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[2016] ZAKZDHC 47
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Ncwane v Ncwane NO and Others (12939/2015) [2016] ZAKZDHC 47 (11 November 2016)
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL DIVISION,
DURBAN
REPORTABLE
Case no: 12939/2015
In the matter between:
STHEMBISO BAFANA
NCWANE APPLICANT
And
NTOMBIKAYISE ELSIE NCWANE
N.O FIRST
RESPONDENT
REGISTRAR OF DEEDS,
PIETERMARITZBURG SECOND
RESPONDENT
CHIEF MAGISTRATE, VERULAM
MAGISTRATE’S COURT THIRD
RESPONDENT
VERULAM
JUDGMENT
MADONDO DJP
[1] The applicant seeks
an order rescinding and setting aside the order this Court granted on
18 November 1996 under case number
6475/1996 against the applicant in
his absence in favour of the first respondent’s husband,
setting aside the registration
of transfer of the property situate at
unit J., KwaMashu, Durban, KwaZulu-Natal held under the Deed of Grant
no. T004109/96. The
applicant grounds his application on that the
order in question was granted erroneously. Firstly, in that in
granting such order
the court proceeded on the premise that the
notice had been sent to the applicant and that the applicant, despite
having knowledge
of the hearing, was in default. Secondly, the court
was unaware of facts, if known to it, would have been precluded from
granting
the order. The first respondent avers that the applicant was
in wilful default and she claims ownership of the property in
question
through acquisitive prescription.
[2] The applicant is
Sthembiso Bafana Ncwane, a major male person, of [...] M. Road,
KwaMashu. The first respondent is Ntombikayise
Elsie Ncwane, a major
female person, of [...] S. Road, KwaMashu, cited herein in her
capacity as an executrix in the state of late
Nthakazelwa Dominic
Ncwane, her husband. The second respondent is the Registrar of Deeds,
Pietermaritzburg, cited in these proceedings
pursuant to the
provisions of section 97 of the Deeds Registry Act 47 of 1937 and
having its offices at 300 Pietermaritz Street,
Pietermaritzburg,
KwaZulu-Natal.
[3] Bhekebona John
Ncwane, Mandlenkosi Ncwane, the previous registered owners of the
immovable property in question; Phineas Ncwane,
the applicant’s
father, and Nthakazelwa Dominic Ncwane, the first respondent’s
husband were residing at KwaMashu Township
and the three treated the
first respondent’s husband as their brother even though,
according to the applicant, there was
no blood relation but they were
only sharing a common surname “Ncwane”.
[4] On 26 June 1963 the
property was registered in the name of Bhekebona Ncwane. After the
death of Bhekebona Ncwane, the first
owner, the ownership of the
property passed onto Mandlenkosi Ncwane. In June 1989 Mandlenkosi
transferred the property in his name
and applied for the issue of a
Deed of Grant. Mandlenkosi died on 2 October 1990.
[5] On the death of
Mandlenkosi the ownership in respect of the property in question was
transferred in the name of the applicant
on 21 October 1994 under the
Deed of Grant No. T004109/96. Before the transfer of the property in
the name of the applicant, the
Local Housing Department advised the
applicant that he was the beneficiary in the estate of Mandlenkosi
and that he should proceed
to the office of the Master of High Court
so to obtain the letter of authority.
[6] The plaintiff avers
that during the life time of this father, Phineas Ncwane, and
Mandlenkosi the first respondent’s husband
used to pay his
father a visit at [...] M. Road, KwaMashu, over the weekends. When
the first respondent’s husband fell in
love with the first
respondent the applicant’s father suggested to the first
respondent’s husband that he should approach
Mandlenkosi for
accommodation as he was then living alone at [...] S. Road KwaMashu.
Mandlenkosi then let a room to the first respondent
and her husband.
The first respondent and her husband remained therein for sometime
and they later moved to Inanda area, where
they had found a place of
their own.
[7] After their
departure, Gugu Funeka came and asked to rent a room from Mandlenkosi
and Mandlenkosi acceded to her request. On
the death of Mandlenkosi
in 1990 the first respondent and her husband returned to the area for
the funeral. It was at that juncture
the first respondent and her
husband chased away Funeka from the house and they then took
occupation of the house. They remained
in occupation of the house
until the death of the first respondent’s husband on 26
September 2002.
