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[2016] ZAGPPHC 502
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Etana Insurance Company (Ltd) v Keren Kula Construction (Pty)LTD (62067/2013) [2016] ZAGPPHC 502 (27 May 2016)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE NUMBER
62067/13
DATE:
27 MAY 2016
In
the
matter
between:
ETANA
INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED PLAINTIFF
and
KEREN KULA
CONSTRUCTION (PTY) LTD 1
st
DEFENDANT
KK
MECHANICAL
(PTY
LTD
2
nd
DEFENDANT
KK
HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD
3
rd
DEFENDANT
NTOMBIZANDILE
KEREN HOFMAN
4
th
DEFENDANT
MICHAEL
JOHN
HOFMAN
5
th
DEFENDANT
CHARLES
ADRIAN HOFMAN 6
th
DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
THULARE AJ
[l] The
plaintiff
i
nstituted
l
egal
proceedings
against the
1
st
defendant (defendant),
which
proceedings were suspended by
a
winding-up of the
d
efendant
Plaintiff
i
ntends
to continue with the proceed
i
ngs
against
the
defendant for purposes of enforcing
i
ts
claims against the defendant, which claims arose before the
commencement of, and the proceedings in respect thereof was
instituted,
before the winding-up. The
defendant,
represented by the
liquidator, argues that the plaintiff did not within four weeks
after
the appointment of the liquidator, give the liquidator not less than
three weeks' notice in
writing
before
continuing or commencing the proceedings. As a result,
the
liquidator argues
that
the
proceedings
are
to
be
considered
abandoned.
[2] On 20 May
2016, on the date of hearing of this argument, judgment by consent
was granted against 3rd to 6th defendant, and judgment
by default was
granted against
the
2nd defendant. The third party was
present.
[3] Summons
commencing plaintiff's action was served on the defendant on 8
October
2013. Notice of intention to defend was delivered on 22 October 2013
and a plea
was
filed on 22 November 2013. The defendant's third party notice was
delivered on 22 November 2013. A notice of set down for trial
on 21
May 2015 was delivered on
21
Febuary 2014. On 25 February 2015 the defendant's then attorneys of
record,
Fasken
Martineau
Inc.
(Fasken)
of
Sandton and Smit Jones
&
Pratt of Pretoria, filed a
notice
of withdrawal as attorneys of record of the defendant. On
17
March
2015 they addressed a letter to the attorneys of record of the
plaintiff, wherein they enclosed a letter received from Van
Greunen &
Associates Inc. (Van Greunen) enclosing a letter from
the
Liquidator, instructing Fasken Martnineau Inc. to withdraw as
attorneys of record on behalf of the defendant. In that letter,
Fasken Martineau Inc also enquired whether
the
plaintiff had given notice in terms of section 359{2)(a) of the 1973
Companies Act that
it
intends continuing to pursue the action against the defendant, and if
so, they ask for
a copy
thereof. This, it would appear, was informed by an earlier letter
from
Van
Greunen, dated 20 February 2015, wherein Van Greunen had asked Fasken
to
provide
copies of all procedural notices.
[4] Upon receipt
of the
letter
of withdrawal
and
its
attachments
from
Fasken,
the plaintiff's
attorneys
wrote a letter to Van Greunen, dated
10
April
2015, wherein they ask whether it was the intention of the
liquidators to proceed with the litigation between the parties
at
all. In a letter dated
13
April
2015, Van Greunen responded, confirming that the defendant has been
placed under final liquidation, and annexed a copy of
the court
order. Paragraph
2
and
3
of
that
letter reads
as
follows:
"2. We confirm that Keren Kula Construction has
been placed underfinal
liquidation.
A copy of the order is annexed hereto for ease of reference.
3.
In
view
here
at
we would be
pleased if
you
could advise whether you intend
to
proceed
with the
litigation and in this regard
do
we refer you
to
the provisions of
the
Insolvency Act
.
"
[5] The
Plaintiff's
attorneys
responded
in a
letter
dated
15
April
2015,
the
relevant
parts
of which read as follows:
"We acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 13
April 2015, received by us on
15
April 2015, the contents of which we have noted.
Could we
kindly request that you provide us with copies of the certificates
of
appointment of the liquidators. At this point in time we wish
to
advise
that
the
matter has been set down for 21 M ay 2015 and that it is our
intention
to
proceed
with the trial. Bear in mind
that
there are five
other
defendants
who
are not affected
by
the liquidation. This letter thus also serves as notice of our
client's intention
to
proceed
with the matter on the aforesaid date."
