Lessing v Van Niekerk and Another (33378/13) [2016] ZAGPPHC 577 (14 April 2016)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Delict — Negligence — Liability for injuries caused by a defective security gate — Plaintiff injured when a security gate, designed and installed by the first defendant, fell on her — Plaintiff claimed damages for personal injuries sustained — Court considered whether the first defendant acted negligently in the design and installation of the gate, which was found to have inherent stability issues — Expert testimony indicated that the gate did not meet safety standards and posed a risk of injury — Court held that the first defendant was liable for the plaintiff's injuries due to failure to ensure the gate's safety and stability, constituting negligence.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This was a delictual damages claim arising from personal injuries sustained when a security gate allegedly designed, manufactured, installed, and maintained by the first defendant fell onto the plaintiff. The plaintiff instituted action in the Gauteng Division, Pretoria (North Gauteng High Court), seeking to hold the defendants liable in damages.


The parties were Jacoba Magdalena Lessing (plaintiff) and Mr Van Niekerk (first defendant) together with Anna Maria Van Niekerk (second defendant). The defendants were married to each other and resided at the premises where the incident occurred.


Procedurally, the parties agreed to a separation of merits and quantum, and the trial before Tolmay R concerned merits only (liability). Evidence was led by the plaintiff, her daughter, and an expert in the manufacture of security gates (Mr Harrop-Allin). Both defendants testified.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned whether the defendants were wrongful and negligent in relation to the construction and safety of the gate (and, in the case of the second defendant, in relation to duties as landlord/sub-lessor), and whether that conduct caused the plaintiff’s injuries.


2. Material Facts


The court accepted that the first and second defendants had rented the property at 97 11th Street, Menlo Park, Pretoria from about March 2009. In September 2012, the second defendant concluded an agreement with the plaintiff in terms of which the plaintiff rented a flat on that property from the second defendant. Although it emerged during trial that the second defendant lacked authority to sublet, the court treated that fact as irrelevant to the issues for decision.


It was common cause that a security gate ran alongside the house from the house to the boundary wall. The gate was described as approximately 3 to 3.5 metres long and weighing about 80 kilograms. The first defendant designed, made, installed, and maintained the gate.


When the defendants left for holiday at or about 30 September 2012, the plaintiff remained at the premises and accepted responsibility for feeding the defendants’ dogs. There was a dispute whether she was asked to do so or volunteered, but the court held the dispute to be immaterial.


The feeding routine required the plaintiff to operate the security gate so that the dogs could be separated on different sides while eating. From 30 September 2012 until 2 October 2012 the routine proceeded without incident. On 3 October 2012 at approximately 18:00, while feeding the dogs, the plaintiff said she closed the gate properly and, while looking down at the food bowls, the gate fell onto her without warning. She landed on her back with the gate on top of her, and she subsequently obtained assistance and was taken to hospital.


It was common cause that the defendants returned early from holiday after being informed. The following morning the first defendant made changes to the gate. There were disputes about the precise nature and extent of the changes, including whether reinforcements were added only on the sides or also in the middle, whether a stop was added to the track, and whether stoppers had existed before the incident or were merely re-welded afterwards. The parties were, however, agreed that the gate had a U-shaped arch at the top, that an additional plate was added after the incident to widen that arch, and that a lock was installed.


The plaintiff led expert evidence from Mr Harrop-Allin, who could not inspect the gate directly but relied on photographs and his experience in the field. He testified that, although no regulations or legislation specifically governed security gate construction, gates should meet safety requirements. He identified features which, in his view, rendered the gate unsafe (including the absence of stabilising components such as certain posts or a guide wheel, the unsuitability of top rollers for stabilisation, and concerns about the top arm length). There was also evidence that the track was not horizontal (the first defendant testified to a 2° slope), which the expert considered potentially relevant to stability. While there was dispute about the adequacy and presence of stoppers, the expert’s broader criticisms concerned stability and safety design features.


The first defendant’s evidence was that he had experience in making gates (having made seven gates) and that the gate had been used frequently for approximately two and a half years without incident. He could not explain why it fell and suggested, speculatively, that the plaintiff might have become dizzy and hung onto the gate. The court treated that suggestion as speculation and further observed that, even if accepted, it would still tend to indicate the gate could be destabilised by a slight person, implying an inherent safety problem.