[8] On 11 February 1994
the Manager of KwaMashu Township wrote the first respondent’s
husband a letter informing him to vacate
the premises. The
Manager had in a letter dated 30 August 1993 advised the first
respondent’s husband that the applicant
had been appointed
representative to the estate of the late Mandlenkosi Ncwane, and that
the application for the transfer of the
house in applicant`s name was
being processed. Prior to this, the police had arrived on the
premises and told the first respondent
and her husband to vacate the
premises.
[9] The Verulam
Magistrate’s Court forwarded the attorneys of the first
respondent’s husband a certificate dated 9 October
1993
reflecting that the estate of Mandlenkosi had been dealt with in
accordance with the provisions of s1(1)(e) of the KwaZulu
Interstate
Succession Act 1988. In a letter dated 11 March 1996 the Department
of Local Government and Housing advised the first
respondent’s
husband that the property had been transferred from Mandlenkosi’s
estate to the applicant.
[10] On 23 September 1996
the first respondent’s husband launched application in this
Court for an order setting aside the
registration of transfer of the
property into the name of the applicant. Further, that the estate of
the late Mandlenkosi Ncwane,
3703075380084, be remitted for
administration in accordance with the provisions of s 1(1) (e) of the
KwaZulu Interstate Succession
Act, 1988, to the Magistrate’s
Court, Verulam. The first respondent’s husband also obtained an
interim order interdicting
and prohibiting the applicant from
alienating, burdening or dealing with the property situate at Unit
J., KwaMashu, pending the
finalisation of the application in this
regard.
[11] On 1 October 1996 at
13h30 the Sheriff served the notice of motion proceedings on the
applicant’s brother, David Ncwane,
whom he found present at the
applicant’s residential address, Unit [...] M. Road, KwaMashu.
On 28 October 1996 this
Court at the instance of the first
respondent`s husband issued a Rule Nisi inviting the applicant to
show cause that on 18 November
1996 why the order sought in the Rule
Nisi should not be granted.
[12] On the return date
the applicant was in default and the order sought was granted in his
absence. In his affidavit, Nthakazelwa
Dominic Ncwane, the first
respondent’s husband, had stated that he had since 1960 been
living with his cousins Bhekebona
Ncwane and Mandlenkosi Ncwane in
the house unit […], KwaMashu. He, the first respondent`s
husband, Bhekebona and Mandlenkosi
referred to each other as
brothers.
[13] The two brothers,
Bhekebona and Mandlenkosi, were both suffering from mental illness
and unemployed. They were both not married
and nor did they have
children. They lived with the first respondent and her husband, who
cared and provided for them.
[14] The first
respondent’s husband made all payments in respect of the house.
On 23 June 1963 the first respondent’s
husband caused the house
to be registered in the name of Bhekebona, his eldest cousin. When
the latter died the first respondent`s
husband instructed the local
authorities that the ownership of the house be transferred to
Mandlenkosi. The first respondent’s
husband stated that he had
paid a deposit and instalments towards the purchase price of the
house with the understanding that on
the death of Mandlenkosi he
would inherit it, as he was then the only surviving relative of
Mandlenkosi. He went on to state that
he paid for rates, water and
electricity. He had purchased the house in the names of his cousins
so to provide security for them
should anything happen to him.
[15] He went on to state
that sometime after the death of Mandlenkosi, the applicant came to
his residence to collect the deceased’s
identity document and
death certificate, on the pretext that he had been sent by the
Magistrate to collect same. He undertook to
return the documents.
But, he did not honour that undertaking. The first respondent’s
husband stated that the applicant was
in no way related to the
deceased, Mandlenkosi Ncwane, and that, therefore, he did not have
any claim to the deceased`s estate.
The first respondent’s
husband stated that he was the one who had a better claim to the
estate of Mandlenkosi as he was by
then his only surviving relative.
Issue
[16] The issues arising
from the facts of this case are; whether the order in question was
erroneously granted and, whether the
first respondent is the owner of
the property in question through acquisitive prescription.
(a)
Was the order
erroneously granted?
