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[2016] ZAFSHC 119
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Transnet Soc Ltd t/a Transnet Property v Defensor Electronic Security Systems (Proprietary) Limited (535/2016) [2016] ZAFSHC 119 (21 July 2016)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case
number: 535/2016
In
the matter between:
TRANSNET
SOC LTD t/a TRANSNET PROPERTY
Applicant
and
DEFENSOR
ELECTRONIC SECURITY SYSTEMS
(PROPRIETARY)
LIMITED
Respondent
(Registration
No: 2012/038837/07)
HEARD
ON:
05 MAY 2016
JUDGMENT
BY:
RAMPAI, J
DELIVERED
ON:
21 JULY 2016
[1]
These were motion proceedings. The applicant, as the lessor,
sought to have the respondent, as
the
lessee, evicted from certain business premises. Adjunct to the
main relief of eviction, the applicant also sought a subsidiary
relief. It sought also to have its t landlord tacit hypothec
against the respondent’s movables on the leased premises
perfected by having them attached with the aid of the sheriff.
The respondent opposed the option.
[2]
There were certain undisputed facts in the matter. The
applicant was the rightful owner of an immovable property.
The
property was situated on an industrial piece of land technically
known as a portion of the remaining extent of Erf 1964 Bloemfontein
commonly known as 9 Long Street, Hilton, Bloemfontein.
[3]
The parties entered into a written lease agreement, in respect of the
applicant’s property as described above. The
material
terms of the lease agreement were, among others; that the lease
would endure for a period of 3 years; that it would
effectively
commence on 1 August 2012; that it would terminate on 31 July 2015;
that the respondent would be obliged to pay rental
to the applicant
at the rate of R28 000.00 per month excluding value added tax;
that the rental would annually escalate at
the rate of 10%; that the
respondent would be obliged to pay a down deposit of R84 000.00
plus monthly contribution towards
the municipal bill in respect of
water consumption, property assessment tax, sewerage and refuse
removal and electricity supplied,
and that the respondent would use
the leased premises for business purposes only - vide “annexure
b”
[4]
The applicant duly complied with its contractual obligations towards
the respondent. It made the leased premises available
to the
respondent. The respondent took beneficial occupation of the
leased premises. The respondent remained in such
occupation at
all times material to these proceedings.
[5]
Notwithstanding its beneficial occupation and unhindered enjoyment of
the leased premises, the respondent failed to pay the
monthly rental
on regular basis in terms of the lease agreement.
[6]
On 27 January 2015 the applicant addressed the first letter of demand
to the respondent. It averred that the latter’s
account
was in arrears and that the exact sum of the arrears was
R491 752.07. It called upon the respondent to rectify
the
account within seven days. It warned the respondent that unless
the arrears were paid in accordance with the demand,
legal
proceedings would be initiated to evict the respondent and to recover
the arrears. The applicant also forewarned the
respondent that
the respondent would not be permitted to remove any of its movables
from the leased premised in those circumstances
since they were
subject to the its landlord’s tacit hypothec - vide “annexure
f”. The first demand notwithstanding,
the respondent failed to
settle the arrears, but remained in occupation of the leased
premises.
[7]
On 27 May 2015 the applicant addressed the second letter to the
respondent, averred that the respondents’ account was
still in
arrears, and claimed that the exact sum thereof was R497 003.34
as on 1 May 2015. As a result of the breaches
the applicant
gave written notice, by way of the said letter, of its decision to
cancel the lease agreement with effect from 27
May 2015. The
respondent was called upon to vacate the leased premises by no later
than 31 May 2015. The respondent
was once again warned that an
application would be launched to have the respondent evicted unless
he vacated the leased premises
in compliance with the notice whereby
the lease agreement was terminated – vide “annexure g”.
[8]
The very next day, on 28 May 2015 to be precise, the applicant
addressed yet another letter of demand to the respondent.
In
the third demand it averred that the respondent’s account was
still in arrears and that the exact sum thereof was R315 391.80.
It once again called upon the respondent to pay the arrears within
seven days. Again it warned the respondent that, unless
the
respondent complied, legal proceedings would be instituted to evict
the respondent and to recover the arrears. Again
the respondent
was forewarned about the landlord’s tacit hypothec over the
lessee’s movables on the leased premises
- vide “annexure
“d”.
