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[2021] ZASCA 152
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R H Christie Incorporated v Taxing Master - Supreme Court of Appeal (1086/2018) [2021] ZASCA 152 (27 October 2021)
THE SUPREME COURT OF
APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Case
no: 1086/2018
In
the Rule 17 Review of Taxation between:
R H CHRISTIE
INCORPORATED APPLICANT
and
TAXING MASTER –
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL FIRST
RESPONDENT
MONTANARI: CHARMAINE
HELEN SECOND
RESPONDENT
In
re:
MONTANARI: CHARMAINE
HELEN APPELLANT
and
MONTANARI: EMILIO PIETRO
VALFREDO RESPONDENT
Neutral
citation:
R H Christie Incorporated v Taxing Master
– Supreme Court of
Appeal
(1086/2018)
[2021]
ZASCA 152
(27 October 2021)
Coram:
NAVSA
ADP
ORDER
1 The
review is successful only to the extent reflected in paragraphs 59 to
62 of this
judgment.
2 There
is no order as to costs.
3 The
allocator is remitted to the taxing master to be redrawn on the basis
set out in this judgment.
JUDGMENT
NAVSA
ADP
[1] This
is a review of taxation referred for decision in terms of the Rules
of this Court. The bill of costs in
question was in respect of an
appeal related to divorce proceedings and involved the circumscribed
novel question of whether the
value of the second respondent’s
spouse’s Living Annuities was to be included in an accrual
calculation. The fee relationship
between the applicant, R H Christie
Incorporated, and the second respondent was between attorney and own
client and the taxing
master was required to tax it as such.
[2] The
appeal process included seeking leave to appeal in the Gauteng
Division of the High Court, Johannesburg
and then an appeal before
the full court of that division, and finally an appeal, following on
a petition, in this Court. Z F Joubert
SC was instructed to
represent, as counsel, the second respondent in the appeal in this
Court. The mandate to do so was given on
16 December 2016 at a
meeting involving a Director, an Associate, and counsel. The latter
flew from Cape Town to O.R Tambo International
Airport for the
meeting, which took place at Edenvale. Counsel was retained until
finalisation of the argument before this Court
on 7 November 2019.
[3] It
is uncontested that at the meeting aforesaid an hourly rate of R3 600
for counsel was agreed (excluding
VAT). Senior counsel was only
involved in the appeal in this Court and not in prior proceedings.
The divorce proceedings are pending
in the trial court. It appears
that the only issue on appeal was the one identified in paragraph 1
above.
[4] The
taxing master taxed off a significant amount from counsel’s
invoices. He disallowed and taxed off
disbursements related to
travelling and flight costs incurred by the applicant in the
prosecution of the appeal. Furthermore, the
taxing master taxed off
items connected to a condonation application. Lastly, the taxing
master disallowed a list of general items
which included
communications between the applicant and counsel, between applicant
and correspondent attorneys, perusal of documentation,
communication
between applicant and opposing legal representatives, and
attendances. I shall, in due course deal with each of the
items in
question. The matters set out in this paragraph are the subject of
the review. Most of what appears immediately hereafter
is taken from
the stated case.
Counsel’s fees
[5] In
respect of counsel’s fees, item 145 in an amount of R86 857.20
was reduced by taxing off R56 842.20,
on the basis that counsel had
been allowed the full R39 330 for preparing the heads of argument on
item 130, and an additional
10 hours to attend to 18 pages of heads
of argument and 3 hours on a practice note. Items 299 and 300 for an
amount of R11 385
was disallowed. In relation to item 403 an invoice
in an amount of R173 134.80 was reduced by R48 934.80, which was for
20 hours
work and a day’s fee. The taxing master accepted that
counsel’s rate was agreed with the second respondent but
insisted
that what was disallowed was fair.
Travelling costs
[6] In
relation to travelling costs under item 138, which involved flying a
candidate attorney to Bloemfontein
to ensure filing of papers, the
taxing master disallowed them on the basis that the disbursement for
a flight to Bloemfontein was
not ‘substantiated’. The
taxing master took the view that the documents that were flown down
by someone from the applicant’s
offices, ought rather to have
been sent down by courier for attention by correspondent attorneys.
