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[2017] ZAKZPHC 54
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Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Co-operative Governance & Traditional Affairs v Maphanga (12477/2016) [2017] ZAKZPHC 54; 2018 (3) SA 246 (KZP) (7 December 2017)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL
DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG
Reportable
Case
No: 12477/2016
In
the matter between:
MEMBER
OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
FOR
THE DEPARTMENT OF CO-OPERATIVE
GOVERNANCE
& TRADITIONAL AFFAIRS
APPLICANT
and
JABULANI
CROSBY
MAPHANGA
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Delivered on: 7 December 2017
GORVEN
J
[1]
The applicant seeks the following relief:
‘1. Subject to this order, it is ordered that Respondent may
not institute legal proceedings, in any high court or inferior
court,
against the applicant, her Department or any employee or former
employee of the Public Service, unless Respondent first
obtains,
pursuant to an application which must be served on Applicant, leave
from such court, which leave:
1.1. shall not be granted unless such court is satisfied that such
proceedings are not an abuse of the process of such court and
that
there is
prima facie
ground for such proceedings.
1.2. may be granted on conditions, including a condition that
Respondent may not institute any such proceedings, unless he first
pays all moneys owing in respect of all and any costs orders that
have been granted in favour of Applicant against Respondent.
2. Respondent may not institute any proceedings in any court without
disclosing to such court a copy of this order.
3. It is declared that all and any claims that Respondent may have
had arising from his employment, prior to 30 June 2000, in the
public
service:
3.1. have been finally determined in terms of the applicable labour
law; and/or
3.2. have become prescribed in terms of the
Prescription Act No. 68
of 1969
.
4. Respondent is interdicted from defaming, insulting or harassing
Applicant and all employees in her Department in relation to
any
claims and disputes arising from Respondent’s said employment
in the public service.
5. In particular, but without derogating from paragraph 4 above,
Respondent is interdicted from referring to any forum or institution
any complaint relating to his said employment in the public service,
unless he first obtains leave from this court.
6. Respondent is ordered to pay the costs of this application on a
scale as between attorney and client.’
[2]
The application was brought on the basis of s
2(1)
(b)
of the
Vexatious Proceedings Act 3 of 1956 (the Act). It was prompted by the
receipt of a Notice of intention to institute legal
proceedings dated
22 June 2016 delivered by the respondent in terms of the
Institution of Legal Proceedings against Certain
Organs of State Act
40 of 2002. After the launch of this application, the respondent
launched the application foreshadowed in the
Notice under case
no. 8345/2016 in the KwaZulu-Natal Local Division, Durban (the
Durban application). In this, he in essence
sought damages arising
from the sale in execution of his immovable property (the property).
He also lodged a dispute concerning
severance pay with the General
Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council (the Bargaining Council).
In response, the applicant
launched an urgent application (the urgent
application), interlocutory to this one. In it she sought and
obtained interim relief
pending the outcome of this application for
prayers 1, 2, 4 and 5 above along with further interim relief to the
effect that:
‘1. The proceedings:
1.1. pending in the Durban High Court in case number 8345/16, and
1.2. pertaining to the dispute that the Respondent has referred to
the General Public Services Sectoral Bargaining Council, in
its case
number GPBC217/2017,
are stayed.’
In
addition to the relief set out in paragraph 1 hereof, the applicant
requests that this further interim relief be made final.
[3]
Section 2(1)
(b)
of the Act reads:
‘If, on an application made by any person against whom legal
proceedings have been instituted by any other person or who
has
reason to believe that the institution of legal proceedings against
him is contemplated by any other person, the court is satisfied
that
the said person has persistently and without any reasonable ground
instituted legal proceedings in any court or in any inferior
court,
whether against the same person or against different persons, the
court may, after hearing that person or giving him an
opportunity of
being heard, order that no legal proceedings shall be instituted by
him against any person in any court or any inferior
court without the
leave of the court, or any judge thereof, or that inferior court, as
the case may be, and such leave shall not
be granted unless the court
or judge or the inferior court, as the case may be, is satisfied that
the proceedings are not an abuse
of the process of the court and that
there is
prima facie
ground for the proceedings.’
This
section has been held to pass constitutional muster.
[1]
Its provisions are slightly wider than the order granted under the
common law jurisdiction of the court to regulate its own proceedings
in
Corderoy v Union Government (Minister of
Finance)
.
