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[2016] ZAFSHC 163
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Labuschagne v Labuschagne and Others (A9.2015) [2016] ZAFSHC 163 (22 September 2016)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH
AFRICA
FREE STATE
DIVISION,
BLOEMFONTEIN
Appeal
Number: A9/15
In
the appeal between:-
FERDINAND
JACOBUS
LABUSCHAGNE
…..........................
Appellant
and
BETTY
LABUSCHAGNE
…........................................................................
.
1
st
Respondent
METROPOLITAN
RETIREMENT
ADMINISTRATORS
..................................................................................
..
.1
st
Respondent
CORAM:
VAN ZYL, ADJP
et
RAMPAI,
J et
CHESIWE,
AJ
JUDGMENT
BY:
VAN ZYL, J
DELIVERED
ON:
22 SEPTEMBER 2016
[1]
This is an appeal against the whole of the judgment and order of
Tsatsi, AJ, delivered on 30 October 2014. Leave to appeal was
granted
by the Court a
quo
on 12 December 2014.
[2]
The first respondent (applicant in the Court a
quo)
instituted
an application against the appellant (first respondent in the Court a
quo)
and the second respondent (second respondent in the Court
a
quo),
which application was opposed by the appellant, but
not by the second respondent. The Court a
quo
granted
the following order:
"1.
The first and second respondents are to furnish to the applicant,
within 1O (TEN) days of the granting of this order, a
true and proper
statement, together with substantiating documents, reflecting the
value of the benefits paid to the first respondent,
which he held in
the Transnet Retirement Fund.
2.
The first and second respondents are to furnish to the applicant,
within 10 (TEN) days of the granting of this order, a true
and proper
statement, together with substantiating documents, reflecting the
value of the first respondent's pension interest in
the Transnet
Retirement Fund as at 14 October 2008.
3.
The applicant is granted leave to approach this Court on the same
papers duly amplified - if so advised - for an order that the
first
respondent to pay to the applicant whatever amounts appear to be due
to the applicant in terms of the aforesaid statements
rendered.
4.
The first respondent is to pay the costs of this application."
[3]
The notice of appeal reflects,
inter
alia,
the following grounds of appeal:
2.
Her
Ladyship respectfully erred in her application of the principles
set-forth in Krygkor Pensioenfonds v Smith
[1993] ZASCA 47
;
1993 (3) SA 459
to the
facts of this matter in that Her Ladyship did not find that:
2.1
the first respondent was entitled to enforce her right by way of
action or application;
2.2
whichever procedure, as elaborated upon immediately herein above,
chosen by the first respondent, she would have been able to
establish
by discovery or Rule 35(13), as the case may be, how much monies the
appellant had received from the second respondent,
if any at all;
2.3
the first respondent could also have obtained any unprivileged
information from the second respondent by obtaining a subpoena
(even,
in appropriate circumstances in motion proceedings);
2.4
the first respondent need not require extraordinary relief in the
application especially in view of the fact that the first
respondent
could have obtained the information in question from the appellant
without deviating from the established rules of procedure;
2.5
given the facts of this matter Her Ladyship erred in the exercise of
her discretion.
3.
Her
Ladyship respectfully erred in finding that the authority and
principles set out in the matter of Sempapalele v Sempapalele
2001
(2) SA 306
(0) were applicable to the facts of this matter.
4.
Her
Ladyship respectfully erred in finding that there was an amendment of
the Honourable Justice Gillie's order, dated 14 October
2010.
5.
Her
Ladyship respectfully erred in finding that the first respondent is
entitled to the relief sought in order to enable her to
determine the
true value of her 50% of the pension fund benefit held by the
appellant and should have dismissed the application
(launched by the
first respondent) with costs."
I
will refer to the parties as in the appeal. The second respondent is
not an active party to the appeal.
[4]
The appellant and the first respondent were married in community of
property on 2 September 2000 and the marriage relationship
was
terminated by a October 2008 ("the Court order"). order
reads as follows: decree of divorce on 14 Paragraph 4 of
the said
"4.