3. Legal Issues


The central questions were whether the defendants incurred delictual liability for the plaintiff’s injuries, specifically whether the falling gate constituted wrongful and negligent conduct attributable to the defendants and causally linked to the harm.


The dispute primarily concerned the application of legal standards to the facts, including whether the incident justified an inference of negligence and whether the defendants discharged any evidential burden to rebut that inference. It also involved evaluative judgments about foreseeability, the reasonable steps expected of a person in the defendants’ positions, and the standard of care applicable to a person who undertakes the specialised task of manufacturing and installing a heavy security gate.


A further issue was whether the circumstances justified reliance on the reasoning commonly associated with res ipsa loquitur, namely whether the occurrence itself supported an inference of negligence where the precise mechanism of failure remained unknown.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter through the established requirements for delictual liability under the actio legis Aquiliae, emphasising that actionable liability depends on recognised unlawfulness/wrongfulness and negligence. Referring to Loureiro v Imvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd, the court noted that negligent conduct is not actionable merely because it is negligent; it must also be recognised as unlawful.


On wrongfulness, the court considered that the event—the gate falling onto the plaintiff and causing physical injury—was prima facie wrongful in the circumstances, as it resulted in harm. The analysis then moved to negligence, applying the test in Kruger v Coetzee, namely whether a diligens paterfamilias in the defendants’ position would foresee the reasonable possibility of harm, would take reasonable steps to prevent it, and whether the defendants failed to take those steps.


The court evaluated the positions and roles of each defendant. In relation to the first defendant, the court stressed that he had manufactured, installed, and maintained the gate and claimed experience in doing so. Because he undertook a task requiring specialised competence, the court held that the appropriate standard was that of a reasonable manufacturer/installer of security gates, and that he owed a duty to persons using the gate to ensure it was made and installed safely and maintained adequately.


In relation to the second defendant, the court treated her as occupying the position of a landlord (in the context of the letting arrangement with the plaintiff) and held that she should have ensured that the security gate on the premises she let did not present a danger to tenants. The court referenced authority for the proposition that a landlord bears responsibilities regarding dangerous conditions on leased premises.


A key element of the court’s reasoning was that the very nature of the event—the unexpected collapse/fall of a large security gate—supported an inference that such an occurrence does not ordinarily happen without negligence. The court indicated that this brought the reasoning associated with res ipsa loquitur into consideration. Relying on Arthur v Bezuidenhout and Mieny and C Goliath v The MEC for Health in the Province of the Eastern Cape, the court treated res ipsa loquitur not as a presumption shifting the onus, but as a permissible inference assisting a court to conclude that a prima facie case of negligence has been established on the proven occurrence.


The court held that, once the plaintiff proved the occurrence giving rise to an inference of negligence, the defendants needed to present evidence explaining the incident or otherwise displacing the inference. The court found the defendants did not provide a satisfactory explanation for why the gate fell. The first defendant’s suggestion that the plaintiff might have become dizzy and held onto the gate was regarded as speculative and inadequate to rebut the inference.


The court further accepted the essence of the expert evidence that there were multiple potential construction/installation deficiencies that could account for the gate’s instability and the incident. While acknowledging that the expert had not inspected the gate directly and relied on photographs (and that photographs could mislead on certain details such as stoppers), the court found that several characteristics relevant to stability were visible and largely undisputed. The dispute, in the court’s view, was less about what the gate looked like and more about whether the identified features could compromise safety. The court concluded that the gate was unsafe and that negligence could be inferred from the fall itself, supported by the expert’s identification of defects capable of causing such an event.


The court also rejected the argument that a long period of use without prior incident necessarily proved the gate was safe. It reasoned that the absence of earlier mishaps did not exclude the possibility that the gate nevertheless presented an inherent risk that eventually materialised.


Ultimately, the court concluded that the plaintiff had proved negligence prima facie and, given the absence of a cogent rebuttal, on a balance of probabilities. The most plausible inference, on the court’s reasoning, was that some defect in the manufacture, installation, and/or maintenance of the gate caused it to fall and injure the plaintiff, rendering the defendants liable.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court held that the plaintiff proved that the defendants were liable for the harm suffered as a result of the gate falling on her.


The court ordered that the defendants were jointly and severally liable for 100% of the plaintiff’s damages arising from the incident, with quantum standing over due to the earlier separation.


The defendants were ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.


Cases Cited


Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd 1978 (4) SA 901 (N).


