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[2016] ZAGPPHC 351
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Dimension Data (Pty) Ltd and Others v State Information Technology Agency (SOC) Ltd and Another (28952/2016) [2016] ZAGPPHC 351 (13 May 2016)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
13/5/16
Case no: 28952/2016
Not reportable
Not of interest to other judges
Revised.
In the matter between:
DIMENSION DATA
(PTY)
LTD
Applicant
NAMBITI
TECHNOLOGIES (PTY)
LTD
Applicant
YOTTA ZETTA
(PTY)
LTD
Third
Applicant
and
STATE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
AGENCY (SOC)
LTD
First
Respondent
EOH MTHOMBO
(PTY)
LTD
Second
Respondent
JUDGMENT
AC BASSON, J
Order
:
[1]
On
6 May 2016 the following order was handed down:
“
1 Pending
the final determination of the relief sought in Part B of the Notice
of Motion, the first respondent is interdicted from:
1.1 further implementing the award of
RFB 1221/2014 (“the tender”);
1.2 taking any steps to procure any
goods or services pursuant to or as envisaged in the tender.
2 The first respondent is directed to
provide the first applicant with copies of the following
documentation within 15 days of this
order:
2.1 a copy of any advisory opinion,
written view, letter or report received by the first respondent from
the Competition Commission
regarding the competition issues raised in
respect of the tender or tender process adopted by the first
respondent;
2.2 copies of all correspondence and
communication between the first respondent and the Competition
Commission, including emails,
notes of meetings with the Commission
and details of any views conveyed to the first respondent by the
Commission regarding competition
law issues in respect of or in
connection with the tender.
3 The first respondent is ordered to
pay the first applicant’s costs, on an attorney and client
scale, including the costs
of two counsel.”
Reasons
[2]
This
was an urgent application for an interim interdict pending the
finalisation of a review of a decision to award a tender for
the
provision of IT networking services to various government
departments.
[3]
This
application is brought in two parts. Part A is the urgent application
that served before this court. The first applicant is
seeking urgent
interim relief to prevent the implementation of the awarding of the
tender pending the outcome of its application
under Part B to review
and set aside the decision made by the first respondent to issue the
invitation to bid (under number RFB1221/2014),
to award the so-called
CISCO tender and the decision to disqualify the Akona consortium’s
response to the CISCO tender of
which the first applicant was
informed by letter dated 29 January 2016.
Parties
[4]
The
first applicant is Dimension Data (Pty) Ltd (hereinafter referred to
as “the applicant”). The applicant was the
main member of
a consortium named the Akono Consortium (hereinafter referred to as
“the consortium”). The consortium
members were the second
applicant - Nambiti Technologies (Pty) Ltd (hereinafter referred to
as “Nambiti”), the third
applicant - Yotta Zetta (Pty)
Ltd (hereinafter referred to as “Zetta”) and the second
respondent - EOH Mthombo (Pty)
Ltd ( hereinafter referred to a
“EOH”).
[5]
The
consortium was not a separate legal entity and was formed for the
sole and exclusive purpose of formulating and submitting a
bid in
response to the tender in respect of CISCO OEM products (“the
tender”).
[6]
Initially three entities
namely Dimension Data, Nambiti and Zetta, were cited as applicants.
In the founding affidavit the deponent
states that due to the urgency
of the matter, it was not possible to properly engage with EOH (the
second respondent) in respect
of the contents of the application. The
deponent states that he had discussion with Nambiti and Zetta who
have both joined issue
with first applicant (Dimension Data).
[7]
When
the matter was argued the court was, however, informed that both
Nambiti and Zetta have withdrawn their support for the urgent
application because they have found themselves in a conflicted
situation and did not wish to jeopardize their relationship with
SITA
who is still the purveyor of billons of rands worth of IT government
work: The government is by far the largest customer for
networking
and other IT services in the industry. Because only one applicant
remains before court (namely the first applicant),
I will refer to it
as “the applicant”.
[8]
The
first respondent is the State Information Technology Agency (SOC) Ltd
(hereinafter referred to as “SITA”). SITA
is mandated in
accordance with section 7(g) of the State information Technology
Agency Act
[1]
to render
information and communications technology services to government
departments and to act as the procurement agency of
government. The
second respondent (EOH Mthombo (Pty Ltd) also conducts business as a
network installer. I have already pointed
out that EOH was a member
of the Akono consortium.
[9]
The
consortium responded to a Request for Bids (hereinafter referred to
as the “RFB”) issued by SITA. I have already
referred to
this bid in paragraph [3]. It is this bid that is the subject matter
of this urgent application.
[10]
The
consortium bid was unsuccessful as it was disqualified because Zetta
did not, according to SITA, comply with certain technical
requirements set out in the tender. (I will return to these
requirements herein below in more detail.)
[11]
Before
I turn to the merits of this application, I must point out that the
papers that served before the court were voluminous.
Oral argument
also took up an entire day. Because of the urgency of this matter I
intend to give only brief reasons for my order.
Non-Joinder
[12]
I
have already briefly referred to the fact that Nambiti and Zetta
withdrew their support for the relief sought in the Notice of
Motion
notwithstanding the fact that both were initially cited as applicants
in this application. On behalf of SITA it was submitted
that the
applicant ought thereafter to have joined them as respondents in this
application.