[9]
The aforesaid notice, “annexure g”, was served by the
Sheriff upon the respondent on 3 June 2015 - vide “annexure
h”.
Notwithstanding service and knowledge that the applicant has
terminated the lease agreement; that the applicant had given
the
respondent final ultimatum to vacate the leased premises and that the
respondent was financially unable to settle the arrears
that had
accumulated over time – the respondent stayed put on the
applicant’s property. Days went by. Weeks
went by.
However, the respondent neither paid the arrears nor vacated the
leased premises. The respondent stayed put
and continued to
enjoy the beneficial occupation of the applicant’s property.
The applicant took no decisive and immediate
legal steps to reclaim
possession of its occupied property from the defaulting respondent.
[10]
On 5 July 2015 a certain Mr Gert Renier van Rooyen, the respondent’s
director and deponent, signed an acknowledgment
of debt, in his
personal capacity, in favour of the applicant. He acknowledged
that he was lawfully indebted to Transnet
Limited in the sum of
R25 000.00 in respect of rental. He then undertook to pay
such a capital debt from 1 August 2015
at a specified rate per month.
[11]
The 3 years lease agreement was supposed to come to its natural
end on 31 July 2015. However, it did not completely run
its
expected natural course on account of its earlier cancellation.
Despite its early cancellation, the respondent did not
vacate the
leased premises. It remained in occupation thereof. These
facts were common cause as far as the original
lease agreement was
concerned. So far the common cause was extrapolated from
the digestion of the founding and answering
affidavits only.
Later on I shall make a synopsis of the further common cause of facts
emanating from the answering and replying
affidavits.
[12]
On 09 October 2015 the applicant’s attorney e-mailed the
respondent’s attorney. He remarked that the respondent’s
arrears in respect of the outstanding rentals were substantial.
He reminded him that the respondent last paid an amount of
R68 692.32
in reduction of the arrears on 24 June 2015. He demanded the
full payment of such outstanding rentals by
30 October 2015 - vide
“annexure aa3”
[13]
The respondent’s attorney also demanded payment of the agreed
rental down deposit for the initial six month period of
the extended
lease agreement by 30 November 2015. He also restated that the
rental in respect of the remaining six months
period of the extended
lease agreement would have to be paid in six equal monthly
instalments as from 1 December 2015 - vide “annexure
aa3”.
[14]
The applicant’s attorney further advised the respondent’s
attorney the applicant would determine the exact amount
of the
monthly rental to be paid by the respondent in respect of the
extended lease agreement once the evaluation of the property,
which
was still occupied by the respondent, had been done. All the
same he urged the respondent to continue paying rental
in accordance
with the rate of the expired lease agreement pending the outcome of
the evaluation - vide “annexure aa3”.
[15]
This now completes the common cause arising from the answering and
the replying affidavits.
[16]
Now I turn to the disputed factual allegations. In the first
place, I summarise the respondent’s denials of certain
allegations made by the applicant. The respondent denied the
allegation that all the facts as stated by the applicant were
true
and correct. The respondent also denied the allegation that as
at 1 November 2015 it was R711 417.93 in arrears
with its rental
payment - vide specified reconciliation statement of account on p 67
of the record. The statement was referred
to at paragraph 4
“annexure f,” being notice of termination.
However, it was erroneously attached
to “annexure b”,
the lease agreement.
[17]
Moreover, the respondent denied the allegation that the applicant had
established a clear right to justify its eviction from
the applicants
property; that the respondent and all those who occupied the
property through or under the respondent were
in unlawful occupation
thereof; that the applicant had a valid landlord’s tacit
hypothec over all of the respondent’s
immovables stored on the
leased premises; that the respondent was holding over without
any legitimate cause and that the
applicant had any landlord’s
tacit hypothec to be perfected.
[18]
These then were the respondent’s key denials. In the
second place I summarise the applicant’s denials of
certain
allegations made by the respondent:
The
applicant denied the allegation that the respondent had remained in
occupation of the leased premises by virtue of a new lease
agreement
or by virtue of a fixed relocation of the old lease agreement.
The
applicant denied the respondent’s assertion that the landlord’s
tacit hypothec the applicant had was premised on
the alleged
outstanding rental occasioned by the respondent’s subsequent
breach of the new lease agreement and not the respondents
initial
breach of the old lease agreement.
