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[2016] ZAFSHC 185
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L v L and Another (A9/15) [2016] ZAFSHC 185 (22 August 2016)
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Appeal
Number: A9/15
In the
appeal between:-
F.
J.
L.
Appellant
and
B.
L.
1
st
Respondent
METROPOLITAN
RETIREMENT
ADMINISTRATORS
2
nd
Respondent
CORAM:
VAN ZYL, ADJP
et
RAMPAI,
J
et
CHESIWE,
AJ
JUDGMENT
BY:
VAN ZYL, J
DELIVERED
ON:
22
SEPTEMBER 2016
[1] This
is an appeal against the whole of the judgment and order of
Tsatsi, AJ, delivered on 30 October 2014.
Leave to
appeal was granted by the Court a
quo
on 12 December 2014.
[2] The
first respondent (applicant in the Court a
quo)
instituted an application against the appellant (first
respondent in the Court a
quo)
and the second respondent (second respondent in the Court a
quo),
which application was opposed by the appellant, but not by the second
respondent. The Court a
quo
granted the following order:
"1.
The first
and
second
respondents
are
to
furnish
to
the applicant,
within
1
0
(TEN)
days
of the granting
of this
order, a true
and
proper statement,
together
with
substantiating documents,
reflecting
the
value of
the benefits paid
to
the first respondent,
which he
held
in
the
Transnet Retirement Fund.
2.
The
first
and
second
respondents
are
to
furnish
to
the applicant,
within
10 (TEN)
days
of
the
granting
of
this
order,
a true
and
proper statement,
together
with
substantiating documents,
reflecting
the
value
of
the
first
respondent's pension
interest
in
the
Transnet
Retirement Fund
as
at 14
October
2008.
3.
The applicant is granted
leave to approach this Court on the
same
papers
duly
amplified -
if
so
advised
-
for
an
order
that
the
first
respondent
to
pay
to
the
applicant
whatever amounts
appear
to
be due to
the
applicant
in terms
of the aforesaid
statements
rendered.
4.
The first
respondent
is to pay the
costs of this
application."
[3] The
notice of appeal reflects,
inter
alia,
the
following grounds of appeal:
“
2.
Her
Ladyship respectfully erred in her application of the principles
set-forth in Krygkor Pensioenfonds v Smith
[1993] ZASCA 47
;
1993 (3) SA 459
to the
facts of this matter in that Her Ladyship did not find that:
2.1
the
first
respondent
was
entitled
to
enforce
her
right
by way
of action or application;
2.2
whichever
procedure,
as
elaborated upon
immediately
herein above,
chosen
by the first
respondent,
she
would have
been
able
to
establish
by
discovery
or
Rule
35(13),
as the
case
may
be,
how
much
monies
the
appellant
had received from the
second
respondent,
if any
at all;
2.3
the
first respondent could
also have
obtained
any
unprivileged
information
from
the
second
respondent by
obtaining
a
subpoena
(even,
in appropriate
circumstances
in
motion
proceedings);
2.4
the
first respondent need
not
require
extraordinary
relief
in
the application
especially
in
view of
the
fact that the
first
respondent
could
have
obtained
the
information
in
question from the
appellant without
deviating from the
established
rules of
procedure;
2.5
given the facts
of this
matter
Her
Ladyship
erred
in the exercise
of
her discretion.
3.
Her
Ladyship respectfully erred in finding that
the authority and principles set out in the
matter of
Sempapalele v Sempapalele
2001 (2) SA 306
(0) were applicable to the
facts of this matter.
4.
Her
Ladyship respectfully erred in finding that there was an amendment of
the Honourable Justice Gillie's order, dated 14 October
2010.
5.
Her
Ladyship respectfully erred in finding that the first respondent is
entitled to the relief sought in order to enable her to
determine the
true value of her 50% of the pension fund benefit held by the
appellant and should have dismissed the application
(launched by the
first respondent) with costs."
will
refer to the parties as in the
appeal. The second
respondent is not an
active party to the appeal.
