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[2016] ZAGPPHC 619
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Quality Plant Hire CC and Another v Greater Tzaneen Minicipality and Others (99728/15, 99729/15) [2016] ZAGPPHC 619 (26 April 2016)
IN THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
DATE:
26/4/2016
CASE
NUMBER: 99728/15
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2) OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
In the matter between:
QAULITY PLANT HIRE
CC 1
ST
APPLICANT
EXPECTRA 388
CC 2
ND
APPLICANT
And
THE GREATER TZANEEN
MUNICIPALITY 1
ST
RESPONDENT
SELBY
CONSTRUCTION 2
ND
RESPONDENT
AND
CASE NUMBER: 99729/15
QUALITY PLANT HIRE
CC 1
ST
APPLICANT
EXPECTRA 388
CC 2
ND
APPLICANT
And
THE GREATER TZANEEN
MUNICIPALITY 1
ST
RESPONDENT
MATLALA NYAPELE
INVESTMENT & PROPERTIES CC 2
ND
RESPONDENT
READIRA REFUSE
SERVICES CC 3
RD
RESPONDENT
Coram
: CROUSE
AJ
Heard
on: 29 and 30 March 2016
Delivered
on: 25 April 2016
JUDGMENT
CROUSE
AJ
[1]
It is convenient to hear the above two matters together and to give
one judgment therein as the matters are closely related.
[2]
The Applicants in both matters are Quality Plant Hire CC and Expectra
388 CC. Acting as a joint venture they entered a tender
bid in two
projects, namely Project 06/2015 - upgrading of the gravel road
between Mafarana and Burgersfort
[1]
to a tar road (hereinafter referred to as Project 1) and Project
02/2015 - upgrading the gravel road from Moruji to
Matshwi/Kheshokolwe
to a tar road (hereinafter referred to as Project
2). Both projects were placed on tender by the First Respondent, the
Greater
Tzaneen Municipality (herein after referred to as "the
Municipality").
[3]
On 28 August 2015, Project 1 was awarded to Selby Construction CC,
the Second Respondent in the first matter (hereinafter referred
to as
"Selby") and Project 2 to the joint venture of Matlala
Nyapele Investment and Properties CC and Readira Refuge,
who are
respectively the Second and Third Respondents in the second matter. I
will refer to these two Respondents jointly as "Readira"
hereinafter. Where I refer to "the Respondents" in this
judgment, I refer to the Municipality, Selby and Readira together.
[4]
Feeling aggrieved by the Municipality's aforesaid allocation of the
tenders, the Applicants sought to engage the Municipality
to obtain
the bid adjudication committee's (hereinafter referred to as "BAG")
minutes, and reasons for not awarding the
tender to them. They also
sought an undertaking that the tenders will not be implemented
pending the giving of reasons and a possible
review application. As
this engagement yielded no results, the Applicants on 9 October 2015
initiated an application for interim
relief to restrain the
Respondents from implementing the said tenders pending a review
thereof. On 1 December 2015 judgment was
given in the Applicants'
favour in the interim interdict. Selby and Readira filed notices of
application for leave to appeal against
the interim interdict, and
continued with the implementation of the tenders. Thereafter the
Applicants filed a notice in terms
of Rule 30, stating that the
interim order was not appealable. As work on the projects did not
cease as ordered in the interim
interdict, the Applicants also
brought a contempt application against the Respondents. In an attempt
to expedite this review application
rather than pursuing
interlocutory applications, the review applications proper were
placed before me for decision by way of special
motion by order of
Fabricius J, dated 26 January 2016. I am informed that the interim
applications have not been abandoned and
cost orders must still be
argued as well.
[5]
In the review applications the Applicants seek the review and setting
aside of the Municipality's decisions to award the tenders
respectively to Selby and Readira, as well as for related relief. In
both cases and for the same reasons the Municipality in its
opposing
papers deemed the Applicants' bids not to have passed the
functionality test.
[6]
Argument in the review applications commenced before me on 30 March
2016 and I heard argument over a period of two days.
[7]
In order to give structure to this judgment, I will deal with the
legislative framework for municipal procurement, the application
for
striking out, the grounds of review, and the appropriate relief.
Discussion
of the relevant municipal procurement legislative framework
[8]
The legislation discussed hereinafter is relevant to this matter, and
is by no means an attempt to deal with all legislation
relevant to
Municipal procurement. Reference to the
Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act
3 of 2000 (hereinafter referred to as
"PAJA"), which is highly relevant to municipal procurement,
will not be dealt with
under this heading.
[9]
The starting point in considering any municipal procurement process,
must be the principles set out in section 217(1) of the
Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, (hereinafter referred to as
"the Constitution") namely that the system
must be fair,
equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective.
[10]
Although not relating to municipal procurement, I am mindful of what
Wallis JA stated in
South African National Roads Agency Ltd v Toll
Collect Consortium
2013 (6) SA 356
(SCA)
toward the end of
paragraph [18]:
" When the Constitution, in s 217, requires
that the procurement of goods and services by organs of state shall
be transparent,
its purpose is to ensure that the tender process is
not abused to favour those who have influence within the institutions
of the
State or those whose interests the relevant officials and
office bearers in organs of state wish to advance. It requires that
public
procurement take place in public view and not by way of
back-door deals, the peddling of influence or other forms of
corruption."
[11]
With the constitutional principles in mind, the Local Government:
Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (hereinafter
referred to
as "the Management Act"), and the regulations thereto (GN
868 of 30 May 2005:
Municipal Supply Chain Management Regulations
-
hereinafter referred to "Supply Chain Regulations") were
enacted. In terms of section 111 of the National Management
Act each
municipality must develop and implement its own supply chain
management policy which must be consistent with applicable
legislation and government policies.
