About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
>>
2016
>>
[2016] ZAGPPHC 483
|
|
Seleka v Road Accident Fund (12555/2015) [2016] ZAGPPHC 483; 2016 (4) SA 445 (GP) (29 April 2016)
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
DATE:
29/4/16
Case
No:
1
2555/2015
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
In the matter
between..
SELEKA.
G.L.
Plaintiff
and
THE
ROAD
ACCIDENT
FUND
Defendant
JUDGMENT
F.
DIEDERICKS (A.J.)
[1]
The Plaintiff in this matter has instituted action against Defendant
in terms of the provisions of the
Road Accident Fund Act, 1996
, No.
56 of 1996 (as amended) for compensation of losses suffered by her as
a result of the demise of her daughter, Masedi Seleka
(born in 1989)
in a motor vehicle accident between a motor vehicle with registration
number […], then and there driven by
one George Pitsoe, and
her daughter, who was a pedestrian at the time. In the Particulars of
Claim an estimated amount of R500,000.00
was claimed for loss of
support.
[2]
The Plaintiff also claimed an amount of R12,550.00 in respect of
funeral expenses, but this Court was informed that the Plaintiff
would not pursue this claim by virtue of the fact that the funeral
expenses of which proof was furnished in the amount of R12,550.00
was
paid directly to the service provider by the Defendant.
[3]
COMMON CAUSE FACTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES:
The
following facts are common cause between the parties:
[3.1]
That the Plaintiff has the necessary
locus
standi in
iudicio;
[3.2]
That the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the matter;
[3.3]
That the applicable regulations pertaining to the claim, procedure
and the periods prescribed by the regulations promulgated
in terms of
the
Road Accident Fund Act, 1996
, were duly complied with;
[3.4]
Negligence on the part of the insured driver was conceded on the
basis that Plaintiff is liable for 100% of Plaintiffs proven
or
agreed damages, subject to the issues in dispute set out below;
[3.5]
That the demise of the deceased was caused by the negligent driving
of the insured driver, i.e. that the death was causally
linked to the
accident in question;
[3.6]
That the deceased was the biological child of the Plaintiff;
[3.7]
The quantum of Plaintiff's loss of support, if a finding is made in
favour of the Plaintiff on the issues in dispute as set
out below, is
the amount of R72,439.00 as calculated by the actuary, Mr. G.W.
Whittaker, in an addendum actuarial report dated
25th of February
2016. The method of calculation, assumptions, contingencies and
result as set out in the aforementioned actuarial
report is not in
issue (dispute) and the report may be handed in as evidence without
the necessity of calling the actuary as a
witness;
[3.8]
The contents of the medico-legal report by Ms. E. Noble are admitted,
save for the allegations relating to the duty of support
by the
deceased towards the Plaintiff as well as the income of the Plaintiff
and her husband.
[4]
ISSUES
IN DISPUTE:
The
following issues are in dispute between the parties:
[4.1]
What the correct legal approach is in respect of a parent claiming
for loss of support as a result of the demise of his or
her
biological child;
[4.2]
Whether the "indigency" of a parent is still a requirement,
and if so, what the appropriate approach and test is
for a parent to
prove indigency;
[4.3]
Whether the customary or African law provides for a duty to support
his/her parents and if so, whether it should be extended
with
particular reference to Tswana law and if not, whether the normal
common law approach to the requirements for a claim for
loss of
support by a parent for the demise of his child should apply.
[5]
EVIDENCE:
[5.1]
Plaintiff and her husband were the only witnesses who testified in
this matter. From the evidence the following salient facts
emerged.
[5.2]
Plaintiff attained Standard 5 as her highest qualification. She was
intermittently employed as a domestic worker until she
was diagnosed
with diabetes and on advice of her medical practitioner ceased her
employment. As domestic worker she only worked
two days per week. The
Plaintiff also testified that the diabetes that she suffered from
necessitated her to inject herself on
a daily basis with insulin. She
also testified that on her own assessment
of
her body
and ability to work, coupled with the fact that she had to inject
herself on a daily basis, she could not ignore the medical
advice
received from the medical practitioner and therefore ceased her
employment. This occurred some time prior to the demise
of her
daughter.