[4] The
appellant and the first
respondent were married
in community of
property on 2 September 2000 and the marriage relationship was
terminated by a October 2008 ("the Court order").
order
reads as follows: decree of divorce on 14
Paragraph 4 of the said
"4.
Oat die verweerder
toe
te
sien dat
50% van
sy
belang
in die
Transwerk
Pensioenfonds
aangedui word
as synde
'n
bedrag waarop
eiseres
geregtig
sal wees
by
datum
van uitbetaling
daarvan.
Die
Regeringwerknemerspensioenfonds
'n
aantekening
ten
dien
effekte
in
sy
rekords
aan
te
teken."
(sic)
[5]
According to the first respondent the appellant was previously
employed by Transwerk, which was a predecessor of the legal entity
Transnet. As such the name of the applicable retirement fund was
amended on 1 December 2000 to the Transnet Retirement Fund. At
all
relevant times to the application the Transnet Retirement Fund was
administered and managed by second respondent. In a letter
from the
second respondent addressed to the first respondent's attorneys of
record, dated 23 November 2009, and attached to the
founding
application papers as annexure
"LB4'',
the second
respondent indicated as follows:
"Mr
L. divorced his first wife on 5 January 1995.
Mr
L. total market value on date of divorce 14 October 2008 amounted to
R1 298 724-41 minus first divorce endorsement of R18
911-67
equals R1 279 812-74, 50% of R1 279
812-74 amounts to R639 906-37."
(sic)
[6] The
appellant's pension benefits accrued to him during September 2012.
The first respondent then initiated the necessary steps
in order to
obtain her 50% share of the accrued pension benefits. The appellant
transferred an amount of R156 634-79 to the trust
account of the
first respondent's attorneys of record. According to the appellant
the aforesaid amount constituted the first respondent's
50% share of
the pension benefits.
[7] The
first respondent believed that the value of the appellant's pension
benefits, as at 23 November 2009, was at least the amount
reflected
in the letter of same date from the second respondent.
[8] A
number of letters were addressed to the second respondent in order to
obtain confirmation of the value of the benefits paid
to the
appellant and a calculation of the value of the pension interest at
the date of divorce. No answer was forthcoming from
the second
respondent. The first respondent subsequently launched the
application.
[9] The
first respondent also averred as follows
in
the founding affidavit:
"22.
I
am advised that and submit that the trustees of a pension fund bear a
common law fiduciary duty to disclose information which
is reasonably
required to protect or advance the rights of a complainant and that
such duty may, in certain circumstances, extend
to a non-member of
the fund.
23.
Insofar
as the first respondent is concerned, he was enjoined by an order of
this Honourable Court to pay 50% of his pension benefits
to me which
he clearly has not done. I respectfully say therefore that the first
respondent ought to be compelled to provide the
requested information
so as to give effect to the relevant court order.
24.
The
disclosure of information that I seek is pivotal to establish
inter
alia:
24.1
if there
is
indeed
any
amount
of
pension
benefits
due
to
me
by the first
espondent;
24.2
the exact
amount
of such
pension benefits
due;
24.3
whether
it would
be
competent
for
me to
approach
this Honourable
Court
by way
of action
or motion proceedings for
the
payment
of
any
pension
benefits that
prove to
be due
to
me.”
[10] The
appellant raised the following defences in his
answering affidavit:
10.1
He has never been a member of the Transwerk Pensioenfonds, nor has he
been a member of the Regeringswerknemerspensioenfonds
referred to 1n
paragraph 4 of the Court order. At all relevant times the appellant
was only a member of the Transnet Retirement
Fund. The appellant
consequently contended that the Court order was not issued against
his retirement fund and therefore there
is no obligation on Transnet
Retirement Fund to comply with the Court order. The amount of R151
544-61 which was indeed paid into
the trust account of the first
respondent's attorneys of record, was therefore paid by himself and
not by the second respondent.