[12]
The object of the Management Act, as set out in section 2 thereof is
"to secure sound and sustainable management of the fiscal and
financial affairs of municipalities and municipal entities by
establishing norms and standards and other requirements"
for
inter alia
supply chain management.
[13]
Section 105 of the Management Act determines that each Municipal
official
"must take all reasonable steps within that
official's area of responsibility to ensure-(a) that the system of
financial management
and internal control established for the entity
is carried out diligently; (b) that the financial and other resources
of the entity
are utilised effectively, efficiently, economically and
transparently; (c) that any irregular expenditure, fruitless and
wasteful
expenditure and other losses are prevented."
[14]
The Supply Chain Regulations
[2]
make provision for committees to drive the tender process. "Tender"
is defined
[3]
as a written offer
in a prescribed or stipulated form in response to an invitation by an
organ of State for the provision of services,
works or goods, through
price quotations, advertised competitive tendering processes or
proposals. The bid specification committee
must compile the
specifications for each procurement. A bid evaluation committee
(hereinafter referred to as the "BEC")
must
inter
alia
evaluate
bids and ensure bidders' ability to execute the contract, and also
check that the successful the bidder's municipal account
for services
and taxes are not in arrears. The BEC then makes a recommendation to
the BAC. The BAC considers the BEC's report and
recommendations, and
can either confirm the BEC's recommendation or make a new
recommendation. If the BAC recommends another bidder,
they must check
that that bidder's municipal account is not in arrears.
[15]
The municipal manager must thereafter, with due regard to the reasons
given, ratify or reject the BAC's recommendation. If
the municipal
manager, as accounting officer, rejects the recommendation, he must
refer the matter to the BAC. He or she also retains
a discretion to
refer the matter back to either the BEC or the BAC throughout the
process. In circumstances where a bidder other
than the one
recommended through the process is the successful bidder, the
municipal manager must comply with sending the necessary
notices as
contemplated in section 114 of the Management Act within ten days.
[16]
Section 114 (1) of the Management Act states that
"(i)f
a
tender other than the one recommended in the normal course of
implementing the supply chain management policy of
a
municipality
or municipal entity is approved, the accounting officer of the
municipality or municipal entity must, in writing, notify
the
Auditor General, the relevant provincial treasury and the
National Treasury and, in the case of
a
municipal entity, also
the parent municipality, of the reasons for deviating from such
recommendation.
[17]
The Municipality must have an effective risk management system for
the identification, consideration and avoidance of potential
risks in
the supply chain management system. They must identify risks on a
case-by-case basis, and must identify a person best
suited to manage
that risk in a pro-active manner.
[4]
[18]
The Municipality must allow a person aggrieved by their decision to
lodge a written complaint within 14 days of the decision.
The
Municipal policy must provide for the appointment of an independent
and impartial person, not directly involved in the supply
chain
management processes, to assist in the prompt resolution of disputes.
[5]
[19]
Section 217(2) and (3) of the Constitution also provides for a
preferential procurement policy which may be implemented through
a
framework set out in national legislation. Currently this framework
is set out in the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework
Act 5 of
2000 (hereinafter referred to as the "Preferential Procurement
Act") and regulations thereto in GNR.502 of 8
June 2011:
Preferential Procurement Regulations, 2011 (hereinafter referred to
as the "Preferential Procurement Regulations").
[20]
The Preferential Procurement Regulations allows for a two stage
process with which to award tenders. Firstly the bidders'
functionality is determined. "Functionality" is defined
[6]
as the measurement according to predetermined norms, as set out in
the tender documents, of a service or commodity that is designed
to
be practical and useful, working or operating, taking into account
among other factors, the quality, reliability, viability
and
durability of a service and the technical capacity and ability of a
tenderer.
[21]
Only those bidders who meet the requisite functionality threshold,
are then considered in a second process. During the second
process
certain bidders will be preferred based on a specific formula as set
out in the Preferential Procurement Regulations.
[7]
The contract must be awarded to the tenderer who scores the highest
points during the second process, unless there are objective
criteria
to justify the award to another tenderer.
[8]
[22]
As much was made during argument of Regulation 4 of the Preferential
Procurement Regulations, I quote it in its entirety:
"Evaluation
of tenders on functionality.-
(1)
An organ of state must indicate in the invitation to submit a tender
if that tender will be evaluated on functionality.
(2)
The evaluation criteria for measuring functionality must be
objective.
(3)
When evaluating tenders on functionality, the-
(a)
evaluation criteria for measuring functionality;
(b)
weight of each criterion;
(c)
applicable values; and
(d)
minimum qualifying score for functionality, must be clearly specified
in the invitation to submit a tender.
(4)
No tender must be regarded as an acceptable tender if it fails to
achieve the minimum qualifying score for functionality as
indicated
in the tender invitation.
(5)
Tenders that have achieved the minimum qualification score for
functionality must be evaluated further in terms of the preference
point systems prescribed in regulations
5
and 6."
[23]
Where appropriate I will refer to other specific legislative
provisions in discussing the grounds of review.
Readira's
Application for striking o
ut:
[24]
In terms of the order of Fabricius J of 26 January 2016, the
Applicants had to file supplementary affidavits, if so advised,
on or
before 1 February 2016. The Applicants did not file supplementary
affidavits, but dealt with new matter in their replying
affidavit.
During argument the Respondents all asked for striking out of the new
matter, but only Readira brought a formal application
in this regard.
[25]
At the commencement of the proceedings before me, all the parties
indicated that the hearing of the review application and
the striking
out application must be heard and decided together as they would not
want to supplement their papers, regardless of
my decision on the
striking out application. I specifically raised with each counsel the
possibility of prejudice to their respective
clients and allowed an
adjournment for the parties to consider possible prejudice should
they persist in such a stance. The parties
remained resolute that the
application for striking out and the review should be heard and
decided together.