[13]
There
is no merit in this submission: Nambiti and Zetta are fully aware of
this application. Neither have filed any papers indicating
that they
in fact oppose any relief sought on behalf of the applicant. To now
join them as respondents would serve no purpose and
would only result
in a delay in bringing this matter to finality. (I will point out
herein below why the matter is considered to
be urgent.)
[14]
In
the answering affidavit the point is also raised that the applicant
had to join the successful bidders as well as all those bidders
who
responded to the invitation to tender and participated in the tender
process, but were unsuccessful. According to SITA the
successful
bidders as well as those who were unsuccessful all have a direct and
substantial interest in the relief sought by the
applicant and should
therefore be joined before the relief which the applicant seeks is
even entertained. Furthermore, various
government departments (
inter
alia
the
South African Police Service) have already placed orders with the
successful bidders for various goods and services. These departments
have not only placed orders, some departments have already received
some of the goods and services that were ordered by them and
have in
some instances already paid the successful bidders for the goods and
services received by them. They should therefore all
be joined as
parties to this application.
[15]
In
considering the merits of the argument in respect of non-joinder, it
is necessary to have regard to the facts that preceded the
launching
of this urgent application. At the time when the applicant drafted
the founding affidavit, the applicant was unaware
as to who the
successful consortium bidders were as no information had been
furnished to the applicant despite numerous requests
to be furnished
with this information. In fact, the applicant had requested to be
furnished with the identity of the winning consortia
and details of
any orders placed in correspondence dating as far back as 18 March
2016. Further letters were also dispatched to
the applicant when the
information was not forthcoming. SITA was therefore expressly
requested to provide the applicant with information
regarding the
identity of the departments that placed orders, when the orders were
placed and with which consortia the orders were
placed. The
information was simply not forthcoming.
[16]
According to the
applicant, it had requested this information from SITA prior to the
launching of this application precisely in
order to avoid there being
a problem with non-joinder.
[17]
The
applicant was therefore not in a position at the stage of the
drafting of the papers to join the successful consortia nor was
the
applicant furnished with any information regarding any orders that
were placed and by whom. In the founding affidavit SITA
was also
expressly requested by the applicant to furnish it with the
particulars regarding the members of the winning consortium
and was
further specifically requested to give the members of the winning
consortium notice of this application and to invite them
to intervene
in this application.
[18]
SITA
initially simply refused to disclose the information to the applicant
on the basis that it was “confidential”.
Why the
information was initially regarded as confidential is not apparent
from the papers especially in light of the fact that
the outcome of a
public procurement process can hardly be regarded as confidential.
[19]
It
was only after the founding affidavit had been filed that the
applicant was informed that the tender was awarded to a consortium
led by Business Connexion (Pty) Ltd (“hereinafter referred to
as “the winning consortium”).
[20]
The
fact that the applicant had pertinently sought relevant information
from SITA regarding all parties that may have an interest
in the
outcome of these proceedings prior to the launching of the
application can therefore not be ignored. It also cannot be ignored
that the applicant has in the founding affidavit pertinently invited
SITA to inform all interested parties of this application.
Only in
the answering affidavit did SITA finally disclose the details
regarding the successful bidders and other interested parties.
Simultaneously with the disclosure of this information SITA also
raised the defence of non-joinder.
[21]
I
am in agreement with the submission that it would have been a simple
matter for this information to have been provided to the
applicant
before the launching of this application. To raise the defence of
non-joinder at this stage and especially after several
after attempts
have been made to obtain this information smacks, in my view, of
mala
fides
.
I have already referred to the fact that SITA had refused to disclose
the information because it was “confidential”
yet it was
willing to disclose the information in its answering affidavit.
[22]
I
am of the view that in these circumstances it is not open to SITA to
now complain about the non-joinder of these parties. The
applicant
was forced to launch the application without confirmation as to who
the winning consortium bidders were and what their
interest was.
[23]
I
should also point to a further fact why I am of the view that the
defence of non-joinder was proffered in bad faith. In the answering
affidavit SITA raised the point that, in any event, SITA has already
spent the bulk of the R 1 billion budget: Only some R 300
million
remains available to spend “in the next few weeks”. If
this court therefore postpones the matter in order to
allow the
applicant to join all the relevant parties (only now identified in
the answering affidavit) this application would be
rendered academic.
[24]
I
am therefore in agreement with the submission made on behalf of the
applicant that a negative inference can be drawn from the
fact that
SITA only raised the issue of non-joinder in the answering affidavit.
This type of conduct is not acceptable and is frowned
upon by our
courts: SITA is a state organ and should not be seen to act in a
manner
which
is bound to prevent a court from granting a remedy.
See
in this regard
Gauteng
Gambling Board and Another v MEC for Economic Development, Gauteng
[2]
where the court held as
follows:
“
[49]
There are two further aspects that require brief attention. First, it
is necessary to say something to demonstrate the court's
displeasure
at the manner in which the MEC behaved, over and above the manner in
which she terminated the membership of all the
members, more
particularly her conduct subsequent to the litigation being
launched….
[50]
More than a century ago Mason J in
Li Kui Yu v Superintendent of
Labourers
1906 TS 181
said the following (at 194):
'That
being so, it is impossible for me to pass over without some notice
what is, I consider, an offence of a serious kind,
namely that of
interfering with the administration of justice by taking
an action which is bound to prevent the Court
granting a remedy.'
…
..