10.2
With regards to his stance pertaining to his own obligations, I deem
it apposite to repeat the appellant's
averments in support of his
defence:
"11.1
Dit is korrek dat ek weier om 50% van my pensioenfonds op datum van
egskeiding aan die applikante oar te betaal.
11.2
Daar
bestaan
geen
hofbevel
wat
my
gelas
om
50%
van
die
pensioenfondsbelang van
die
Transnet
Pensioenfonds
soos op
datum van
egskeiding aan
die
applikante oor
te
betaal
nie.
11.3
lndien
die
applikante
van
voornemens is
om
die
bestaande hofbevel
soos
uiteengesit
in Aanhangsel 'LB1'
te
wysig,
sal
ek
sodanige
aansoek
opponeer.
11.4
Ek
was te
alle
tye onder die indruk
gewees dat ek slegs geregtig is
om 50%
van die
pensioenfondsbelang
wat ontstaan
het vanaf
datum van
my huwelik
met die applikante
tot
datum
van
ontbinding van die
huwelik
aan
haar
oor
te
betaal.
Ek
het bygevolg Transnet
versoek
om
sodanige
berekening
te
doen
wat 'n
bedrag
daargestel
het
van
R151 544-61,
welke
bedrag inderdaad
aan die applikante
oorbetaal was.
11.5
lndien die applikante
nou wens
aansoek
te doen
vir
wysiging
van
die
hofbevel
sal ek
sodanige
aansoek
opponeer
en terselfdetyd
aansoek
doen
dat
die
hofbevel
oak
gewysig
moet
word
dat die applikante slegs
geregtig
sal
wees
op
50%
van
my
pensioenfondsbelang vir
die
datum
wat
ek
met die applikante
getroud was.
11.6
Die
applikante
is
klaarblyklik
van
oordeel
dat
sy
geregtig is op 50%
van my
totale
pensioenfondsbelang vanaf my aansluiting by
die
pensioenfonds,
tot
en
met
die
ontbinding van
die
huwelik.
Die
applikante
neem
ook
nie
in
ag
dat
ek
reeds voorheen
getroud was
en dat
my eerste eggenote
geregtig
was
op
50%
van
my
pensioenfondsbelang
soos
op
datum van my
eerste egskeiding nie. Ek heg hierby aan as Aanhangsel 'FJL3', my
eerste egskeidingsbevel tesame met die akte van dading
daartoe."
Regarding
the aforesaid calculation which the appellant requested from
Transnet, he referred to a letter from the second respondent
addressed to appellant's attorneys of record, dated 5 March 2014,
attached to the answering affidavit as annexure
"FJL4'',
in which the following was stated:
"Refer
to your letter RJ Britz.... dated 26 February 2014.
The
calculation from date of marriage till date of divorce was done on
enquiry from your client. The first calculation that was
done was
from date of service till date of divorce minus the first divorce
endorsement."
10.3
Lastly, the appellant averred that he is not in possession of any
documentation which the first respondent
seeks in terms of prayers 2
of the notice of motion and that she can make the necessary
calculations with the information at her
disposal. In this regard he
made the following averments:
"16.2
Ek het geen dokumente
wat
ek aan die applikante
kan
beskikbaar
stel
nie.
16.3
Daar is ook geen hofbevel wat die Transnet Pensioenfonds en ook die
administrateurs van die Transnet Pensioenfonds verplig
om enige dokumentasie aan die
applikante beskikbaar te stel nie. Daar bestaan immers
nie 'n
hofbevel teen die Transnet Pensioenfonds nie.
18.1
....Die inhoud van Aanhangsel 'LB4' is insiggewend.
In hierdie dokumente word volledige besonderhede verskaf
van my
bedankingswaardes soos op datum van egskeiding en is dit nie vir my
duidelik na welke ander dokumentasie die applikante
opsoek is nie.