Loureiro v Imvula Quality Protection (Pty) Ltd 2014 (3) SA 394 (CC).


Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A).


Swinburn v Newbee Investments (Pty) Ltd 2010 (5) SA 296.


Arthur v Bezuidenhout and Mieny 1962 (2) SA 566 (A).


C Goliath v The MEC for Health in the Province of the Eastern Cape (085/2014) [2014] ZASCA 182 (25 November 2014).


Groenewald v Conradie; Groenewald en Andere v Auto Protection Insurance Co Ltd 1965 (1) SA 184 (AD).


Madyosi v SA Eagle Insurance Co Ltd [1990] ZASCA 65; 1990 (3) SA 442 (A).


Osborne Panama SA v Shell & BP South African Petroleum Refineries (Pty) Ltd 1982 (4) SA 890 (A).


Naure NO v Transvaal Boot and Shoe Manufacturing Co 1938 AD 379.


Ballard v Northern British Railway Co 60 Sc LR 448.


Ratcliffe v Plymouth and Torbay Health Authority [1998] EWCA Civ 2000 (11 February 1998).


Legislation Cited


No legislation was cited as governing the construction or installation of security gates, and no specific statutory provision formed part of the court’s reasoning.


Rules of Court Cited


No Rules of Court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court found that the falling of the security gate onto the plaintiff, causing injury, justified an inference that the gate was unsafe and that the defendants were negligent in relation to its manufacture, installation, and/or maintenance (and, for the second defendant, in failing to ensure the premises were not dangerous to a tenant). The defendants failed to provide a satisfactory explanation to rebut the inference arising from the occurrence. On the evidence, including the expert testimony identifying safety deficiencies, the plaintiff discharged the onus of proving negligence on a balance of probabilities.


The defendants were declared jointly and severally liable for 100% of the plaintiff’s damages arising from the incident, and they were ordered jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff’s costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Delictual liability under the actio legis Aquiliae requires proof of conduct that is wrongful (unlawful) and negligent, causally linked to legally recognised harm. Negligence alone is not automatically actionable; the law must recognise the conduct as wrongful in context.


The test for negligence remains that formulated in Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A), requiring assessment of whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would foresee harm, would take reasonable preventative steps, and whether the defendant failed to take those steps.


Where a defendant undertakes a task requiring specialised skill, the standard of care may be assessed with reference to what a reasonable person competent in that field would do. A person who manufactures and installs a heavy security gate owes a duty to users to ensure it is safely constructed, installed, and maintained.


A landlord or person letting premises has responsibilities to ensure that features on the premises do not pose a danger to tenants.


The reasoning associated with res ipsa loquitur does not create a presumption shifting the onus, but permits an inference of negligence where the occurrence is such that it would not ordinarily happen without negligence. Once the plaintiff proves the occurrence supporting that inference, the defendant bears an evidential burden to provide an explanation; speculative hypotheses are insufficient to displace the inference. The ultimate question remains whether the plaintiff has proved negligence on a balance of probabilities.

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[2016] ZAGPPHC 577
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Lessing v Van Niekerk and Another (33378/13) [2016] ZAGPPHC 577 (14 April 2016)

IN DIE HOë HOF VAN
SUID-AFRIKA
(GAUTENG AFDELING,
PRETORIA)
SAAKNOMMER:
33378/13
DATUM:
14/4/16
Not
reportable
Not
of interest to other judges
Revised.
IN
DIE SAAK TUSSEN
JACOBA MAGDALENA
LESSING                                                                             EISER
EN
MNR
VAN
NIEKERK                                                                     EERSTE

VERWEERDER
ANNA
MARIA VAN
NIEKERK
TWEEDE
VERWEERDER
UITSPRAAK
TOLMAY, R:
INLEIDING:
[1]
Die eiseres het 'n eis ingestel teen die verweerders nadat 'n
sekuritietshek wat deur die eerste verweerder ontwerp, gemaak
en
geinstalleer is op haar geval het. Die partye  het ooreengekom
dat quantum en meriete geskei word en op hierdie stadium
is net die
eis ten aansien van die meriete deur my aangehoor. Namens eiseres het
sy, haar dogter en Mnr Harrop-Allin, 'n deskundige
ten aansien van
die vervaardiging van sekuriteitshekke, getuig. Eerste en tweede
verweerders het ook getuig.
DIE GETUIENIS:
[2]
Die eerste en tweede verweerders, wat met mekaar getroud is, het
vanaf ongeveer Maart 2009 die perseel gelee te Elfdestraat
97,
Menlopark, Pretoria gehuur. Gedurende September 2012 het tweede
verweerderes 'n ooreenkoms met eiseres gesluit in terme waarvan