[52]
Our present constitutional order is such that the state should be a
model of compliance. It and other litigants have a duty
not to
frustrate the enforcement by courts of constitutional rights. In
Tswelopele
Non-Profit Organisation and Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan
Municipality and Others
2007
(6) SA 511 (SCA)
in
para 17 this court stated the following:
'This
places intense focus on the question of remedy, for though the
Constitution speaks through its norms and principles, it acts
through
the relief granted under it. And if the Constitution is to be more
than merely rhetoric, cases such as this demand an effective
remedy,
since (in the oft-cited words of Ackermann J in
Fose v
Minister of Safety and Security
) "without effective remedies
for breach, the values underlying and the right entrenched in the
Constitution cannot properly
be upheld or enhanced":
"Particularly
in a country where so few have the means to enforce their rights
through the courts, it is essential that on those
occasions when
the legal process does establish that an infringement of an
entrenched right has occurred, it be effectively vindicated."'
……
.
[54]
In the present case the best that can be said for the MEC and her
department is that their conduct, although veering toward
thwarting
the relief sought by the board, cannot conclusively be said to
constitute contempt of court. However, that does
not excuse their
behaviour. The MEC, in her responses to the opposition by the board,
appeared indignant and played the victim.
She adopted this attitude
while acting in flagrant disregard of constitutional norms. She
attempted to turn turpitude into rectitude.
The special costs
order, namely, on the attorney and client scale, sought by the board
and Mafojane is justified. However, it is
the taxpayer who ultimately
will meet those costs. It is time for courts to seriously consider
holding officials who behave in
the high-handed manner described
above, personally liable for costs incurred. This might have a
sobering effect on truant public
office bearers. Regrettably, in
the present case, it was not prayed for and thus not addressed.”
[25]
I
will return to this issue herein below where I consider the issue of
costs.
Urgency
[26]
The
urgency of this application was also strongly disputed on behalf of
SITA. More in particular, it was submitted that the urgency
in this
matter was self-created.
[27]
Both
parties submitted lengthy arguments in respect of the urgency of this
matter. I do not intend dealing with these submissions
in detail.
Suffice to point out that I am not persuaded that urgency has been
self-created. In this regard the court was
informed that the
applicant only received the letter informing it that the Akono bid
was unsuccessful on 8 February 2016. On 12
February 2016 the
applicant wrote to SITA and requested a formal debriefing. SITA only
responded to the request on 24 February
2016 and scheduled the
debriefing for 3 March 2016. On 9 March 2016 the applicant sought
access to relevant information about the
tender process including a
copy of an opinion furnished to SITA by the Competition Commission.
On 18 March 2016 the applicant requested
further information,
including the identity of the winning consortium and information in
respect of whether any agreements had
been concluded between SITA and
the winning consortium and government departments. By 22 March 2016
no response had been received
from SITA and further letters were
dispatched to SITA. On 30 March 2016 the applicant sent a
comprehensive letter of demand to
SITA requesting it to furnish the
applicant with an undertaking that the tender would not be
implemented pending a review. On 1
April 2016 SITA responded by
stating that it refused to furnish such an undertaking. As already
pointed out SITA also refused to
disclose the identity of the winning
consortia.
[28]
This
application was launched on 11 April 2016. Service was affected on
SITA by email and was followed up by physical service on
12 April
2016.
[29]
On
behalf of the applicant it was submitted that it had no choice
but to launch this application particularly in light of
SITA’s
obstruction and lack of transparency in allowing the applicant access
to material information and documents: As already
pointed out, SITA
refused to disclose the identity of the winning consortium, refused
to disclose whether orders had been placed
with the winning
consortium and refused to disclose whether SITA had concluded Service
Level Agreements (“SLA”) with
the winning consortium.
[30]
It
should also be pointed out that, on SITA’s own version, some
R300 million or 30% off the budget of R1 billion allocated
remains
unspent and that there is an intention (on SITA’s own version)
to spend the remaining budget within the next few
weeks. If that is
so, any relief sought by the applicant would in any event soon be
academic.
[31]
I
am therefore persuaded on the papers that the matter is urgent. I am
also persuaded that the applicant had attempted to avoid
approaching
this court by seeking an undertaking from SITA not to implement the
tender pending a review on expedited time frames.
I
can therefore find nothing dilatory in the efforts of the applicant
to engage SITA in an attempt to avoid rushing off to court.
Is the matter
academic?
[32]
I
have already mentioned that SITA made an allegation that the matter
is now academic as the bulk of the allocated budget had already
been
spent and that the remainder of the budget will be spend in the next
few weeks.
[33]
Before
I deal with this submission I should point out that, apart from the
fact that this allegation in fact substantiates the urgency
of this
matter, SITA is not particularly forthcoming in the answering
affidavit in respect of details regarding spending.
[34]
In
March 2016 the applicant sent a letter to SITA requesting it to
furnish it with an undertaking that the contested bid awards
would
not be implemented pending the outcome of a review. On 1 April 2016
SITA refused to furnish such an undertaking. As already
pointed out
this resulted in the applicant being compelled to launch these
proceedings on 11 April 2016 without the requested information.
In
light of SITA’s own version that some R300 million or 30% of
the budget remains unspent, it can hardly be argued that
the matter
is “academic”.
Brief introductory
remarks
[35]
Before
I turn to the question before this court it is necessary to make a
few brief remarks regarding the context within which the
merits of
his application need to be considered.