[17] A judgment is
erroneously granted if the court granted the judgment or order on the
basis that the defendant personally knew
of the trial date and yet
had not appeared and, if there existed at the time of its issue a
fact of which the judge was unaware,
which would have precluded the
granting of the judgment and which would have induced the judge, if
aware of it, not to grant the
judgment. See
De Wet and Others v
Western Bank Ltd
1977(4) SA 770(T);
Myingwa v Moolman NO
1993
(2) SA 508
(Tk) at 510 D-G;
Naidoo v Matlala NO
2012 (1) SA
143
(GNP) at 153C.
[18] Rule 42(1) of the
Uniform Rules of Court grants the court powers,
mero mutu
or
upon application of any party affected to rescind or vary an order or
judgment erroneously sought and granted. However, the
court has
discretion whether or not to grant an application for rescission
under this sub rule. In
Tapol and others v LS Group Management and
Services (Pty) Ltd
1988(1) SA 639(W), the court rescinded a
judgment which had been granted on the premise that the defaulting
parties had been given
notice and were in wilful default whereas they
had not in fact been given notice.
[19] Once it has been
established that the judgment was erroneously granted in the absence
of a party affected thereby the rescission
of the judgment should be
granted. See
Mutebwa v Mutebwa
2001 (2) SA 193
(Tk) at 1991-J.
In
Tshabalala and another vs Peer
1979 (4) SA 27(T)
at 30D,
the court held that if the court holds that an order or judgment was
erroneously granted in the absence of any party affected
thereby, it
should without further inquiry rescind or vary the order. It is not
necessary for a party to show good cause for the
sub rule to apply.
See
De Wet and other
CASE AT 777. In
Bakoven Ltd vs GJ
Howes (Pty) ltd
1992 (2) SA 466
(ECD) 471G, Erasmus J said:
‘
Rule 42(1) (a), it
seems to me, is a procedural step designed to correct expeditiously
an obvious wrong judgment or order’.
[20] An order or judgment
is erroneously granted if it was granted on the basis that a party
was in wilful default whereas it was
not. In the present case the
notice of the intended proceedings was served on the applicant’s
brother, David, in applicant’s
absence. The applicant avers
that his brother did not give him the notice and as a result he was
not aware of the proceedings.
Upon tender of the return of service
the court assumed that the applicant had received the notice and that
he was then in wilful
default. However, good cause in regard to
default has to be shown.
[21] There are three ways
in which a judgment taken in the absence of one of the parties may be
set aside, namely in terms of (a)
sub rule 42(1) , or (b) Rule
31(2)(b) or (c) at common law – See
Athmaram v Singh
1989(3) SA 953(D) at 954E. The applicant in this matter has elected
to proceed in terms of Rule 42(1). In order to succeed, an
applicant
for rescission of a judgment taken against him by default must show
good sufficient cause. See
Colyn v Tiger Food Industries Ltd t/a
Meadow Feed Mills (Cape)
2003 (6) SA 1
(SCA) at 9C. This entails
three elements; the applicant must (i) give a reasonable explanation
for his default (ii) show that his
application is
bonafide
;
and (iii) show that on the merits he has
bonafide
defence
which
prima facie
carries some prospects of success. See
Meadow Feed Mills case at 9E; Naidoo v Matlala case
at 152 H –
153.
[22] The onus of showing
the existence of sufficient cause for relief is on the applicant and
he has to satisfy the court that there
was some reasonably
satisfactory explanation why the judgment was allowed to go by
default. In L
odhi 2 Properties Investments v Bondev Developments
2007(6)SA 87 (SCA) at 95E, the court held that where the matter
had been properly enrolled and all the Rules of Court had been
complied
with the plaintiff is quite within its rights to press for
judgment in terms of the Rules. The court further held that where a
plaintiff is procedurally entitled to judgment in the absence of the
defendant the judgment if granted cannot be said to have been
granted
erroneously in the light of a subsequently disclosed defence. In this
matter the court was dealing with the scenario where
the defendant
having given an intention to defend, was not filing a plea and
defending the matter. In the circumstances, the plaintiff
is entitled
to the order sought. The existence or non-existence of a defence on
the merits is an irrelevant consideration and,
if subsequently
disclosed cannot transform a validly obtained judgment into an
erroneous judgment. In my view this case is distinguishable
on facts
from the present case since in the present case the order was granted
in the absence of the applicant on the basis that
he had been
notified of the motion proceedings.
[23] The first respondent
contends that the applicant has failed to give a reasonable
explanation for his default. According to
the applicant the reason
for his default was that his brother did not give him the notice.