Daar kan nie ander dokumentasie wees nie. Dit is bygevolg 'n
verkwisting van tyd en kostes gewees om hierdie aansoek
te verrig
het.
19.
Ek
het reeds gehandel met die inhoud van Aanhangsel 'LB4' en is dit nie
vir my duidelik na welke ander informasie die applikante
en haar
prokureur opsoek is nie. Uit Aanhangsel 'LB4' blyk dit duidelik
wat my pensioenfondsbelang te Transnet beloop het
op datum van
egskeiding en kan die applikante, indien sy 'n berekening wil doen,
daarvolgens handel."
[11] Mr
Tsangarakis, appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted that the
application was premature as a consequence of the
fact that no order
has been granted against the appellant in terms of which he is
obliged to pay any pension benefits from his
Transnet Retirement Fund
to the first respondent. There can consequently
mutatis
mutandis
be no obligation on the
second respondent to provide
any documentation or information to the first respondent.
[12] It
was also submitted by Mr Tsangarakis that the relief granted by the
Court a
quo
in effect compels the appellant to make
discovery of documents even prior to the institution of an
application/ action which is
not the object of discovery and which
should not be allowed. In this regard he relied on the following
passage from
Erasmus
Superior
Court Practice
,
D.E. Van Loggerenberg, Volume 2, Part D, at 01-459:
"The
employment of discovery should be confined to cases where parties are
properly before the court and are litigating 'at
full stretch'. The
essential feature of discovery is that the person requiring discovery
is
in general
only entitled to discovery once the
battle lines are drawn and the legal issues established. It is not a
tool designed to put a
party in a position to draw the battle lines
and establish the legal issues. Rather, it is a tool used to identify
factual issues
once legal issues are established. Discovery is not
intended to be used as a sniping weapon in preliminary skirmishes."
Mr
Tsangarakis also contended that the Court a
quo
should
even have been more loathe to have ordered discovery in the
circumstances where the appellant specifically indicated in paragraph
16.2 of the answering affidavit that he himself does not have any
documents available and that second respondent cannot be compelled
to
provide documents to the appellant in the absence of any reference to
the Transnet Retirement Fund in the Court order of 14
October 2008.
[13] It
was furthermore the submission of Mr Tsangarakis that the first
respondent in any event did not make out a proper case regarding
the
alleged necessity to obtain the documents and information prior to
the commencement of litigation. He submitted that the first
respondent has enough information at her disposal to formulate a
sustainable cause of action. She would then be able to obtain
the
available documentation and/or information in the normal course of
litigation by means of discovery and/or the other various
mechanisms
available to her in terms of the Uniform Rules of Court.
[14] Mr
Tsangarakis submitted that although it was decided in
Krygkor
Pensioenfonds
v
Smith
[1993] ZASCA 47
;
1993
(3) SA 459
(A) that a Court has the inherent power to adapt its
procedures when it is in the interest of
justice, it would exercise
its inherent jurisdiction to
deviate from established
procedures in exceptional circumstances only
and where the
requirements of justice demand it. Even then a Court will always
attempt to deviate as little as possible from such
established
procedures and practices. Mr Tsangarakis submitted that
the first respondent proffered
no explanation or grounds
regarding the existence of the required exceptional circumstances in
support of the exceptional
relief which she seeks.
Contents
of the Court Order and Misnomer of
the Retirement Fund:
[15] The
Court a
quo
dealt with these aspects in paragraphs [19] and [20] of
her judgment. In my view her findings cannot be faulted.
[16] The
fact of the matter is that the appellant was a beneficiary of the
Transnet Retirement Fund, which, at all relevant times
hereto, was
administered by the second respondent. Any entitlement which the
first respondent may have to the appellant's pension
benefits can
only be with regard to his membership of the Transnet Retirement
Fund. The said retirement fund was previously known
and described as
the Transwerk Pension Fund, as referred to in paragraph 4 of the
Court order. From the replying affidavit it is
evident that Transwerk
was the predecessor of the legal entity known and described as
Transnet and as such the name of the retirement
fund was amended
accordingly on
1
December
2000.