Oat die verweerder toe te sien dat 50% van sy belang in die Transwerk
Pensioenfonds aangedui word as synde 'n bedrag waarop
eiseres
geregtig sal wees by datum van uitbetaling daarvan. Die
Regeringwerknemerspensioenfonds 'n aantekening ten dien effekte
in sy
rekords aan te teken." (sic)
[5]
According to the first respondent the appellant was previously
employed by Transwerk, which was a predecessor of the legal entity
Transnet. As such the name of the applicable retirement fund was
amended on 1 December 2000 to the Transnet Retirement Fund. At
all
relevant times to the application the Transnet Retirement Fund was
administered and managed by second respondent. In a letter
from the
second respondent addressed to the first respondent's attorneys of
record, dated 23 November 2009, and attached to the
founding
application papers as annexure
"LB4",
the second
respondent indicated as follows:
"Mr
Labuschagne divorced his first wife on 5 January 1995.
Mr
Labuschagne total market value on date of divorce 14 October 2008
amounted to R1 298 724-41 minus first divorce endorsement of
R18
911-67 equals R1 279 812-74, 50% of R1 279 812-74 amounts to R639
906-37."
(sic)
[6]
The appellant's pension benefits accrued to him during September
2012. The first respondent then initiated the necessary steps
in
order to obtain her 50% share of the accrued pension benefits. The
appellant transferred an amount of R156 634-79 to the trust
account
of the first respondent's attorneys of record. According to the
appellant the aforesaid amount constituted the first respondent's
50%
share of the pension benefits.
[7]
The first respondent believed that the value of the appellant's
pension benefits, as at 23 November 2009, was at least the amount
reflected in the letter of same date from the second respondent.
[8]
A number of letters were addressed to the second respondent in order
to obtain confirmation of the value of the benefits paid
to the
appellant and a calculation of the value of the pension interest at
the date of divorce. No answer was forthcoming from
the second
respondent. The first respondent subsequently launched the
application.
[9]
The first respondent also averred as follows in the founding
affidavit:
"22.
I
am advised that and submit that the trustees of a pension fund bear a
common law fiduciary duty to disclose information which
is reasonably
required to protect or advance the rights of a complainant and that
such duty may, in certain circumstances, extend
to a non-member of
the fund.
23.
Insofar
as the first respondent is concerned, he was enjoined by an order of
this Honourable Court to pay 50% of his pension benefits
to me which
he clearly has not done. I respectfully say therefore that the first
respondent ought to be compelled to provide the
requested information
so as to give effect to the relevant court order.
24.
The
disclosure of information that I seek is pivotal to establish
inter
alia:
24.1
if there is indeed any amount of pension benefits due to me by the
first espondent;
24.2
the exact amount of such pension benefits due;
24.3
whether it would be competent for me to approach this Honourable
Court by way of action or motion proceedings for the payment
of any
pension benefits that prove to be due to me.I'
[10]
The appellant raised the following defences in his answering
affidavit:
10.1
He has never been a member of the Transwerk Pensioenfonds, nor has he
been a member of the Regeringswerknemerspensioenfonds
referred to 1n
paragraph 4 of the Court order. At all relevant times the appellant
was only a member of the Transnet Retirement
Fund. The appellant
consequently contended that the Court order was not issued against
his retirement fund and therefore there
is no obligation on Transnet
Retirement Fund to comply with the Court order. The amount of R151
544-61 which was indeed paid into
the trust account of the first
respondent's attorneys of record, was therefore paid by himself and
not by the second respondent.
10.2
With regards to his stance pertaining to his own obligations, I deem
it apposite to repeat the appellant's averments in support
of his
defence:
"11.1
Dit is korrek dat ek weier om 50% van my pensioenfonds op datum van
egskeiding aan die applikante oar te betaal.
11.2
Daar bestaan geen hofbevel wat my gelas om 50% van die
pensioenfondsbelang van die Transnet Pensioenfonds soos op datum van
egskeiding aan die applikante oor te betaal nie.
11.3
lndien die applikante van voornemens is om die bestaande hofbevel
soos uiteengesit in Aanhangsel 'LB1' te wysig, sal ek sodanige
aansoek opponeer.
11.4
Ek was te alle tye onder die indruk gewees dat ek slegs geregtig is
om 50% van die pensioenfondsbelang wat ontstaan het
vanaf datum
van my huwelik met die applikante tot datum van ontbinding van die
huwelik aan haar oor te betaal. Ek het bygevolg
Transnet versoek om
sodanige berekening te doen wat 'n bedrag daargestel het van R151
544-61, welke bedrag inderdaad aan die applikante
oorbetaal was.