Nothing gainsays the applicant’s
version that he did not
receive the notice instituting motion proceedings against him.
It has merely been assumed that since
the notice had been served on
his brother, the applicant might have received it.
[24] The plaintiff must
furnish an explanation of his default sufficiently full to enable the
court to understand how it really
came about and to assess his
conduct and motives. There is no evidence to support an allegation
that the applicant had demonstrated
a conduct evincing an intention
not to defend the motion proceedings by the first respondent’s
husband. See also
Silber v Ozen Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd
1954(2) SA 345 (A) at 352C. His intention to defend the first
respondent’s claim is evident from the applicant’s
conduct
subsequent to his becoming aware of the existence of an order
against him. He approached Verulam Justice Centre for legal
assistance.
Following his initiative his attorneys of record has been
instructed at the instance of Judicare to bring the rescission
proceedings.
[25] However, this court
has discretion to grant the relief sought, notwithstanding the fact
that a good cause is not shown. But
the onus is on the first
respondent to prove that the applicant did receive the notice and
that he deliberately failed to attend
court. I am not satisfied that
she has discharged such onus.
[26] The applicant also
avers that when applying for an order in question, the first
respondent’s husband in his founding
affidavit deliberately
misrepresented the facts to the court so to mislead it. Further, the
applicant contends that had the true
facts been placed before court,
it would have given a judgment or order other than the one it was
induced by the incorrect evidence
to give. In his affidavit the first
respondent’s husband painted a picture of him, in fact, being
the purchaser of the property
in that he paid the deposit and
instalments towards its purchase price. According to him, both
Bhekebona and Mandlenkosi were under
his control and care. He went on
to state that the applicant obtained Mandlenkosi`s birth and death
certificates in deceit. In
applicant’s version in this regard
is that he was summoned to the Magistrate’s office and told
that he was an intestate
heir to the estate of Mandlenkosi.
[27] If a fraud is
committed in that the facts are deliberately misrepresented to the
court the order will be erroneously granted.
See
Naidoo vs Matlala
NO
2012(1) SA 143 (GNP) at 153 C-E. In order to succeed on a
claim that a judgment or order be set aside on the ground of fraud,
it
is necessary for the applicant to alleged and prove;
(a) that the successful
litigant was a party to fraud;
(b) that the evidence was
in fact incorrect;
(c) that it was made
fraudulently and with intent to mislead; and that
(d) it diverged to such
an extent from the true facts that the court would, if the true facts
had been placed before it, have given
a judgment other than which it
was induced by the incorrect evidence to give.
[28] It is trite that
fraud as a ground for the rescission of an order may take any form
and is not limited to perjured evidence
or fraud committed during the
proceedings. See
Rowe v Rowe
1997(4) SA 160 (SCA) at 166J-I.
The first respondent’s husband in his affidavit, attached to
papers, stated that he purchased
the property in question and
deliberately caused it to be registered in the name of the first
owner, Bhekebona Ncwane, so for it
to devolve to Mandlenkosi Ncwane
on the death of Bhekebona and eventually to him (the first
respondent’s husband). He went
on to state that he did all this
in order to provide security for Bhekebona and Mandlenkosi should he
die as they were under his
care and control. On the balance of
probabilities, it is improbable that the first respondent’s
husband would purchase the
property and cause it to be registered in
the name of Bhekebona and on the death of Bhekebona to
allow it to devolve
to Mandlenkosi with the hope that the property
would one day ultimately return to him. It does not appear from his
affidavit as
to how he knew that both Bhekebona and Mandlenkosi would
predecease him. Further; there is no merit in the allegation by the
first
respondent’s husband in his founding affidavit that he
did all this in order to provide security for his cousins Bhekebona
and Mandlenkosi. It stands to reason that had the first respondent`s
husband predeceased them, he would be survived by his wife,
the first
respondent, who would naturally succeed to him as the owner of the
property in question. I am, therefore, satisfied that
the applicant
has discharged the onus resting on him to prove that the first
respondent’s husband misrepresented the facts
to the court with
the intention to induce it to grant the order in his favour.
[29] The facts stated
below militate against the allegation that the first respondent’s
husband had at any stage been the
owner of the property in question.