[5.3]
The Plaintiff and her husband have been married for a considerable
period. Plaintiff testified that they entered into a civil
marriage
while her husband also added that prior to them entering into the
civil marriage, they were also married in terms of Tswana
custom.
According to Plaintiffs husband they first entered into a Tswana
customary union and thereafter concluded a civil marriage.
[5.4]
It is clear from the evidence of both the Plaintiff and her husband
that they live in the Bafokeng area in a settlement called
"Phokeng",
which was governed by the traditional Bafokeng Authority under the
leadership of a chief. The name of their
chief is Chief Lebone. The
First Chief Lebone passed away and his son, Chief Lebone(Jnr), is the
current chief of this tribal authority.
[5.5]
According to the evidence of Plaintiffs husband, the Tswana customary
laws and traditions were derived from Tswana culture.
He,
inter
alia,
testified that:
[5.5.1]
they entered into a customary union before entering into a civil
marriage;
[5.5.2]
they arranged their family affairs and raised their children
according to the Tswana custom;
[5.5.3]
they lived by the laws and traditions of the Tswana custom and
culture and adhered to all rules and regulations as laid
down by the
tribal authority and the chief. As example of one of these rules
mention was made of the fact that the chief and tribal
authority
regulated the water extracted from the river in respect of each and
every household and also determined the amount of
money payable per
household in respect of water so extracted;
[5.6]
Plaintiff's husband, according to Plaintiff's evidence, received a
Provident Fund lump sum payment when he went on pension
some time
prior to the demise of their daughter. The bulk of the money were
utilised to build a three-bedroom brick and tile house
for them,
which comprised also of a kitchen, dining room and sitting room. The
remainder of the Provident Fund payout was utilised
to assist a
family member with funeral expenses incurred by that family member
and the lump sum was soon depleted;
[5.7]
Plaintiffs husband, according to the Plaintiff, started receiving old
age pension which is currently R1,500.00 per month.
According to
Plaintiff's husband's evidence he only started receiving his pension
in November 2015;
[5.8]
The uncontested evidence by Plaintiff was that the deceased resided
with them in the house and contributed to the support
of the
Plaintiff in the approximate amount of R1,300.00 per month. The
further uncontested evidence according to documentation
shows that
the deceased earned a salary of approximately R2,500.00 per month.
This was dependent on how many hours overtime was
worked in a
particular month. Plaintiff testified that the R1,300.00 per month
were needed in order to provide for the basic necessities
of life,
namely water, electricity and groceries;
[5.9]
The evidence was not contradicted. It was not disputed that the
payments made by the deceased terminated on her demise;
[5.10]
It was also uncontested that Plaintiff and her husband did not have
any other substantial assets from which they could provide
for their
own maintenance and support. On the evidence of Plaintiff, they
rented out three rooms at an amount of R450.00 each.
These were rooms
built outside their house on the same stand. This was done to
supplement their income. This practice was subsequently
terminated
when it became clear to them that they were not allowed to rent out
these premises. Plaintiff testified that the reason
why they were not
allowed to rent out these premises was on account thereof that the
tribal authority would not grant permission
to rent out the dwellings
on account thereof that the people living in those dwellings did not
contribute towards the water extracted
from the river. Plaintiff's
husband, however, testified that they rented out four rooms, one for
the amount of R450.00, one for
R350.00 and one for R300.00. The
rental for the fourth room on Plaintiff's husband's evidence is not
clear since he only mentioned
the three different rates. His evidence
in this regard differ from that of the Plaintiff in that he stated
that they rented out
the premises also prior to the demise of the
deceased, whilst the Plaintiff testified that they so rented out the
premises only
after the demise of the deceased;
[5.11]
Plaintiff ran the household and household finances. Plaintiff's
husband is an illiterate person and cannot read or write.