[19]
The applicant further denied the following allegations made by the
respondent:
·
That
the applicant had continued to collect monthly rental from the
respondent subsequent to the expiry of the original lease until
the
launch of the present eviction application without complaining that
the respondent was an unlawful occupier;
·
That
the respondent had a legal right to remain on the leased premises
until 30 June 2016;
·
That
the applicant had established no clear case that motion procedure was
a suitable method for obtaining the relief sought by
the applicant to
sustain the grant of an eviction order against the respondent;
·
That,
on the facts before the court, the applicant had no landlord’s
tacit hypothec over the respondent’s movable goods
that were on
the leased premises;
·
That
the respondent was not indebted to the applicant in the total sum of
R711 417.93 in respect of accumulated arrears of
unpaid rental.
Here
ends my summary of the disputed factual allegations.
[20]
The scope of the dispute raised a number of issues in connection
with the alleged arrears, settlement agreement, landlord’s
tacit hypothec and the appropriate procedure for the resolution of
the current dispute. However, in my view, the decisive
issue in
the matter was whether or not the respondent was, on the facts, an
unlawful occupier of the applicant’s property.
[21]
On the one hand, Mr Motloung, counsel for the applicant, submitted
that the applicant was indeed an unlawful occupier. Accordingly
counsel urged me to determine the real issue in the affirmative and
to grant the eviction order against the respondent.
[22]
On the other hand, Mr Van Aswegen, counsel for the respondent,
submitted that the respondent was a lawful occupier of the
applicant’s property and that the application for the
respondent’s eviction was specious and still born.
Accordingly
counsel urged me to answer the crucial question in the
negative and inevitably dismiss the eviction application
[23]
I deem it necessary to give an exposition of some principles of law
applicable to the remedy of eviction from land. The
lawful acts
of dispossession or unlawful acts of occupation of another’s
land entitle the disposessed landowner to reclaim
possession of his
unlawfully invaded or occupied land by way of the restorative remedy
of
action
rei vindicatio
Graham
v Ridley
1931 TPD 476
and
Chetty
v Naidoo
1974(3) SA 13(A).
[24]
Where a lessee breaches a material term of a lease agreement, a
lessor is entitled to terminate a lease agreement and to evict
a
defaulting lessee from leased premises.
Myaka
v Haveman
1948
(3) SA 457(A)
Sigh
v Santawn Insurance Co Ltd
1997(1) SA 291 (SCA).
[25]
Before an aggrieved lessor approaches a court to seek an eviction
order against a lessor, it is incumbent upon him (or her
or it) to
ensure that all the formalities applicable to cancellation of a
lease contract have been complied with –
Seite
v Berlein & others
[2009] Jol 23757
(KZP).
[26]
The landlord’s tacit hypothec provides, a lessor with security
for a lessee’s arrears in respect of the rental.
Timmerman
v Le Roux
2000(4)
SA59(W).
According
to the law of contracts, almost all agreements manifest two important
features, namely: an offer and a corresponding acceptance.
In
Watermeyer
v Murray
1911 AD 61
on 70 Solomon J went on to say :
“…
every contract
consists of an offer made by the one party and accepted by the
other
.
”
It
is hackneyed law that a lessor’s common law remedy termed a
landlord’s tacit hypothec, provides a landlord whose
tenant is
in arrears with the payment of the agreed rental, to seize movable
goods of such a tenant which are on the leased premises,
and to sell
them in order to recoup the arrears.
[27]
The concept of tacit relocation was elucidated in
Pareto
Limited & others v Mythos Leather Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd t/a
Venucci
2000 (3) SA 999
(W). In concluding that there was tacit
relocation in that matter and that the notice of termination which
preceded such
tacit relocation was rendered ineffective by the
subsequent tacit relocation, the court relief on the opinion of the
author W.E.
Cooper: Landlord and Tenant, second edition on
p350.
[28]
Cooper writes:
“
The
tacit relocation of a lease is an implied agreement to relet the
premises and is concluded by the lessor permitting the
lessee to
remain in occupation after the termination of the lease and accepting
rent from the lessee for the use and enjoyment
of the property.”