[26]
[1]
The new material which Readira seeks
[9]
to be struck out consists of: Paragraph 29.5 of the replying
affidavit pertaining to Annexure
RA7.
This is
a BAC's report dated 6 August 2015 recommending that Project 2 be
awarded to Selby for an amount of just less than R90 million.
The
significance of this report is that Readira was in fact appointed as
the successful tenderer on Project 2 for a tender amount
of R99
million. The Applicants' tender for Project 2 was R15 million rand
less.
[2]
Paragraph 29.7 of the replying affidavit wherein the Applicants state
that the review record does not reflect how Project 2
was awarded to
Readira as the BAC had recommended Selby. The Applicants allege that
the inescapable conclusion is that it was merely
informally handed
over to Readira.
[3]
Paragraph 29.9 of the replying affidavit, that simply states that in
the Applicants' view a different set of rules applied to
Selby and
Readira, than the rest of the bidders.
[4]
Paragraph 157 of the replying affidavit. The Replying affidavit
contains two paragraphs 157, the first one simply states that
the
deponent will hereinafter answer the allegations in Readira's
answering affidavit. The second one simply states that qualifications
were stated as NQF level 5.
[27]
In argument, the request for striking out was extended to cover the
rest of the documents pertaining to the tender process
which the
Applicants attached to their replying affidavit, namely:
[1]
Paragraphs 10-41 (pages 226-231): These paragraphs relate to the
Applicants' complaint that the review record that the Municipality
provided is wholly inadequate and the Applicants' attachment of RA 1-
RA4 being documents that should have been included in the
record.
•
RA1
pertains to the BEG's report to the BAG dated 9 July 2015 wherein
Selby is recommended as the successful bidder on project 1 for
the
tender amount of just less than R54 million.
•
RA2
pertains to the report of the BAG to the Municipal Manager dated
6 August 2015, but which was only signed by individual members
between 12 August 2015 and 28 August 2015.
•
RA3
contains a document prepared and signed by the BEG dated 28 July
2015 setting out the plant and equipment of each of the 33 bidders
to
projects 1 and 2.
•
RA4
contains numerous letters ranging between 1 October 2015 and 6
October 2016 wherein Selby obtained financing from Nedbank for
equipment.
[2]
Paragraphs 25 - 35
[10]
(pages
231- 235) deal with Annexures
RA5-8,
being
documents of which the Municipality is the author and which the
Applicants allege should have formed part of the review record.
•
Annexure
RAS
is the memo dated 29 August 2015 by the Acting Municipal
Manager awarding Project 1 to Selby subject to conditions to be met
by
Selby, for just less than R54 million.
•
Annexure
RAG
is the undated BEC report which states that the BEC met on
2 July 2015 and that Selby is recommended for Project 2 in the amount
of just less than R90 million.
•
Annexure
RA7
as discussed above is the BAC report recommending Selby
for project 2.
•
Annexure
RAB
is the memo by the acting municipal manager awarding
project 2 to Selby subject to certain conditions for just less than
R90 million.
[28]
Neither Shelby nor the Municipality brought applications for striking
out, but both piggy-backed on Readira's application and
argued that
all new matter should be struck from the replying affidavit. In view
of the fact that no objection was levied to Readira's
extended
request for striking out I will give consideration thereto without
necessary finding that it was regularly made.
[29]
Striking out applications are governed by Rule 6(15) which reads:
"The Court may on application order to be struck out from any
affidavit any matter which is scandalous, vexatious or irrelevant,
with an appropriate order as to costs, including costs as between
attorney and client. The Court shall not grant the application
unless
it is satisfied that the applicant will be prejudiced in his case if
it be not granted."
[30]
It is trite that in motion proceedings an applicant must make out a
case in the founding affidavit. New matter in a replying
affidavit
may be struck out because it is irrelevant to the case made out in
the founding affidavit.
(Van Zyl and others v Government of RSA
and others
[2005] 4 All SA 96
(T)).
The concept
"irrelevant
matter"
was defined in
Swissborough Diamond Mines (Pty)
Ltd v Government of the RSA
1999 (2) SA 279
(T)
as
"allegations
which do not apply to the matter in hand and do not contribute one
way or the other to
a
decision of such matter."
[31]
In
Finishing Touch 163 (Pty) Ltd v BHP Billiton Energy Coal South
Africa Ltd and Others
2013 (2) SA 204
(SCA)
at p 212 at [26] and
[27], the Supreme Court of Appeal dealt with the question of new
matter in a replying affidavit. That Court
found the rule that all
the necessary allegations upon which the applicant relies must appear
in the founding affidavit was not
absolute and that a court has a
discretion to allow new matter in a replying affidavit in exceptional
circumstances. That Court
also stated that a distinction must be
drawn between a case in which the new material is merely left out of
the founding affidavit,
and one where new matter came to hand after
the filing of the founding affidavit.
[32]
Nestadt J in
Shepard v Tuckers Land Development Corporation (Pty)
Ltd
(1)
1978 (1) SA 173
(W) at p 177G
-
178A
also stated that the
rule to make out an applicant's case in the founding papers is not an
absolute rule and that a Court has a
discretion to allow new matter
to remain in a replying affidavit, giving the respondent the
opportunity to deal with it in a second
set of answering affidavits.
[33]
In my opinion the facts
in casu,
over and above the
Respondents' procedural lapse, constitute special circumstances which
oblige me to exercise my discretion in
favour of the Applicants and
dictate that I should not strike out the new matter in the
Applicant's replying affidavit. I make
this decision for the
following reasons:
[33.1]
The new matter falls exclusively within the knowledge of the
Municipality and should in fairness to the Applicants have been
included in the review record as it is highly relevant to the matter
at hand. In this regard I cannot find that there will be any
prejudice to the Municipality if the application for striking out is
dismissed. In fact during argument, counsel for the Municipality
contended that the Municipality was well aware of all the new
documents.
