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[2016] ZAECMHC 5
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Madlongolwana and Another v Walter Sisulu University and Others (484/2016) [2016] ZAECMHC 5 (10 March 2016)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN
CAPE LOCAL DIVISION: MTHATHA
CASE
NO.484/2016
DATE:
10 MARCH 2016
In
the matter between:
ZOLILE
GODFREY
MADLONGOLWANA
....................................................................
1
st
Applicant
GCINABANTU
SIVUYISE
MADLONGOLWANA
.......................................................
2
nd
Applicant
And
WALTER
SISULU
UNIVERSITY
..................................................................................
1
st
Respondent
PROF
KHAYA
MFENYANA
..........................................................................................
2
nd
Respondent
MR
MAKHAYA
MAPHINDA
........................................................................................
3
rd
Respondent
PROF
PATTERSON
MAKIWANE
................................................................................
4
th
Respondent
JUDGMENT
BROOKS
AJ:
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The first applicant is an employee of Walter Sisulu University (the
first respondent). The second applicant is his son, who
seeks
admission to the first respondent as a student in its faculty of
humanities, social science and law.
THE
FORM OF THE APPLICATION
[2]
This matter comes before the court as an urgent application, as
envisaged in the provisions of Rule 6 (12) of the Uniform Rules
of
Court. Before dealing with the substance of the application,
something should be said about the form in which it was initially
presented.
[3]
The applicants approached the duty judge in chambers on 12 February
2016, presenting a certificate of urgency in which were
set out
reasons why the matter should be permitted to proceed as an urgent
application and seeking a directive in terms of Rule
12 of the Joint
Rules of Practice for the High Courts of the Eastern Cape Province
regarding the hearing and further conduct of
the matter. A
directive was issued to the effect that the matter may be set down
for hearing on 18 February 2016 at 09h30
and requiring service of the
application papers on or before 15 February 2016.
[4]
The first observation which must be made is that it was not necessary
for the applicants to approach the duty judge for a directive
regarding the hearing and further conduct of the matter. The
reason is that the targeted date, 18 February 2016, was a motion
court date. A careful reading of Rule 12 (d) of the Joint Rules
of Practice for the High Courts of the Eastern Cape Province
reveals
that the purpose of that rule is to provide a mechanism whereby an
applicant can approach a judge in chambers for a directive
in
circumstances in which the applicant wishes to move the court for
relief on a day which is not ordinarily a day on which a motion
court
sits. Given that the applicants wished to move for relief on a
motion court day, they were at liberty to do so by the
issue of a
notice of motion accompanied by a certificate of urgency and
supported by a founding affidavit in accordance with the
provisions
of Rule 6 (12) of the Uniform Rules of Court. It was not
necessary for the applicants to obtain a directive before
issuing and
serving their application.
[5]
Secondly, an observation must be made about the content of the notice
of motion which was issued and served. The introductory
portion
of the notice of motion informed the respondents that an application
would be made on 18 February 2016 as a matter of urgency
at 10h00.
The terms of the order to be sought were then set out. One of
the prayers referred to a punitive order for
costs which would be
sought against the respondents “in the event they oppose this
application” (sic). Nowhere
in the notice of motion were
the respondents told what they must do in the event that they wished
to oppose the application.
[6]
Invevitably, on 18 February 2016, when the matter was called, a legal
representative appeared on behalf of the respondents,
noting their
opposition. The matter had to be postponed, with an order
setting the time frame within which answering and
replying affidavits
had to be served and filed and directing the date upon which heads of
argument would have to be filed.
The matter was postponed to 3
March 2016, a date two weeks thereafter, to accommodate the exchange
of affidavits.
[7]
In the founding affidavit, the first applicant sets out the recent
history of the second applicant’s application to become
a
student of the first respondent in 2016. A reading of that
recent history leaves no room for a conclusion that there were
doubts
in the minds of the applicants that this application would be opposed
by the respondents. I fail to understand why,
in such
circumstances, the applicants elected to craft their notice of motion
in a manner which failed to inform the respondents
what must be done
in the event of their deciding to oppose the application. Not
only is no date or time given for the filing
of a notice of
opposition, but the very notion of opposition finds no expression
other than in the prayer seeking a punitive costs
order.
