Summary of Judgment

1. Introduction

This matter was an appeal against both conviction and sentence in a criminal case. The appellant, Paul Khoza, appealed a conviction for housebreaking with intent to steal and theft and a sentence of five years’ imprisonment imposed by the Klerksdorp Magistrates’ Court.

The respondent was the State. The appellant had been granted leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence, and the appeal was heard in the High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Division, Pretoria.

The dispute concerned the sufficiency and evaluation of fingerprint evidence as the sole incriminating proof against the appellant, and whether the magistrate correctly applied the criminal standard of proof, particularly when rejecting an accused’s explanation that could be reasonably possibly true.

2. Material Facts

It was common cause that during or about 18 October 2011, there was a break-in at a shop known as Symbol Collection, owned by the complainant Mr E Mofokeng, within the Klerksdorp Magisterial District. The perpetrator gained entry by breaking a window pane forming part of a display window, behind which shirts were displayed, and shirts valued at R3 300.00 were stolen.

It was also not in dispute that the police attended the scene and uplifted two fingerprints from the broken window pane used to gain access to the goods. These were taken from the display window area associated with entry and access to the items that were stolen.

The State’s case against the appellant rested on the fact that, after analysis, one fingerprint was identified as the appellant’s right index finger, while the second fingerprint was not identified. The judgment records that this fingerprint identification was the only evidence presented by the State implicating the appellant.

The appellant’s version, advanced to explain the presence of his fingerprint, was that he lived in the area and had often stood at the display window admiring the shirts, and that he had pointed at the shirts with his right index finger, thereby touching the window pane. He denied being responsible for the housebreaking and theft.

The magistrate rejected the appellant’s explanation as improbable, reasoning that pointing at the items behind the window pane would not likely occur if the appellant was alone. The magistrate also did not consider the relevance of the second, unidentified fingerprint, despite evidence (including a report referenced as an exhibit) indicating that two prints were uplifted, with one identified and one not identified.

3. Legal Issues

The central legal issue was whether, on the evidence presented, the State had proved the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, given that the conviction was based on fingerprint evidence as the sole incriminating proof and in the face of an explanation offered by the appellant for the presence of his print.

A related issue concerned the proper approach to evaluating the accused’s version in criminal proceedings, namely whether the trial court was entitled to reject the appellant’s explanation on the basis that it was “improbable,” or whether it had to be rejected only if it was so improbable that it could not be reasonably possibly true.

The dispute primarily involved the application of legal principles to the facts, especially the criminal standard of proof and the assessment of an accused’s version. It also entailed an evaluative judgment about whether the presence of an unidentified second fingerprint introduced reasonable doubt that ought to have prevented a conviction.

4. Court’s Reasoning

The High Court approached the appeal on the basis of established principles governing the burden of proof in criminal matters and the evaluation of an accused person’s version. The court relied on the proposition, drawn from authority, that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and that an accused’s version need not be accepted as probably true in every detail; it must be accepted if it is reasonably possibly true in substance. The court emphasised that it is permissible to test the accused’s version against inherent probabilities, but that a version cannot be rejected merely because it is improbable; it can be rejected only if it is so improbable that it cannot reasonably possibly be true.

Applying these principles, the High Court held that the magistrate had erred in rejecting the appellant’s explanation of the fingerprint. The magistrate’s “point of departure” was that a person cannot point at an object unless pointing it out to someone else, and that the appellant’s explanation was improbable because he was alone. The High Court found that this premise was not necessarily correct and that it was possible for a person to point at something they admire even if alone. On that basis, the appellant’s version fell within the range of what could be reasonably possibly true, and the rejection of that version was inconsistent with the applicable criminal-law test.

The High Court then considered an additional aspect that, in its view, materially affected the safety of the conviction: the evidence established that there were two fingerprints uplifted from the broken window pane, and the second was unidentified. The court reasoned that the presence of the unidentified fingerprint, in circumstances where fingerprint evidence was central and the State relied on a single identified print, introduced doubt as to whether the appellant was the perpetrator.

The court further stated that, given the State’s reliance on fingerprint evidence, it bore a duty to present evidence that every possible means had been taken to identify the second fingerprint before proceeding in a manner that resulted in the appellant being charged and convicted on the strength of only one identified print. The court expressly contemplated the possibility that the unidentified print could have belonged to the person who broke the window pane and stole the goods. This contributed to the conclusion that there was reasonable doubt, and therefore that the State had not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

In light of these considerations, the High Court concluded that this was a case in which an appellate court should intervene by setting aside the conviction and sentence.

5. Outcome and Relief

The appeal against conviction and sentence succeeded.

The High Court set aside the conviction and the sentence imposed by the magistrate’s court on 26 November 2012, and substituted them with an order that the accused was found not guilty and discharged.

No separate or additional order as to costs was recorded in the judgment.

Cases Cited

State v Shackell 2001 (4) SA 1

Legislation Cited

No legislation was cited in the judgment.

Rules of Court Cited

No rules of court were cited in the judgment.

Held

The High Court held that the magistrate misapplied the criminal standard of proof by rejecting the appellant’s explanation for his fingerprint on the broken display window as merely improbable, despite it being reasonably possibly true. The court further held that the existence of a second, unidentified fingerprint on the same broken window pane undermined the safety of the conviction and contributed to reasonable doubt. Consequently, the State failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the conviction and sentence were set aside and replaced with an acquittal and discharge.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

The prosecution bears the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and a conviction cannot follow from a mere preponderance of probabilities. In evaluating an accused person’s version, a court does not need to be satisfied that every detail is true; if the version is reasonably possibly true in substance, it must be accepted for purposes of the verdict.

A court may assess an accused’s version against inherent probabilities, but it may not reject that version solely because it appears improbable. Rejection is justified only where the version is so improbable that it cannot reasonably possibly be true.

Where the State relies on fingerprint evidence as the central incriminating proof, the presence of additional, unidentified fingerprints at the scene may materially affect whether the State has discharged its burden. If such evidence introduces reasonable doubt as to the identity of the perpetrator, the conviction cannot stand.