[29]
Now I turn to the application of the law to the facts. It was
common cause that the respondent took lawful occupation
of the
applicant’s landed property on 1 August 2012; that the
respondent subsequently failed, not once but on numerous occasions,
to regularly pay the monthly rental as contractually agreed; that the
lease agreement was supposed to endure until 31 Jul 2015;
that as a
result of the respondent’s contractual breaches coupled with
the concomitant ever-rising respondent’s arrears,
the applicant
gave the respondent notice in terms of clause 37 whereby the lease
agreement was terminated. The lease agreement
was prematurely
terminated about two months before it was due to expire in the
ordinary course of events. The untimely cancellation
was
occasioned by the respondent’s default. By then the
respondent’s total sum of arrears was well in excess
of
R497 003.34
[30]
It will be readily appreciated that in spite of its warning of 27 May
2015 to launch an application for the respondent’s
eviction
from the leased premises, the applicant neglected to take an
immediate, decisive and appropriate legal action to evict
the
respondent. The respondent did not vacate the leased premises
but remained in occupation, not only for the last two remaining
months of the lease but rather for almost eight and half more months
before the applicant eventually initiated these proceedings
on 9
February 2016.
[31]
The respondent defied the applicant’s ultimatum to vacate the
leased premises by no later than 31 May 2015. The
notice of
termination was valid and good in law. However, the
applicant’s lack of resolve to act decisively and
promptly
against the respondent by virtue of such notice enroded its legal
efficacy. Since then until the eviction application
was argued
before me, almost twelve months later, the respondent had remained in
occupation. In its founding affidavit, the applicant
proffered no
explanation as to how such a state of affairs came about. After
reading the founding papers, I was left wondering
as to how the
respondent still remained in occupation of the applicant’s
property after the lapse of the ultimatum on 31
May 2015.
[32]
Still wondering why the applicant tolerated such a state of unlawful
occupation of its property to prevail for so long, I turned
to the
respondent’s answering affidavit. It then emerged that
the respondent had made certain proposals to the applicant
on
10 June 2015, seven days
after receiving the notice of termination.
On
behalf of the respondent, Attorney Slabbert wrote:
Quote:
“
We
hold instructions
to
propose the following in order to settle the matter amicably.
These
proposals are made entirely without prejudice and without the
acknowledgement of any indebtedness by our client to your client.
1.
Our
client made a payment of R150 000.00 (one hundred and fifty
thousand rand) in respect of the arrear amount of 20 April
2015 (see
appended);
2.
Our
client will make payment of the amount still due in respect of
arrears by 30 June 2015 subject to the following:
2.1
Your client agree to an extension of the lease agreement for a
further period of 12 months
commencing on 1 July 2015 and ending on
30 June 2016;
2.2
On 30 June 2015 our client will make an upfront payment equal to 6
month’s rental
in respect of the extended lease period;
2.3
Thereafter our client will make monthly payments in respect of the
remainder of the extended
lease period on or before the last day of
each month;
2.4
The effect therefore would be that the all rentals due in respect of
the extended lease
period will be paid for in full withion the first
6 months thereof;
2.5
For the duration of the extended lease period our client will pay for
water, rates, sewerage
removal and electricity as per existing lease
agreement.
We
submit that these proposals are more than reasonable especially as a
business consideration. At the end your client wants
his money
rather than be embroiled in costly and time consuming litigation.”
vide
“annexure aa1”. The date of the letter was
significant to bear in mind. The letter laid down a foundation
for the respondent’s further and lawful occupation of the
applicant’s property.
[33]
Fifteen days later, on 25 June 2015 the applicant replied through its
attorney, Mr Jooma. The reply indicated that the
applicant was
amenable to the respondent’s proposed terms of the settlement.
Through the reply the applicant accepted:
·
That
the original lease agreement which was on the verge of expiring on 31
July 2015 would be extended;
·
That
the subsequent lease agreement would commence on 1 July 2015
and terminate on 30 June 2016;
·
That
the respondent would make a single, composite and upfront payment of
rental to cover the first six months of the extended lease
period;
·
That
the respondent would pay monthly rental from the last day, of the
seventh month in respect of the remaining six month period
of
the extended leased period;
·
That
the respondent would pay the arrears in respect of the old lease
agreement in full by 30 June 2015, in other words before the
new
lease agreement commencement on 1 July 2015.