[36]
At
the outset I should point out that I am mindful of the fact that what
is before this court is an application for an interim interdict
and
that, should this court grant the order sought under Part A of the
Notice of Motion, the matter will ultimately be fully ventilated
in
terms of Part B of the Notice of Motion.
[37]
I
am thus mindful that the applicant only needs to establish a
prima
facie
right
though open to some doubt (coupled with the other requirements for
interim relief). My introductory remarks should therefore
be viewed
in this context.
[38]
Section 217 of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
[3]
sets out the broad legislative framework within which a government
procurement process must be implemented:
“
217 Procurement
(1) When an organ of
state in the national, provincial or local sphere of government, or
any other institution identified in national
legislation, contracts
for goods or services, it must do so in accordance with a system
which is fair, equitable, transparent,
competitive and
cost-effective.
(2) Subsection (1) does
not prevent the organs of state or institutions referred to in that
subsection from implementing a procurement
policy providing for-
(a)
categories
of preference in the allocation of contracts; and
(b)
the
protection or advancement of persons, or categories of persons,
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.
(3) National legislation
must prescribe a framework within which the policy referred to in
subsection (2) must be implemented.”
[39]
This
section therefore makes it clear that, as a minimum requirement for a
valid procurement process, the process must be fair,
equitable,
transparent, competitive and cost effective.
[40]
Also
critical to the assessment of this process is the provisions of the
Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act
[4]
(hereinafter referred to as the “PPPFA”). It terms of
section 1 of the PPPFA an “acceptable tender means any
tender
which,
in
all respects
,
[5]
complies with the specifications and conditions of tender as set out
in the tender document.”
[41]
[n502y2011]
In
terms of the
Preferential
Procurement Regulations,
[6]
a tender is described as
“
a written offer in a prescribed or
stipulated form in response to an invitation by an organ of state for
the provision of services,
works or goods, through
price
quotations, advertised competitive tendering processes or proposals.”
[42]
The
requirement for a fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost
effective procurement process is also reaffirmed in section
51(1)(a)(iii) of the Public Finance Management Act.
[7]
[43]
When
a court is called upon to assess the fairness and lawfulness of a
procurement process, a court should be mindful of the fact
that this
assessment is independent of the (final) outcome of the tender
process. Fundamental to this enquire is therefore the
fairness of the
process and not the substantive correctness of the outcome.
[44]
In
challenging the procurement process an applicant is entitled to rely
on any number of irregularities in the procurement process.
In doing
so an applicant must set out such facts that would persuade this
court that irregularities did in fact occur in the procurement
process. Such facts are presented as evidence to establish that any
one or more of the grounds of review under PAJA may exist:
[8]
“The judicial task is to assess whether this evidence justifies
the conclusion that any one or more of the review grounds
do in fact
exist”.
[9]
[45]
Ultimately the assessment
of the fairness and lawfulness of the procurement process will be
done within the legislative framework
of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act
[10]
(hereinafter referred to as PAJA”). Fundamental to section 6 of
PAJA is the principle that bidders (in the context of this
matter)
have the right to administrative action “that is lawful,
reasonable and procedurally fair.”
[46]
I
should also make a few remarks regarding the importance of
transformation and economic redress in the context of the past
exclusion
of black people from all spheres of our economy. I make
these comments against the background of one of the complaints raised
by
the applicant namely that SITA awarded the tender without price
and BEE evaluations. In fact, as will be pointed out herein below,
it
was common cause that SITA did not do any price and BEE evaluations
before the tender was awarded.
[47]
In
this regard section 217(2) of the Constitution clearly states that a
procurement policy may “provide [for] the protection
or
advancement of persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by
unfair discrimination.” The PPPFA also provides that
a
procurement policy may provide for specific goals which may include
“contracting with persons or categories of persons
historically
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the basis of race, gender
or disability”. The Preferential Procurement
Regulations
explicitly refer to the BBBEE status
[11]
of a bidder and specifically provides for a process to evaluate not
only functionality
[12]
but
also price and BBBEE status.
[48]
The
importance of the BBBEE status of a bidder can therefore not be
overemphasised. This sentiment was succinctly summarized by
the
Constitutional Court in
Allpay
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief
Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency, and
Others
where the court held as
follows:
“
[46]
The transformation that our Constitution requires includes economic
redress. In the context of the past exclusion of black
people from
access to mineral resources Mogoeng CJ stated in
Agri
SA
:
'(B)y
design, the MPRDA is meant to broaden access to business
opportunities in the mining industry for all, especially previously
disadvantaged people. It is not only about the promotion of equitable
access, but also about job creation, the advancement of the
social
and economic welfare of all our people, the promotion of economic
growth and the development of our mineral and petroleum
resources for the common good of all South Africans.'
[47]
Economic redress for previously disadvantaged people also lies at our
constitutional and legislative procurement framework.
Section 217(2)
provides for categories of preference in the allocation of contracts
and the protection or advancement of persons,
or categories of
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. Section 217(3)
provides for the means to effect this, in the
form of national
legislation that must prescribe a framework within which the policy
must be implemented.”
[49]
In
order to achieve BBBEE it is thus imperative that the BBBEE
credentials or employment of prospective bidders be investigated
and
assessed.
[50]
In
this regard the Preferential Procurement Regulations provide for a
two pronged process: A bid will first be evaluated for functionality.