[2]
I shall return to this case later. The jurisdiction of this court to
regulate its own proceedings has since been made explicit
in s 173
of the Constitution:
[3]
‘The Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the
High Court of South Africa each has the inherent power to
protect and
regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, taking
into account the interests of justice.’
[4]
The essential facts relied upon by the applicant
to found the relief she seeks follow. Prior to 1994, the respondent
was employed
by the Natal Provincial Administration. Due to
subsequent rationalisation under the democratic dispensation, the
respondent became
an employee in the Department of Local Government
and Housing. He claimed that he should have been promoted. In
addition, he claimed
compensation for ‘sustained personality
infringement’ arising from the failure to promote him. He
litigated this claim
against that Department in the Labour Court. The
Labour Court held that it did not have jurisdiction. He then took the
same dispute
to the Industrial Court. On 16 August 1998,
the Industrial Court dismissed his claim on the basis that it ought
to have
been instituted in the civil courts. Dissatisfied with this
outcome, the respondent lodged a complaint with the Public Protector
on 10 October 1998. This was dismissed. He approached the
South African Human Rights Commission on 16 May 2000
which
required further information. During 2001, he complained about the
handling of his complaint by the Public Protector to a
parliamentarian and to the City Press newspaper respectively. During
2004, he referred these complaints to the Parliamentary Portfolio
Committee on Justice. There is no indication on the papers as to the
outcome.
[5]
On 30 June 2000, the respondent
accepted a voluntary severance package, ending his employment in the
public service. On
17 May 2013, the respondent referred an
unfair labour practice dispute to the Bargaining Council. The dispute
seems to
have been characterised as ‘promotion’ in one
document and dismissal in another. Due to the time which had passed
since
he was last employed, he was required to apply for condonation
which was refused. He then sought to review and set aside the refusal
of condonation in the Labour Court. The review application was
dismissed with costs on 18 November 2014. He applied for
leave to appeal this dismissal which was also dismissed with costs by
that court, this time on 6 August 2015. The respondent
then
petitioned the Labour Appeal Court for leave to appeal. This was
refused on 5 November 2015. He indicated that he
would
bring an application for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court
but this was never launched.
[6]
In 1999, the applicant taxed costs arising from
the litigation. These costs amount to just over R40 000. As I
indicated, the
Durban application, which prompted the grant of
interim relief, claims damages for the wrongful and unlawful sale in
execution
of the property. The respondent claims that the applicant
sold the property in execution to satisfy the costs order.
[7]
The appeal procedures and attempts to have
extra-curial bodies come to his assistance were quite clearly an
attempt by the respondent
to exhaust whatever remedies might have
been available to him. They do not constitute fresh proceedings. In
essence, therefore,
the respondent has brought two sets of legal
proceedings against the applicant arising from his broad
dissatisfaction with the
Department and its predecessors. In
contrast, the Durban application concerns a delictual action for
damages alleged to have been
suffered as a result of the sale in
execution of the property. The pending complaint to the Bargaining
Council concerns severance
pay. As far as I can make out from the
papers, this is the first time that this complaint has been made.
[8]
The applicant submits that, in addition to her
express reliance on the provisions of the Act, she has made out a
case under the
common law for the relief sought. Before dealing
specifically with the provisions of the Act, it will be helpful to
sketch the
common law relating to an application such as this. This
will serve two purposes. First, it will set out what the applicant
has
to prove under the common law. Secondly, it will shed light on
the similarities and differences of the two procedures.
[9]
As regards the common law, the applicant sought
to rely on the judgments in
Corderoy
and
Bisset v Boland Bank Ltd
.
[4]
The court in
Corderoy
was confronted with a plea in bar to a declaration. The relief sought
included a prayer that the plaintiff be ordered to abstain
from
further legal proceedings on the same subject matter. There had been
six previous legal proceedings based on the same ground,
affecting
the same subject matter and between essentially the same parties. The
plaintiff had been ‘uniformly unsuccessful’
in all of
them. He announced his intention of continuing with such actions
until, as he put it, the facts of the case were dealt
with by some
competent court. Innes CJ referred to an English case where, in a
pending action, twenty-nine frivolous interlocutory
applications had
been brought.
[5]
The court there made an order that the defendant was not allowed to
make any further applications without leave of a judge in Chambers.
[10]
In
Corderoy
,
the Appellate Division held that our courts had inherent jurisdiction
to regulate their procedures. A litigant is entitled to
protection
against ‘long-continued unsuccessful onslaughts in respect of
the same dispute’.