[33.2]
This is not an ordinary motion, but a review application where a
supplementary affidavit is allowed and appropriate as a
matter of
course once a proper record is filed.
[33.3]
The Respondents have ignored the rule of practice that it is not
sufficient to rely on a striking out application alone,
and that they
were obliged to deal with the new allegations. At the beginning of
proceedings I invited all the Respondents to consider
whether they
would want the right to answer should the "new material" be
admitted. I repeated the invitation again during
the course of the
argument.
[33.4]
The tendering process constitutes a constitutional matter which must
be dealt with in a fair and transparent manner to uphold
the rule of
law in South Africa. Review thus constitutes a public law remedy. In
Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board of the Eastern Cape
2007
(3) SA 121
(CC)
Moseneke DCJ stated at paragraph [20]: ". .
.
when a tender board procures goods and services on behalf of
government it wields power derived first from the Constitution itself
and next from legislation in pursuit of constitutional goals. It
bears repetition that the exercise and control of public power
is
always a constitutional matter. Section 195 of the Constitution
further qualifies the exercise of public power by requiring
that
public administration be accountable, transparent and fair."
At
paragraph [29] of the judgment, Moseneke DCJ proceeds:
"Ultimately
the purpose of a public (law) remedy is to afford the prejudiced
party administrative justice, to advance efficient
and effective
public administration compelled by constitutional precepts and at a
broader level, to entrench the rule of law."
[33.5]
As tender processes are evaluated in terms of public law, any facts
which could adversely influence the constitutional principles
set out
in section 217 of the Constitution, should be placed before a Court
during a review application. This should preferably
be done by the
decision maker to uphold the integrity of the process. I must find
that even where the information was placed before
me by the
Applicants, Selby and Readira cannot complain of prejudice as they
had the opportunity with several invitations, to call
for the full
record or to answer to the new matter.
[33.6]
The Applicants were not aware of the new material at the time of
preparing the founding papers. The Applicants' counsel further
argued
that there was no legally valid reason to supplement after the filing
of the review records and prior to the filing of the
answering
affidavits. He submitted that an incomplete record is not a ground to
supplement.
[34]
For these reasons, I am not prepared to strike out the paragraphs as
identified by Readira or any other paragraphs from the
replying
affidavit. During argument I have on more than one occasion, without
any success, questioned the correctness of the Respondents'
refusal
to supplement or to seek supplementation of the record.
Grounds
of r
eview:
[35]
The Applicants raised three grounds of review which I will discuss
separately under the following sub-headings:
[35.1]
Broader Irregularities
[35.2]
Regulation 4
[35.3]
Plant and equipment
Ground
of review: Broader Irregularities:
[36]
The Applicants submitted that the broader irregularities in the
procurement process caused the awarding of the tenders to be
unlawful. Central to this issue is that the filed review record
contains no documentary indication that the correct procurement
processes were followed.
[37]
The purpose of the record is to determine whether the action taken by
the municipality is justifiable. In
Democratic Alliance and Others
v Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others
2012 (3)
SA 486
(SCA)
at paragraph [37], it is stated that
"In the
constitutional era courts are clearly empowered beyond the confines
of PAJA to scrutinise the exercise of public power
for compliance
with constitutional prescripts. That much is clear from the
Constitutional Court judgments set out above. It can
hardly be argued
that, in an era of greater transparency, accountability and access to
information,
a
record of decision related to the exercise of
public power that can be reviewed should not be made available,
whether in terms of
Rule 53 or by courts exercising their inherent
power to regulate their own process. Without the record
a
court
cannot perform its constitutionally entrenched review function, with
the result that
a
litigant's right in terms of s 34 of the
Constitution to have
a
justiciable dispute decided in
a
fair public hearing before
a
court with all the issues
being ventilated, would be infringed." (footnote omitted)
[38]
The filed review record in the Selby matter (Project 1) contains only
the tender bid submitted by the Applicants without any
further
markings thereon and a blank draft tender document of some 370 pages
of an unrelated tender document. The new documents
show that Selby
should have lost at least 30 percentage points on plants and
equipment on each tender. There is no evidence of
other scores
awarded to Selby during the first stage of determining functionality.
[39]
The filed review record in the Readira matter (Project 2) contains
the tender bid submitted by the Applicants without any further
markings thereon and a blank tender document similar to the one which
the Applicants submitted consisting of some 370 pages. Over
and above
the lack of showing that Selby passed the functionality test in
respect of project 2, there is no indication as to how
the award to
Selby turned into an award to Readira.
[40]
All the Respondents' counsel argued strongly that these records were
sufficient to make a finding that the tenders to Selby
and Readira
were regularly awarded, as it showed that the Applicants' bid did not
receive the requisite 70% on functionality, and
therefore did not
qualify to be considered in the second stage of the process. The
argument continues, that even if the "new
matter" in the
replying affidavit is not struck out, the Applicant does not have
locus standi
to seek a review on general irregularities during
the tender processes, other than to contest the decision on the
Applicants' functionality.
Reliance was placed on the matter of
Giant
Concerts
CC
v Rinaldo Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others
2013
(3) BCLR 251
(CC) ("Giant concerts') for this contention.
In
my opinion
Giant Concerts
is not applicable to the matter at
hand as it is not premised upon a tender process.
[41]
The Applicants' counsel, on the other hand, contended that if the
"new matter" in the founding affidavit is not struck
out,
it forms part of the grounds of review and, as an unsuccessful
bidder, the Applicants'
locus standi
is established
independently from the success of any of the grounds of appeal.