The same pertains to item 195,
which was for travelling costs to
Bloemfontein to file heads of argument. In respect of item 404, the
taxing master stated as follows:
‘
The flight fee of
R53 and the disbursement of R6757.84 was disallowed as there was no
need for counsel to fly to Bloemfontein because
it was not the day of
the hearing and this is not the cheapest way of litigation. The
flight was on 4 November while the hearing
was on 7 November.’
Item
421, which comprised motor vehicle travelling costs to Bloemfontein
at the rate of R14.22 per km, was disallowed because ‘no
proof
[was] furnished’. The total claimed was R12 027.28, which is
more than twice the return cost of travelling by aeroplane.
This was
reduced by allowing only R4.50 per km. The item was thus reduced by
R8 221.18.
Condonation application
[7] The
disallowed items in relation to the late filing of the appeal record,
were items 151 to 164 and items 171
to 176, which relate to
confirmatory affidavits connected with the condonation application.
The taxing master recorded that this
was disallowed on the basis that
the application for condonation was necessary because of a systems
failure at the applicant’s
offices. It involved data losses and
data breaches. He noted that the record was required to be filed by
the Applicant by 19 March
2019, and that work on this commenced on 17
January 2019, and that only one volume was filed timeously and that
the remaining two
volumes were filed late, for which the second
respondent was not responsible and in respect of which she ought not
to be liable.
[8] Items
177 and 178, in respect of copying and arranging and perusing the
record of appeal – eight hours
were allowed for a candidate
attorney instead of the fee for an attorney and the cost of 10
copies, instead of 11, was allowed
and R423.50 was taxed off.
General
Items
[9] Many
items were disallowed which bore on the condonation application,
namely, items 221-232, 234 – 242,
264-268, 270-273, 275-277,
and items 141 and 142.
[10] Items
4 and 5 were considered a duplication of item 13 – in relation
to a letter to counsel. On Item
10, the fee allowed for instructions
from client was reduced from R789 to R520.
[11] Item
25 was for a letter to the correspondent attorney. It was considered
by the taxing master to be a duplication
of item 24 and adjudged to
be a case of over-caution.
[12] Item
35 for perusing lodgement letter (57 pages) was reduced to allowing
only the letter and the filing page,
which the taxing master deemed
was all that was required.
[13] Items
49, 50, 51 and 52 comprised; a letter to counsel advising that the
petition to the SCA had been lodged
timeously; a further email to
counsel the same day and two letters on separate occasions on the
same day to the correspondent.
Amounts were taxed off as unnecessary
piecemeal instructions.
[14] In
respect of items 65 and 66, the taxing master adopted the attitude
that item 65 was for the applicant writing
to counsel stating that no
further affidavit to an answering affidavit was required, only to be
followed a week later by the applicant
drawing a replying affidavit,
rendering the prior communication as unnecessary and wasteful.
[15] In
relation to items 103 and 104, which were in relation to two letters
to the second respondent on the same
day for communications with the
second respondent ‘attaching Court Order’. These were
disallowed by taxing master on
the basis that they were a duplication
of items 95 and 96. The latter items were in respect of
communications with the second respondent
attaching the court order.
[16] The
taxing master had regard to items 108 and 109, which were for letters
to counsel on the same day, the
first of which attached indices to
the record for his attention. He disallowed these disbursements on
the basis that the complete
record had already been sent to counsel
under item 131.
[17] Under
item 116, which was for copies, the taxing master disallowed costs
relating to an 11th copy which he
considered unnecessary. The taxing
master took the view that item 117 was in connection with a core
bundle which was not proceeded
with and disallowed it. The claim was
described as ‘Attendance to receive letter from Schindler’s
with attachments
to be included in the Proposed Core Bundle’.
Items 121 and 122 were disallowed on the same basis. Item 121 read as
follows:
‘
Letter to Counsel
advising that the Respondent’s attorneys wish to include
Certain documentation in the proposed core bundle’.
[18] Items
135, 136 and 137 were in connection with precedents of heads of
argument, as examples for counsel to
follow. The taxing master
questioned why counsel, who is the expert, required these. The items
were all disallowed.
[19] Item
205 was for perusal of lodged heads of argument, list of authorities,
practice note, condonation application,
court stamp and signature,
for which an amount of R7 685 was claimed. The taxing master took the
view that when Bloemfontein correspondents
send proof of service,
they only send the necessary pages which were stamped and signed by
the court. There was thus no need to
send all the items said to be
perused.