No tender must be regarded as an acceptable tender if it fails to
achieve the minimum qualifying score for functionality as indicated
in the tender invitation.
[13]
Once a tender has achieved the minimum score for functionality, such
tender must further be evaluated in terms of the preference
point
system prescribed in section 5 of the Preferential Procurement
Regulations. In brief a 90/10 preference point system is then
applied: A maximum of 90 points are awarded for price and the
remaining 10 points are awarded for attaining the required BBBEE
status.
[51]
The
assessment of BBBEE or empowerment must therefore be done during the
second stage of the assessment process. Where there is
no other
competitor left – in other words where only one tenderer
advances to the second stage of the assessment process
and
effectively becomes the winning tenderer – the obligation to
assess the winning tenderer’s BBBEE credentials becomes
even
more important. This much was confirmed by the Constitutional Court
in
Allpay
:
[14]
“
[68]
The Procurement Act provides that an organ of state must determine
its preferential procurement policy within a preference-point
system
for specific goals, which may include 'contracting with persons, or
categories of persons, historically disadvantaged by
unfair
discrimination on the basis of race, gender or disability'.
The handling of the tender process by SASSA made
this a nullity, in
that the black economic empowerment preference points — which
were to be assessed in the second stage
— played no actual role
in the decision because by that stage there was no competitor. An
investigation into the propriety
of empowerment credentials does not
become necessary only after a complaint has been lodged. There
was an obligation on SASSA
to ensure that the empowerment credentials
of the prospective tenderers were investigated and confirmed before
the award was finally
made. That obligation became even more crucial
when there were no other competitors left in the second stage. There
is then an
even greater obligation for the tender administrator to
confirm the empowerment credentials of the winning bidder.
[69]
Cash Paymaster claimed that its equity partners would manage and
execute over 74% of the tender. Its tender did not substantiate
this.
All it did was to provide particulars of the management
capabilities of its workforce, which included previously
disadvantaged
people. On the face of the information provided by Cash
Paymaster in its tender it was not possible to determine whether its
claimed
empowerment credentials were up to scratch or not.
[70]
Despite this failure, SASSA did not call on Cash Paymaster
to substantiate its claimed empowerment credentials, presumably
because by that stage the preference points could not have affected
the outcome.
This
effectively made the consideration of empowerment an empty shell,
where preference points were calculated as a formality but
where the
true goal of empowerment requirements was never given effect to.
…
[72]
Given the central and fundamental importance of substantive
empowerment under the Constitution and the Procurement and
Empowerment
Acts, SASSA's failure to ensure that the claimed
empowerment credentials were objectively confirmed was fatally
defective.
It is difficult to think of a more fundamentally mandatory
and material condition prescribed by the constitutional and
legislative
procurement framework than objectively determined
empowerment credentials. The failure to make that objective
determination
fell afoul of s 6(2)
(b)
of PAJA (non-compliance
with a mandatory and material condition) and s 6(2)
(e)
(iii)
(failure to consider a relevant consideration).”
Interim relief
[52]
The
legal requirements for an interim interdict are the following:
[15]
(a)
a prima facie right,
though open to some doubt;
(b)
an injury actually
committed or a reasonable apprehension of irreparable harm;
(c)
the balance of
convenience favours the applicant;
(d)
the absence of similar
protection by any other ordinary remedy.
Prima facie right
though open to some doubt
[53]
I
will now briefly turn to the question whether this court should grant
interim relief. In this regard it needs to be considered
whether the
applicant has established a
prima
facie
right
that is likely to result in the relief sought in the main review. Put
differently, a prima facie right may be established
by an applicant
demonstrating prospects of success in the review. This requirement
must be weighed up along with the other requirements
of irreparable
and imminent harm if an interdict is not granted, the balance of
convenience and, lastly, whether there is an absence
of an
alternative and effective remedy.
[54]
The
applicant relied on the following 5 alleged unlawful irregularities
in the procurement process:
(i)
SITA
did not conduct price and BEE evaluations;
(ii)
the
2014 framework constituted unlawful competition;
(iii)
the
2014 framework was anticompetitive;
(iv)
the
AKONO bid was unlawfully disqualified; and
(v)
Government departments
have unlawfully placed orders directly with the winning consortium
instead of ordering through SITA.
[55]
I
do not intend dealing with each of these grounds in detail as I am of
the view that on at least two of these grounds the applicant
has
established a
prima
facie
right
to relief sought and has therefore established that it has prospects
of success in the main review.
SITA did not conduct
price and BEE evaluations
[56]
I
have already referred to the fact that the invitation to bid in this
particular case expressly committed the tender process to
the 90/10
evaluation system as provided for in the PPPFA. In clause 2.2.4 of
the invitation to bid it is stated that the bid “shall
be
evaluated in terms of the PPPFA”.
[57]
The
bid further specifically refers to the principles of BBBEE as defined
in section 1 of the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment
Act.
Specific reference is also made to the BBBEE status level of a
contributor.
[58]
In
clause 5.4 2 of the invitation to bid it is also specifically stated
that SITA supports BBBEE as an essential ingredient of its
business
and that SITA insists that the private sector demonstrates its
commitment and track record to BBBEE in the areas of ownership
(shareholding), skills transfer, employment equity and procurement
practices (SMME Development) etc.
[59]
A
contract must be awarded to the bidder scoring the highest total
number of points in respect of price and BBBEEE unless objective
criteria justify the tender to be awarded to another bidder.