[8]
Moreover, the longer form of the notice of motion
[1]
which, in compliance with the provisions of Rule 6 (5) of the Uniform
Rules of Court, is customarily used to commence application
proceedings which are likely to be opposed contains specific portions
which deal with the requirement that a respondent who wishes
to
oppose the application must do so within a specified period of time
and must appoint an address for service within a specific
radius of
the court, then giving a time period within which any answering
affidavits must be filed. The provisions of Rule
6 (12) of the
Uniform Rules of Court permit an applicant to deviate from the normal
time periods set out elsewhere in that rule.
What is desirable
is for an applicant to issue a notice of motion in which the time
periods expressed have been truncated in such
a manner as meets the
exigencies dictated by the urgency in the matter but still permit a
respondent who wishes to oppose the application
a realistic
opportunity to do so. It is not of assistance to either party
if an applicant issues a notice of motion in which
the customary
portions intended to regulate the further conduct of the matter have
been omitted. Had the applicants structured
their notice of
motion in this matter in accordance with the long form but on
truncated time periods, the matter would have been
before court as a
fully developed opposed application at least one week earlier than
has occurred and the inconvenience and cost
of the appearances in
court on 18 February 2016 would have been avoided. That date
ought to have been specified in the notice
of motion as the date upon
which the matter would be enrolled for hearing in the event that no
opposition was noted within the
time period nominated by the
applicants.
THE
NATURE OF THE RELIEF
[9]
In the notice of motion the applicants seek an order in the following
terms:
“
1.
That the Applicants’ non-compliance with the normal procedures,
form and time frames for instituting this Application in
terms of
Rule 6 of the Rules of this Honourable Court be condoned and the
Applicants be granted leave to bring this Application
as a matter of
urgency in terms of Rule 6 (12) (a).
2.
That a rule nisi be and is hereby issued calling upon the
Respondents’ to show cause, if any, on Tuesday, 22
nd
March 2016 at 10h00, why the following order should not be made
final:-
2.1
The decision of the 4
th
Respondent of the Department of Law in refusing the 2
nd
Applicant into LLB Program during the 2016 academic year be and is
hereby declared as unlawful and is set aside.
2.2
That the decision of the 4
th
Respondent of the Department of Law in increasing the rating points
for admission into LLB Program from 27 laid down by the 1
st
Respondent’s Council as reflected in its
2010
Prospectus to 34 points, or any higher point than 27, without the
approval of Council, be and is hereby declaring ultra vires the
powers of the Department of Law, unlawful, arbitrary, unreasonable
and is reviewed and set aside as of no legal effect ab initio.
2.3
That the conduct of the 4
th
Respondent Department of Law is selectively admitting some students
who do not have the minimum rating points of 34, while refusing
to
admit others, including the 2
nd
Applicant in particular, be and is hereby declared to be
discriminatory, unconstitutional, malicious, arbitrary, unlawful and
is set aside.
2.4
That the Respondents be and are hereby ordered and directed to admit
the 2
nd
Applicant into the LLB Program during the current 2016 academic year
with effect from February 2016, forthwith.
2.5
That the Respondents in the event they oppose this application, pay
costs jointly and severally on a punitive scale on the scale
as
between attorney and client in order to demonstrate this Honourable
Court’s displeasure at their arbitrariness and abuse
of power,
otherwise such costs be on a party and party scale of costs.
3.
That paragraph 2.4 above shall operate as an interim relief and
mandamus pending the finalisation of this Application; and
4.
That the Respondents pay costs for the granting of the interim
relief.
”
(sic)
[10]
Mr MATYUMZA, who appeared on behalf of the applicants, agreed that
since the application is opposed and a full set affidavits
has been
exchanged by the parties, no purpose would be served by a
consideration of the applicants’ entitlement to interim
relief. Rather, it would be appropriate to determine the matter
on the basis that it is an application for final relief.
THE
LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
[11]
The requirements for a final interdict are well established.
[2]
The applicants must demonstrate:
·
a clear right;
·
an injury committed or reasonably
apprehended;
·
the absence of any satisfactory alternative
remedy.
[12]
The availability of a final mandatory interdict in appropriate
circumstances is also well established in our law.
[3]
[13]
Consequently, the evaluation of the affidavits filed of record must
occur in accordance with the
Plascon-Evans
rule which has been restated recently
[4]
in the following terms:
“
Motion
proceedings, unless concerned with interim relief, are all about the
resolution of legal issues based on common cause facts.
Unless
the circumstances are special they cannot be used to resolve factual
issues because they are not designed to determine probabilities.