[20] In
respect of items 209 and 210, which were for perusing a courier’s
invoice and attending to pay for
it, the taxing master ruled that
there was no need to courier to counsel the heads he had already
drafted.
[21] Items
211 and 212 involved the sending of heads of argument to the second
respondent. These were considered
by the taxing master to be
duplications of items 206 and 207.
[22] Items
280 and 281 bore on communications with counsel, advising that a date
for hearing had not been allocated.
That, according to the taxing
master, had been catered for by item 287, which was a communication
with counsel advising of a date
for hearing.
[23] Items
299 and 300 were already dealt with under counsel’s fees above.
In relation to items 306, 307,
410 to 416 the taxing master insisted
that they were not explained or substantiated.
[24] In
respect of item 422, for attendance at court for 5 hours, the taxing
master indicated that he only allowed
3 hours, which was the actual
duration of proceedings in court.
[25] The
taxing master listed items 460, 461, 462, 463, 463(2), 464, 467,468,
469,470, 471 and 472 as being unjustified
as they related to a time
after applicant’s mandate had been terminated.
The applicant’s
contentions
[26] The
applicant began by accusing the taxing master of failing to
appreciate that he was required to tax the
bill presented on an
attorney and own client scale, and that he had mistakenly dealt with
it on the attorney and client scale.
The applicant insisted that the
taxing master had erred by concluding that it had treated the second
respondent improperly and
unfairly.
[27] The
applicant was adamant that the appeal involved ‘various
complexities and was novel in nature. .
.’, more particularly,
because of a ‘prior decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal . .
.’. The applicant pointed
out that ‘new law’ had
been made. It recorded its dismay at the ‘enormous reduction’
that ensued due to
the mistaken ‘conclusion’ that the
matter was not one of great complexity. It was stressed that the
second respondent
had obtained success due to the endeavours of
senior counsel. Reliance was placed on the second respondent’s
undertaking
to pay, on which the first respondent relied, and that he
would be required to make good the shortfall. This so, it was
contended,
was egregious conduct on the part of the second
respondent.
[28] The
applicant pointed out that no objections had in the past been raised
by the second respondent in relation
to fees, that fees had been paid
at intervals, and that on 19 November 2019, the second respondent had
undertaken to pay all amounts
due to counsel by the end of January
2020. This, the applicant contended, was an acknowledgement of
indebtedness and was a concession
that the fees charged were
reasonable. The second respondent subsequently terminated applicant’s
mandate.
[29] It
was contended on behalf of the applicant that the taxing master had
failed to consider that by virtue of
the fee agreement reached with
the second respondent, counsel and the applicant were entitled to a
full indemnity and thus erred
when he assessed reasonableness. The
applicant referred repeatedly to the complexity or extraordinary
nature of the appeal, which
resulted in the incurring of costs beyond
what was allowed by the taxing master. Furthermore, so the applicant
contended, the Cape
Bar had confirmed that the rate charged by senior
counsel was reasonable. The disallowance of the fees of counsel was
labelled
arbitrary and reviewable.
[30] In
relation to disallowing the disbursement involving the flight from
Cape Town to Bloemfontein in the amount
of R 6 757.84 (item 404), the
applicant pointed out that this was payment in advance for counsel to
have flown from Cape Town to
Bloemfontein and that he did so to
attend at the hearing of the matter and contended that the
disallowance of this amount was incomprehensible.
[31] In
connection with the disallowance of the flight costs for someone from
the applicant’s office to file
documents in Bloemfontein, under
items 138 and 195, the applicant contended that the record would not
have been filed timeously
if a courier had been used and that the
applicant had acted in the second respondent’s best interests.
[32] In
respect of the application for condonation, the applicant submitted
that it was necessary to protect the
second respondent’s
interest and that the applicant itself was not to blame for the
system’s failure at its office.
It was contended that at least
the costs of preparing and filing the bundles should be allowed.
[33] The
applicant pointed out that items 4 and 5 were not a duplication of
item 13. It explained that the communication
was to alert counsel to
the judgment handed down by the high court, which was attached for
counsel’s attention. This, they
stated, was separate from item
13, which was in relation to the notice of motion and founding
affidavit, which was sent to counsel
for settling and correction.
[34] In
relation to item 35, which it will be recalled was for perusal of 57
pages, the applicant contended that
it was necessary to ensure that
the correct documents were filed and that it was work performed by
the applicant for which it should
be entitled to remuneration.
[35] The
applicant responded to the taxing master denying items 49,50, 51 and
52, referred to in para 14, because
he considered it unnecessary
piecemeal communications, by stating that it shows the extent of the
work done on the second respondent’s
behalf.
[36] On
items 65 and 66, dealt with at para 15 above, where the taxing master
would not allow the costs of what
he considered unnecessary and
conflicting communications, for which the second respondent should
not be held liable, the applicant
submitted that the work that was
done was to protect the second respondent’s interests.
[37] In
respect of items 103 and 104, which the taxing master disallowed
because it was considered a duplication
of items 95 and 96, the
applicant contended that that they did not only concern the court
order but were an update regarding the
compilation of the record.
[38] There
was no retort to the taxing master’s reasons for disallowing
items 108 and 109, and 116, referred
to in paras 16 and 17 above.
[39] With
regard to items 117 and 118, which related to interaction with the
opposing attorneys, the applicant
pointed out that it was common
practice that all correspondence from opposing attorneys must be
perused and considered. The attachment
received from the opposing
side comprised 90 pages. The applicant insisted that these costs were
justified even if the concept
of a core bundle had been abandoned.
[40] There
was no response to the disallowance by the taxing master of items
135- 137, which were costs related
to providing counsel with
precedents of heads of argument.
[41] In
connection with item 205, which the taxing master largely disallowed
on the basis that the perusal ought
to have been limited to a perusal
of only the pages that were stamped for proof of service, the
applicant submitted that perusal
was necessary to ensure that the
correct documents were filed.
[42] In
relation to items 209 and 210, involving the perusal of a courier’s
invoice and attending to pay
for it, which were disallowed on the
basis that there was no need to courier to counsel a set of heads of
argument which he already
had, there was no specific response.
[43] In
relation to items 211 and 212, which were disallowed on the basis
that it was a duplication of items 209
and 210, there was no response
by the applicant.
[44] Regarding
items 280 and 281, advising counsel that a date for hearing had not
been allocated, which were disallowed
on the basis that counsel had
later been advised of a date of hearing and that costs had been
awarded under item 287, the applicant
contended that they were
distinguishable in that the latter item attached the notice of set
down.
[45] In
connection with items 306 and 307, disallowed on the basis that there
was no proof or substantiation, it
was submitted on behalf of the
applicant that that the courier’s invoice had been provided and
that it was in relation to
the appeal record being sent to counsel.
[46] Items
410-416 were disallowed on the basis that they had not been
substantiated and proved. It was contended
that these items pertained
to correspondence with the correspondent and opposing attorneys and
that they were clearly identified
as such in the bill. It was
submitted that had the taxing master required proof of the
correspondence he could have asked for it.
[47] In
relation to item 422, which was for time in court on the day of the
hearing and in relation to which the
taxing master allowed only three
hours, instead of five, the applicant indicated that the additional
two hours included waiting
time.
Second respondent’s
contentions
[48] It
was submitted on behalf of the second respondent that she found
herself in an impecunious position, which
the applicant was aware of,
and thus should have been more conscientious and diligent in relation
to incurring costs. She had made
payments to the applicant in respect
of high court proceedings, so it was said, with a layperson’s
understanding of her right
to challenge fees and disbursements. She
only became aware of this right after the applicant’s mandate
was terminated and
after she was so advised by her present legal
representatives, and consequently appointed a costs consultant for
advice.
[49] In
relation to the condonation application, the second respondent was
adamant that it was totally unreasonable
to lay those costs at her
door. She pointed out that the applicant had been ordered to file the
appeal record four months hence,
it was against these circumstances
that the raising of fees for the condonation costs must be viewed.
[50] In
relation to counsel’s fees being reduced, the second respondent
pointed out that certain items had
to be read together. Item 29
comprised an amount for 4 hours in an amount of R 16 560. Item 130
related to counsel’s invoice
in an amount of R39 330, which
comprised 8.85 hours. Item 300 related to 2.75 hours, in an amount of
R11 385. Item 299 was the
applicant’s costs in relation to the
perusal of counsel’s invoice. In respect of item 403, counsel
levied an invoice
in an amount of R173 134.80, which encompassed a
further 31.82 hours of preparation. Counsel had already been
compensated for items
29, 130 and 145 for preparing, drafting, and
settling papers and heads of argument. The taxing master in
considering item 403 took
the view that a globular amount of 20 hours
preparation time was warranted. It was for this reason that items 299
and 300 were
taxed off and item 403 was reduced by R48 934.80,
allowing 20 hours preparation time plus counsel’s day fee.