[6]
However, Innes CJ warned:
‘This is a power which should be very cautiously exercised,
because it affects the elemental right of free access to the
courts,
with which we should be slow to interfere except in exceptional and
necessary instances.’
[7]
The
test adopted in that matter was that it must be shown that such a
person ‘habitually and persistently instituted vexatious
legal
proceedings without reasonable grounds’.
[8]
The relief granted in
Cordero
y
was that the plaintiff was ordered to ‘abstain from any further
legal proceedings of any description in this Court against
the above
defendant in connection with the said subject matter . . . without
leave of the Court.’
[9]
[11]
What is meant in
Cordero
y
by ‘vexatious legal proceedings’ was explained in
African
Farms and Townships Ltd v Cape Town Municipality
,
[10]
where Holmes JA said:
‘Our law recognises that the Court has an inherent power to
strike out claims which are vexatious; see
Western Assurance
Co v Caldwell's Trustee
,
1918 AD 262
at p. 272. An action is
vexatious and an abuse of the process of Court
inter alia
if
it is obviously unsustainable. This must appear as a certainty, and
not merely on a preponderance of probability.’
This
latter test was applied in
Bisset
.
An action for damages had been brought against attorneys responsible
for registration of a bond in contravention of the provisions
of
certain legislation. The attorneys brought an application for an
order striking out the action on the basis that it was unsustainable
and clearly vexatious. The court held that it had not been shown that
the action was unsustainable as a matter of certainty and,
therefore,
vexatious.
[12]
In re Anastassiades
[11]
dealt with the limitations of the common law. In that
matter, Ramsbottom J had issued a rule
nisi
calling on Mr Anastassiades to show cause why he should not grant an
order:
‘Forbidding . . . Anastassiades from instituting or
continuing in any way any legal proceedings of any kind whatsoever,
against any person whatsoever, in this Court, unless and until,
after application in writing addressed to the Registrar, he
shall
have obtained permission from a Judge to institute or to continue
such proceedings.’
[12]
On
the return day of the rule
nisi
, Ramsbottom J declined to
confirm the rule, holding that he had no jurisdiction to grant such
an order. He relied on
Corderoy
as authority for that
proposition, saying:
‘I think that it is implicit . . . from the judgment that
the learned CHIEF JUSTICE considered that the wide powers
conferred by the statute in England exceeded the inherent power
exercised by the Courts under the Common Law, and that in the absence
of such statutory powers the South African Courts do not possess
inherent power to impose a general prohibition of the kind referred
to in the English Statute.’
[13]
[13]
Citing this
dictum
with approval, the Constitutional Court said:
‘…Ramsbottom J held that, absent a statutory power, he
had no jurisdiction under the common law to make an order that
would
curtail Mr Anastassiades' power to litigate more than that which
would be required by the circumstances and between
the parties of the
particular case. In direct response to this, the Act was passed
the following year. However, this Act did
not purport to repeal the
common law.’
[14]
Commenting
on
Anastassiades
and
Beinash
in
ABSA
Bank Ltd v Dlamini
,
[15]
Rabie J said:
‘An analysis of the Act and the aforesaid authorities (and the
authorities mentioned therein) seems to enforce the view
that:
(a)
the court has no inherent jurisdiction at
common law to prevent the future institution of vexatious
proceedings; and
(b)
the provisions of the Act only
aim to protect a person or persons against the institution of
future vexatious proceedings
in any court or inferior court and do
not relate to any proceedings already instituted.’
[14]
I was not referred to any decided cases,
including that of
Dlamini
,
which deal with the requirements of s 2(1)
(b)
of the Act. I consider that Rabie J was correct in his finding that
the Act deals only with prospective litigation and not existing
litigation. This is because the section provides only for an order
‘that no legal proceedings
shall
be instituted by him’.
[16]
This clearly deals only with an interdict against instituting
litigation, not one against continuing it. For existing litigation,
a
party must make out a case under the common law.
[15]
Section 2(1)
(b)
has two requirements before an order may be granted. The first
requirement is that legal proceedings have in the past been, or
there
is reason to believe will in the future be, instituted against the
applicant. That requirement is satisfied. It is clear
that the legal
proceedings which were instituted in the Labour Court and the
Industrial Court in 1998 fulfil this criterion, as
does the Durban
application.
[16]
I was referred to no authority that the lodging
of a complaint before the Bargaining Council amounted to instituting
legal proceedings.