It is well established under the Plascon–Evans rule that where
in motion proceedings disputes of fact arise on the affidavits,
a
final order can be granted only if the facts averred in the
applicant’s (Mr Zuma’s) affidavits, which have been
admitted by the respondent (the NDPP), together with the facts
alleged by the latter, justify such order. It may be different
if the respondent’s version consists of bald or uncreditworthy
denials, raises fictitious disputes of fact, is palpably implausible,
far-fetched or so clearly untenable that the court is justified in
rejecting them merely on the papers.”
[14]
In assessing whether a real, genuine and
bona
fide
dispute of fact exists, the court will only come to the conclusion
that it does if it is satisfied that the party who purports
to raise
the dispute of fact has in his or her affidavit seriously and
unambiguously addressed the fact said to be disputed.
Where the
facts alleged are such that the disputing party must necessarily
possess knowledge of them and be able to provide an
answer or
countervailing evidence if they be not true or accurate but instead
of doing so, rests his or her case on a bare or ambiguous
denial, the
court will generally have difficulty in finding that the test is
satisfied.
[5]
LOCUS
STANDI OF THE FIRST APPLICANT
[15]
The answering affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in this
matter is deposed to by the Interim Vice Chancellor of Walter
Sisulu
University (the second respondent). It raises a preliminary
objection to the participation by the first applicant
in this
application, the argument raised being that the first applicant has
not established a direct and substantial interest in
these
proceedings and as a result has no
locus
standi.
[16]
It is common cause that the second applicant is an adult male of full
legal capacity. The relief claimed in the notice
of motion has
been crafted to address squarely his desire to become enrolled as a
student of the first respondent. He did
not need the legal
assistance of his father to bring the application.
[17]
Mr MATYUMZA defended the joinder of the first applicant in these
proceedings with the argument that as a
paterfamilias
the
first applicant is possessed of rights to ensure that members of his
family progress in their studies. Moreover, the second
applicant is potentially the beneficiary of a study subsidy which
would accrue to him if he were to become a student of the first
respondent by virtue of the employment by the first respondent of his
father, the first applicant.
[18]
Mr BODLANI, who appeared on behalf of the respondents, countered
these submissions with the argument that the interest in the
matter
demonstrated by the first applicant in his founding affidavit was
purely a financial interest. No relief is sought
vis
ẚ vis
the study subsidy and
nothing in the papers suggests that the study subsidy is at stake.
[19]
In my view, in the circumstances of this application there is no
merit in the submission that as a
paterfamilias
the first applicant has a direct and substantial interest in these
proceedings born of rights to ensure that members of his family
progress in their studies. At best for the first applicant, the
founding affidavit demonstrates that he has a mere financial
interest
in the outcome of his application. This is an indirect interest
which does not require his joinder.
[6]
[20]
In his argument on the point
in limine
Mr Bodlani drew
attention to the fact that the confirmatory affidavit deposed to by
the second applicant and included in the founding
papers was deposed
to on 12 February 2016 and purports to confirm the correctness of the
content of the founding affidavit deposed
to by the first applicant
insofar as the content thereof refers to the second respondent.
A difficulty arises when cognisance
is taken of the fact that the
founding affidavit deposed to by the first applicant was deposed to
only on 15 February 2016.
One cannot accept that the affidavit
to which reference is made by the second applicant in his
confirmatory affidavit is the one
included in the founding papers.
Quite simply, on 12 February 2016 that affidavit did not exist.
[21]
No specific relief was sought pursuant to the argument on the point
in limine
.
Mr BODLANI referred to the position in which the respondents found
themselves as a conundrum. If the matter were to be determined
simply
upon the basis that the application fell to be dismissed on the
findings that the first applicant has no
locus
standi
and that the deficiencies in the
confirmatory affidavit of the second applicant meant that he had
placed no material under oath
before the court upon which to consider
his application, no findings would have been made on the merits and
the respondents may
experience the inconvenience and expense of
facing a second application in due course.
[22]
In my view, these being urgent proceedings in which it is readily
apparent that all the parties are desirous of achieving a
determination of the main issues as expeditiously as possible, Mr
BODLANI is correct in not pursuing a specific order relating
to the
locus standi
of the first applicant. Notwithstanding the finding that his
interest in the proceedings is a financial interest and therefore
indirect and not requiring his joinder, the founding affidavit of the
first applicant remains before court. It is in the
interests of
justice that cognisance be taken of its content within the context of
the
Plascon–Evans
rule in the determination of whether or not the second applicant is
entitled to relief.