Plaintiffs
husband testified to this extent that by virtue of the fact that he
could not read or write, he was never able to read
his salary slip at
the time that he was employed. He usually asked a colleague to read
the salary slip and tell him how much pay
he got. This also did not
improve after he retired and he left the financial affairs completely
in the hands of his wife due to
his inability to read or write. This,
in turn, led to quarrels between him and his wife (which according to
this Court, happens
in many households) due to the fact that he (the
husband) could not understand what happened to all the money. He
would then approach
the children to assist him to reconcile their
financial situation. In view of the above situation, this Court is of
the view that
the Plaintiffs account of the financial affairs of the
family should be preferred as compared to her husband's views
thereof;
[5.12]
It must be noted that it was uncontested that the letting of rooms by
the Plaintiff and her husband was not authorised by
the tribal
authority and therefore unlawful;
[5.13]
Plaintiffs husband also testified that he attempted to supplement
their income by selling Magau beer. He testified that he
sold on
average between one and three crates of beer per month consisting of
15 cartons each. He sold each carton for R7.00 per
carton. His costs
to purchase a crate amounts to R85.20 per crate. His gross profit,
according to him, was therefore R19.80 per
crate. According to his
evidence he also did not sell all the cartons in a crate due to the
fact that some of the cartons became,
as he called it, "fermented"
and he had to throw them away. Manually calculated at the best for
him, if he sells the
full three crates per month, his gross profit
could amount to approximately R59.40 per month. According to
Plaintiffs evidence
her husband would also drink some of these
cartons. It also became clear that the Plaintiffs husband did not
consider the costs
of travelling to go and buy these cartons of Magau
and bring them back to his home from where it was sold. It is
therefore doubtful
whether any meaningful profit was made by the
selling of this Magau;
[5.14]
Apart from the aforementioned, the Plaintiff and her husband had no
other income prior to and after the demise of the deceased;
[5.15]
Apart from the evidence tendered by the Plaintiff that her daughter
factually maintained her parents, the Plaintiff also
explained that
the daughter so maintained them subsequent to a verbal contract
entered into between herself and the deceased. This
verbal contract
was entered into at the time when the Plaintiff was no longer able
and fit to work in the labour market as a domestic
worker. The
duration of this verbal agreement between mother and daughter was
that the parties contemplated that this maintenance
would only be
payable by the deceased until such time that the Plaintiff would
reach the age of 60, when she would become eligible
to receive an old
age pension from government. This evidence was never challenged
during cross-examination.
[6]
THE DUTY OF A CHILD TO MAINTAIN HIS
I
HER
PARENTS:
ROMAN DUTCH LAW:
[6.1]
Voet
25.3.8
states
the following:
"
Contrary
wise
needy
parents
also
must
be maintained by their
children. This is
so
not only if they are
of
sound
report
and
reputation,
but
even
if
the
mother has made profit out of her body and has thus
been daubed with the stain of infamy. So far does this go that even a
very son
who has been conceived from roving carnal intercourse of his
mother can be forced to provide maintenance for her; and legitimate
children are bound to feed an incestuous father and to furnish him
with other things needful. That is so because such persons are
still
parents, though they are despised of the law and are impious."
[6.2]
In
Voet 25.3.11
we find that the Roman Dutch Law also
left to the discretion of the Judge the different classes of family
members which may be liable
for the maintenance of other family
members. This would depend on the circumstances of each case.
[7]
DEVELOPMENT
OF THE
COMMON
LAW
IN SOUTH AFRICA:
In
the matter of
Oosthuizen
v.
Stanley,
1938
AD
322
,
which was an application for leave to appeal, the Learned Court
stated that a Plaintiff who claims for loss of support for the death
of his child must prove (a) that the child contributed towards his
support; and (b) there was a legal duty to contribute because
circumstances were such that he needed the contribution.
[8]
In
Law of Parent and Child,
4th
edition, p. 403 by Irwin Spirow,
it is found that:
"The
requisites
of the duty of children to support
their parents
are mutatis mutandis
the
same as those of the corresponding duty of
the
parents namely the
parent must be unable to
support himself or herself,
that is to say that lack of
means is not sufficient
if parents are able to maintain
themselves
by working and the child must be able
to support
his
or
her
parents.
The parent
who
claims
to
be entitled to maintenance
must
show that it has been said that he or she is in want of what should,
considering
his or her station in life, be regarded
as coming
under the law of necessity,
but
it is submitted that the concept of necessities,
which
really depends on all circumstances,
must not be
understood in a narrow sense and that
generally
the
quantum
of
maintenance
owed
by
children
to
their parents
is
mutatis mutandis
the same as in the case of the
duty of
parents to
support their children."