Neither could I find any. It is not readily clear
that approaching the Labour Court in 2013 to review the refusal of
the Bargaining
Council to grant condonation meets the requirement. I
say this because this was simply an attempt to have the complaint
lodged
with the Bargaining Council dealt with substantively. However,
since the requirement is met by the legal proceedings referred to
above, no finding need be made on this issue.
[17]
Clearly, lodging complaints with the Public
Protector and the Human Rights Commission did not amount to
instituting legal proceedings.
Neither did sending the letters
written to the parliamentarian and City Press newspaper or lodging
the complaint with the Parliamentary
Portfolio Committee on Justice.
[18]
The second requirement is that the court must be
satisfied on two counts. First, that the person in question has
persistently instituted
legal proceedings in a court. Secondly that
she or he has done so without any reasonable ground.
[19]
Can it be said that the respondent has
persistently instituted legal proceedings? The word ‘persistent’
has a range
of meanings. It can simply mean a tendency to persist; in
other words, a refusal to give up in the face of adversity.
[17]
It can also mean continuing or recurring.
[18]
Taking account of the language, the context and, in particular, the
purpose of the legislation and
the
background to its preparation
,
[19]
the word must mean recurring legal proceedings and not sheer
doggedness in seeing a single matter through to finality. Because
the
legislation limits the right of access to the courts, it must be
restrictively interpreted in a way which least intrudes on
that
right.
[20]
What is thus required is repeated institution of legal proceedings.
He did so in 1998 in the Labour Court. That was dismissed,
not on the
merits, but on grounds of lack of jurisdiction. His response was to
do so in the Industrial Court. That was also dismissed,
not on the
merits, but on grounds of lack of jurisdiction. His next approach to
a court was to the Labour Court to review the refusal
of condonation
for the late lodging of a complaint with the Bargaining Council. When
this was refused, he appealed and when the
appeal was dismissed
sought leave to appeal. These last two approaches cannot be
characterised as instituting legal proceedings.
They were exhausting
the appeal procedures open to him on the application for review which
he had instituted. In my view, the requirement
of persistent
institution of legal proceedings is not made out in the application.
[20]
Were these proceedings instituted without any
reasonable ground? As regards the promotion dispute, no substantive
judgment has been
handed down. It is not possible to find that the
respondent had no reasonable grounds to institute those proceedings.
The fact
that he has always represented himself without legal
assistance does not change this. This dispute was, quite simply,
never adjudicated
and there is certainly not enough evidential
material before me to show that reasonable grounds did not exist at
the time. This
applies equally to the matter previously referred to
the Bargaining Council, if indeed it amounts to the institution of
legal proceedings.
Likewise, there is insufficient evidence
concerning the matter presently referred to the Bargaining Council
for this purpose.
[21]
This means that the applicant has not made out a
case on either of the aspects of the second requirement. In my view,
no court can
be satisfied that the respondent ‘has persistently
and without any reasonable ground instituted legal proceedings’.
No relief accordingly lies under s 2(1)
(b)
of the Act to interdict the institution of future proceedings.
[22]
The question remains whether the applicant is
entitled to relief under the common law. As I mentioned, the test set
out in
Corderoy
is
that it must be shown that the respondent has ‘habitually and
persistently instituted vexatious legal proceedings without
reasonable grounds’.
[21]
African Farms
held
that the proceedings must be ‘obviously unsustainable’.
[22]
As I have mentioned, it was also there held that this must be shown
as a matter of certainty and not merely on a balance of
probabilities.
[23]
[23]
The only existing litigation is the Durban
application. In the first place, my comments above concerning the
failure of the applicant
to show that the respondent has persistently
instituted legal proceeding apply equally here. On this score alone,
the application
must fail.
[24]
In case I am wrong in that view, I shall consider
whether it is shown that the Durban application is obviously
unsustainable. The
applicant submits that the Durban application is
doomed to failure. The applicant in argument attacks the very
foundation of the
Durban application. viz. that it was the applicant,
or her predecessor in title, who sold the property in execution. The
deponent
to the applicant’s affidavits in this and the urgent
application is an official who has only been involved since 2013. He
testified that no sale in execution of the respondent’s
property took place at the instance of the applicant since 2013.