[60]
It
therefore follows that an evaluation of price and BBBEE is critical
to the 90/10 evaluation system and without prices being evaluated
and
without BBBEE being evaluated points cannot be awarded. As apready
pointed out, where only one bidder advances to the second
stage of
the process, it becomes even more critical to assess the BBBEE status
of such a bidder.
[61]
In
this instance it is not disputed that SITA did not consider bidders’
prices at all. This fact only became known to the
applicant when SITA
finally disclosed various documents pertaining to the tender process.
These documents were disclosed only after
SITA was forced by the
applicant with the lodging of a PAIA request and only after the
applicant had filed its founding affidavit.
[62]
Apart
from the fact that no price evaluation was done, it was common case
that no BBBEE evaluation was done prior to awarding the
tender to the
winning consortium. (I will return to the failure to evaluate BBBEE
herein below.)
[63]
Tenderers were not
required to bid in rand. They were only required to specify a
percentage mark-up according to a published costing
model. Apart from
the fact that it is common cause that no price evaluation was made,
it transpired from the disclosed documents
that the awarding of the
bid was previously cancelled precisely because no price comparison
(using Rand as a point of departure)
could be made. In this regard
the documents show that a request was made in April 2015 by SITA’s
Acquisition Management that
the 2014 framework be cancelled. The
reason was:
“
The reason for
cancellation is that the Price evaluators are unable to conduct price
evaluation on a comparative basis since the
costing model did not
provide for the bidders to indicate their bid price and SCM [Supply
Chain Management] is unable to determine
a winning bidder.”
[64]
In
April 2015 SITA’s own Acquisition Management Department (and
Supply Chain Management Department) was therefore of the view
that
the tender must be cancelled because SITA was unable to conduct a
price evaluation. The reason why a price evaluation could
not be done
was because bidders were only required to include in their bids a
proposed percentage mark-up on networking products.
[65]
A
very different picture emerged a few months later in August 2015.
Without there having been any changes to the bids and despite
the
fact that bidders were still required to submit their bids providing
only for a percentage mark-up, SITA concluded that:
“
Each response was
analysed to the completeness of the proposed price and to identify
possible risks, concerns and additional benefits.
The evaluation is
based on the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act with
bidders ‘scores calculated using the following
formula…
The formula applied to calculate the price points is based on the
90/10 preference point system as the lowest acceptable
offer under
SITA consideration… The formula will be applied per brand for
price comparison as required under the published
RFP document.”
[66]
According to what was now
stated in August 2015, bids were in fact evaluated according to the
90/10 system meaning that the bids
were evaluated with reference to
price and scores were awarded. The 90/10 evaluation system was
therefore ostensibly applied in
the exact circumstances (the same
bids and same bid information) that previously in April prompted SITA
to conclude that, because
a price comparison was impossible, a winner
could not be determined.
[67]
A
further, and again different scenario, presented itself in October
and December 2015: Although it was previously expressly stated
in
August 2015 that SITA had applied the 90/10 system and had scored
price according to the price formula, it now stated in October
that
price evaluations were in fact not done:
“
The price
evaluation was not conducted due to bidders were requested to provide
mark-up % according to the published costing model.
However the price
evaluation will be applied during the RFQ stage.”
[68]
The
same statement was repeated in October and again in December 2015.
The October and December reports also record that BEE evaluations
were not done.
[69]
Three
different versions therefore emerge out of SITA’s own
documents: (i) In April 2015 it was impossible to conduct price
comparisons and select a winner. (ii) In August 2015 the 90/10 system
and the pricing formula were ostensibly applied to bidders
and points
were awarded even though bidders also did not provide Rand prices.
(iii) In October and December 2015 SITA now stated
that it did not
conduct price evaluations nor BEE evaluations thereby contradicting
previous statements.
[70]
I
am in agreement with the submission on behalf of the applicant that
the 90/10 evaluation system is compulsory not only by statute
but
also in terms of the express undertakings made in the invitation to
bid.
[71]
What
appears from the papers to have taken place since August 2015 was a
change in SITA’s stance as to when price and BEE
evaluations
would take place. Whereas it is clear that the required evaluation
should take place
before
the awarding of a bid (if
the provisions of the PPPFA is taken into account as well as the bid
invitation itself), SITA appears
to have taken the decision to
summarily relocate evaluations on price and BEE to be evaluated only
“during the RFQ stage”.
Presumably this means that price
and BEE would only be evaluated once a government department places
an order. I am in agreement
that this is
prima
facie
unlawful.
[72]
In
respect of the failure to conduct a proper BBBEE evaluation, I am
equally of the view that this failure
prima
facie
constitutes
a serious irregularity in the procurement process. In October 2015
the following was expressly recorded:
“
B-BBEE Points
Evaluation Summary
The B-BBEE evaluation was
not conducted and the process will be applied during the RFQ stage.”
[73]
In
the circumstances I am therefore satisfied that the applicant has
established a
prima
facie
case
that an irregularity was committed during the procurement process.
[74]
Although not strictly
necessary I will also consider one further complaint of procurement
irregularity raised by the applicant.
Cancellation of the
Akono bid
[75]
It
was common cause that the Akono bid was disqualified because one of
its members (Zetta) did not comply with three tender requirements
relating to the experience and technical capacity of consortium
members.