11.5
lndien die applikante nou wens aansoek te doen vir wysiging van die
hofbevel sal ek sodanige aansoek opponeer en terselfdetyd
aansoek
doen dat die hofbevel oak gewysig moet word dat die applikante slegs
geregtig sal wees op 50% van my pensioenfondsbelang
vir die
datum wat ek met die applikante getroud was.
11.6
Die applikante is klaarblyklik van oordeel dat sy geregtig is op 50%
van my totale pensioenfondsbelang vanaf my aansluiting
by die
pensioenfonds, tot en met die ontbinding van die huwelik. Die
applikante neem ook nie in ag dat ek reeds voorheen getroud
was en
dat my eerste eggenote geregtig was op 50% van my pensioenfondsbelang
soos op datum van my eerste egskeiding nie. Ek heg
hierby aan as
Aanhangsel 'FJL3', my eerste egskeidingsbevel tesame met die akte van
dading daartoe."
Regarding
the aforesaid calculation which the appellant requested from
Transnet, he referred to a letter from the second respondent
addressed to appellant's attorneys of record, dated 5 March 2014,
attached to the answering affidavit as annexure
"FJL4",
in which the following was stated:
"Refer
to your letter RJ Britz.... dated 26 February 2014.
The
calculation from date of marriage till date of divorce was done on
enquiry from your client. The first calculation that was
done was
from date of service till date of divorce minus the first divorce
endorsement."
10.3
Lastly, the appellant averred that he is not in possession of any
documentation which the first respondent seeks in terms of
prayers 2
of the notice of motion and that she can make the necessary
calculations with the information at her disposal. In this
regard he
made the following averments:
"16.2
Ek het geen dokumente wat ek aan die applikante kan beskikbaar stel
nie.
16.3
Daar is ook geen hofbevel wat die Transnet Pensioenfonds en ook die
administrateurs van die Transnet Pensioenfonds verplig
om enige
dokumentasie aan die applikante beskikbaar te stel nie. Daar bestaan
immers nie 'n hofbevel teen die Transnet Pensioenfonds
nie.
18.1....Die
inhoud van Aanhangsel 'LB4' is insiggewend. In hierdie dokumente word
volledige besonderhede verskaf van my bedankingswaardes
soos op datum
van egskeiding en is dit nie vir my duidelik na welke ander
dokumentasie die applikante opsoek is nie. Daar kan nie
ander
dokumentasie wees nie. Dit is bygevolg 'n verkwisting van tyd en
kostes gewees om hierdie aansoek te verrig het.
19.
Ek
het reeds gehandel met die inhoud van Aanhangsel 'LB4' en is dit nie
vir my duidelik na welke ander informasie die applikante
en haar
prokureur opsoek is nie. Uit Aanhangsel 'LB4' blyk dit duidelik wat
my pensioenfondsbelang te Transnet beloop het op datum
van egskeiding
en kan die applikante, indien sy 'n berekening wil doen, daarvolgens
handel."
[11]
Mr Tsangarakis, appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted that
the application was premature as a consequence of the
fact that no
order has been granted against the appellant in terms of which he is
obliged to pay any pension benefits from his
Transnet Retirement Fund
to the first respondent. There can consequently
mutatis mutandis
be no obligation on the second respondent to provide any
documentation or information to the first respondent.
[12]
It was also submitted by Mr Tsangarakis that the relief granted by
the Court a
quo
in effect compels the appellant to make
discovery of documents even prior to the institution of an
application/ action which is
not the object of discovery and which
should not be allowed. In this regard he relied on the following
passage from
Erasmus Superior Court Practice,
D.E.
Van Loggerenberg, Volume 2, Part D, at 01-459:
"The
employment of discovery should be confined to cases where parties are
properly before the court and are litigating 'at
full stretch'. The
essential feature of discovery is that the person requiring discovery
is
in general
only entitled to discovery once the
battle lines are drawn and the legal issues established. It is not a
tool designed to put a
party in a position to draw the battle lines
and establish the legal issues. Rather, it is a tool used to identify
factual issues
once legal issues are established. Discovery is not
intended to be used as a sniping weapon in preliminary skirmishes."