ENTITLEMENT
TO RELIEF
[23]
The following allegations made in the first applicant’s
founding affidavit are not disputed by the respondents in their
answering affidavit and in the circumstances must be deemed to be
admitted:
·
In 2009 the second applicant passed and
obtained the National Senior Certificate with an endorsement that he
had met the minimum
requirements for admission to a bachelor’s
degree or to study for a diploma or a senior certificate;
·
In 2010 the second applicant registered as
a B.Sc. Computer Science student on a four year extended programme
with the first respondent;
·
The second applicant failed the 2010 year
end examinations;
·
For financial reasons the second applicant
did not register again with the first respondent in 2011 and
2012;
·
The second applicant registered again with
the first respondent in 2013 but failed all his courses. In the
result, the second
applicant was suspended and excluded from his
B.Sc. studies on academic grounds for a period of one year;
·
On 6 January 2016 the second applicant
completed application forms seeking his admission to the first
respondent as a law student;
·
On 8 January 2016 the first respondent made
enquiries and was told that the second applicant’s application
had been refused
because he had less than the minimum requirement of
thirty-four points needed to study towards an LL.B.
[24]
The second respondent makes the following allegations in the
answering affidavit on behalf of the first respondent
which are
germane to the issues with which this application is concerned:
·
The first respondent’s council
determines the first respondent’s admissions policy;
·
On 2 October 2009 the first respondent’s
admissions policy was reviewed. The following details of that
policy are relevant
to the resolution of the current dispute between
the second applicant and the first respondent:
The
admissions policy would become effective as of 1 January 2010;
Applications
must comply with general admission requirements, as well as other
specific requirements as prescribed by the relevant
faculty and
department;
The
minimum legal requirement for admission to a degree programme is a
National Senior Certificate or a Senior Certificate or a
Matriculation endorsement, each at the applicable level for degree
admission or a mature age exemption;
An
applicant who attained the age of twenty-three years or more and is
in possession of a Senior Certificate/National Senior Certificate
and
has been granted a certificate of conditional exemption by the
Matriculation Board/HESA respectively, on the grounds of mature
age,
may be admitted to a bachelor’s degree;
The
University may at Senate’s discretion, admit a student
irrespective of educational qualification, who has been granted
a
certificate of conditional exemption by the Matriculation Board/HESA
on the grounds of having attained the age of forty-five
years on or
before the year in which he or she intends to enrol for a bachelor’s
degree;
An
applicant who holds a Senior Certificate and a three-year recognised
diploma and has been granted a Matriculation exemption by
the
Matriculation Board/HESA shall be admitted to a bachelor’s
degree irrespective of age. This will apply to the following
categories:
a
diploma obtained from a South African university; or
a
teacher’s diploma obtained from a South African college of
education; or
a
national diploma obtained from a South African technikon or
university of technology; or
a
nursing diploma obtained from a South African nursing college
affiliated to a South African university; or
a
teachers diploma awarded on the grounds of interrupted periods of
study comprising combinations of a two-year post-school certificate
and a one-year upgrading diploma or a two-year post-school
certificate followed by a two-year diploma;
any
other equivalent post-school qualification approved by the
Matriculation Board/HESA;
Notwithstanding
having met one or more of the requirements above, a prospective
student must have obtained an admission point score
(APS) as
specified by the faculty.
·
At a practical level, the admissions point
score specified by each faculty is presented to the Senate and
thereafter referred to
the Council for noting and concurrence.
This becomes a continuous exercise whenever there are changes to an
admissions point
score;
·
The currently applicable admissions point
score in the department of law is thirty-four. This has been
the position since
2014;
·
The second applicant does not meet the
currently applicable admissions point score of thirty four;
·
In addition, the second applicant does not
meet the criteria set out in the admissions policy;
·
The second applicant has never been
registered previously as a student in the first respondent’s
department of law;
·
The entry requirements to the first
respondent’s LL.B. programme have been sanctioned by the first
respondent;
·
The admissions policy was formulated and
approved by the first respondent and has been lawfully and correctly
applied since it came
into operation;
·
The first respondent’s prospectus of
the year 2010 finds no application in 2016;
·
If a student who was enrolled in a
particular department in 2010 drops out of the first respondent and
then in 2016 makes application
for admission as a student in a
different department, the application is dealt with in accordance
with the current admissions policy
criteria.