[76]
The
reasons for disqualifying the Akono bid are contained in a document
entitled “Functional / Technical Evaluation Report
(dated 20
April 2015). Zetta was eliminated and consequently the Akona bid was
disqualified for the following three reasons: (i)
Zetta did not
provide reference letters although every other member has provided
such letters. (ii) Zetta did not provide proof
of residence although
every other member has provided proof of residence. (iii) Zetta did
not provide any letters by an accounting
officer or from registered
auditors.
[77]
In
response to these grounds for disqualification the applicant
submitted that the disqualification of Zetta (and consequently the
consortium) was irregular. This is denied by SITA who submitted
that the consortia were indeed expected to have business
premises to
cover the national footprint and zoning as stipulated in the RFB.
SITA would, however, afford a consortium a
maximum period of 6
months to establish proper business premises for BBBEE entities.
[78]
The
applicant maintained that the disqualification of Zetta was
irregular: Firstly, it was submitted that the technical requirements
did not apply to Zetta because these technical requirements did not
pertain to the BBBEE and SMME (small business) members of the
consortium. In this regard the applicant further submitted that, in
any event, the purpose of the technical requirements was to
ensure
that the consortium has the necessary technical ability to provide IT
services. Consequently this requirement only applied
to those members
of the consortium that actually would have provided technical
services. According to the applicant only the applicant
and Nambiti
are IT companies and therefore only they would have provided the
required technical services if the Akono bid was successful.
I pause
here to point out that it was not in dispute that they have complied
with the technical requirements. Secondly the applicant
submitted
that Zetta was assigned a very different role in the structure of the
consortium and only had a non-technical role: Zetta
was a consortium
referee and not a technical participant and its role was to manage
the spread of work between the other consortium
members to ensure
that each consortium properly allocate 40% of its share of the
consortium’s business to small businesses.
This, according to
the applicant, was made clear to SITA in its Executive Summary where
the following was stated:
“
The consortium has
chosen to have an administrative head which is independent of the
members but each member would have representation
or will participate
in a steering forum that will govern the Consortium. In this case,
Yotta Zetta is an SMME which will manage
and proactively bring
external auditors as well to keep track on delivery of the project
against the tender milestones and objectives.
We have adopted the
Single Service Aggregator model which is designed to overcome the
problem of managing multiple supplier relationships
by appointing a
Single Service Aggregator (SSA) – The administrative agent will
have access or integrate to individual consortium
member systems and
personnel specifically for this project. The Agent will give rise to
the Architectural blueprint that will be
derived and singed off
within an agreed timeframe.”
[79]
According to the
applicant it therefore ought to have been readily apparent from the
consortium structure that Zetta was not an
accredited networking
installer consortium member and that it was only entitled to 5% as a
management / administration fee to which
it was entitled to in terms
of clause 12 of the consortium agreement as well as Annexure A to the
consortium agreement. As such
it should have been readily apparent to
the Evaluation Committee that the consortium included Zetta as a SMMe
and that it was included
solely to be an administrative agent in the
consortium.
[80]
In
its response SITA merely stated that the reference to the Executive
Summary where the role of Zetta is explained does not assist
the
applicant because it is “inconsistent” with the
provisions of the applicant’s consortium agreement. To what
extent it is inconsistent is not explained by SITA.
[81]
There
is in my view some merit in the applicant’s submission: There
is no indication from the documents – especially
from the
document purporting to set out the reasons for the disqualification
of Zetta – that any consideration was given
to the fact that
the structure of the consortium was that there were only three 20%
shareholders (the applicant, EOH and Nambiti)
and that they
de
facto
were
the members who would have been responsible for the technical
execution of the bid and that only they therefore ought to have
been
subjected to scrutiny regarding the mandatory requirements stipulated
in the tender. There is accordingly in my view merit
in the
submission that had the Evaluation Committee properly applied their
minds to the consortium’s response to the tender
it would have
appreciated the structure of the consortium and the explanation that
Zetta was included solely to be an administrative
agent in the
consortium.
[82]
In
the alternative, it was submitted on behalf of the applicant that
SITA should have exercised its discretion and should have condoned
Zetta’s non-compliance with these requirements especially in
light of its stated role in the consortium.
[83]
The
applicant further submitted that, at the very least, SITA ought to
have sought clarification from the consortium on Zetta’s
role
and its non-compliance with the technical requirements. This ought to
have been done especially in circumstances where SITA
had extended an
opportunity to another consortium (the Ubuntu consortium) to submit
its BBBEE level and tax clearance certificates
which were not
attached to their bid. This opportunity was extended to Ubuntu in
circumstances where the invitation to bid contains
a very specific
requirement that a bidder must submit a valid and original tax
clearance certificate and an original or certified
copy of its BBBEE
certificate. Bidders are further specifically informed that “such
bidder must submit outstanding certificate(s)
to SITA tender office
within seven (7) week days from the closing date of this tender.
Failure to do so may result in SITA rejecting
the bidder’s
response or not awarding claimed BBBEE points.” Why such an
opportunity was not similarly extended to
the Akona consortium is not
clear. Clearly SITA was of the view that it had a discretion to
depart from insisting on strict
compliance with the bid requirements
contained in the invitation to bid.
[84]
Tenderers have the right
to a fair tender process and has this right irrespective of whether
the tender is ultimately awarded to
them.
[16]
[85]
In
the circumstances I am therefore satisfied that the applicant has
established a
prima
facie
case
that an irregularity was committed during the procurement process
that ultimately led to the disqualification of the Akona
consortium.
[86]
With
regard to an injury actually committed or a reasonable apprehension
of irreparable harm I am equally satisfied that the applicant
had
established that it has a reasonably apprehension of irreparable
harm. Not only was the applicant frustrated in perusing its
rights in
this court, the applicant has
prima
facie
established
that it was not treated fairly in the adjudication of the tender bid.
[87]
I
am equally persuaded that the applicant does not have available any
other ordinary remedy: Damages may not be an adequate remedy
particularly in light of the fact that it would be notoriously
difficult for the applicant in matters such as this to pursue a
claim
for damages that are purely economic in nature.
[88]
Does
the balance of convenience
favour
the granting of the interdict? In this regard a court has a
discretion upon a consideration of all the facts. This
discretion
must be exercised judicially. It is clear from
Olympic
Passenger Service
[17]
that
the balance of convenience is not evaluated in isolation: the
stronger the prospects of success in the main proceedings the
less
need for the balance to favour the applicant and
vice
versa
:
“
In
such cases, upon proof of a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable
harm, and there being no adequate ordinary remedy, the
court may
grant an interdict — it has a discretion, to be exercised
judicially upon a consideration of all the facts.
Usually this
will resolve itself into a nice consideration of the prospects of
success and the balance of convenience — the
stronger the
prospects of success, the less need for such balance to favour the
applicant: the weaker the prospects of success,
the greater the need
for the balance of convenience to favour him. I need hardly add that
by balance of convenience is meant the prejudice
to the
applicant if the interdict be refused, weighed against the prejudice
to the respondent if it be granted.'
[89]
On
behalf of the respondent it was strongly disputed that the balance of
convenience favours the applicant: More in particular SITA
referred
to the fact that the South African Police Service has already placed
orders with the successful bidders and SAPS will
not be able to serve
the public if the order is not given effect to. In its replying
affidavit, the applicant (with reference
to documents disclosed by
SITA only after the launching of this application pursuant to its
request for information in terms of
PAIA) states that in any event,
these orders were not lawfully placed with SITA as these orders were
directly placed by SAPS with
the winning consortia and not through
SITA as stipulated in National Treasure Practice Note No 5 2009/2010
which requires of government
departments to place orders for all
networking contracts through SITA. The applicant further stated that
SAPS had in any event
been required by SITA’s inefficiency to
wait for its requirements to be satisfied and will not therefore be
unduly prejudiced
if it has to wait for another few months until the
applicant’s application is adjudicated.
[90]
What
is in my view clear from the facts is that, if the applicant is
denied an interdict, the matter will be rendered academic.
Furthermore, it is in my view in the public interest that this tender
be scrutinized under Part B of the Notice of Motion. In these
circumstances I am of the view that the balance of convenience
(considered together with the prospects of success in he main review)
favours the applicant. I can therefore find no proper ground for
denying the applicant the relief sought in the Notice of
Motion.
Costs
[91]
The
application is granted with costs on an attorney and client scale. In
this regard I have already referred to the views expressed
by the
court in
Gauteng
Gambling Board
[18]
to
the effect that the state should not conduct itself in such a manner
that it may ultimately result in this court not being able
to grant a
remedy.
Application
to strike out
[92]
SITA
also brought an application to strike out in terms of Rule 6(15). I
have considered the merits of the application and can find
no reason
to strike out the founding affidavit. SITA does not, as it was
obliged to do, indicate the passages to which objection
is taken but
instead seeks to strike out the whole of the founding affidavit. In
the event the application is dismissed.
_________________________
AC BASSON
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
Appearances:
For the Applicant: Adv A
R Bhana (SC)
Adv S M Wentzel
Adv J Mitchell
Instructed by: Eversheds
Inc.
For the 1
st
Respondent: Adv J Peter (SC)
Instructed by: Hogan
Lovells Inc.
[1]
88 of 1988.
[2]
2013 (5) SA 24 (SCA).
[3]
108 of 1996.
[4]
5 of 2000.
[5]
My emphasis.
[6]
2011.
Published under GN R502 in
GG
34350
of 8 June 2011 (with effect from 7 December 2011).
[7]
“
General
responsibilities of accounting authorities.
—(1) An
accounting authority for a public entity— (
a
)
must ensure that that public entity has and maintains— (iii)
an appropriate procurement and provisioning system which
is fair,
equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective.”
[8]
Allpay
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief
Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency,
and Others
2014 (1) SA 604
(CC) ad para [44].
[9]
Ibid.
[10]
3 of 2000.
[11]
Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment.
[12]
Section 1 of the Regulations defines
functionality
as follows: “functionality means the measurement according to
predetermined norms, as set out in the tender
documents, of a
service or commodity that is designed to be practical and useful,
working or operating, taking into account,
among other factors, the
quality, reliability, viability and durability of a service and the
technical capacity and ability of
a tenderer.”
[13]
Section 4(4) of them Preferential Procurement Regulations.
[14]
Supra
.
[15]
Se:
Olympic
Passenger Service (Pty) Ltd v Ramlagan
1957
(2) SA 382
(D) at 383E – F:
[16]
Logbro
Properties CC v Bedderson NO and others
2003 (2) SA 460
(SCA) at paras [24] and [25].
[17]
Supra at
383E
– G.
[18]
Supra
.