[6]
On
4 May
2015
the plaintiff's attorneys re-iterated a previous enquiry as to
whether
Van
Greunen
would enter an appearance on behalf of the defendant, as the matter
was set
down
for 21 May 2015. Van Greunen was specifically requested to advise if
the
liquidator was
not
going to participate in the trial. On
11May
Van
Greunen
filed their
notice
of appointment as attorneys of record. A pre-trial conference was
held.
The
plaintiff was represented by its attorneys of record and the
defendant by Van
Greunen.
[7] It has to be
mentioned that these activities were engaged in by the provisional
liquidator as the
final liquidator had not
yet
been appointed. This very point was raised
as
a first point of concern by the defendant at the pre-trial conference
and the defendant expressed the view that in light of the
liquidation
and the lack
of
appointment
of a
final
liquidator,
the matter
is not
ripe to proceed to trial on 21 May
2015.
The
defendant went as far as to request the plaintiff to give an
undertaking that it would not proceed against the first defendant
at
trial, an undertaking the plaintiff was not
willing
to
give at
that
stage. The plaintiff consequently served a notice
of
removal of the matter from the trial roll.
[8] On
1
0
June 20
1
5
the provisional liquidator's appointment was made
final,
however,
plaintiff was not aware of this. On
1
July
20
1
5
the plaintiff's attorneys addressed a letter to Van
Greunen
where
i
n
they sought to be advised whether a final
liquidator
had been appointed, and whether
the
liquidator,
albeit
interim
or final, intended to continue the defence of plaintiff's claim and
whether
plaintiff's
claim will be admitted. Plaintiff served on Van Greunen notice of
application for trial date on 6 July 20
1
5.
On
1
3
July
20
1
5
plaintiff delivered a notice of set down for the trial to be heard on
20 May 20
1
6.
[9] On 25
September 2015 the plaintiff's attorneys addressed a letter to Van
Greunen. The contents whereof reads as follows:
"We refer to the above mentioned matter as well as the trial
date set for 20 May
2016.
We confirm
that all the necessary pleadings have been finalized and we
kindly
request that
you
advise whether the
first
meeting of creditors has
been
convened by
the
interim
liquidator
and
whether
or
not
the
interim
liquidator
has
been
finally appointed. We confirm that neither our offices nor our client
has received any indication or communication confirming
the final
appointment of the
liquidator.
In respect of
the trial we kindly request that you advise whether or not our
client's
claim is admitted and whether the liquidator will continue the
defence of the
claim
against Keren Kula Construction (Pty} ltd (in
liquidation).
We confirm
that
all our client's rights
in
the above mentioned
regards
remains
fully reserved.
We
await
your
urgent
response
.
11
[10] In reply
hereto, Van Greunen addressed a letter to plaintiff's attorneys dated
11
December 2015
the
relevant contents of
which
read
as
follows:
"1. The abovementioned matter as well as
correspondence dated the 2sth of September 2015 refers.
2.
We apologise for the delay in our
response.
3.
We confirm that we are consulting with our client early
in January
2016.
4.
At this point in time we confirm that the defence is
persisted with.
5.
We attach the final certificate of
appointment.
6.
We confirm
that
the creditors
meetings
have
already
been
convened.
11
[11]
On
9
February
2016
Van
Greunen
addressed
a
letter
to
the
plaintiff's
attorneys
with
the
relevant
parts
in
the
following
terms:
"1. We refer to the abovementioned
matter.
2.
We have ascertained from our client that the second
creditors meeting in
the insolvent estate of Keren Kula
Construction (Pty) Ltd was convened and finalized on/or about the 17h
December 2015.
3.
The consequence of the above, is that the legal
proceedings currently
pending against Keren Kula
Construction (Pty) Ltd is deemed to have lapsed due to
the
Plaintiff s non- compliance with
Section 75(1)
of the
Insolvency Act
24 of 1936
in that itfailed to deliver the proper
required
notice.
4.
As a result of the above, it is therefore our opinion
that the Trial, currently
set down for the 2dh M ay
2016, cannot proceed against the 1st Defendant, and
we invite
you to provide us with your views in this regard.
5.
Kindly confirm receipt of this
correspondence.
6.
We
trust you find the above in order and
await your response herein.