eiseres 'n woonstel op die gemelde perseel van tweede verweerderes
gehuur het. Tydens die verhoor het dit geblyk dat tweede verweerderes

nie gemagtig was om die woonstel te onderverhuur nie, maar die feit
is irrelevant vir doeleindes van hierdie saak. Eiseres het
saam met
haar dogter in die woonstel gewoon.  Op of ongeveer 30 September
2012 het die verweerders met vakansie na Balito
vetrek en het eiseres
se dogter saam met hulle geneem. Eiseres het tuis gebly en het oak
verantwoordelikheid aanvaar om die verweerders
se honed kos te gee.
Daar was 'n geskil of sy gevra is en of sy aangebied het om dit te
doen, dit is egter irrelevant vir doeleindes
van hierdie saak.
[3]
Die proses om die honde kos te gee het ingesluit dat sy moes seker
maak dat die honde afsonderlik gevoer word. Langs die huis
was 'n
sekuriteitshek wat vanaf die huis tot die grensmuur gestrek het en
wat volgens eerste verweerder ongeveer 3 - 3.5 m lank
was en ±
80 kg geweeg het. Eerste verweerder het hierdie hek gemaak,
ge"lnstalleer en instand gehou. Eiseres moes die
hek oopmaak en
seker maak dat die honde aan verskillende kante van die hek is
voordat sy hulle kos gee. Dit het beteken dat sy
die hek moes oopmaak
een van die honde laat deurkom en die hek toe maak. Sy moes dan
toesien dat die honde klaar eet voordat sy
hulle weer toelaat om aan
dieselfde kant van die hek te wees. Vanaf 30 September 2012 tot 2
Oktober 2012 het die proses glad verloop.
Op 3 Oktober 2012 teen
ongeveer 18:00 het sy, soos die vorige aande weer die honde kos gegee
op die wyse hierbo beskryf en volgens
haar het sy die hek behoorlik
toegemaak. Toe sy klaar was en volgens haar besig was om af te kyk na
die bakke het die hek sander
enige waarskuwing op haar geval. Sy het
op haar rug met die hek bo-op haar beland. Sy het getuig dat sy onder
die hek uitgeseil
het om by haar selfoon, wat klaarblyklik deur die
momentum uit haar hand gestamp is, uit te kom. Sy het tweede
verweerderes gebel
wat hulp ontbied het en eiseres wat beserings
opgedoen het is dan ook hospitaal toe geneem. Eerste en tweede
verweerders het onmiddelik
hulle  vakansie  onderbreek en
teruggekeer na Pretoria. Hulle het ongeveer tussen 01:00 en 02:00 die
volgende oggend
by die huis aangekom. Die eerste verweerder het die
volgende oggend sekere veranderings aan die hek aangebring, wat
hierdie  veranderings
presies behels het is in geskil, daarna
het eiseres se dogter en die verweerders se seun die hek geverf.
Volgens eiseres en haar
dogter is 3 versterkings aan die kante en
middel van die  hek aangebring, volgens eerste verweerder is net
versterkings aan
die kante aangebring, die een in die middle was
volgens horn reeds daar. Volgens eiseres en haar dogter is daar 'n
stop op die
spoor aangebring, volgens eerste verweerder was daar 'n
stop beide aan die voor en agterkant van die hek, maar die bestaande
stoppers
is net weer gesweis om doodseker te maak dat dit veilig is.
Die partye is dit eens dat daar 'n U-boog aan die bokant van die hek

was waarin die hek tot stilstand gekom het, en dat eerste verweerder
'n addisionele plaat aangebring het na die insident wat die
U-boog
verbreed het. Hulle stem ook saam dat 'n slot aangebring is. Uit
bogenoemde is dit duidelik dat die partye slegs op 'n enkele
punte
van mekaar verskil.
[4]
Getuienis is gelei oor wanneer tweede verweerderes eiseres in die
hospitaal besoek het, klaarblyklik om gebrek aan belangstelling
en
empatie te toon. Na my mening is hierdie getuienis irrelevant vir
doeleindes van hierdie saak wees en handel ek nie daarmee
nie.
[5]
Die eiseres het 'n deskundige, Mnr Harrop-Allin geroep om te
kom getuig oar wat vereis word om te verseker dat 'n sekuriteitshek