Even the particulars of
claim contained an averment that the appellant was in the employment
of Transwerk. It is therefore
in my view evident that the
reference in paragraph
4
of the Court order to
"Transwerk Pensioenfonds" is a mere misnomer. The reference
to "Die Regeringswerknemerspensioenfonds",
on the other
hand, is an apparent patent error. Whether it will be
necessary for the first respondent to have the aforesaid
amended
and/or corrected, and the manner in which that ought to be done, are
not necessary to be decided upon in this judgment.
As correctly
submitted by Mr Coetzer, appearing on behalf of the first respondent,
the application was not aimed at obtaining a
ruling regarding the
appellant's obligation to effect a payment to the first respondent.
Therefore, where it is common cause that
the appellant was a member
of the Transnet Retirement Fund, the misnomer/error in the Court
order could not, for purposes of the
current proceedings, have caused
the application to be dismissed.
[17]
Similarly, the issue regarding the difference between the initial
prayers in the particulars of claim and the subsequent contents
of
the Court order, is irrelevant for purposes of the current
proceedings. On the facts currently before Court, the Court order
is
the one which had been issued at the time and is in the absence of
any amendment thereto up to date, currently still of force
and
effect.
[18] I
am consequently of the view
that the judgment
in
Sempapalele
v
Sempapalele
and
Another
2001
(2)
SA
306
(0) is not
directly relevant to the appeal. The facts are distinguishable in the
sense that in that matter there was a deed of settlement
which
provided for a blanket division of the joint estate. In this appeal
there is a binding Court order which specifically identifies
the
pension fund (albeit by means of a misnomer) and which specifically
provides for a
50%
entitlement
to the pension benefits in favour of the first respondent. However,
the Court a
quo's
reference to the said judgment has,
in my view, no impact on the outcome of this appeal.
Exceptional
circumstances:
[19] The
first issue to be decided is whether the exceptional relief which was
granted by the Court a
quo
was at all necessary
considering the contention by Mr Tsangarakis that the first
respondent has enough information at her disposal
to formulate
a sustainable cause of action for the payment of the pension benefits
allegedly due to her. As correctly pointed
out by Mr Coetzer, Rule 18
requires that the first respondent will have to formulate her
hypothetical particulars of claim with
sufficient particularity to
enable the appellant to reply thereto, failing which the appellant
may either file an exception and/or
a Rule 30 notice. This may lead
to the striking out of the particulars of claim even before the
discovery phase of litigation arrives
and the first respondent will
not be able to recover her share of the appellant's pension benefits
as she is legally entitled to.
The same principles apply to a
hypothetical application. Annexure "LB4" to the founding
affidavit is, to say the least,
extremely badly worded and merely
provides certain figures without giving any indication as to how
those figures have allegedly
been compiled and calculated. All
attempts to obtain more information from the second respondent were
unsuccessful. The said letter
refers to the "total market value"
"on date of divorce". It is not clear whether "total
market value"
is the same as the actual value of the first
respondent's pension interest at the said date. As further correctly
averred by the
appellant in her replying affidavit, Annexure "LB4"
is dated 23 November 2009, almost three years prior to the date on
which the first respondent's pension benefits accrued to him and the
appellant consequently became entitled to the payment of her
share.
The appellant has no knowledge of the bearing that interest has had
on the respective figures, nor does she know what the
value was of
the pension benefits which had in fact accrued to the first
respondent and exactly what amount had been paid out to
him. Without
the information she requested in the application, the first
respondent is called upon to speculate whether she in
fact has a
valid claim, how much money is owed to her and to formulate her claim
based upon such speculation. She reasonably requires
the said
information to protect her rights.