Mr
Tsangarakis also contended that the Court a
quo
should even
have been more loathe to have ordered discovery in the circumstances
where the appellant specifically indicated in paragraph
16.2 of the
answering affidavit that he himself does not have any documents
available and that second respondent cannot be compelled
to provide
documents to the appellant in the absence of any reference to the
Transnet Retirement Fund in the Court order of 14
October 2008.
[13]
It was furthermore the submission of Mr Tsangarakis that the first
respondent in any event did not make out a proper case regarding
the
alleged necessity to obtain the documents and information prior to
the commencement of litigation. He submitted that the first
respondent has enough information at her disposal to formulate a
sustainable cause of action. She would then be able to obtain
the
available documentation and/or information in the normal course of
litigation by means of discovery and/or the other various
mechanisms
available to her in terms of the Uniform Rules of Court.
[14]
Mr Tsangarakis submitted that although it was decided in
Krygkor
Pensioenfonds v Smith
[1993] ZASCA 47
;
1993 (3) SA 459
(A) that a Court has
the inherent power to adapt its procedures when it is in the interest
of justice, it would exercise its inherent
jurisdiction to deviate
from established procedures in exceptional circumstances only and
where the requirements of justice demand
it. Even then a Court will
always attempt to deviate as little as possible from such established
procedures and practices. Mr Tsangarakis
submitted that the first
respondent proffered no explanation or grounds regarding the
existence of the required exceptional circumstances
in support of the
exceptional relief which she seeks.
C
ontents
of the Court Order and Misnomer of the
Retirement
Fund:
[15]
The Court a
quo
dealt with these aspects in paragraphs [19]
and [20] of her judgment. In my view her findings cannot be faulted.
[16]
The fact of the matter is that the appellant was a beneficiary of the
Transnet Retirement Fund, which, at all relevant times
hereto, was
administered by the second respondent. Any entitlement which the
first respondent may have to the appellant's pension
benefits can
only be with regard to his membership of the Transnet Retirement
Fund. The said retirement fund was previously known
and described as
the Transwerk Pension Fund, as referred to in paragraph 4 of the
Court order. From the replying affidavit it is
evident that Transwerk
was the predecessor of the legal entity known and described as
Transnet and as such the name of the retirement
fund was amended
accordingly on 1 December 2000. Even the particulars of claim
contained an averment that the appellant was in
the employment of
Transwerk. It is therefore in my view evident that the reference in
paragraph 4 of the Court order to "Transwerk
Pensioenfonds"
is a mere misnomer. The reference to
"Die Regeringswerknemerspensioenfonds", on the other
hand,
is an apparent patent error. Whether it will be necessary for
the first respondent to have the aforesaid amended and/or corrected,
and the manner in which that ought to be done, are not necessary to
be decided upon in this judgment. As correctly submitted by
Mr
Coetzer, appearing on behalf of the first respondent, the application
was not aimed at obtaining a ruling regarding the appellant's
obligation to effect a payment to the first respondent. Therefore,
where it is common cause that the appellant was a member of
the
Transnet Retirement Fund, the misnomer/error in the Court order could
not, for purposes of the current proceedings, have caused
the
application to be dismissed.
[17]
Similarly, the issue regarding the difference between the initial
prayers in the particulars of claim and the subsequent contents
of
the Court order, is irrelevant for purposes of the current
proceedings. On the facts currently before Court, the Court order
is
the one which had been issued at the time and is in the absence of
any amendment thereto up to date, currently still of force
and
effect.
[18]
I am consequently of the view that the judgment in
Sempapalele
v Sempapalele and Another
2001(2) SA 306
(0)
is not directly relevant to the appeal. The facts are distinguishable
in the sense that in that matter there was a deed of settlement
which
provided for a blanket division of the joint estate. In this appeal
there is a binding Court order which specifically identifies
the
pension fund (albeit by means of a misnomer) and which specifically
provides for a 50% entitlement to the pension benefits
in favour of
the first respondent. However, the Court a
quo's
reference
to the said judgment has, in my view, no impact on the outcome of
this appeal.
Exceptional
circumstances:
[19]
The first issue to be decided is whether the exceptional relief which
was granted by the Court a
quo
was at all necessary
considering the contention by Mr Tsangarakis that the first
respondent has enough information at her disposal
to formulate a
sustainable cause of action for the payment of the pension benefits
allegedly due to her. As correctly pointed out
by Mr Coetzer, Rule 18
requires that the first respondent will have to formulate her
hypothetical particulars of claim with sufficient
particularity to
enable the appellant to reply thereto, failing which the appellant
may either file an exception and/or a Rule
30 notice. This may lead
to the striking out of the particulars of claim even before the
discovery phase of litigation arrives
and the first respondent will
not be able to recover her share of the appellant's pension benefits
as she is legally entitled to.