[9]
It is trite law that a parent under the common law should prove
indigency in order to claim maintenance from his child (apart
from
proving a duty to do so). In the case of
Smith v.
Mutual
&
Federal Insurance Co Ltd,
1998(4) SA 626 (C)
the following was stated in this
regard:
"To
be indigent means to be in extreme need or want whereas to be poor
means having few things or nothing. Accordingly when
the Plaintiff
pleads indigence, it is not sufficient to show that the Plaintiff
lives on very little or nothing (vide: World Book
Dictionary). The
Plaintiff must prove something more. The Plaintiff must prove that
there is an extreme need or want for basic
necessities of life."
[10]
One fact that cannot be overlooked is that in South Africa we live in
a country with much diversity with reference to its people
and their
languages, cultures and customs. This, in the view of this Court,
begs the question whether a litigant being a member
of one specific
race or cultural group should mould his action into the requisites or
requirements as set out in the laws applicable
to other culture- or
racegroups which are foreign to himself, in order to be successful in
his action.
[11]
In short, this question really entails whether a citizen of this
country should not be entitled to pursue his case on the basis
of the
law applicable and well-known to his own race- and culturegroup as
developed by his or her forefathers and thus became the
customary
law,
in casu,
of particularly African people in this country.
[12]
AFRICAN
CUSTOMARY
LAW
:
This
Court deems it necessary to look at the African customary law with
specific reference to the question whether or not and under
which
circumstances a duty would rest upon a child to maintain his/her
parents.
[13]
In
Native Law in South Africa,
Seymoure,
2nd
edition,
on p.159,
the following is
said in this regard:
"In
return
for
his
care
and
upkeep,
a
child
is
obliged
to perform certain
duties for his kraal head: boys between the ages of about seven
and
ten
years
herd
small
stock
and
calves,
while
those between
the
ages
of
eleven
and
fifteen
herd
large
stock: older boys
might
help
their
father
in ploughing; a father
may
lend
the serevices
of
his
son
to
a neighbour
in
return
for
which
the
son
is kept
free
of charge until he is
no longer
required.
In the case of girls,
they help their mothers in their duties, according
to
strength and ability, and generally fit themselves to
be
wives in due course.
"
[14]
Very similar wording on duties of children can be found in
"A
Handbook
of
Tswana
Law
and
Custom",
I.
Schapera
(New Impression, 1977)
on
p. 179
where the author mentions the following:
"Children
are expected from fairly early age to assist in the routine
occupations of the household, their elders acting as
their mentors.
The girls are made to help their mothers by fetching water and wood,
stamping corn and cooking, cleaning and repairing
the homestead, and
acting as nursemaids of the babies. These and the many other
household duties pertaining to their sex, they
carry on until they
reach womanhood, when on marriage they assume for themselves the
responsibility of housewives. Young boys must
help their mother by
going messages for her and performing any small menial tasks she sets
them to do. Older boys must work for
their father by herding and
milking his cattle, going out hunting with him, helping him to build
huts, plough and protect the family
property, running errands, and so
on."
[15]
With particular reference to a duty to support, we find the following
reference on
p.179
of
the
work
of
I. Schapera:
"
When
a
child
is grown
up
and
able
to
earn
a
living
by
work,
he must
also support his parents,
'because they are old and
have no more strength'.
"
O busa dikotlô
:
it is said:'
he repays them for his
maintenance
'. Sons must
give
their fathers
everything
they
obtained by hunting, gift, or purchase
and nowadays
also by work among
the
Europeans. This
is
known
to
the
Ngwato
as
"
kgo šôma
".
The father
can
take it
all
for
himself,
or may
otherwise
dispose
of it
as he
thinks
fit.
But
he is
expected
to consider
the son, and
see that
he gets something out of what
he has acquired."
[16]
According to the author, in Tswana customary law, this duty to
maintain only refers to African males. It does not refer to
a similar
duty owed by a female to her parents. The obvious reason being that
females are brought up to eventually become mothers
and nurturers of
children and to be homebound.
[17]
It is well-known that over the past half century black females has
entered the labour market firstly as domestic workers in
European
family households and later on in work environments previously
reserved for their male counterparts. In modern day female
African
workers are to be found in every sphere of life competing on an even
level with their male counterparts.