[25]
It is against this factual matrix that the second applicant’s
entitlement to relief must be evaluated. A careful
reading of
the founding affidavit makes it clear that as far as the interdict is
concerned, the applicants’ primary complaint
is that the first
respondent’s department of law had no authority to elevate the
admissions point score from twenty-seven
to thirty-four and that its
action in doing so is unlawful. In my view, this challenge is
more than adequately met in the
answering affidavit where the second
respondent demonstrates that the current admissions policy approved
by the first respondent’s
council permits individual facilities
to specify an applicable admissions point score, that since 2014 this
score has been thirty-four
in respect of the department of law and
that the current entry requirements for an LL. B. degree have been
sanctioned by the first
respondent. Nothing in the relevant
portions of the answering affidavit can be criticised as a bald,
vague or ambiguous denial
or as an allegation which, through its
inadequacy, fails to raise a genuine and
bona
fide
dispute of fact. In the
circumstances, I am of the view that Mr MATYUMZA’S submission
that the first respondent has
failed to prove the truth of the
allegations made on its behalf is without merit.
[26]
It is important to record that the applicants in no way challenge the
legality of the first respondent’s admissions policy
itself.
Indeed the provisions of s8 (i) (e) of the Statute of Walter Sisulu
University
[7]
provide as
follows:
[the
Council] “
must consider for
approval the admissions and readmissions policy of the university as
recommended by Senate
;”
The
admissions policy which is accepted by the applicants as current and
valid includes the important provision that “a prospective
student must have obtained an Admissions Point Score (APS) as
specified by the faculty”.
[27]
A less obvious ground of attack aimed at obtaining the interdict is
hinted at in the founding affidavit but was relied upon
strongly by
Mr MATYUMZA in argument, namely that because the second applicant was
first admitted as a student of the first respondent
in 2010, to the
extended B.Sc. programme, his application for admission to the first
respondent in 2016, to the LL.B programme,
should have been evaluated
using the criteria which were relevant to the admissions policy which
was current in 2010. To bolster
this argument, the second applicant
was referred to in the founding affidavit as “a returning
student”. That
this would be an accurate description of
the second applicant was specifically denied by the respondents.
Indeed, the facts
relating to the second applicant’s movement
in and out of the first respondent since 2010, set out in the
founding affidavit,
militate against any finding that he is “a
returning student”. The second respondent states
unequivocally that
in seeking his admission to a different faculty in
2016, his application for admission falls to be evaluated in
accordance with
the admissions policy criteria pertinent to that
faculty currently. In my view, the flaw in the applicants’
argument
is easily exposed. Not only were there a significant
number of years after the second applicant’s unsuccessful
attempt
at a B.Sc. when, on his own version, he was not registered as
a student of the first respondent, but his application in 2016 is
for
admission in a completely different faculty. Logic dictates
that the 2016 application bears no resemblance to the 2010
application, save perhaps that the second applicant’s name and
secondary school qualification remain the same.
The
complete break with the first respondent between the two applications
for admission and the specific circumstances in which
it occurred
further militate against any finding that the respondents are
incorrect in making the allegation that the application
is not that
of a “returning student” and must be assessed in
accordance with current admissions policy criteria, including
the
admissions point score applicable to the first respondent’s
department of law.
[28]
To the extent that the applicants may have attempted to introduce
other bases from which to attack the elevation of the admissions
point score from twenty-seven to thirty-four in the replying
affidavit, it is well established for good reason that an applicant
cannot make out a case for relief in the replying affidavit.
[29]
In my view, the applicants have failed to demonstrate a clear right
which requires the protection or promotion of either a
prohibitory or
a mandatory interdict. They have failed to demonstrate that the
decision of the fourth respondent in the department
of law to
increase the admissions point score with effect from 2014 is
ultra
vires.
They have also failed to
establish that the decision taken to refuse the second applicant’s
application for admission
to the first respondent in 2016 as a
student in the LL.B. programme is unlawful and must be set aside.
Thirdly, the applicants
have failed to demonstrate a clear right
which would justify an order directing the respondents to admit the
second applicant into
the LL. B. programme during the 2016 academic
year.
DECLARATORY
ORDER OF UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION
[30]
The relief claimed in prayer 2.3 of the notice of motion requires
specific attention. It purports to address conduct
alleged on
the part of the fourth respondent as head of the department of law
and/or the department of law itself. In describing
that conduct
as “discriminatory” and “unconstitutional”
the prayer must be read as invoking the provisions
of s9 of the
Constitution
[8]
. Indeed
after the commencement of the application proceedings the applicants
issued a notice in terms of Rule 16A of the
Uniform Rules of Court
indicating that they “have raised constitutional issues in
their application” and in which they
make a specific reference
to the relief contemplated in prayer 2.3 of the notice of motion.