The same principles apply to a
hypothetical application. Annexure "LB4" to the founding
affidavit is, to say the least,
extremely badly worded and merely
provides certain figures without giving any indication as to how
those figures have allegedly
been compiled and calculated. All
attempts to obtain more information from the second respondent were
unsuccessful. The said letter
refers to the "total market value"
"on date of divorce". It is not clear whether "total
market value"
is the same as the actual value of the first
respondent's pension interest at the said date. As further correctly
averred by the
appellant in her replying affidavit, Annexure "LB4"
is dated 23 November 2009, almost three years prior to the date on
which the first respondent's pension benefits accrued to him and the
appellant consequently became entitled to the payment of her
share.
The appellant has no knowledge of the bearing that interest has had
on the respective figures, nor does she know what the
value was of
the pension benefitswhich had in fact accrued to the first respondent
and exactly what amount had been paid out to
him. Without the
information she requested in the application, the first respondent is
called upon to speculate whether she in
fact has a valid claim, how
much money is owed to her and to formulate her claim based upon such
speculation. She reasonably requires
the said information to protect
her rights.
[20]
Mr Tsangarakis correctly submitted that the order made by the Court a
quo
was tantamount to compelling the discovery of documents
even prior to the commencement of litigation. He also correctly
pointed
out that in general this should not be allowed as it is
contrary to the purpose of discovery as stated in
Erasmus
Superior Court Practice,
supra.
[21]
In the
Kryqkor P
ensioenfonds-matter,
supra,
the background facts and circumstances were similar (although not
identical as I will later show) to the facts of this appeal. There
Mrs Smith approached Court on an urgent basis for,
inter
alia,
an order compelling the pension fund of which her ex-husband was a
member, to provide her with certain information regarding
his pension
benefits and payments that were made to him. The relief was granted
by the Court a quo and the pension fund then took
the matter on
appeal. The following principles were stated at 469 B - I of the
judgment:
"Hoewel
die debat rondom
Hart v Stone
en
Stuart v Ismail
dus
nog nie finaal afgehandel is nie, het hierdie Hof gesaghebbend
bevestig dat die Hof wel sy prosedure kan aanpas in die belang
van
behoorlike regspleging. Vir huidige doeleindes is ek bereid om ten
gunste van mev Smith te veronderstel, sander om die punt
te beslis,
dat 'n Hof in
'n gepaste geval selfs 'n derde party, teen
wie die
applikant geen eisoorsaak het nie en wat nie 'n
party of beoogde party
tot
litigasie met
die
applikant
is
nie,
kan gelas om die
aangevraagde inligting te verstrek.
Dit sou verder veronderstel dat afgewyk word van die
dicta
in
die
House of Jewels
& Gems-saak
supra
op 828H-829A
en die
Cerebos
Food-saak
supra
op 173E
ten effekte dat die verlening van so 'n bevel 'n saak van
substantiewe reg is, en nie een van prosesreg nie. In hierdie
veronderstelling sou die Hof a
quo
die bevoegdheid gehad om
die verskaffing van die aangevraagde inligting deur die Pensioenfonds
te gelas. Die verdere vraag is dan
hoe hierdie bevoegdheid uitgeoefen
moes word.