[42]
The filed review records are in my opinion severely deficient. With
only the Applicants' tender filed, the record cannot be
regarded as
showing that the tender was allocated in a fair, equitable,
transparent, competitive and cost effective manner. One
would have
expected the record to show at least which decisions were reached and
what the reasons for the decisions were. Section
5(3) of the PAJA
reads
"If
an administrator fails to furnish adequate reasons for an
administrative action it must,
...
in the
absence of proof to the contrary, be presumed in any proceedings for
judicial review that the administrative action was taken
without good
reason."
Serious
questions exist, especially in light of the so-called "new
material" which shows that the Readira tender was initially
awarded to Selby. The supply chain management policy of the
Municipality defines "final award" as "a final
decision
on which bid or quote to accept". Therefore once it was
accepted that Selby's bid was successful, the tender process closes,
unless section 114(1) of the Management Act comes into play. The
argument therefore that the municipality could just, at a whim,
substitute one successful bidder for the next, flies in the face of
all the constitutional principles applicable to State procurement.
Section 114(1) of the Management Act is part and parcel of a
procedure to ensure transparency, fairness and to curb what Wallis
JA
[11]
termed
"back-door
deals, the peddling of influence and other forms of corruption"
.
[43]
The Municipality, in accepting the Readira bid, was legally obliged
to comply with section 114(1) of the Management Act. Proof
of
compliance should have been in the review record. Had there been
compliance, proof of the notices to the Auditor-General, the
provincial treasury and the National treasury containing reasons for
this substitution could very easily have been placed in a
supplementary record during the month after the replying affidavit
was filed to the hearing of the matter. I therefore accept that
section 114(1) of the Management Act was not complied with.
[44]
Having accepted that in Project 2 there are no adequate reasons for
the appointment of Readira, I am unable to find that Readira's
appointment was fair and transparent. In addition, it is a
requirement of procedural fairness that a tenderer is not entitled to
withdraw his bid, especially after being successful. In circumstances
where Selby's bid was substantially less than that of Readira,
Selby
could not merely have withdrawn from the process as contractual
obligations had arisen. In not pursuing its private law remedies
and
merely awarding the tender at a higher price to Readira, the
Municipality failed, on the face of it, to act with transparency
and
cost-effectively.
[45]
In respect of Project 1, the filed review record bears no proof of
the reasons for the appointment of Selby. However in the
"new
matter" filed by the Applicants there is evidence that Selby did
not have the necessary plant and equipment. There
is no indication of
what Selby's scoring on the other functionality criteria were. It
would have been very easy for the Municipality
to have shown such a
score card. They elected not to do so. Selby could have dealt with
its functionality in its answering affidavit
or supplemented its
papers or asked that the record be supplemented. It deliberately
chose not to do so. I am therefore unable
to find that Selby's
appointment was transparent or fair in the circumstances.
[46]
Having made these findings, the question arises as to how this
impacts on the right to fair administrative action of the Applicants.
If I find that the Applicants' bids were wrongly disqualified during
the functionality evaluation, it goes without saying that
the second
part of the process and the appointment of Selby and Readira unfairly
impacted on the Applicants' right to fair administrative
action. In
light of my decision hereinunder in respect of functionality, it is
not necessary for me to consider the effect of the
finding that the
record does not show valid reasons for the appointments of Selby and
Readira, if the Applicants' bids were correctly
disqualified.
Ground
of review: Non-compliance with Regulation
4
:
[47]
The second ground of review is that the invitation to tender did not
comply with regulation 4 of the Preferential Procurement
Regulations.
I have quoted the full content of the regulation above under the
legislative framework.
[48]
The Applicants argue that the
invitation to tender
did not
objectively comply with three of the four requisites set out in
Regulation 4(3), in that the initial advertisement containing
an
invitation to tender did not set out the evaluation criteria for
measuring functionality, the weight of each criterion, nor
its
applicable values. As the Applicants regarded this as an absolute
requirement which must be tested objectively, the Applicants'
submission is that it was unnecessary to show any prejudice to them
as a result of this non-compliance. In fact the Applicants
cannot
point to any prejudice as they were fully aware of these requisites
at the time of filing their bids.
[49]
The Preferential Procurement Regulations do not define "invitation
to tender." The Applicants' argument is that "invitation
to
tender" consists only of the first publication of a tender in a
newspaper or on the Municipality's website. The Respondents'
argument
is that this cannot constitute a ground for review if I undertake a
purposive interpretation of Regulation 4. It is in
my opinion not
necessary to decide whether the Applicants' contention is correct or
whether "invitation to tender" also
includes further
communications such as "price quotations, advertised competitive
tendering processes or proposals,"
as contemplated in regulation
1(s) of the Preferential Procurement Regulations. I will accept,
without deciding, that the Applicants
are correct in their contention
and have therefore established a ground of review under section
6(2)(b) of PAJA, namely that a
mandatory and material procedure
prescribed by an empowering provision was not complied with. If I
make such a finding, then I
am obliged to declare the tender
unlawful.
[50]
Although I am mindful not to confuse process and outcome as cautioned
by Froneman J in the
Al/Pay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty)
Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer, South African Social
Security Agency, and
Others
2014 (1) SA 604
(CC), herein referred
to as
"Al/pay matter of November 2014" ,
I am
equally satisfied that if this was the only ground of review, I would
not have afforded the Applicants the relief they seek
in deciding
what a just and equitable order would be. In considering what an
appropriate order would be, Froneman J in paragraph
[56] of the
Al/pay matter of November 2014
stated that a court may take
into consideration whether despite such breach a similar outcome
would have ensued. I am of the opinion
that I may at this stage look
at prejudice to the bidders. I must also look at public interest.
There was no prejudice to any of
the parties before me. There is no
indication that the Municipality would have reached a different
outcome, even if Regulation
4 were fully complied with.
[51]
Even if I accept that the Applicants' are correct in raising this
ground of review, I am unable to find that it is fair or
equitable to
afford the Applicants' the relief they seek on this ground of review.
I am obliged to find that the Applicants are
nonsuited on this
ground of appeal.