[20] Mr
Tsangarakis correctly submitted that the order made by the Court
a
quo
was tantamount to compelling the discovery
of documents even prior to the commencement of litigation. He also
correctly pointed
out that in general this should not be allowed as
it is contrary to the purpose of discovery as stated in
Erasmus
Superior Court Practice,
supra.
[21] In
the
Krygkor
Pensioenfonds-matter,
supra,
the background facts and circumstances were similar
(although not identical as I will later show) to the facts of this
appeal. There
Mrs Smith approached Court on an urgent basis for,
inter
alia, an order compelling the pension fund of which her
ex-husband was a member, to provide her with certain information
regarding
his pension benefits and payments that were made to him.
The relief was granted by the Court a quo and the pension fund then
took
the matter on appeal. The following principles were stated at
469 B - I of the judgment:
"Hoewel
die debat rondom
Hart
v Stone
en
Stuart
v Ismail
dus nog nie finaal
afgehandel
is
nie, het hierdie
Hof
gesaghebbend
bevestig
dat
die
Hof wel
sy
prosedure
kan
aanpas
in
die
belang
van
behoorlike
regspleging. Vir
huidige
doeleindes
is ek
bereid
om
ten
gunste
van
mev Smith te veronderstel, sander om
die punt te beslis,
dat 'n Hof in
'n
gepaste
geval
selfs
'n
derde
party,
teen
wie
die
applikant geen
eisoorsaak
het
nie en
wat
nie
'n
party
of
beoogde
party
tot
litigasie met die
applikant
is nie,
kan
gelas
om die
aangevraagde
inligting te verstrek.
Dit sou verder veronderstel
dat afgewyk word van die
dicta
in die
House
of
Jewels
& Gems-saak
supra
op 828H-829A en
die
Cerebos
Food-saak
supra
op 173E ten
effekte dat die verlening van so 'n bevel 'n saak van
substantiewe reg is, en nie een van prosesreg nie.
In hierdie
veronderstelling sou die Hof a
quo
die
bevoegdheid gehad om die verskaffing van die aangevraagde
inligting deur die Pensioenfonds te gelas. Die
verdere vraag is dan hoe hierdie bevoegdheid uitgeoefen
moes word.
Normaalweg
word die verstrekking van inligting as 'n deel van die regsproses
gereel deur die Hofreels. Voorsiening word gemaak vir
blootlegging
inter
partes
en vir getuiedagvaardings of
dagvaardings
duces
tecum
ten opsigte van
derde partye. Ons Howe is tradisioneel ongenee om buite hierdie
bepalings te gaan. Sien, bv, behalwe die gewysdes
reeds hierbo
behandel,
Biden
v French
and
D'Esterre Diamond
Mining
Company
(1882)
1 Buch AC 95;
Colonial
Government
v
W
H
Tatham
(1902)
23
NLR
153
op
157-8;
Spies
v Vorster
1910
NLR 205
op 216;
Messina
Brothers,
Coles and Searle
v Hansen
and
Schrader
Ltd
1911 CPD 781
;
Moulded
Components
and Rotomoulding
South Africa
(Pty) Ltd
v Coucourakis
and Another
1979 (2)
SA 457
(W) op 462H-463B;
Roamer
Watch
Co
SA and Another
v African Textile
Distributors
also
tla
M
K
Patel
Wholesale
Merchants and
Direct Importers
1980
(2) SA 254
(W) op
282C en
284C en
Seetal
v
Pravitha
and
Another NO
1983
(3)
SA
827
(D)
op
832G- 833E.
Vergelyk
ook
die
bespreking
in
Jaffa
se
saak
supra
op
293J-
294D.
Wat
duidelik
uit
hierdie
gewysdes
blyk,
is
dat
die
Hof
slegs
in
u
i
tsonderlike
gevalle
sy inherente bevoegdheid
sal
uitoefen
om prosedures te volg
waarvoor
nie in die gewone
prosesreg voorsiening
gemaak
word
nie.