Normaalweg
word die verstrekking van inligting as 'n deel van die regsproses
gereel deur die Hofreels. Voorsiening word gemaak vir
blootlegging
inter partes
en vir getuiedagvaardings of dagvaardings
duces
tecum
ten opsigte van derde partye. Ons Howe is tradisioneel
ongenee om buite hierdie bepalings te gaan. Sien, bv, behalwe die
gewysdes
reeds hierbo behandel,
Biden v French and
D'Esterre Diamond Mining Company
(1882) 1 Buch AC 95
;
Colonial
Government
v W H Tatham
(1902) 23 NLR 153
op 157-8;
Spies
v
Vorster
1910 NLR 205
op 216;
Messina Brothers, Coles and
Searle
v Hansen
and
Schrader
Ltd
1911 CPD 781
;
Moulded
Components
and
Rotomoulding South Africa (Pty) Ltd v
Coucourakis and Another
1979
(2) SA 457
(W)
op
462H-463B;
Roamer Watch
Co
SA and Another
v
African Textile Distributors also tla M K Patel Wholesale
Merchants and Direct Importers
1980 (2) SA 254
(W)
op
282C en 284C en
Seetal v Pravitha and Another NO
1983 (3)
SA 827
(D)
op 832G- 833E. Vergelyk ook die bespreking in
Jaffa
se saak
supra
op 293J- 294D. Wat duidelik
uit hierdie gewysdes blyk, is dat die Hof slegs in
uitsonderlike gevalle
sy inherente bevoegdheid sal
uitoefen om prosedures te volg waarvoor nie in die gewone
prosesreg voorsiening
gemaak word nie. Die uitsonderlike gevalle word
op verskillende maniere omskryf in die beslissings
wat
hierbo aangehaal is. Virhuidige doeleindes is dit
egter genoeg om te se dat die Hof hierdie bevoegdheid sal uitoefen
net
waar gereqtigheid vereis
dat afgewyk word van die gewone
prosedure-reels. En selfs waar 'n afwyking nodig mag wees, sal die
Hof natuurlik altyd poog om so
naby as moontlik aan die erkende
praktyke te bly." (Own emphasis)
[22]
It is evident from the aforesaid passage that it was found that a
Court has the inherent discretion to adapt its procedures
when
it is in the interest of justice. A Court will only exercise such
inherent jurisdiction to deviate from its established
procedures
in exceptional circumstances where the requirements of justice demand
it.
[23]
In my view it is important to also specifically take note of
the factual findings the Court made in applying the
aforesaid
principles to the facts of that matter, as it appears at 469
I - 470 G of the said judgment:
"As
hierdie benadering in die onderhawige geval
toegepas word, is die resultaat myns insiens
soos volg.
Mev Smith het 'n reg tot 'n helfte van die pensioengeld gehad.
Hierdie reg kon sy by wyse van aksie of aansoek teen
mnr Smith
afdwing. Watter prosedure sy ook al gevolg het, sou sy deur
blootlegging kon vasstel watter bedrae mnr Smith ontvang
het (sien
Reel 35 en veral Reel 35(13) van die Eenvormige Hofreels). Verder sou
sy enige ongeprivilegieerde inligting van die Pensioenfonds
kon bekom
deur middel van 'n getuiedagvaarding selfs, in 'n gepaste
geval, in mosie-verrigtinge. Sien Harms
Civil Procedure
in
the
Supreme
Court
para
G27. Vir 'n gewone Hofproses het sy dus geen buitengewone
regshulp nodig gehad nie.
Sy
het egter om verstaanbare redes besluit om 'n dringende aansoek aan
te vra. Haar eerste bede was
om
'n bevel wat mnr Smith gelas
om
die helfte van die bedrag wat hy van die Pensioenfonds ontvang
het, aan haar te lewer. As sy bang was dat hy haar sou bedrieg
en
minagting van die Hof sou pleeg deur 'n bedrag oor te betaal
wat minder as die helfte is, sou sy ook in hierdie
aansoek
die Hof kon gevra het om terselfdertyd blootlegging te gelas
ingevolge Hofreel 35(13). Dit sou haar in staat
gestel het om insae
te kry in alle relevante dokumente wat in sy besit was, soos
byvoorbeeld korrespondensie met die Pensioenfonds,
bankstate, en dies
meer. Geen rede blyk uit die stukke om te vermoed dat mnr Smith 'n
meinedige blootleggingsverklaring sou geliasseer
het nie. Ook in die
dringende aansoek het sy dus myns insiens nie buitengewone regshulp
nodig gehad nie. Veral was dit nie nodig
om die Pensioenfonds, 'n
buitestaander, in hierdie stadium in te trek in die geskil tussen
haar en haar voormalige man nie. Die
Pensioenfonds was nie die
enigste wat die inligting gehad het nie. Mnr Smith het dit ook gehad,
en van horn kon sy dit kry sander
om af te wyk van die erkende
praktykreels, behalwe miskien insoverre dit nodig mag gewees het om
hulle aan te pas weens die dringendheid
van die saak. En as dit
uiteindelik onmoontlik geblyk het om reg te laat geskied sander die
inligting van die Pensioenfonds, sou
die Hof kon gelas het dat 'n
gepaste amptenaar van die fonds
viva voce
getuienis
afle. Sien
Harms (op
cit).