[34]
Those then were the material terms and conditions that paved the way
for a new deal between the parties. I hasten to
point out that
the original lease agreement was terminated by the applicant on
account of the respondent’s breache(s).
The effective
date on which the respondent’s lawful occupation of the leased
premises terminated was 31 May 2015. It
followed, therefore,
that the unlawfulness of the respondent’s occupation began on 1
June 2015 as per “annexure aa1”.
It endured until
the new deal was clinched on 25 June 2015 as per “annexure
aa2”. I pause to point out that although
the applicant
did not expressly admit the respondent’s averments
relative to “annexure aa1” and “annexure
aa2”,
it did not pertinently reject them either. Insteadthe applicant
merely replied that it noted the contents of
paragraphs 11 to 32.
[35]
At the time of the acceptance by the applicant of the respondent’s
fresh offer of a new deal, the old lease agreement
no longer
existed. Therefore, it was absurd for the parties to talk about
the new lease agreement as the “extended
lease agreement”
and the old lease agreement as the “expired lease
agreement.” The original lease
agreement was dead and
buried. Since it was, it could not be legally given a new lease
of live. In saying so, I am
fortified by the fact that the
subsequent lease commenced on 1 July 2015, about 30 days before the
expected natural expiry of the
old lease agreement. Save for
the notice of termination, the original lease agreement would still
have been in place at the
time. The new lease agreement was
certainly not an extension of the old lease agreement. It was a
break from the past
- a new chapter, so to speak. Those
anomalies had to be highlighted.
[36]
Consequently, it followed, as a matter of logic, that the notice of
termination on which the applicant relied had nothing to
do with the
new lease agreement. Instead it had everything to do with the
old lease agreement. Its legal force and
effect were limited to
the respondent’s breach of the old lease agreement – vide
“ annexure g” Such
breache(s) and the notice that
stemmed from it before 31 May 2015, were part and parcel of the
closed chapter. It was anomalous
and illogical for the
applicant to contend that a notice given on 27 May 2015 could in law
have terminated a lease agreement subsequently
concluded on 25 June
2015. The notice of cancellation derived its force from the breach(s)
committed before 27 May 2015 and not
the breach committed afterwards.
[37]
The applicant denied the respondent’s allegation that a new
lease agreement came into operation on 1 July 2015.
The denial
and the related argument failed to impress me. It was reasoned
that no new lease agreement was ultimately entered
because, as I
understood the argument, the respondent failed to comply with its
contractual obligations on 30 June 2015 in accordance
with “annexure
aa2” read together with “annexure aa1”.
However, the applicant allowed the respondent
to remain in occupation
of the applicant’s property although the respondent had not in
full paid upfront the agreed six months
down deposit or the arrears
of the old lease agreement.
[38]
Instead of giving the respondent a fresh notice of termination of the
implied new lease agreement, and calling upon the respondent
afresh
to vacate its property, the applicant sat back relaxed and did
nothing to reclaim possession of its occupied property by
respondent. More than 3 months went by. On 9 October 2015
the applicant once again showed misplaced indulgence to the
respondent instead of cancelling the new deal and evicting the
respondent. The applicant wrote through its attorney:
Quote:
paragraph 8, “annexure aa3”
“
8.
Accordingly, payment is to be made as follows:
8.1
the outstanding arrear rentals by 30 October 2015;
8.2
an upfront payment equal to 6 months’ rentals in respect of the
extended lease agreement by 30
November 2015; and
8.3
the remainder of the extended lease period to be paid in 6 equal
monthly instalments commencing on 1
December 2015.
”
[39]
In my view the applicant’s conduct conclusively evidenced
willingness to allow the respondent to continue occupying the
property contrary to the fresh terms and conditions of the new deal.
The respondent had once again breached those fresh terms and
conditions of the new lease agreement. In my view there was a
tacit relocation reached by the parties on 25 June 2015.
Tacit
relocation is an implied agreement to relet. It is concluded by
a lessor permitting a lessee to remain in occupation
–
Pareto
,
supra
.
Therefore, a subsequent notice of termination calling upon the
respondent to vacate the applicant’s property was required
to
signal the end of the respondent’s lawful occupation in terms
of the new lease agreement and to render the respondent
liable to
eviction. Such notice was never given. Since it was not,
it could not be said that the respondent was in
unlawful occupation
of the applicant’s property, at the time the current eviction
proceedings were instituted. The
respondent had the right to
possess or to occupy the applicant’s property. I am of
the view that the applicant failed
to make out a case for the
respondent’s eviction.