[12] It has to be
mentioned that Van Greunen in early 2016 sought to deny knowledge
and
receipt of the letter dated
15
April
addressed to them. Counsel for the defendant, rightly so in my view,
did not pursue that denial. The documents that plaintiff
presented
clearly show that the correspondence was not only sent to Van
Greunen, but to
their
client as well, and the fax transmission result reports on both
indicate that the documents were transmitted. Generally, the
communication between the parties
has
been via fax or e-mail.
[13] The
i
ssue
i
s
whether the plaintiff gave notice as required by the law.
[14] Section 359
(2) of the Companies Act, 1973 (Act No. 61of 1973) provides as
follows:
"359.
Legal
proceedings suspended and
attachments
void.
-
(2) (a) Every
person who, having instituted legal proceedings against a company
which
were suspended by a winding-up intends to continue the same, and
every
person who intends to institute legal proceedings for the purpose of
enforcing
any
claim against the company which arose before the commencement of the
winding-up, shall within four weeks after the appointment
of the
liquidator give the liquidator not less than three weeks' notice in
writing before continuing
or
commencing the proceedings.
(b)
If notice is not given the proceedings shall be considered to be
abandoned unless the Court otherwise
directs."
[15]
The parties are
agreed that the word "liquidator''
in
the
section refers
to the
final
liquidator.
(see
Strydom
v MGN Constr. ltd: In re Haljen {In liq)
1983
(1) SA 799
(D
&
CLD) at 807 C-G). The provisions of the section are enacted
exclusively for the benefit of the liquidator of the company in
liquidation. (see
Millman
NO and Steub NO v
Koetter
1993
(2) SA 749
CPD at 758 8-C. The provisions
provides
a defence
in the
hands of the liquidator, which defence is not absolute because the
court may direct that
the
proceedings are not considered to have been abandoned.
(see
Barlows Tractor Co (Pty) ltd v Townsend
[1996] ZASCA 3
;
1996
(2) SA 869
AD at
884F-G).
[16] In
Umbogintwini Land
&
Investment
Co v Barclays National Bank Ltd
1987
(4) SA 894
AD at
910 F -
911A
Viljoen
JA
said:
"In my view s 359(2)(a) is capable of one
construction only. The obligation to give notice within a period of
four weeks after
the appointment of a liquidator is imposed upon the
creditor who intends to institute legal proceedings forthwith.
The
creditor
who intends to
enforce his claim by proving it at a meeting of
creditors
of
that
estate is not hit by the provision at all.
.
..
The
provision
was designed, in
my view, to afford the liquidator an opportunity, immediately
after
his appointment,
to
consider and assess, in the interests of
the
general
body
of
creditors,
the nature and validity of the claim or contemplated claim and how
to
deal
with
it
-
whether,
for instance,
to
dispute
or
settle
or
acknowle
d
ge
it.
Cf
Randfontein
Extension
ltd
v South Randfontein Mines
ltd
and
Others
1936 WLD
1
at 3. In
the
case of
claims
sought
to
be proved in the estate,
the
liquidator does
not
require such an opportunity. In
the
case of
claims
sought to be proved in the estate, the liquidator does not require
such an opportunity. If the
claim
is rejected by the
officer
presiding in
terms
of
section 44(3}
of
the
Insolvency Act,
the
liquidator would be
fully
apprised and if disallowed by the
M
aster
in terms of
s 45(3)
he would
be
fully
aware of
the
nature of the claim concerned because the Master acts on his report.
Consequently, in neither case would he require three weeks'
time
within which to consider the claim.
[17]
The object
of the
section
is to
prevent
the
liquidator
from
being
inundated
with
proceedings
which he has had no time to consider. Dealing with the interpretation
of the provisions of section
118
of the
Companies Act, 46 of 1926, Greenberg J
in
Randfontein
Extension ltd v South Randfontein Mines ltd
&
Others,
1936
WLD 1at
page 3 said the
following:
'7he object of the provisions read together with sec.
118(1), is, I think, clear. It was intended that a person who is
appointed
liquidator of a company should not
be
embarrassed by actions before he has had an opportunity of
considering the matter, and, a fortiori, costs should not be incurred
by the institution of
proceedings
between the time when the winding up order has been made and the
liquidator
has been
appointed.
Vieyra
J puts it
this
way in
Van
der
Harst and Another v Wells,
NO
1964
(4) SA 362
(WLD) at 363 F
-
G:
"It seems to me that the intention of the legislature in
requiring timeous notice to be given as also the provision for the
three weeks' notice before commencing or continuing proceedings is
for the benefit of the liquidator. I can see no other purpose
to be
served nor did counsel for the respondent suggest that there was any
other purpose. This was the view taken by Miller, J.,
in Gilbert
Hamer
&
Co. Ltd v
lcedrome Promotions Ltd.,
1
962
(3)
SA
372
(D)
at p. 373D-H,
with which view I
respectfully agree.”
[18] In Truter v
ltzikowitz, NO
1962 (1) SA 572
TPD at 574 D-575A Cillie J said about
a provisional liquidator:
'7he appointment of a
provisional liquidator, which is permitted by the Act, is a
provisional appointment. It is for the liquidator
once he is finally
appointed to investigate the position and to institute action if he
thinks that is desirable or to defend any
action which he thinks
ought to be defended. Because the property of a company in terms of
the Act vests in the M aster on the
granting of the provisional order
of liquidation, it is a matter of expediency that a provisional
liquidator is appointed to carry
out the duties which the M aster
confers upon him. In this case it is to look after the property of
the company and to carry on
or to discontinue the business or any
part thereof as far as that may be necessary for the beneficial
winding up of the company.
I do not think it was intended that he
should be the person who must investigate whether an action
instituted against the company
should be defended or should not be
defended; more particularly, as he is not placed in the same
favourable position in which a
liquidator is who has all the facts at
his disposal. So, for example, it appears from Rule 25 of the
Winding-up of Companies, that
"thefirst meetings of creditors
and contributories shall be held as soon as may be after thefinal
winding up order.
It would appear
that a provisional liquidator normally has no power to call such
meetings.
I
respectfully
agree with the principles in
the
two
cases
to
which
I have referred, namely that the burden of deciding on facts such
as
these, should not be placed on the shoulders of the provisional
liquidator. It
is
possible of course
that
he may
later
be appointed
final
liquidator
in
which
case
he
will
have
more
facts at
his
disposal
and be in a
better
position to investigate what the merits of any action instituted
against the Company are.
[19] Discussing
circumstances where notice was not given, Boshoff J in
Baskin
v Levey
and
Others,
NNO
1967
(3) SA 121
(WLD)
at 123 H- 124
A,
said:
"If no such notice has been given to a
liquidator, proceedings are to be considered abandoned to bring about
finality so that
the liquidator may be in a position to report to the
creditors of his company as accurately as possible on the state of
and the
claims against the company. It would, therefore, seem that a
liquidator would, generally speaking, be entitled to oppose an
application
for the purging of a default if he can show that he had
been prejudiced by the default or that the excuse
advanced
by the applicant is not bona fide and reasonable or, if it is
necessary, to insist on terms on which an applicant
should
be
allowed
either
to continue or to commence proceedings.
[20]
Civil
proceedings against
a
company in
respect
of
which
the
court
has
made
an
order
for its winding-up, are suspended until
the
appointment of a liquidator. The appointment of a liquidator lifts up
the suspension. The person in the position of the plaintiff,
who,
having instituted
legal proceedings against
a
company
which were suspended
by
winding up, and who intends to continue the legal proceedings, once
the suspension is
lifted,
must give notice to the
liquidator.
[2
1
]
The notice referred to,
i
n
my
view,
i
s
an advance notification of the
i
ntention
to continue with the proceedings. The notice is intended to allow the
liquidator to discover and/or
to
determine
the
existence
or presence of the fact that legal proceedings have been instituted
and are intended to be proceeded with. It is an official
written
document containing information about the legal proceedings and a
warning about something
that
i
s
going to happen, which
i
s
the announcement
of the
intended process.
I
t
follows that, in my view, a
notice
of an application for
a
trial
date
cannot be a
notice
as envisaged
in
section 359 (2) (a) of the Companies Act,
1
973.
Notice of an application for
a
trial
date
i
s
a
step
in
furtherance of the
action.
It is a step
i
n
continuation of the action. Consequently, in my
view,
the
plaintiff did not, within four weeks after the appointment of the
liquidator,
give the
liquidator
not
less
than three weeks' notice, in writing, before continuing the
proceedings.
[22] If notice
has not been given, as I
found,
the next question
I have
to consider
is
whether I should direct otherwise, (section 359 (2)
(b),
as
an
overall
i
mpression
made
on
me
by the facts set out by the parties before me. This question
i
s
made difficult by the recognition
that
the plaintiff chose not
to
bring an
application
for condonation
of its
failure to timeously give notice, but instead opted
to
argue
for my
indulgence
on the date of trial,
in
that I
should
find that they have not abandoned the proceedings.