Ground
of review: Plant and equipment
[52]
Prior to the launching of the urgent application, the Municipality
did not give reasons for their decision to disqualify the
Applicants'
bids, despite a request from the Applicants. Neither did the
Municipality implement any attempt at risk management
and resolution
of the dispute, as they are required to do in a procedurally fair
process. I will come back to this aspect later
in the judgment.
[53]
According to the bid documents, functionality was evaluated on four
criteria, namely:
[53.1]
Reputation and reference: This weighs 40 percentage points with a
grading system depending on company experience for the
previous five
years and the value of a previous road updating tender. Highest
points were awarded for successful completion of
a contract of more
than R80 million and lowest points for a contract of more than R40
million. It is accepted by all parties that
the Applicants should
have scored 40 percentage points for this.
[53.2]
Financial References: This weighs 10 percentage points depending on
the bidder's bank rating. It is accepted by all parties
that the
Applicants should have scored 10 percentage points for this.
[53.3]
Experience of staff and personnel: This weighs 20 percentage points.
The Municipality required an academic requirement as
a minimum
requisite before evaluating the number of years of the site agent.
Although the Applicants' site agent has more than
25 years'
experience, which constitutes more experience than necessary for the
maximum score provided for in the evaluation, he
did not have the
requisite academic qualification. It is accepted by all parties that
the Applicants scored zero percentage points
here.
[53.4]
Plant and equipment: This weighs 30 percentage points. The
Municipality chose not to work with a grading in respect of the
requisite plant and equipment, but rather with an
"all or
nothing"
approach. This means that if a bidder did not have
all the plant and equipment, that bidder would receive a zero score,
even if
that bidder was in possession of most of the equipment. This
will hold true even if a bidder just lacks one piece of plant or
equipment.
I fail to see the logic of this, but I am not called to
second guess the criteria determined by the Municipality due to the
principle
of deference. The Applicants scored zero. It is in dispute
that this score was correctly and fairly given. I will proceed to
deal
with this issue further herein under.
[54]
On 28 July 2015
[12]
, the BEG
signed a spreadsheet listing the equipment each of the bidders had
available. The spreadsheet is clearly marked for Project
1 and 2.
According to this spreadsheet not a single bidder could have received
any score for plant and equipment. On the spreadsheet
the Applicants'
position on plant and equipment is far more favourable than that of
the other bidders. The document reflects that
the Applicants had all
the items necessary to receive full marks, but for an excavator, a
water tanker and a grader. Selby had
no plant and equipment. Readira
had no equipment under four categories and the wrong equipment under
two further categories.
[55]
The spreadsheet is however incorrect in reflecting that the
Applicants lacked the required plant and equipment. In fact their
bid
had shown that they had two excavators, two water tankers and two
graders. Their bid clearly stated that the Joint Venture
owned and
have available all the required plant and equipment for the upgrading
of the roads and all registration papers were attached
to that
statement.
[56]
The reason for the non-appearance of the items on the spreadsheet is
quite simple. In the attached registration certificates
the
excavators are described as "long crawlers," a common name
for excavators; and the water tankers and graders were
not identified
as such on the registration certificates.
[57]
In its report dated 9 July 2015 the BEC indicated that their
evaluation of the bid was completed on 9 July 2015. It is clear
from
the spreadsheet that the BEC's purpose was to establish whether each
bid had the necessary equipment available by looking
at the attached
registration certificates. They wrongly came to the conclusion that
none of the companies had excavators. The report
then states,
interestingly enough, that some of the vehicle licencing certificates
did not have a vehicle description on it. Consequently
the BEC
contacted a licencing officer at the Municipality to ascertain why
the licencing documents did not contain a description.
This unnamed
official told the BEC that the vehicle owners were responsible to
ensure that the description of a vehicle is correctly
captured. Based
on this, and without any further clarification, the Applicants (and
presumably others) were merely disqualified.
The BAC on the face of
the documents merely concurred with the recommendation of the BEC.
[58]
The Municipality's reason for the disqualification of the Applicants'
bid was that the Applicants were unable to score the
requisite 70% on
the functionality test. The lack of the necessary academic
qualifications of the site manager and the fact that
the Applicants'
joint venture
could not prove that it had ownership of and/or
lease contracts for the necessary road construction equipment were
given as the
two reasons why the Applicants were unable to score the
requite 70%.
[59]
I am satisfied that the mentioned documents do not bear out that
there was ever a problem with the fact that the Applicants'
joint
venture did not own the plant and equipment as given as the reason by
the Municipality
ex post facto.
As a joint venture is not a
legal persona it would be impossible for the registration papers to
be in the name of the joint venture.
The only reasonable inference to
be made from the report, as was contended by the Applicants' counsel,
is that the ownership issue
of the Applicants' joint venture was an
afterthought. Coupled with the fact that no reasons were given when
the Applicants sought
same before the interim interdict, and the fact
that the Municipality did not provide the necessary documents dealing
with the
scoring during both stages of the tender process, this
raises a reasonable suspicion that the Municipality did not act with
the
necessary transparency. The reports by the BEC and the BAC,
coupled with the spreadsheet on plant and equipment, clearly indicate
that these committees were only interested in determining whether
there was a licencing certificate with a description of each
of the
necessary road construction motor vehicles to show that the bidders
had access to specific equipment. If it was contended
as per the
reasons given by the Municipality that ownership was in issue, then
the spreadsheet would have shown no plant and equipment
for the
Applicants, whereas as indicated above, the Applicants only lacked
equipment under three categories.