[31]
In his argument on behalf of the respondents Mr BODLANI met this
“constitutional challenge” with the following
argument:
·
Whilst
the provisions of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair
Discrimination Act
[9]
(the Act)
prescribe that every high court is an equality court for the area of
its jurisdiction
[10]
, this
court has not been designated as a presiding officer in terms of the
Act
[11]
;
·
In
terms of the provisions of the Act
[12]
no proceedings may be instituted in any equality court unless a
presiding officer and one or more clerks are available;
·
This
court not having been designated as a presiding officer in terms of
the provisions of the Act
[13]
and the jurisdiction of this court effectively having been ousted by
the provisions of the Act, it is not competent for this court
to
entertain an application for the relief contemplated in prayer 2.3 of
the notice of motion;
·
Moreover,
the applicants have failed to comply with the statutory procedural
requirements of the Act
[14]
;
·
In
addition, the principle of constitutional subsidiarity forbids the
applicants from placing direct reliance upon the Constitution
[15]
in circumstances where legislation
[16]
has been enacted to give effect to a constitutional right.
[17]
[32]
In my view, there is merit in the submissions made by Mr BODLANI in
respect of the relief contemplated in prayer 2.3 of the
notice of
motion.
[33]
In all the circumstances, I am of the view that the application falls
to be dismissed.
COSTS
[34]
Mr MATYUMZA submitted that in the event that the application was
dismissed, the court should direct that each party pay their
own
costs in recognition of the fact that the constitutional issue raised
therein has been raised by the applicants “for
the benefit of
everyone”. In my view there is no merit in this
submission. The motives of the applicants are
predominantly of
a private nature. In the event of a failure on their part to
obtain the relief sought, no reason exists
why costs should not
follow the result.
ORDER
[35]
The following order will issue:
“
The
application is dismissed with costs”
RWN
BROOKS
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT (ACTING)
Counsel
for the applicant: ADV M MATYUMZA
Instructed
by Mafungo Tshaka Inc.
MTHATHA
Counsel
for the respondents: ADV A BODLANI
Instructed
by Fikile Ntayiya & Associates
MTHATHA
Matter
heard on: 03 March 2016
Judgment
delivered on: 10 March 2016
[1]
Form
2 (a) of the First Schedule to the Uniform Rules of Court.
[2]
VAN
DEVENTER v IVORY SUN TRADING TRADING 77 (PTY) LTD 2015 (3) SA 532
(SCA) 540 C.
[3]
TRANSET
BPK h/a COACH EXPRESS EN ‘N ANDER v VOORSITTER, NASIONALE
VERVOERSOMMISSIE, EN ANDERE 1995 (3) SA 844 (T) 847 F.
[4]
NATIONAL
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS v ZUMA
[2009] ZASCA 1
;
2009 (2) SA 277
(SCA) par
[26].
[5]
WIGHTMAN
t/a J W CONSTRUCTION v HEADFOUR (PTY) LTD AND ANOTHER
[2008] ZASCA 6
;
2008 (3) SA
371
(SCA) par [13].
[6]
HARTLAND
IMPLEMENTE (EDMS) BPK v ENAL EIENDOMME BK EN ANDERE 2002 (3) SA 653
(NC) 663 E-H.
[7]
PROMULGATED
ON 26 AUGUST 2008 IN GOVERNMENT NOTICE NO 900 PUBLISHED IN
GOVERNMENT GAZETTE NO 31358 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS
OF THE
HIGHER EDUCATION ACT NO 101 OF 1997
.
[8]
Act
No 108 of 1996.
[9]
Act
No 4 of 2000
[10]
S
16 (1) (a)
[11]
S16
(1) (b)
[12]
S
31 (1)
[13]
S
31 (2) (a)
[14]
S
20 (2)
[15]
Note
8 SUPRA
[16]
Note
10 SUPRA
[17]
MEC
FOR EDUCATION, KWAZULU-NATAL, AND OTHERS v PILLAY
[2007] ZACC 21
;
2008 (1) SA 474
(CC) par [40]; SALI v NATIONAL COMMISSIONER OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN
POLICE SERVICE AND OTHERS 2014(9) BCLR 997 (CC) par [4].