It is not in dispute that at the time of his death in 1990
Mandlenkosi Ncwane was residing at
J764, Sibhubhu Road, KwaMashu,
with the first respondent and her husband. However, between 1990 and
before September 1995 there
is absolutely nothing to suggest that the
first respondent and her husband had ever taken any step to approach
the relevant local
authority to have the house in question
transferred in their name. In the distribution account in respect of
the estate of Mandlenkosi
reference is made to the applicant as the
surviving nephew. Further, it is recorded that funeral expenses
totalling R1400 were
paid by the first respondent’s husband and
were as such registered as a claim against the estate. It therefore
follows that
had the applicant fraudulently claimed that he was the
nephew of Mandlenkosi and therefore entitled to inherit intestate the
deceased’s
estate the applicant would not have recorded the
claim by the first respondent’s husband for funeral expenses in
the distribution
account. It was only after the applicant had
instituted eviction proceedings against the first respondent and her
husband, the
first respondent`s husband launched an application for
an order setting aside the transfer of the house in the applicant’s
name. Prior to this, no claim relating to the ownership of the house
had ever been lodged by the first respondent and her husband.
[30] For her claim to the
house in question the first respondent does not rely on that her
husband purchased the house in question
and that he was therefore the
owner of the house in question. Nor does she rely on the ground that,
as the only surviving blood
relative of Mandlenkosi, her husband had
a better claim to the property than the applicant. Instead, she
relies on the fact that
she and her husband had since 1963 been
living in the house in question. As a consequence she and her husband
acquired the property
through acquisitive prescription.
[31]
Section 1
of the
Prescription Act 68 of 1969
provides that ‘a person shall by
prescription become the owner of a thing which he has possessed
openly and as if he were
the owner thereof for an uninterrupted
period of thirty years.’ In terms of this section acquisitive
prescription of land
is defined as being the acquisition of ownership
by the possession of another’s’ immovable property
continuously for
thirty years,
noc vi nee
claim
nec
precario
. In
Du Toit and others vs Furstenberg and others v
1957(1) SA 501 (O) at 503G, De Villiers J defined the phrase
nec
precario
as meaning ‘not by virtue of a precarious consent’
or ‘not by virtue of revocable permission’ or ‘not
on sufferance.’
[32] The onus is upon the
first respondent to prove that she and her husband had continuously
for thirty years possessed the disputed
property openly as if they
were owners of the property in question. According to the first
respondent she and her husband started
living in the disputed house
in 1963. At the time they were asked to vacate the property they had
had possessed the property continuously
for thirty years. It is not
in dispute that at the time the first respondent and her husband were
in this house, were living with
both previous registered owners of
the property with their permission. This remained the passion until
the previous owners both
died in 1988 and 1990 respectively. During
their life time they could revoke such permission. On that basis, it
could not be said
that first respondent and her husband independently
and openly possessed the property as if they were its owners. To the
contrary,
the evidence shows that there were rather lodgers than
owners of the property in question.
[33] According to the
applicant the first respondent came into possession of the property
during 1984 and remained in possession
thereof. With the consent of
its registered owner Mandlenkosi, until he, the owner, died in 1990.
After the death of the owner
they remained in occupation of the house
until the death of the first respondent’s husband. However, the
first respondent
denies that she and her husband started living in
the disputed house during 1984 and she claims that they started
living there
in 1963. The onus is consequently upon the first
respondent to prove that she and her husband acquired the disputed
property by
prescription and that accordingly her husband, through
whom she claims, was its true owner. It is common cause that in a
letter
dated 11 February 1994 the office of KwaMashu Township Manager
instructed the first respondent and her husband to vacate the
disputed
property. In the same year, in August, the police also told
the first respondent and her husband to vacate the disputed property.
In October of the same year the Department of Local Government and
Housing told the first respondent and her husband that the property
had been transferred to the applicant intestate. In 1995 and 2013 the
applicant instituted eviction proceedings against the first
respondents’ husband and all persons who were then occupying
the house through him. It therefore follows that their possession
was
interrupted in 1884, 1995 and 2013 respectively, and they could not
be heard when they say that they continuously occupied
the disputed
property for thirty years.
[34] It is common cause
that the property is presently registered in the name of the
applicant and that it has been so registered
since 21 October 1994.