[60]
Realising that the registration certificates did not contain the
correct and/or full description of the plant and equipment,
the BEC
sought internal clarification. This bears out that the BEC realised
that their assessment of the availability of the respective
bidders'
plant and equipment could not be correct. The internal answer
received to the query, that the blame for the absence of
a full
description on the registration certificate lies at the door of the
owner of the vehicles, cannot be considered relevant
to the decision
the BEC had to make. The decision was whether the bidders had the
necessary plant and equipment, and not who is
to blame for the
perceived faulty or incomplete registration. Without giving the
bidders a reasonable opportunity to respond to
the advice sought or
to clarify the position, the BEC just found that the bidders' did not
have the necessary plant and equipment,
despite knowing this to be
incorrect. The Applicants' rights and/or legitimate expectations were
therefor adversely affected by
the BEC's evaluation of the
availability of the bidders' plant and equipment.
[61]
The BEC's so-called "consultation" with another municipal
official, after realising that the licencing certificates
did not
contain the necessary descriptions, and then not to give the
Applicants (and the other bidders) the opportunity to respond
thereto, offends against the rules of natural justice. Fairness must
be decided in each case with reference to the circumstances
of that
case. The BEC and BAC has therefore not acted procedurally fairly
towards the Applicants and other bidders as contemplated
in PAJA.
[62]
Both the BEG and the BAG must have realised that they were not acting
procedurally fairly vis-a-vis the bidders who have attached
registration certificates and who contended that the registration
certificates pertained to the necessary equipment. More so in
the
case of the Applicants, where there was a formal document on a
letterhead of the Applicants' joint venture indicating that
the
necessary plant and equipment are owned and available, and a
sufficient number of registration certificates were attached.
[63]
I am mindful of the dictum of Conradie JA in
Metro Projects
CC
and Another v Klerksdorp Local Municipality and Others
[2004] 1
All SA 504
(SCA)
where he stated:
"In Logbro Properties
Cameron JA referred to the 'ever-flexible duty to act fairly' that
rested on a provincial tender committee.
Fairness must be decided on
the circumstances of each case. It may in given circumstances be fair
to ask a tenderer to explain
an ambiguity in its tender; it may be
fair to allow a tenderer to correct an obvious mistake; it may,
particularly in a complex
tender, be fair to ask for clarification or
details required for its proper evaluation. Whatever is done may not
cause the process
to Jose the attribute of fairness or, in the local
government sphere, the attributes of transparency, competitiveness
and cost-effectiveness."
(Citations omitted).
[64]
The matter before me is definitely a complex matter due to the length
of the tender book (consisting of 370 pages) as well
as the very high
cost of the projects. As the Municipality was aware that the
Applicants and other tenderers had the plant available
but that the
registration documents did not bear the correct registration, they
were obliged in my opinion to have called for clarification
of the
registration documents attached to the bid. Having not done so has
especially infringed upon transparency and cost effectiveness
of the
whole process.
[65]
Having acted in this unreasonable manner, the Municipality has
disqualified the Applicants' bid (and probably other bidders)
on
functionality, in circumstances where the Applicants' bid should have
been considered in the second process. The Applicant's
bid was lower
than that of Selby in both projects. It therefore stands to be
reasoned that the outcome could have been different,
depending on the
BEEE status of the Applicants, had the Applicants been included in
the second process.
[66]
In the circumstances I find that the Applicants' review as
contemplated in PAJA must succeed. The Municipality did not act
procedurally fair towards the Applicants (and probably other
bidders), they further took irrelevant considerations into account
and did not consider relevant considerations; and the decision is not
rationally connected to the reasons stated therefor by the
Municipality.
Relief
[67]
Having now found that the Applicants have succeeded in showing that
their rights were adversely affected by the administrative
action of
the Municipality in awarding the tenders, I must consider what relief
is fair and equitable.
[68]
All the Respondents raised the issue of money already spent in
fulfilling the tender, and the financial prejudice that will
result
in a re-advertisement of the tender. This is indeed an important
factor which a review court should consider in the exercise
of its
discretion in formulating a remedy. However, in my opinion, this
factor must be considered against the facts of each matter.
At the
time when the interim interdict was sought, the Applicants had shown
through undisputed evidence that, at that stage, no
work had been
commenced with. Despite this, the Respondents failed to state when
the work (now allegedly done) was in fact done.
I was not informed
whether the work commenced prior to the granting of the interim
interdict or not, but I am told that after the
granting of the
interim interdict, it was necessary for the Applicants to bring a
further application to interdict the Respondents
from continuing the
work on the two tenders. Both Selby and Readira brought an
Application for Leave to Appeal after the granting
of the interim
interdict. Despite the Applicants' contention that no appeal lies
against the granting of an interim interdict,
the Respondents
continued to work on the projects. The issue whether an interim order
is appealable was discussed in
National Treasury and Others v
Opposition To Urban Tolling Alliance and Others
2012 (6) SA 223
(CC),
but I am not called upon to decide whether the interim order in
this case was appealable or not. Counsel for both Selby and Readira
has disavowed that they would have given advice to proceed with work
after the interim interdict.
[69]
The only inference to be drawn is that the Respondents were well
aware of the assumed risk when they, without a court's ruling,
and
after having been informed of the Applicants' position, commenced or
continued to work on the projects. As such, any prejudice
which they
may have suffered in consequence of their actions is entirely
self-created. Having made this finding however, I cannot
neglect to
deal with the Municipality's role in allowing the projects to
continue. Although the Municipality was obliged in terms
of
Regulation 41 of the Supply Chain Management Regulations to do proper
risk management, the Municipality did not adhere to the
Regulation.
Counsel for the Municipality indicated that it was not necessary for
the Municipality to ensure that no work be done
at the time of the
Applicants' objection prior to the interdict, as the Municipality was
of the view that the objection did not
hold water. Neither did the
Municipality employ risk management in response to the interim
interdict as the Municipality was of
the opinion that the Applicants'
review application, after the interdict, was doomed to fail. Such an
attitude is a dangerous one
and again offends against the rules of
natural justice; but in the face of a valid court order, it is
contemptuous. The Municipality,
in not implementing risk management,
failed in its constitutional duty of acting in a procedural fair
manner.
[70]
Both Selby and Readira have raised the issue that the community is
entitled to the envisaged tar road and to proper service
delivery.
This is undoubtedly so. The community is entitled to prompt and
efficient service delivery. The question is however,
if the rule of
law is breached in awarding the tenders, must the community's wish
for a continuation of the unlawfully awarded
tender proceed, because
they are anxious that the road be completed, or must the rule of law
be upheld and thereby postpone the
completion of the road, which was
envisaged to have been competed at the end of 2017, with six or more
months. In my opinion the
rule of law must weigh heavier. Ultimately
any State procurement that does not uphold the rule of law and/or
which does not seem
to do so through a transparent process, defies
the rule of law and works to the detriment of the general public.
More often than
not, this detriment is most visible in the lives of
the most vulnerable members of our society. On the other hand if the
procurement
processes are transparent and fair, it combats
corruption, creates work opportunities and cost effective
infrastructure. This in
turn creates public confidence.
[71]
The Applicants requested that I, in considering what a fair remedy
should be, should consider an order that the Municipality
compensate
Selby and Readira for the work already done on Projects 1 and 2. I
have given serious consideration to this suggestion.
Neither Selby
nor Readira have requested this. I have decided not to do so, as I do
not want to limit any remedy that either party
may have against the
Municipality or vice-a-versa.
Order:
[72]
It is therefore ordered under case number 99728/15 that:
[72.1]
The First Respondent's (Municipality's) decision to disqualify the
Applicants' bid for Project 06/2015 - for upgrading of
the gravel
road between Mafarana and Burgersfort (Project 1) to a tar road is
reviewed and set aside.
[72.2]
The Municipality's decision to award the tender in Project 1 to the
Second Respondent, as well as the service level agreement
entered
into between the Municipality and the Second Respondent as a result
thereof, are reviewed and set aside.
[72.3]
The Municipality is to commence afresh with the tender process within
21 days of this order.
[72.4]
The Respondents are to pay the Applicants' costs jointly and
severally, the one paying the other to be absolved. These costs
should include the costs consequent on the employment of two counsel.
[73]
It is ordered under case number 99729/15 that:
[73.1]
The First Respondent's (Municipality's) decision to disqualify the
Applicants' bid for Project 02/2015 - for upgrading the
gravel road
from Moruji to Matshwi/Kheshokolwe to a tar road (hereinafter
referred to as Project 2) is reviewed and set aside.
[73.2]
The Municipality's decision to award the tender in Project 2 to the
Second and Third Respondents, as well as the service
level agreements
entered into between the Municipality and Second and Third
Respondents as a result thereof, are reviewed and set
aside.
[73.3]
The Municipality is to commence afresh with the tender process within
21 days of this order.
[73.4]
The Respondents are to pay the Applicants' costs jointly and
severally, the one paying the other to be absolved. These costs
should include the costs consequent on the employment of two counsel.
-------------------------
E.
CROUSE
Acting
Judge of the High Court
Attorney
for the Applicant in case numbers 99728/15 & 99729/15:
THOMAS
& SWANEPOEL INC
Clo
DELPORT VAN DEN BERG ATTORNEYS
PRETORIA
Tel:
012 - 361 5002
Email:
louis@tsonline.co.za//m.pienaar@delberg.co.za
Ref:
Merike Pienaar/MP0426
Attorney
for the First Respondent in case numbers 99728/15 & 99729/15:
MAHOWA
INC
c/o
GILDENHUYS MALATJI INC PRETORIA
Tel:
015 - 307 4574
Ref:
Mashudu Rambau//Mahowa/km/101854
Attorney
for the Second Respondent in case number 9972811
5:
JACK
HAJIBEY INC
Clo
ROOTH & WESSELS ATT
PRETORIA
Tel:
012 - 452 4000
Ref:
SHAHEEN BHYAT
I
RS
I
S1419
Attorneys
for the Second and Third Respondent in case number 9972911
5:
MCULU
INCORPORATED
Clo
MAFUYEKA & ASSOCIATES
PRETORIA
Tel:
012 - 343 2187
Ref:
R081CIV CAM SM0383
[1]
In some of the tender documents reference is made to Burgersdorp
instead of Burgerfort. I accept for purposes of this judgment
that
it should be Burgerfort as the latter, unlike Burgersdorp, falls
within the jurisdiction of the Municipality.
[2]
Regulations 26-29 of the Supply Chain Management Regulations.
[3]
Regulation 1(s) of the Preferred Procurement Regulations.
[4]
Regulation 41 of the Supply Chain Management Regulations.
[5]
Regulations 49 and 50 of the Supply Chain Regulations.
[6]
Regulation 1(k) of the Preferred Procurement Regulations.
[7]
Regulation 6 of the Preferred Procurement Regulations, for tenders
in excess of R10 million whereby a bidder with the lowest
tender
will receive 90 percentage points and a maximum of 10 further points
determined by the bidders B-BBEE status level. (Regulation
1 defines
B-BBEE"
as
broad-based black economic empowerment as defined in section 1 of
the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act)
[8]
Section 2(1) of the Preferential Procurement Act
[9]
In their Notice in terms of Rule 6(15).
[10]
Although this refers to a paragraph which should be before the
previous paragraph, it is not so. After paragraph 41, the
Applicants'
founding affidavit continues with a second paragraph 25.
[11]
South
African National Roads Agency Ltd v Toll Collect Consortium
2013 (6)
SA 356
(SCA) at [18].
[12]
Although this spreadsheet was signed by the BEC nearly 20 days after
their recommendation to the BAC, I make no inference of
mala
fides
here.
It is equally plausible that they had a handwritten spreadsheet at
the time of making their recommendation.