He
cannot say with certainty that such a sale did not take place at the
instance of the applicant before then. The applicant thus
perforce
can only contend that the respondent has not to date put up proof of
any such sale in the Durban application. This is
correct. However,
the respondent put up two warrants of execution issued in 1999 in
respect of the costs order. The first, dated
March 1999,
required the sheriff to attach and take into execution the movable
goods of the respondent. This clearly could
not be executed against
the property. The second, however, dated November 1999, purports to
be a re-issue of the first warrant
but does not specify that only
movable property can be attached and sold in execution.
[25]
It can thus not be said with certainty that the
property was not sold in execution at the instance of the applicant.
The applicant
contends that the respondent is required to go beyond a
bare averment that this was done and to put up the Notice of Sale in
execution.
This would certainly have clarified this point one way or
the other. However, it must be borne in mind that, as I said earlier,
the respondent acts in person. He does not necessarily have the
requisite knowledge and skill to hunt down and obtain a copy of
that
Notice. In addition, he may apply to supplement his papers in the
Durban application with the Notice, if one exists. Finally,
the
applicant bears the onus to show with certainty that the Durban
application is ‘obviously unsustainable’ on this
basis.
In order to do so, the applicant could herself have obtained a copy
of the Notice if the property was not sold at her instance,
and have
put it up. In summary, therefore, it is unclear whether the property
was sold at the instance of the applicant.
[26]
Of course, this is only one element which the
respondent must prove in order to succeed. It must be said that,
viewing his averments
in the Durban application, I have grave doubts
that he will succeed. The averments, both in the Notice foreshadowing
the Durban
application and in that application itself, are not
clearly focussed. It is difficult to see what case for damages is
made out.
This comment should not be construed as a finding to that
effect. However, the respondent would be well advised to obtain
proper,
qualified, legal advice before taking any further steps in
this or any other future course of conduct. However, this is not the
test. It must be shown with certainty that the Durban application is
unsustainable. I do not consider that this test is satisfied
in the
circumstances.
[27]
I have already dealt with the failure of the
applicant to show that the respondent has ‘habitually and
persistently instituted
vexatious legal proceedings’.
[24]
To that must be added the failure to show that the Durban application
has been brought without reasonable grounds. The common law
test is
accordingly also not satisfied. This means that the applicant is not
entitled to paragraphs 1 and 2 of the relief claimed.
[28]
Paragraph 3 of the order sought is by way of two
declarations of rights. The first that all claims arising from the
employment of
the respondent in the public service prior to 30 June
2000 have been finally determined. The second that all such claims
have prescribed.
The complaint presently before the Bargaining
Council is for severance pay and arises from that employment. There
is no particularity
concerning this claim and I can accordingly not
make a finding that it has been finally determined or that it has
prescribed. In
any event, the position concerning prescription of
claims arising from employment relationships is by no means settled
as was helpfully
drawn to my attention by the applicant in argument.
In
Myathaza v Johannesburg Metropolitan Bus
Services (SOC) Ltd t/a Metrobus & others
,
[25]
three judgments were handed down. The two main judgments, in each of
which three other judges concurred, differed on this point.
In one of
these, Jafta J held that the provisions of
s 16
of the
Prescription Act
>
[26]
do not apply to claims under the Labour Relations Act.
[27]
I am therefore not persuaded that a case has been made out for any
such declarations.
[29]
Paragraphs 4 and 5 deal with interdicts sought
against the respondent. It should immediately be noted that this
relief does not
fall within the ambit of s 2(1)
(b)
of the Act or amount to the regulation of court procedure. No relief
thus lies on the basis of the legal principles set out above.
Accordingly, in order to succeed, the applicant must prove the
requirements for a final interdict. These are notorious: ‘a
clear right, injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended, and
the absence of similar protection by any other ordinary remedy.’
[28]
[30]
Paragraph 4 seeks to interdict the respondent
from ‘defaming, insulting or harassing’ the applicant and
employees in
her Department. When I put to the respondent that his
language in some of the correspondence is
prima
facie
defamatory, he did not deny this.
Dealing only with his Notice that he intended to launch the Durban
application, he claims that
the sale of the property was ‘malicious,
mysterious, corrupt and barbaric’. He speaks of ‘oppressive,
repressive
victimization’ and unlawful discrimination. He
claims that the Department subjected him to nuisance and had
notorious unsound
industrial practice. He accuses the Department of
having issued the writ for costs out of ‘sheer vengeance and
malice’,
that it became ‘jovial at my pleas and became
contemptuous, contumacious’. I need go no further. Strong as
the respondent’s
feelings may be, he offers no justification
for this language. The applicant and staff in her Department have a
clear right not
to be defamed. The injury has been committed and, in
the light of previous similar defamatory language by the respondent,
she has
no alternative but to seek an interdict. I shall deal with
the issue of harassment when evaluating the relief sought under
paragraph
5.