The first respondent’s husband after obtaining the order,
setting aside the transfer of the property
in the name of the
applicant, he did not give effect to it by having the disputed
property transferred in his name until he died
in 2002. This affords
prima facie
proof that the applicant is the lawful owner of
the disputed property.
[35] The first respondent
avers that the applicant has failed to bring this case within the
reasonable time from the date he became
aware of the existence of the
order in question. She therefore contends that this application
should be dismissed by reason of
the long time lapse. What is
reasonable time depends upon the facts of each case See therefore
Pro
Media Drukkers and Uitgewers (Edms)Bpk v Kaimowitz and Others
1996(4)
SA 411(C) at 421G. In
First National Bank of SA Ltd vs Van
Rensburg NO and others
1994(1) SA 677(T) at 681B-H the applicant
had launched the application more than three years after the
appellant’s attorney
had uplifted the order. The court held
that a reasonable time in the case was substantially less than three
years. A reasonable
time had lapsed and there was no explanation for
the delay.
[36] In the present case
the applicant came to know for the first time of the existence of the
order in 2013. At the time when he
instituted eviction against the
first respondent, the applicant was represented by Freedom Mhlongo of
Freedom & Associates
Attorneys, acting on the instruction of
Verulam Justice Centre. After perusing the order Mr Mhlongo was of
the view that rescission
should be sought first. However, such
decision had to be sanctioned by the Justice Centre. Notwithstanding
the existence of the
order in relation to the property the Justice
Centre advised that the applicant should proceed with the eviction
proceedings. The
application for eviction order was only made on 25
June 2014. Once against the question of the existence of the order
came to the
fore. On returning to the Centre for assistance in that
regard, the Centre told him to wait. The application was only
launched
on 1 December 2015 by the applicant’s attorneys of
record acting on the instructions of the Judicare. The applicant was
by
then unemployed and as a consequence he could not instruct any
attorney of his own choice to bring the application for rescission.
From the facts of this case one can deduce that the present
application was launched within two years from the time the applicant
became aware the order in question. In the light of the plausible
explanation the applicant has given, it could not be said that
he has
failed to bring the application within a reasonable time, as it is
required in law.
[37] If the defendant
fails to show good cause for relief or if the plaintiff shows that
the defendant was in wilful default the
court is not entitled to
rescind the judgment, if good cause has, and wilful default had not,
been shown the court has a discretion.
See
Silber Case, supra,
at 352H.
[38] When the question of
sufficiency of a defendant’s explanation for his default is
finally balanced, the fact that his
defence carries reasonable or
good prospects of success on the merits might tip the scale in his
favour. See
Creative Car Sound v Automobile Radio Dealers
Association
1989 (Pty) Ltd 2007(4) SA 546(D) at 555C-D. In the
present case, the applicant proceeds in terms of
Rule 42(1)
and in
terms of which showing good or sufficient cause is not a requirement.
However, this court has discretion whether or not
to grant an
application for rescission under
Rule 4
2(1). See
Tshivase Royal
Council v Tshivase: Tshivase v Tshivase
1992(4) SA 852(AD) at
862J- 863A.
[39] Apart from that at
the time of granting the order in question the court was not aware of
the fact that the notice of motion
proceedings had not come to the
notice of the applicant, the first respondent’s husband,
Nthakazelwa Dominic Ncwane, misrepresented
the facts to the court
that he had acquired the property in question for the benefit of the
two previous owners of the house, Bhekebona
Ncwane and Mandlenkosi
Ncwane, for they were during their life time unemployed and suffering
from mental illness. He went on to
state that he was the only
surviving blood relative of the deceased, having a better claim to
the property, and that the applicant
had obtained transfer of the
house in his name by deceit. Had the court been aware of the fact
that that was a misrepresentation
on his part, it would not have
granted the order sought. In the premises, I am satisfied that the
applicant has made a case for
the relief sought.
Order
[40] (a) The order issued
by this Court on 18 November 1996 under case number 6475/96 is
hereby rescinded and set aside.
(b) The first respondent
is ordered to pay the costs of the application.
Date
reserved:
19 October 2016
Date
delivered:
11 November 2016
Counsel for
Applicant:
Mr Mpanza
Instructed
by:
Mpanza & Associates
Counsel for
Respondent: Adv Sitharam
Instructed
by:
I C Meer Kallideen & Co.