Die u
i
tsonderlike
gevalle
word
op
verskillende maniere
omskryf
in
die
beslissings
wat
hierbo
aangehaal
is.
Vir
huidige doeleindes is dit egter genoeg om te se dat
die Hof hierdie bevoegdheid sal uitoefen net
waar
geregtigheid vereis
dat afgewyk
word van die gewone prosedure-reels. En selfs waar 'n afwyking
nodig mag wees, sal die Hof natuurlik altyd
poog om so naby as
moontlik aan die erkende praktyke te bly." (Own emphasis)
[22] It
is evident from the aforesaid passage that it was found that a Court
has the inherent discretion to adapt its procedures
when it is in the
interest of justice. A Court will only exercise such inherent
jurisdiction to deviate from its established procedures
in
exceptional circumstances where the requirements of justice demand
it.
[23] In
my view it is important to also specifically take note of the factual
findings the Court made in applying the aforesaid
principles to the
facts of that matter, as it appears at 469 I - 470 G of the said
judgment:
"As
hierdie benadering in die onderhawige geval toegepas word, is die
resultaat myns insiens soos volg. Mev Smith het 'n reg
tot 'n helfte
van die pensioengeld gehad. Hierdie reg kon sy by wyse van aksie of
aansoek teen mnr Smith afdwing. Watter prosedure
sy ook al gevolg
het, sou sy deur blootlegging kon vasstel watter bedrae mnr Smith
ontvang het (sien Reel 35 en veral Reel 35(13)
van die Eenvormige
Hofreels). Verder sou sy enige ongeprivilegieerde inligting van die
Pensioenfonds kon bekom deur middel van
'n getuiedagvaarding
selfs, in 'n gepaste geval, in mosie-verrigtinge. Sien Harms
Civil
Procedure
in
the
Supreme
Court
para G27. Vir 'n gewone Hofproses het sy dus
geen buitengewone regshulp nodig gehad nie.
Sy
het egter om verstaanbare redes besluit om 'n dringende aansoek aan
te vra. Haar eerste bede was om 'n bevel wat mnr Smith gelas
om die
helfte van die bedrag wat hy van die Pensioenfonds ontvang het, aan
haar te lewer. As sy bang was dat hy haar sou bedrieg
en minagting
van die Hof sou pleeg deur 'n bedrag oor te betaal wat minder as die
helfte is, sou sy ook in hierdie aansoek die
Hof kon gevra het om
terselfdertyd blootlegging te gelas ingevolge Hofreel 35(13). Dit sou
haar in staat gestel het om insae te
kry in alle relevante dokumente
wat in sy besit was, soos byvoorbeeld korrespondensie met die
Pensioenfonds, bankstate, en dies
meer. Geen rede blyk uit die stukke
om te vermoed dat mnr Smith 'n meinedige blootleggingsverklaring sou
geliasseer het nie. Ook
in die dringende aansoek het sy dus myns
insiens nie buitengewone regshulp nodig gehad nie. Veral was dit nie
nodig om die Pensioenfonds,
'n buitestaander, in hierdie stadium in
te trek in die geskil tussen haar en haar voormalige man nie. Die
Pensioenfonds was nie
die enigste wat die inligting gehad het nie.
Mnr Smith het dit ook gehad, en van horn kon sy dit kry sander om af
te wyk van die
erkende praktykreels, behalwe miskien insoverre dit
nodig mag gewees het om hulle aan te pas weens die dringendheid van
die saak.
En as dit uiteindelik onmoontlik geblyk het om reg te laat
geskied sander die inligting van die Pensioenfonds, sou die Hof kon
gelas het dat 'n gepaste amptenaar van die fonds
viva
voce
getuienis afle. Sien
Harms
(op cit).
Om
op te som: as ek veronderstel dat die Hof wel die inherente
bevoegdheid het om bekendmaking van hierdie soort inligting deur
'n
buitestaander tot 'n geskil te gelas, meen ek nogtans nie dat die Hof
dit in hierdie geval behoort te gedoen het nie. Daar was
dus myns
insiens geen regverdiging vir mev Smith om die Pensioenfonds by
hierdie aansoek te betrek nie..."