[51] In
relation to item 145, counsel’s invoice included items related
to the condonation application, which
it was contended were correctly
disallowed. A further fee in relation to the heads of argument was
allowed, allowing counsel to
be compensated for 10 hours on heads of
argument, which was over and above the further 20 hours preparation
time allowed at Item
403. In relation to the payment for counsel’s
flight catered for in item 404, the second respondent contended that
no proof
had been supplied.
[52] In
respect of flying a candidate attorney to Bloemfontein to attend to
the filing of a volume of the record,
the second respondent allied
with the taxing master, by stating that it was unwarranted and
amounted to over-caution. That duty
ought to have been seen to by the
correspondent attorney.
[53] In
relation to the costs related to Mr Christie driving to Bloemfontein,
the second respondent noted that
no prior proof of disbursement was
provided at the time of taxation. Subsequently, on review, it was
confirmed that Mr Christie
drove to Bloemfontein. However, the taxing
master, in ensuring that what was allowed was fair and reasonable,
had allowed a lesser
rate allowing a total of R3 806.10.
[54] In
sum, the second respondent submitted that it is trite that all
disbursements and fees occasioned by duplication,
and/or overcaution,
and/or extravagance and not in the most cost-effective manner, are
not recoverable even as between attorney
and own client.
Conclusions
[55]
What
test is a court to apply when it is considering whether to interfere
with a ruling by the taxing master? Where he or she has
acted mala
fide; or from ulterior purpose or improper motives; or has not
applied his mind to the matter or exercised his discretion
at all; or
if he disregarded regulatory prescripts, a court will be bound to
interfere. A court will interfere if it is satisfied
that the taxing
master was clearly wrong.
[1]
Of course,
the court will only interfere when it is in the same or better
position than the
taxing
master to determine the issue.
[2]
This Court has stated it will only interfere when
it is
satisfied that the taxing master’s view differs so materially
from its own that it should be held to vitiate his ruling.
[3]
[56]
In
relation to an attorney and own client bill the law is settled. As
far as expenses
are
concerned, that which has been specifically agreed, expressly and
impliedly, may
be
recovered. That too, is qualified. A taxing master has a discretion
to disallow certain
expenses
where an attorney has overreached his client or has been negligent or
mala
fide.
[4]
Overreaching means, in the context of an attorney and client
relationship, inter alia, the extraction of a fee that is
unconscionable
or excessive.
[5]
As stated in
Aircraft
Completions Centre (Pty) Ltd v Rossouw and Others
,
[6]
our legal system does not allow
a taxing
master to draw, tax and allow a bill of costs that will impose an
unjust liability
on a costs
debtor.
[7]
It is against the
principles referred to in this and the preceding paragraphs that the
present review must be adjudicated.
[57] The
applicant confuses the agreement of an hourly rate for counsel with
the question of whether the expenses
were normal or usual or, whether
the expenses fell within what might have been authorised.
[58] Prior
payment of accounts, without objection by an uninformed litigant who
was struggling to pay the fees
presented, is not to be regarded as a
bar to testing whether there was over-reaching or the imposition of
an unfair liability for
cost. In this case, the taxing master was
aware that he was presented with an attorney and own client bill. It
must be said that
there was no ‘conclusion’ by the taxing
master, as submitted on behalf of the applicant that the matter was
not one
of complexity, but more about that later.
[59] First,
I deal with the items in respect of which the taxing master clearly
erred. Item 404, which related
to counsel flying to Bloemfontein to
argue the matter, the taxing master erred in relating the date of the
payment to the date
of the appearance. There is nothing to gainsay
the assertion that it was paid in advance to enable counsel to fly to
Bloemfontein.
Or indeed, that counsel argued the matter in
Bloemfontein on the day of the hearing. The taxing master’s
report does not
engage on this aspect. That item was clearly wrongly
disallowed.