[31]
Paragraph 5 seeks to interdict the respondent
from referring any complaint relating to his employment in the public
service to any
forum or institution. No case is made out in the
papers for interdictory relief of this nature. The founding papers
refer to a
complaint recently made to a ‘complaints hotline’.
It is submitted, without more, that ‘[s]uch complaints are
injurious and damaging to Applicant and her Department.’ No
reason is given for this assertion. In the replying affidavit,
it is
said that the complaints amount to ‘harassment and defamation’
in support of the relief sought in paragraphs
4 and 5. The word
‘harass’ means to ‘torment by subjecting to
constant interference or intimidation’.
[29]
Lodging those complaints by the respondent does not, in my view, meet
this definition. The last complaint made to a body other
than the
Bargaining Council was in 2004, to the Parliamentary Portfolio
Committee on Justice. In my view, no relief can be granted
under this
head.
[32]
The last substantive issue is that the applicant
seeks the final stay of the Durban application and the dispute which
has recently
been referred to the Bargaining Council. This relief was
granted pending the outcome of this application and a rule
nisi
was issued to show cause why the order should not be made final. I
have dealt with each of these matters. No case has been made
out for
this relief.
[33]
Finally, I come to the issue of costs. The
applicant has not succeeded in the main relief sought. However, the
respondent’s
conduct entitles the applicant to an interdict
against his defaming her and employees of her Department. In my view,
it is appropriate
in the circumstances that there is no order as to
costs.
[34]
In the result, the following order is granted:
1. Prayers 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the notice of motion are
dismissed.
2. The respondent is interdicted from defaming the
applicant or any employee in her Department in relation to any claims
and disputes
arising from the respondent’s employment in the
public service which terminated on 30 June 2000.
3. Subject to paragraph 2 hereof, the rule
nisi
issued on 17 March 2017 is discharged.
_________________
GORVEN
J
Date of Hearing: 20 November 2017
Date
of Judgment: 7 December 2017
Appearances
For the Applicant: D Crampton
Instructed by PKX Attorneys
For the Respondent: In person
[1]
Beinash & another v Ernst & Young
& others
1999 (2) SA 116 (CC).
[2]
Corderoy v Union Government (Minister of Finance)
1918 AD 512
at 520.
[3]
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
[4]
Bisset & others v Boland Bank Ltd
& others
1991
(4) SA 603 (D).
[5]
Kinnaird v Field
1905 LR 2 ChD 306.
[6]
Corderoy
at 518.
[7]
Corderoy
at 519.
[8]
Loc cit.
[9]
At 520.
[10]
African Farms and Townships Ltd v Cape Town Municipality
1963
(2) SA 555
(A) at 565D-E.
[11]
In re Anastassiades
1955 (2) SA 220 (W).
[12]
Anastassiades
at 221A-B.
[13]
Anastassiades
at 225G-226A.
[14]
Beinash
(note 1) para 11. Reference omitted.
[15]
ABSA Bank Ltd v Dlamini
[2007] ZAGPHC 241
;
2008 (2) SA 262
(T) para 24.
[16]
My emphasis.
[17]
Oxford South African Concise Dictionary
2ed 2010 p878.
[18]
Loc cit.
[19]
Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
[2012] ZASCA 13
;
2012 (4) SA 593
(SCA) para 18.
[20]
See
Regering van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika v Disotto en
andere
[1997] ZASCA 83
;
1998 (1) SA 728
(SCA) at 735D-E.
[21]
At 519.
[22]
At 565D-E.
[23]
Loc cit.
[24]
Corderoy
at 519.
[25]
Myathaza v Johannesburg Metropolitan Bus Services (SOC) Ltd t/a
Metrobus & others
[2016] ZACC 49
; (2017) 38 ILJ 527 (CC).
[26]
Prescription Act 68 of 1969
.
[27]
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995
. In saying this, I am alive to the
fact that the
Labour Relations Act might
not apply to this claim,
but no argument to this effect was advance before me.
[28]
Per Innes JA in
Setlogelo v Setlogelo
1914 AD 221
at 227.
[29]
Oxford South African Concise Dictionary
op cit p531.