[23] In my view,
there has to be good cause for me to grant the indulgence sought by
the
plaintiff.
This means looking at all those factors which bear on the fairness of
granting
the relief sought by
the plaintiff as between the parties and all the factors that may
affect the proper administration of
justice,
amongst other factors, the
bona
/ides
of
the plaintiff, the sufficiency of the explanation given as to why
timeous proper notice
was
not given and the contribution of other persons including the
defendant, to the
failure
of the
plaintiff
to give
notice
as well
as any
evidence from
which
abandonment
may be
inferred.
[24] In
Silber
v Ozen Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd
1954
(2) SA 345
(A) Schreiner JA said at
352H-
353A
'7he meaning of "good cause" which was
considered by this Court in Cairns's Executors v Gaarn,
1912
A.D.
181
,
should not lightly be made subject to further definition. For
to do so may conveniently interfere with the application of the
provision
to cases not at present in contemplation. There are many
decisions in which the same or similar expressions have been applied
in
the granting or refusal of dIfferent kinds of procedural relief.
It is enough for present purposes to say that the defendant must
at
least furnish an explanation of his default sufficiently full to
enable the Court to understand how it really came about, and
to
assess his conduct and motives."
The passage
relates to a different legislative context, to wit, Rule 46 (5) of
the
Magistrates' Court Rules. In my
view,
it
offers guidance to the approach to the
question
before me in terms of section 359 (2) (b) of the Companies Act, 1973.
In my
view,
evidence
of abandonment is a relevant consideration for the determination of
good
cause in
these
circumstances.
[25] In this
matter,
it is attorneys
attached
to the
provisional
liquidator
who
addressed
a
letter to the
plaintiff, on
10
April
2015 wherein they enquired whether the
plaintiff
intends to proceed
with the litigation. On
15
April
2015
the plaintiff gave them notice of
intention
to proceed with the matter. The provisional liquidator, on behalf of
the defendant, after the notice, delivered a notice
of appointment of
its attorneys of record
and
participated in
a
pre-trial
conference.
This happened after
the
provisional liquidator
had
caused the attorneys who were acting on behalf of the respondent
before liquidation,
to
withdraw
as attorneys of record.
[26]
The
same person who was appointed the provisional liquidator was
appointed the final
liquidator
on
10
June
2015. Within four week of their appointment as final
liquidators,
the plaintiff served
on them the notice of application for a trial date. On 11
December
2015, the final
liquidator confirmed to the plaintiff that they are persisting with
the
same
defence
on
the
matter.
[27]The
provisional
liquidator
took
effective
control of the issues between the plaintiff and the defendant. They
were in charge of the defendant's
case.
By conduct, the provisional liquidator sought to lift the suspension,
which
i
s
a benefit due to them, and signalled an entrance and in fact entered
an appearance
in the
proceedings, through appointment
of
attorneys of record in the matter and participating in the
proceedings. In my view, it cannot be said that the liquidators would
not have been in a position to report to anyone as accurately as
possible on the state of
the
claim
of
the
plaintiff
against
the
company.
[28] It is too
artificial, in my view, in the circumstances, to hold that the
permanent
appointment
wiped out all the knowledge the liquidator had, which was necessary
for them to engage with the matter. In my
view,
for
them to enter an appearance must of necessity suggest that they had
investigated the matter,
considered
it responsibly and arrived at a position where they found it
desirable to defend the action of the plaintiff against
them. It is
just, under the circumstances, to conclude that at the time of
their
appointment as final liquidators, from their conduct, they had all
the facts in
relation
to this matter at
their
disposal. They were well informed of the plaintiff's legal
proceedings and had
taken
a position
on
it.
[29]The
defendant
knew
about
the
plaintiff's
intention
to
proceed
with this litigation, and after
the
permanent
appointment of the final liquidator, the
plaintiff,
within
4
weeks, served on the defendant a notice of application for a trial
date. The defendant subsequently confirmed that
it is
persistin
g
,
under the direction and control of the final liquidator, with
its
defence
to the
plaintiff's
action.
It is against the weight of the true facts
in
this
matter,
to suggest
that
the
plaintiff
can be
deemed to have abandoned its action, under the circumstances. There
is nothing to justify the opinion of the defendant that
the plaintiff
had abandoned its action. On the contrary, it is evident from the
correspondence
and
conduct
of the
parties
that
it was
at all
times
the
intention of the plaintiff to pursue its claim against the defendant,
and that the liquidator was
aware
of this fact.