[60] Second,
in relation to items 4 and 5, the taxing master clearly erred in not
distinguishing items 4 and 5
from item 13, as explained on behalf of
the applicant. These items too ought to have been allowed.
[61] Third,
items 306, 307, and 410-416, in my view were too readily rejected by
the taxing master. I am persuaded
that if he had doubt about whether
they were properly incurred he could have called for the
correspondence and other documentation.
These items ought to have
been allowed.
[62] Fourth,
in relation to item 422, it does appear that the taxing master was
too rigid in allowing only two
hours for the attendance on the day of
the hearing. The two additional hours comprising waiting time do not
appear excessive. In
my view, in this regard too, the taxing master
erred. This item should have been allowed.
[63] I
now turn to the other items disallowed. Essentially, the biggest
complaint and sense of grievance on the
part of the applicant appears
to be that there was a lack of appreciation, on the part of the
taxing master, of the complexities
involved in this matter, the
enormous effort expended by counsel, and that new law was created.
The matter on appeal was a narrow
one. It involved a consideration of
whether a prior decision of this Court was applicable, whether it was
distinguishable on the
pleadings or the facts, or whether it ought,
in any event, to be departed from. It called for a decision on the
narrow aspect identified
at the commencement of this review. This
Court is frequently faced with novel questions and in the light of
our Constitutional
order, has not infrequently been constrained to
depart from prior decisions. The taxing master allowed fees which
catered for a
sufficient time to prepare to present argument on the
circumscribed issue and any complexities that might arise. The total
fee
for counsel, before a substantial part was disallowed was, even
in the circumstances of the novel identified issue, excessive. The
applicant’s submission that there had been no complaint lodged
with the Cape Bar is not useful. The second respondent explained
that
as a layperson she did not know of her rights to challenge the bill
of costs until so advised by her present attorneys. The
agreed hourly
rate does not extend an open- ended invitation to unlimited hours to
be spent on the case.
[64] I
cannot conclude that on this latter aspect the taxing master acted
wrongly. Neither am I persuaded that
the costs related to the flights
by persons from the applicant’s office, to file papers
personally, rather than have the
local correspondent deal with it,
are justified. In this regard too, the taxing master cannot be
faulted. Neither can he be accused
of being unfair in relation to the
costs associated with the condonation application. The circumstances
that led to the delay were
not of the second respondent’s
making and there had been ample time for time-limits set by the rules
of court to be met.
If any client were, in those circumstances, to be
asked in advance whether he or she should pay the substantial costs
for such
a mishap, including the cost of counsel’s assistance
in that regard, the answer would be obvious. It is unacceptable that
the second respondent should bear such costs on the asserted basis
that on an attorney client scale there should be full indemnity
for
costs.
[65] In
relation to the other contested items, I find that the taxing
master’s reasoning and conclusions
are such that on the stated
authorities they cannot be faulted. In the light of the conclusions
reached, it appears to me to be
fair to make no order as to costs.
[66] I
make the following order:
1 The
review is successful only to the extent reflected in paragraphs 59 to
62 of this judgment.
2 There
is no order as to costs.
3 The
allocator is remitted to the taxing master to be redrawn on the basis
set out in this judgment.
M
S NAVSA
Acting
Deputy President
Appearances:
For
the applicant: L
van Schalkwyk
Webbers
Attorneys, Bloemfontein
Instructed
by: R
C Christie Incorporated
For
2nd respondent: T
Abbotts
Hammond
Pole Inc, Boksburg.
[1]
Legal &
General Assurance Society Ltd v Lieberum N O and Anothe
r
[1968] 1 All SA 398
(A);
1968 (1) SA
473
(A)
at
477A-478H;
Ocean
Commodities
Inc
and
Others
v
Standard
Bank
of
SA Ltd and
Others
1984
(3) SA 15
(A) at 18F-G.
[2]
Legal &
General
fn
1 above at 478H.
[3]
Ocean
Commodities
fn
1 above at 18G.
[4]
Muller
v The Master and Others
[1992]
4 All SA 470
;
1992 (4) SA 277
(T) at 283I- 284G.
[5]
Ibid at 284G.
[6]
Aircraft
Completions Centre (Pty) Ltd v Rossouw and Others
2004
(1) SA 123
;
[2003] 3 All SA 617
(W).
[7]
Ibid para 108.