veilig is. Hy was vir baie jare die besturende direkteur van 'n
maatskappy wat heinings en hekke vervaardig en installeer. Hy het

getuig dat hy nie daarin kon slaag om die hek te inspekteer nie, maar
het ten aansien van die fotos sekere afleidings gemaak en
het ook
getuig ten opsigte van wat vereis word om te verseker dat 'n
sekuriteitshek veilig is. Fotos van die sekuriteitshek soos
dit na
die veranderings deur eerste verweerder daarna uitsien is deurgaans
in die verhoor deur beide partye na verwys. Volgens
horn bestaan daar
nie regulasies of wetgewing ten aansien van die oprigting van
sekuriteitshekke  nie, maar 'n hek moet wel
aan sekere vereiste
voldoen ten einde veilig te wees. Hy het horn ook uitgespreek dat
mense wat nie oor die kundigheid beskik hekke
maak wat 'n risiko daar
stel. Hy het getuig dat die hek onveilig is en dat dit steeds
onveilig is selfs na die aanbring van die
veranderings deur die
eerste verweerder. Volgens horn moet daar 2 pale, alternatief, 'n
gidswiel ge·1nstalleer wees om stabiliteit
van die hek te
verseker. Hy getuig dat die hek soos gesien op die fotos nie hieraan
voldoen nie. Daar is nie deur die verweerders
aangevoer dat die
hek wel hieraan voldoen het nie. Hy het ook getuig dat die rollers
wat aan die bokant gernstalleer is, en wat
eerste verweerder beweer
het die hek moet regop hou, nie geskik vir die doel is nie. Hy getuig
verder dat die boogarm aan die bopunt
van die hek waar die rollers
ge"lnstalleer is langer moes wees en verby die rollers moes
strek ten einde te verseker dat die
hek stewig en stabiel is. Daar
was 'n dispuut tussen die partye ten aansien van die feit of die
stoppers wat die hek moes keer
as dit in sy baan gly, teenwoordig was
voor die insident al dan nie. Mnr Harrop-Allin het getuig dat die
stoppers wat hy op die
fotos waarneem in ieder geval nie voldoende
was nie. Ek neem in ag dat hy nie die hek ge·1nspekteer het
nie en dat die fotos
derhalwe in sekere opsigte misleidend mag wees
ten aansien van die geskiktheid van die stoppers. Hy het horn ook
uitgespreek daaroor
dat die spoor nie horisontaal is nie en dat dit
kon bydra tot die gebrek aan stabiliteit van die hek. Eerste
verweerder het getuig
dat daar 'n 2° helling is wat beteken dat
die hek nie horisontaal is nie . Volgense Mnr Harrop-Allin moet daar
ook 'n 500m
speling wees om toe te laat dat die hek veilig verby gly
wanneer dit oopgemaak word, as dit nie daar is nie kan 'n hek uitval,
in hierdie geval is daar nie hieraan voldoen nie. Ter opsomming het
Mnr Harrop-Allin se getuienis daarop neergekom dat daar etlike

tekortkominge in die konstruksie van die hek was wat kon lei tot die
insident. Alhoewel Mnr Harrop-Allin se getuienis as deskundige
deur
Mnr Hattingh, namens die verweerders gekritiseer is omdat hy nie die
hek self inspekteer het nie, is behalwe vir die stoppers
wat nie
duidelik op die fotos mag wees nie, die eienskappe van die hek
duidelik sigbaar op die fotos. Verder is die waarnemings
ten aansien
van hoe die hek gelyk het grotendeels nie betwis nie. Waaroor die
partye wel verskil is of die aspekte wat deur die
deskundiges
uitgewys is wel die veiligheid van die hek sou bernvloed.
[6]
Die eerste verweerder het getuig dat hy van kleins of sy vader gehelp
het met die maak van hekke en hy het self al sewe hekke
gemaak.
Volgens horn was die hek stabiel en was daar geen rede waarom die
insident moes plaasgevind het nie. Hy het spekuleer dat
eiseres
moontlik duislig geword het en aan die hek gehang het. Dit is egter
bloot spekulasie, en in ieder geval, as die eiseres
wat 'n klein en
skraal vroutje is die hek kan ontspoor deur daarteen te val of daar
aan te hang, was daar in ieder geval iets inherent
tout met die hek.
Eerste verweerder het die hek ook vergelyk met ander hekke en is van
mening dat die hek goed vergelyk met ander
sekuriteitshekke. Hy het
getuig dat die hekke wat hy inspekteer nie aan Mnr Harrop-Allin se
vereistes voldoen het nie. Die getuienis
neem ek aan moes illustreer
dat 'n redelike man nie kon of moes voorsien dat die hek 'n
potensiele gevaar geskep het nie en dat
die verweerders gevolglik nie
nalatig was nie. Volgens horn het hy na die insident sekere
verbeteringe aan die hek aangebring net
om doodseker te maak dat dit
veilig is. Hy het getuig dat die hek vir 21'2 jaar tussen 3 650 tot 8
000 keer gebruik is sander enige
insident. Die tweede verweerderes se
getuienis het weinig bygedra behalwe om te bevestig dat die hek altyd
goed gewerk het, sy
getuig dat sy niks weet van die maak of
installasie van hekke nie. Sy het bevestig dat sy die huurkontrak met
eiseres gesluit het
ten aansien van die woonstel wat eiseres bewoon
het.
DIE TOEPASLIKE
REGSBEGINSELS:
[7]
Die regsbeginsels ten aansien  van  aanspreeklikheid  op
grond  van delik is welbekend. In terme van
die
actio
legis Aquiliae
mag 'n party vermoensregtelike verlies gely deur
'n onregmatige en nalatige handeling van die persoon verantwoordelik
daarvoor verhaal.
Aanspreeklikheid
sal afhang van die onregmatigheid van die handeling of late
[1]
.
[8]
In
Loureiro
v lmvula Quality Protection
[2]
is die
volgende gese ten aansien van die ondersoek na onregmatigheid en
nalatigheid:
"[54] I begin
with the enquiry into wrongfulness, because
-
'(n)egligent conduct
giving rise to damages is not
...
actionable
per se. it is only actionable if the Jaw recognises it as unlawful."
[9]
In hierdie geval is ek van mening dat die gebeurtenis, synde die val
van die hek op eiseres
prima facie
onregmatig is omdat dit
skade in die vorm van fisiese  beserings veroorsaak het.
[10]
Die toets vir nalatigheid soos uiteengesit in
Kruger
v Coetzee
[3]
is
steeds van toepassing. Die toets is as volg gestel:
"For the purposes
of liability culpa arises if
-
(a)
a
diligens paterfamilias
in the position of the defendant

(i)
would foresee the reasonable possibility of
his conduct injuring another in his person or property and causing
him patrimonial loss;
and
(ii)
would take reasonable steps to guard against
such occurrence; and
(b)
the defendant failed to take such steps.
[11]
Die vraag wat volg is of 'n
diligens
paterfamilias
in
die posisie van die verweerders voorsien het of moes voorsien het dat
skade kan voortloei uit hulle handeling en/of late. Dan
is die
verdere vraag of hulle redelike stappe sou geneem het  om die
skade te voorkom. Laastens moet aangetoon word dat hulle
versuim  het
om sodanige stappe te neem
[4]
.
[12]
In
casu
het die
eerste verweerder die sekuriteitshek vervaardig, gebou, ge·1nstalleer
en instand gehou en volgens horn was hy ervare
in die bou en
installasie van sulke hekke. Eerste verweerder moes voorsien dat 'n
hek wat nie behoorlik vervaardig en/of ge·1nstalleer
word nie
'n potensiele gevaar skep wat tot skade kon lei. Die eerste
verweerder het sy hand gewaag aan iets wat besondere kundigheid

vereis en daarom behoort die maatstaf wat vir horn aangewend word die
van die redelike vervaardiger van sekuriteitshekke wees.
Dit volg dat
die eerste verweerder as sulks 'n regsplig gehad het teenoor alle
persone wat die hek gebruik om te sorg dat hy die
nodige vaardigheid
en kundigheid het om die hek behoorlik en veilig te vervaardig,
installeer en instand te hou en behoort hy stappe
te geneem het om te
sorg dat dit veilig is. Tweede verweerderes as verhuurder moes
verseker dat die sekuriteitshek wat op die perseel
wat deur haar
verhuur is nie 'n gevaar vir huurders inhou nie
[5]
. Ons weet dat die hek op eiseres geval het en nie sy of eerste
verweerder kon verduidelik waarom dit gebeur het nie.  Mnr

Harrop-Allin  het in sy getuienis  sekere
tekortkominge uitgewys om  aan te toon waarom die hek volgens
horn
potensieel onveilig was en wat moontlik kon verklaar waarom dit
op eiseres geval het.
[13]
Die aard van die gebeurtenis, naamlik die val van die hek, lei na my
mening tot 'n noodwendige afleiding van nalatigheid want
dit is iets
wat nie normaalweg sou gebeur in die afwesigheid van nalatigheid nie.
Die presiese oorsaak van die gebeurtnis is onbekend.
Die leerstuk van
res ipsa
loquitor
kom
dus ter sprake
[6]
.
[14]
In
Arthur
v Bezuidenhout and Mieny
[7]
is
die volgende ten aansien van die leerstukgese:
"The maxim res
ipsa loquitur, where applicable, gives rise to an inference rather
than
a
presumption.
Nor is the court
...
necessarily
compelled to  draw the inference
...
[O]nce the plaintiff proves the occurrence
giving rise to the inference of negligence on the part of the
defendant, the latter must
adduce evidence to the contrary. He must
tell the remainder of the story or take the
risk of judgment being given against him. How far the defendant's
evidence need go to
displace the inference of negligence arising from
proof of the occurrence complained by the plaintiff depends on the
facts of the
particular case
...
Mere
theories or hypothetical suggestions will, of course, not avail the
defendant
...
That is
not, however, to say that the onus rests on the defendant to
establish the correctness of his explanation on
a
balance of probabilities."
[15]
C
Goliath v The  MEC for  Health in the Province of the
Eastern Cape
[8]
is
die volgende ten aansien van
res
ipsa loquitor
gese:
"[10] Broadly
stated, res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself) is a
convenient Latin phrase used to describe the proof of
facts which are sufficient to support an inference that
a
defendant was negligent and thereby to
establish
a
prima
facie case against him. The maxim is no
magic
formula (Arthur v Bezuidenhout and Mieny
1962 (2) SA
566
(A) at 573E). It is not
a
presumption of law, but merely
a
permissible inference which the court may
employ if upon all the facts it appears to be justified (Zeffertt
&
Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 2 ed
at 219). It is usually invoked in circumstances when the only known
facts, relating
to negligence, consist of the occurrence itself (see
Groenewald v Conradie; Groenewald en Andere v Auto Protection
Insurance
Co
Ltd
1965
(1) SA 184
(AD) at 187F)
-
where
the occurrence may be of such
a
nature
as to warrant an inference of negligence. The maxim alters neither
the incidence of the onus nor the rules of pleading (Madyosi
v SA
Eagle Insurance
Co
Ltd
[1990] ZASCA 65
;
1990 (3) SA 442
(A) at 445F)
-
it
being trite that the onus resting upon
a
plaintiff never shifts (Arthur v Bezuidenhout
and Mieny at 573C). Nothing about
its
invocation or application, I dare say, is intended to displace common
sense. In the words of Lord Shaw in Ballard v Northern
British
Railway
Co
60 Sc LR
448
, 'the expression need not be magnified into a legal rule: it
simply has its place in that scheme of and search for causation upon

which the mind sets itself working' (cited with approval in Naure NO
v Transvaal Boot and Shoe Manufacturing
Co
1938 AD 379
and Arthur v Bezuidenhout and
Mieny at 573F
-
G).
En
verder:
[12] Thus in every
case, including one where the maxim res ipsa loquitur is applicable,
the enquiry at the end of the case is whether
the plaintiff has
discharged the onus resting upon her in connection with the issue of
negligence (Osborne Panama SA v Shell
&
BP South African Petroleum Refineries (Pty)
Ltd
1982 (4) SA 890
(A) at 897H
-
898A).
That being so, and given what Holmes JA described as the 'evolved
mystique of the maxim', the time may well have come for
us to heed
the call of Lord Justice Hobhouse to jettison it from our legal
lexicon. In that regard he stated in Ratcliffe v Plymouth
and Torbay
Health Authority
[1998] EWCA Civ 2000
(11 February 1998):
'In my judgment
the leading cases already gives sufficient guidance to litigators and
judges about the proper approach to
the drawing of inferences and if
I were to say anything further it would be confined to suggesting
that  the expression
res  ipsa  loquitur
should  be dropped
from the
litigator's vocabulary and replaced by the phrase a prima facie case.
Res ipsa loquitur is not a principle of Jaw: it does
not relate to or
raise any presumption. It is merely a guide to help to identify when
a prima facie case is being made out. Where
expert and factual
evidence has been called on both sides at a trial its usefulness will
normally have long since been exhausted."
[16]
Uit bogenoemde blyk dit dat die leerstuk nie 'n vermoede daarstel
nie, maar bloat 'n afleiding van nalatigheid onder sekere

omstandighede toelaat. Die bewyslas bly egter steeds op die eiseres
om nalatigheid te bewys. Sodra die gebeurtenis 'n afleiding
van
nalatigheid regverdig moet die verweerder getuienis tot die teendeel
lei. Die verweerders het egter geen verduideliking vir
die insident
gehad nie. Na my mening is dit nie werklik van belang of die leerstuk
as sulks voortbestaan of by die naam genoem
word nie in die finale
stand van sake is die vraag wat nag altyd gevra is en wat gevra moet
word of die eiseres 'n
prima facie
saak bewys het.
[17]
In
casu
weet ans dat die hek op eiseres geval het, Mnr
Harrop-Allin het sekere probleme uitgewys wat dit kon veroorsaak het.
Hy het getuig
dat 'n behoorlike gernstalleerede hek nie sou val soos
wat hier gebeur het nie. Die feit dat eerste verweerder nie weet wat
dit
veroorsaak het nie vat die saak nie verder nie. Die blote feit
dat die hek vir 'n lang tyd sander insident gebruik is beteken nie

dat die hek as gevolg van inherente risiko's nie altyd 'n gevaar
daargestel  het nie. Ek aanvaar Mnr Harrop-Allin se getuienis

dat daar verskeie gebreke was wat die insident kon veroorsaak het.
Die blote feit dat die hek geval het regverdig na my mening
'n
afleiding dat die hek onveilig was en dat die verweerders nalatig was
en gevolglik dat die eiseres nalatigheid
prima facie
bewys
het. In die afwesigheid van 'n verduideliking van verweerders word
die
prima facie
bewys, bewys op 'n oorwig van waarskynlikhede.
Die noodwendige afleiding in hierdie omstandighede is dat vanwee 'n
gebrek in die
installasie en/of vervaardiging en/of die
instandhouding van die hek, die hek op die betrokke dag op Eiseres
geval het en beserings
veroorsaak het.
[18]
Gevolglik is ek van mening dat eiseres bewys het dat die verweerders
aanspreeklik is vir die skade wat sy gely het as gevolg
van die val
van die hek op haar.
[19]
Ek maak die volgende bevel:
19.1.
Die verweerders is gesamentlik en
afsonderlik aanspreeklik vir 100% van die skade gely as gevolg van
die val van die hek op eiseres;
en
19.2.
Die verweerders word gelas om die koste
van eiseres gesamentlik en afsonderlik te betaal, die een te betaal,
die ander vrygestel
te word.
________________________
R G TOLMAY
REGTER
VAN DIE HOë HOF
PARTIES:

J M LESSING v MR VAN NIEKERK
CASE
NO:

33378/13
DATE
OF HEARING:

14 - 17 MARCH 2016
DATE
OF JUDGMENT:

14 APRIL 2016
ATTORNEY
FOR PLAINITFF:
RAUTENBACH PROKUREURS
ADVOCATE
FOR PLAINITFF:
ADV HADING
ATTORNEY
FOR DEFENDANT:
LAAS DOMAN INGELYF
ADVOCATE
FOR RESPONDENT:         ADV
DE WAAL
[1]
Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd
1978(4) SA 901 (N)
[2]
2014(3) SA 394 (CC) par 53 en 54, p 410
[3]
1966(2) SA 428 at 430 E-F
[4]
Kruger v Coetzee, supra
[5]
Swinburn v Newbee lnvestements (Pty) Ltd 20106) S 296
[6]
Principles pf Delict, Jonathan Burchell, p 105-106
[7]
1962(2) SA 566 (A)
[8]
(085/2014)
[2014] ZASCA 182
(25 November 2014)