceased. It would
have served no purpose. The purpose
of clause 1.18 was to give her the right to cancel the agreement if
she did not receive the
proceeds of the sale of Marinet with which
she could have financed the loan.
[9]
For the above reasons, I find that the resolutive condition contained
in clause 1.18 was fulfilled when Marinet was not sold
and
transferred on or before 9 November 2010 and that the agreement was
thereafter properly cancelled by the plaintiff. It follows
that the
defendant is obliged to repay the amount of the loan to the
plaintiff.
[10]
In view of this finding, it is unnecessary to consider the
plaintiff's alternative cause of action.
[11]
An order is accordingly granted against the defendant for:
[a]
Payment of the amount of R360 000.00;
[b]Payment of
interest on the said amount at the rate of 15,5% per annum a
tempore
morae;
[c]
Payment of the costs of the action.
Counsel
for Plaintiff: Adv. N Breytenbach.
Instructed
by: Froneman-Roux & Streicher Attorneys, Centurion.
Counsel
for defendant: Adv C J Welgemoed.
Instructed
by: Carrim Attorneys, Pretoria.