Om
op te som: as ek veronderstel dat die Hof wel die inherente
bevoegdheid het om bekendmaking van hierdie soort inligting deur
'n
buitestaander tot 'n geskil te gelas, meen ek nogtans nie dat die Hof
dit in hierdie geval behoort te gedoen het nie. Daar was
dus myns
insiens geen regverdiging vir mev Smith om die Pensioenfonds by
hierdie aansoek te betrek nie..."
[24]
The finding regarding the existence of exceptional circumstances, or
not, will obviously depend on the particular facts of
the matter. In
my view there are very important facts which distinguish the
Krygkor
Pensioenfonds-matter
from this appeal. In that matter
the Court found that Mrs Smith could have enforced her entitlement to
half of her ex husband's
pension benefits by means of action or
application, in which instance she would have been able to establish
the required information
by means of the normal rules of discovery. I
have already made the finding that in this matter the first
respondent does not have
enough information at her disposal to
formulate a sustainable cause of action, whether by
means of action or
application. The Court also stated that in
the case of an application, she could have included a request for
discovery in
terms of Rule 35(13) "......as sy bang was dat hy
haar sou bedrieg en minagting van die Hof sou pleeg deur 'n bedrag
oor te
betaal wat minder as die helfte is.....". In the instant
appeal, on the first respondent's version, this is exactly what the
appellant had already done.
The
Court then continued and found that Rule 35(13) would have provided
her with an appropriate remedy in that she would have been
able to
obtain all the necessary documentation which Mr Smith had in his
possession because "....geen rede blyk uit die stukke
om te
vermoed dat Mnr Smith 'n meinedige blootleggingsverklaring sou
geliasseer het nie....". It was also found that the pension
fund
was not the only party who had the information at its disposal as
"....Mnr Smith het dit ook gehad, en van horn ken sy
dit kry
sender om af te wyk van die erkende praktyksreels ....". The
circumstances in the current appeal are however completely
different.
In the current instance the appellant specifically stated in
paragraph 16.2 of the answering affidavit that he has no
documentation at his disposal which he can provide to the first
respondent. Moreover, he indicated in paragraph 18 of his answering
affidavit that ".....dit (is) nie vir my duidelik na welke ander
dokumentasie die applikante opsoek is nie.... daar kan nie
ander
dokumentasie wees nie...". He again confirmed this attitude in
paragraph 27 of the answering affidavit where he stated
" ...ek
beskik
bowendien nie oor sodanige informasie nie...".
[25]
The obstructive conduct and attitude of the appellant as reflected by
the contents of the application papers, speak of a complete
lack of
co-operation. Moreover, it is quite obvious that he will leave no
stone unturned to frustrate the first respondent in any
of her
attempts to obtain the necessary information in order to claim any
further payments from him. This was clearly also the
experience of
the first respondent as she specifically stated the following in
paragraph 21 of her founding affidavit.
"I
did not seek the relevant information from the first respondent
simply because of the fact that, as a result of the first
respondent's conduct that precipitated this application in the first
place, the inference was inescapable that he would in all
likelihood
not have played open cards with me, so to speak."
[26]
In view of all the peculiar circumstances of the matter, the first
respondent' s decision to have recourse against the second
respondent
was justified. In my view the aforesaid facts constitute exceptional
circumstances which indeed necessitated a deviation
from the
established procedures. The order the Court
a quo
made was
justified as justice would have been defeated in the absence thereof.
[27]
I pause to mention that although the Court a
quo
did not
specifically deal with the question of exceptional
circumstances, her factual findings cannot be faulted and they
are
indicative of the existence of the required exceptional
circumstances.
Order:
[28]
The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
_____________
C.
VAN ZYL, J
I
concur.
______________
M.H.RAMPAI,
J
I
concur.
________________
C.
CHESIWE,
AJ
On
behalf of Appellant:
….
Adv
S. Tsangarakis
…
........................................................
Instructed
by: Honey Attorneys
…
........................................................
BLOEMFONTEIN
On
behalf of First Respondent:
Adv. JC Coetzer
…
.........................................................
Instructed
by:
…
........................................................
McIntyre
& van der Post
…
........................................................
BLOEMFONTEIN