[18]
There is therefore in this day and age no reason in law or logic that
it cannot be said that a female African does not have
a duty to
maintain her parents if maintenance is needed by such parents.
[19]
In this regard I am in agreement with His Lordship Mr. Justice Dlodlo
where he dealt with these principles in the decision
of
Fosi v.
Road Accident
Fund
&
Another,
2008(3) SA 560 (C).
I agree
with my Learned brother that the test as set out in the
Smith-
decision,
supra,
is more onerous and difficult
to prove compared to pronouncements made in earlier decisions. He
preferred the test as spelt out
by Rabie JA in
Van Vuuren v.
Sam,
1972(2) SA 633 (A)
where it
is stated:
"Dit
is natuurlik
waar
...
dat noodsaaklike
behoeftes
en behoeftigheid
relatiewe
begrippe
is, maar daar
dien
terselfdertyd op gelet te word dat die verlening van hulp beperk is
tot wat
as
die mens
se
basiese
behoeftes
beskou
kan
word,
naamlik
voedsel, klere, onderdak en
geneesmiddels en
versorging
in
tyd van
siekte."
[20]
I fully agree with my brother Dlodlo J with the principles of South
African customary law which places an obligation on a child
who is
financially able to do so to provide maintenance to his or her needy
parents. I must, however, also add that as far as Tswana
law and
custom is concerned, this principle has in fact also developed from
not only a duty by a son to maintain his parents, but
also to include
such duty on a daughter.
[21]
THE HOUSEHOLD
INCOME:
I
have already alluded to the household income pre and post the demise
of the Plaintiff's daughter.
[22]
The household expenses before the demise of Plaintiff's daughter was
the following:
[22.1]
Food and groceries R2,000.00
[22.2]Electricity R
250.00
[22.3]Water R
180.00
[22.4]Funeral
policy R
300.00
-------------
R2,630.00
According
to the evidence the deceased contributed R1,300.00 towards these
expenditure, the balance of R1,330.00 came out of the
pocket of her
parents.
[23]
The current household expenditure is as follows:
[23.1]
Food and groceries R
800.00
[23.2]
Electricity R
180.00
[23.3]
Water R
150.00
[23.4]
Transport R
150.00
[23.5]
Funeral policy R
300.00
_________
R1,650.00
[24]
In my view this Court should consider also the fact that earlier the
family was used to an income from the father's salary
of R5,500.00 a
month. It is also my duty not to overlook the status and general
circumstances that prevailed in the past and are
still prevailing at
present.
[25]
It is a well-known fact that the cost of living, with particular
reference to consumables such as food and clothing are rising
by the
day whilst government pensions does not increase at the same rate as
does inflation and the general cost of living.
[26]
An amount of R800.00 is according to the above budget merely enough
for two elderly people to survive on, having regard to
the current
cost of living. I observe that no provision is made in this budget
for the cost of clothing which is also in my view
a "bare
necessity".
[27]
Argument was forwarded on behalf of Defendant that the cost of living
in rural areas are much lower than the cost of living
in cities, but
no evidence to that effect was led and this Court can subsequently
not accept it as a true reflection of the cost
of living in rural
areas as compared to same in city areas.
[28]
I therefore have no doubt in my mind that these two elderly people
are in fact Indigent.
[29]
Apart from the above, I have already mentioned the fact that there is
uncontested evidence that there was a contract between
Plaintiff and
her deceased daughter that the latter would maintain her parents by
contributing an amount of R1,300.00 per month
towards the household
expenses, until such time that her mother would turn 60 years of age
and thus eligible to receive a Government
old age pension . This duty
could no longer be fulfilled by the daughter as a result of her
untimely death as a result of the accident
in question.
[30]
In the last instance I find that in terms of the Principles of the
South African Customary law, as outlined above, the Plaintiff
is
entitled to be compensated for the losses suffered by her as a result
of the demise of her daughter in the accident.
[31]
The only aspect that remains is the Question of the Scale of costs
that plaintiff is entitled to in view thereof that, so it
was argued
by Defendant, the Amount falls within the Jurisdiction of the
Magistrates court and Plaintiff should therefore have
pursued her
action in that forum.