[24] The
finding regarding the existence of exceptional circumstances, or not,
will obviously depend on the particular facts of
the matter. In
my view there are very important facts which distinguish the
Krygkor
Pensioenfonds-matter
from this appeal. In
that matter the Court found that Mrs Smith could have enforced her
entitlement to half of her ex husband's
pension benefits by
means of action or application, in which instance she would have been
able to establish the required information
by means of the normal
rules of discovery. I have already made the finding that in this
matter the first respondent does not have
enough information at her
disposal to formulate a sustainable cause of action, whether by means
of action or application. The
Court also stated that in the
case of an application, she could have included a request for
discovery in terms of Rule 35(13) "......
as
sy bang was
dat hy haar sou bedrieg
en minagting van die Hof sou pleeg deur 'n bedrag oor te
betaal wat
minder
as
die
helfte
is.....".
In the instant appeal, on the first respondent's version, this
is exactly what the appellant had already done.
The Court
then continued and found that Rule 35(13) would have provided
her with an appropriate remedy in that she would have
been able to
obtain all the necessary documentation which Mr Smith had in his
possession because
"....geen
rede
blyk
uit
die
stukke
om te
vermoed
dat
Mnr
Smith
'n
meinedige
blootleggingsverklaring
sou geliasseer
het nie....".
It was also found that the pension fund was not the only party
who had the information at its disposal as "....
Mnr
Smith
het
dit ook
gehad,
en
van
horn
ken
sy
dit
kry
sender
om
af
te
wyk
van
die
erkende
praktyksreels
....".
The circumstances in the current appeal are however completely
different. In the current instance the appellant specifically stated
in paragraph 16.2 of the answering affidavit that he has no
documentation at his disposal which he can provide to the first
respondent. Moreover, he indicated in paragraph 18 of his answering
affidavit that ".....
dit
(is) nie vir my
duidelik
na welke ander dokumentasie die applikante opsoek is nie.... daar kan
nie
ander dokumentasie wees
nie...".
He
again confirmed this attitude in paragraph 27 of the answering
affidavit where he stated " ...
ek
beskik bowendien nie oor sodanige informasie nie...".
[25] The
obstructive conduct and attitude of the appellant as reflected by the
contents of the application papers, speak of a complete
lack of
co-operation. Moreover, it is quite obvious that he will leave no
stone unturned to frustrate the first respondent in any
of her
attempts to obtain the necessary information in order to claim any
further payments from him. This was clearly also the
experience of
the first respondent as she specifically stated the following in
paragraph 21 of her founding affidavit.
"I
did not seek the relevant information from the first respondent
simply because of the fact that, as a result of the first
respondent's conduct that precipitated this application in the first
place, the inference was inescapable that he would in all
likelihood
not have played open cards with me, so to speak."
[26] In
view of all the peculiar circumstances of the matter, the first
respondent's decision to have recourse against the second
respondent
was justified. In my view the aforesaid facts constitute exceptional
circumstances which indeed necessitated a deviation
from the
established procedures. The order the Court
a
quo
made was justified as justice would have been defeated
in the absence thereof.
[27] I
pause to mention that although the Court a
quo
did not
specifically deal with the question of exceptional circumstances, her
factual findings cannot be faulted and they are indicative
of the
existence of the required exceptional circumstances.
Order:
[28] The
appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
__________________
c.
VAN ZYL,
J
I concur.
_________________
M.H.RAMPAI,
J
I concur.
_________________
C.
CHESIWE,
AJ
On
behalf
of
Appellant:
Adv
S.
Tsangarakis
I
nstructed
by:
Honey
Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
On behalf
of First Respondent:
Adv. JC Coetzer
Instructed by:
McIntyre & van der Post
BLOEMFONTEIN