[30] In my
view,
it
is in circumstances like the present, where the company relies on
the
failure of a plaintiff to serve notice timeously on the liquidator,
that the court may
direct
otherwise than that the proceedings shall be considered to be
abandoned. The
purpose
of the direction
otherwise,
is to
allow
the
legal
proceedings
to
proceed
despite the fact that notice was not given. In exercising its
discretion, the court must determine whether, under the circumstances
of the case, the company can rely on
non-compliance
with the notice requirement. It has not been shown that the defendant
will suffer
any
prejudice arising out of the non-compliance with the notice
requirement.
[3
1
]
A disturbing
feature
in
this case, which invites comment from the court, is the certificate
of appointment of the final liquidator. The court has a duty
to
ensure that persons
i
nvolved
in the administration of justice
act
appropriately. The Master of the High Court,
i
n
liquidation matters,
i
s
the nerve centre of the meeting point of business, government, and
the
law.
Where officials demonstrate levels of incompetency and or laziness,
it
is
necessary that the root causes of such conduct be established, so
that
i
t
can be determined how a situation of such nature can be avoided
i
n
the future, through prompt and proper attention.
[32] The
certificate
i
s
a pro forma form issued by the Department of Justice and Correctional
Services. It has a number
of
options
and
the
person
completing
the form
must
delete
options which are not applicable. On the title, for example, the form
reads:
"CERTIFICATE
OF APPOINTMENT OF PROVISIONAL LIQUIDATOR(S)/ LIQUIDATOR(S)/
PROVISIONAL
MANAGER/JUDICIAL MANAGER."
All
these
options
have
been
deleted
with
the
result
that
the
title
of the
form
simply
reads:
"CERTIFICATE
OF APPOINTMENT
OF".
Throughout
the
certificate, all the options given still remain, with
none
deleted if
not
applicable. For an
inductive reader, the appointment certificate is not clear. I suspect
that practitioners
may have learned
to
accept
that nothing
better
can be
expected
from
the
Office
of
the
Master
of
the
High
Court.
I
am
not
prepared
to
condone
such
lackadaisical
attitude to one's duties which is in display on
this
form, and hold the
view
that the attention
of the Chief Master needs to be drawn to such matters for
his
attention.
[33] I will elect
to be guided by the wisdom of an Afrikaner when he
says:
"Die plig
van 'n regsprekende beampte is om verskil te bereg en nie om oor reg
te
verskil nie".
Informed
by that heritage, I will accept that the final liquidator was duly
appointed on the 11June 2015, on the instrument which
finds the basis
of my discontent.
For
these
reasons,
I find
it
just
and
equitable
to make
the
following
orders:
1.
The
court declares that the plaintiff has not abandoned the proceedings
against the 1st defendant in this matter.
2.
The plaintiff is granted leave to proceed with the action, not
earlier than three weeks from the date of this order.
3.
Each party is to pay Its own costs.
4.
The
costs of the third party are in the cause.
5. The Registrar is
directed to serve a copy of
this
judgmen
t
,
to which the cert
i
ficate
of appointment, appearing on pa
g
e
7
0
of bund
l
e
F of the additional bundles to this matter
i
s
to be attached
,
to
the
Chief Master for his attention.
DM THULARE
ACTING
JUDGE
OF
THE HIGH
COURT
Date Heard: 20
MAY 2016
Counsel for
Plaintif: Adv AJ D aniels
Attorney for
Plaintiff: Frese Moll & Partners
Counsel for
1
st
Defendant's: Adv HSL van Wyk
Attorney for
1
st
Defendant:Van Greunen & Associates
Counsel for
3
rd
Party:Adv .L Sisilana
Attorney for
3
rd
Party: Norton Rose Fullbright South Africa
Judgemennt
Delivered: 27 May 2016
Counsel
for
Plaintiff:
Attorney
for
Plaintiff:
Counsel
for
1
st
Defendant:
Attorney
for
1
stDefendant:
Counsel
for
3rd
Party: Attorney
for
3rdparty:
Judgment
Delivered:
20 May 2016
Adv AJ Daniels
Frese Moll
&
Partners
Adv
HSLvan
Wyk
Van Greunen &
Associates
Adv. LSisilana
Norton Rose
Fulbright South Africa
27 May 2016