[32]
In this regard I am of the view that the amount of the claim is not
the only factor that should be considered by this court
when
considering an appropriate cost order.
[33]
This case had components of complexities that justifies the decision
of Plaintiff to institute action in the High Court and
I therefore
order that costs are awarded to Plaintiff on a High Court scale.
[34]
The parties has, subject to the above findings of this court,
prepared a Draft Court order and agreed that same should be made
an
order of court in the event that Defendant is found to be liable to
pay Plaintiff's damages in the amount agreed upon.
The
following order is hereby made:
A)
The "DRAFT ORDER OF COURT" which I have marked "X"
for identification purposes is hereby made an order of
court.
----------------------------
DIEDERICKS,
AJ
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT,
NORTH
GAUTENG DIVISION.
Date
Heard: 18-19th April 2016.
Date
of Judgment: 29th April 2016.
I
N
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
HELD AT PRETORIA ON
THIS THE 22
nd
DAY OF APRIL 2016 AT COURT 4G BEFORE THE
HONOURABLE JUSTICE DIEDERICKS (AJ)
In the matter between:
CASE
NO: 12555/15
SELEKA,
G
L
Plaintiff
and
ROAD
ACC
I
DENT
FUND
Defendant
DRAFT
ORDER OF COURT
HAVING HEARD
COUNSEL
for the Plaintiff and Defendant.
THE COURT GRANTS
JUDGMENT
in favour of the Plaintiff against the Defendant in
the following terms:
1.
The Defendant shall pay an amount of
R72 439.00 (SEVENTY
TWO THOUSAND FOUR
HUNDRED
AND
THIRTY
NINE
RAND)
to the
Plaintiff in settlement of the Plaintiff's claim for past and future
loss of support.
2.
The aforementioned amount shall be payable by direct transfer into
the trust account of Adams and Adams, details of which are
as
follows:
Nedbank
Account
number: [1…]
Branch
number: 198765 Pretoria
Ref:
JPR/JLR/P1461
3.
The Defendant must make payment of the Plaintiff's taxed or agreed
party and party costs on the High Court scale, which costs
shall
include, but not be limited to the following:-
3.1
The fees of Senior-Junior Counsel on the High Court Scale, inclusive
of Counsel's full reasonable day fees for 18, 19 and 21
April 2016,
and the reasonable costs in respect of the preparation of the Heads
of Argument;
3.2
The reasonable taxable costs of obtaining all expert, medico-legal
and actuarial reports from the Plaintiff's experts which
were
furnished to the Defendant;
3.3
The reasonable taxable preparation, qualification, travelling and
reservation fees, if any, of the following experts of whom
notice has
been given, being:-
3.3.1
Ms Noble;
3.3.2
Mr Whittaker.
3.4
The costs of a consultation between the Plaintiff and her attorney to
discuss the terms of this order;
3.5
The reasonable taxable accommodation and transportation costs
(including Toll and E-Toll charges) incurred by or on behalf
of the
Plaintiff in attending all medico-legal consultations with the
parties' experts, consultations with the legal representatives
and
the court proceedings, the quantum of which is subject to the
discretion of the Taxing Master;
3.6
The costs of Ms SR Masondo (Sworn Translator) for her attendance at
court on 18 and 19 April 2016 in the total sum of R4000.00;
3.7
It is recorded that there is no contingency fee agreement.
3.8
The above costs will also be paid into the aforementioned trust
account.
4.
The following provisions will apply with regards to the determination
of the aforementioned taxed or agreed costs:-
4.1
The Plaintiff shall serve the notice of taxation on the Defendant's
attorney of record;
4.2
The Plaintiff shall allow the Defendant 7 (SEVEN) court days to make
payment of the taxed costs from date of settlement or
taxation
thereof;
4.3
Should payment not be effected timeously, the Plaintiff will be
entitled to recover interest at the applicable rate per annum
on the
taxed or agreed costs from date of allocatur to date of final
payment.
BY
ORDER OF THE COURT
ADAMS
& ADAMS JPR/JLR/P1461
ON
BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF: ADVOCATE P NEL
ON
BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT: ADVOCATE MAGAGULA