[40]
Similarly the applicant failed to activate his landlord’s tacit
hypothec. As earlier pointed out, the legal remedy
allows a
landlord to have the tenant’s movebables that are onthe leased
property attached and sold in order to recover the
unpaid rental
arrears.The landlord, who has, firstly, cancelled the lease
agreement, and secondly called upon the tenant to vacate
the leased
premises – has the right to seize and sell the movable goods of
the tenant which are on the leased premises, if
the tenant fails to
pay the rental. The landlord’s tacit hypothec
automatically operates against a defaulting tenant
once the tenant
has been given notice of cancellation and called upon to vacate the
leased premises. The landlord’s
tacit hypothec remains
dormant unless the requisite notice is given to the tenant to
activate it.
[41]
In the instant matter, the respondent raised a defence to the
applicant’s endeavour to perfect its landlord’s tacit
hypothec. The nub of the defence put up by the respondent was
that the parties had reached a compromise over the dispute
pertaining
to the original lease agreement. Consequently the respondent
defensively contended that the applicant could no
longer rely on the
original cause. It followed, therefore, that the contractual
obligations that the respondent might have
had under the original
lease agreement in respect of rental arrears were extinguished by the
compromise and replaced with fresh
contractual obligations that were
embodied in the settlement agreement, in other words, the new lease
agreement. Although
the new lease agreement was never reduced
to a written form, it was implicitly concluded by conduct and
evidenced by “annexure
aa1”, “annexure aa2”
and “annexure aa3”.
[42]
I am persuaded that a valid tacit relocation was concluded by the
parties. By virtue of such a new deal the respondent’s
prior unlawful occupation was tacitly legalised by the applicant.
The mutual transition from the state of unlawfulness to
the state of
lawfulness that underlined the respondent’s occupation
deactivated the applicant’s tacit hypothec which
was activated
by “annexure g”, the cancellation notice of 27 May 2015,
whereby the original lease agreement was terminated,
the respondent
commanded to vacate the leased premises and the respondent’s
movables attached by the landlord’s tacit
hypothec. One
of the legal effects of the compromise was to tacitly detach the
respondent’s movables that were subject
to the applicant’s
tacit hypothec from 3 June 2015 when the sheriff served the
cancellation notice upon the respondent.
[43]
In my view, the only conceivable basis on which the applicant can
successfully posit its claim to perfect its landlord’s
tacit
hypothec, would be to rely on a fresh breach of the new lease
agreement, and a corresponding notice of termination.
Before
these eviction proceedings were launched the applicant never
complained that the respondent was holding over or that the
respondent was ever called upon to vacate the applicant’s
property or that the respondent’s occupation of the property
was unlawful. Such deafening silence on the part of the
applicant was inconsistent with the conduct one would come to expect
from an unlawfully dispossessed landowner. It strongly
militated against the applicant’s case that the respondent
was
an unlawful occupier.
[44]
The remedy of
actio
rei vindicatio
found
no application, given the peculiar circumstances of the particular
case. That was so because the respondent did not,
in stealth,
take occupation of the property owned by the applicant. On the
contrary, the applicant voluntarily surrendered
possession of his
property to the respondent. In the absence of any proof that
the respondent committed any act(s) of dispossession
through which
the applicant was wrongfully deprived of possession, occupation and
enjoyment of its property, the eviction application
cannot succeed.
In this instance the respondent’s right of possession has to
prevail over the applicant’s of
ownership. In the instant
matter, the essence of the dispute concerned the possessory right and
not the ownershiright per se.
[45]
The respondent has emerged victorious. There is no sound reason
why the general rule of costs should not apply.
The respondent
is, therefore, entitled to the fruits of its success.
[46]
Therefore I made the following order:
46.1 The application for
the respondent’s eviction is refused;
46.2
The applicant is directed to pay the costs.
_____________
MH
RAMPAI, J
On
behalf of the applicant: Adv. S.E Motloung
Instructed
by:
Rosendorff
Reitz Barry
BLOEMFONTEIN
On
behalf of the respondent: Adv. W.A van Aswegen
Instructed
by:
Peyper
Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN