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[2018] ZASCA 138
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Monde v Viljoen NO and Others (1162/17) [2018] ZASCA 138; [2018] 4 All SA 665 (SCA); 2019 (2) SA 205 (SCA) (28 September 2018)
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THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case
No: 1162/17
In
the matter between:
MZIMKHULU
MARTIENS
MONDE
APPELLANT
and
JACOBUS
JOHANNES VILJOEN NO
FIRST
RESPONDENT
JACOBUS
JOHANNES VILJOEN
SECOND
RESPONDENT
BREEDE
VALLEY MUNICIPALITY
THIRD
RESPONDENT
THE
PROVINCIAL DIRECTOR OF THE
DEPARTMENT
OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT
AND
LAND
REFORM
FOURTH
RESPONDENT
Neutral
citation:
Monde
v Viljoen NO & others
(1162/17)
[2018] ZASCA 138
(28 September 2018)
Coram:
Maya
P, Swain, Mocumie and Schippers JJA and Mothle AJA
Heard:
13
September 2018
Delivered:
28
September 2018
Summary:
Land
-
Land reform - Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA) -
ss 8(1), 9(3) and 10(1)
(c)
- termination of right of residence - whether occupier lawfully
evicted - probation officer’s report prior to eviction order
peremptory - termination of appellant’s right of residence
unlawful and invalid.
ORDER
On appeal from:
Land Claims Court,
Randburg (Rajab-Budlender AJ sitting as court of review in terms of s
19(3) of ESTA):
1 The appeal is
upheld.
2 Paragraph 2 of the
order of the Land Claims Court is set aside and replaced with the
following:
‘
The order of
the Worcester Magistrate’s Court for the eviction of the first
respondent from
Millhurst
Farm in De Doorns, Western Cape
,
is set aside and replaced with the following:
‘
The
application is dismissed. There is no order as to costs.’
JUDGMENT
Schippers
JA (Maya P, Swain and Mocumie JJA and Mothle AJA concurring):
[1]
In
November 2016 the Land Claims Court (LCC) confirmed an order made by
the Worcester Magistrate’s Court for the eviction
of the
appellant from Millhurst Farm in De Doorns, Western Cape (the farm),
on automatic review, in terms of s 19(3) of the Extension
of Security
of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA).
[1]
The LCC granted the appellant leave to appeal. On 15 December 2016,
the appellant noted an appeal to the LCC against the eviction
order.
However, on 21 December 2016 the Constitutional Court delivered
judgment in
Snyders
[2]
in which it held that an eviction order under ESTA granted by the
magistrate’s court confirmed on automatic review by the
LCC in
terms of s 19(3) of ESTA, should be appealed to this court.
Accordingly, on 22 December 2016 the appellant lodged with the
LCC a
notice of application for leave to appeal to this court against the
confirmation of the eviction order. The central issue
in the appeal
is whether the first and second respondents satisfied the
requirements for an eviction order in terms of s 9(2) of
ESTA.
[2]
The
Stonefield Trust, of which the first respondent is a trustee, owns
the farm. The second respondent Mr Jacobus Johannes Viljoen
(Mr
Viljoen) is the manager responsible for the day-to-day farming
activities on the farm. Where appropriate, I refer to the first
and
second respondents as, ‘the respondents’. In 2014 they
applied to the Magistrate, Worcester, for an order evicting
the
appellant from the farm. The case for eviction, in sum, was this. The
appellant was appointed as a general farm worker on 6
January 1995
and given a house to occupy on the farm. On 4 November 2011 he
concluded a written employment contract with the first
respondent
(the employment contract). One of its essential terms was that he
would only have accommodation for as long as he was
employed by the
first respondent. At all times it was the policy of the farm, as well
as other farms in the area, that an employee
would be entitled to
reside on the farm only whilst he or she worked on the farm. The
appellant’s right of residence was
thus derived exclusively
from his employment.
[3]
On 25
March 2013 the appellant was dismissed from his employment after he
was found guilty on charges that he had been absent from
work without
permission or leave, and failed to notify the employer of his
absence. That day he was given a written notice of summary
dismissal.
The appellant did not refer his dismissal to the Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), in terms
of the
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA), with the result that his right
of residence terminated automatically upon termination
of his
employment. By letter dated 22 October 2013, the respondents’
attorneys informed the appellant that his right of residence
on the
farm came to an end upon his dismissal, and he was given notice to
vacate the house on the farm within 30 days.
[4]
The
appellant had a history of being absent from work without permission
or leave, despite repeated oral and written warnings from
January
2010 to February 2013 to desist from that conduct. This, inter alia,
led to a fundamental breach of the relationship between
him and Mr
Viljoen. The appellant’s failure to report for work had a
disruptive effect on farming operations and placed more
pressure on
other workers who also had to do his work in addition to their own.
The room that he occupies is needed for other workers
whose interests
carry greater weight.
[5]
In his
answering affidavit the appellant alleged that he was employed in
1988 and was given a single room on the farm in 1992, which
he still
occupied. He denied that he concluded the employment contract and
said that it was never shown to him. He alleged that
he always worked
on the farm in terms of an oral employment contract; and that he did
not waive or limit his right of residence.
He also denied that the
respondents adopted a policy that workers could reside on the farm
only if they were employed on it.
[6]
The
appellant admitted that his employment gave rise to his right of
residence, but denied that it was the only source of that right:
he
had been given permission to live on the farm and enjoyed a right of
residence on the ground of his family connection to his
mother, who
was also an occupier with a right of residence. The appellant
conceded that his employment had been terminated, but
denied that the
dismissal was fair. He said that he had referred a dispute in this
regard to the CCMA, but heard nothing further.
He alleged that his
right of residents had not been lawfully terminated. He also denied
that there had been a fundamental breach
of his relationship with Mr
Viljoen.
[7]
A
recurring feature of the appellant’s answer is a bald denial of
the allegations in the founding affidavit. This, so the
appellant’s
counsel submitted, gave rise to several disputes of fact, so that a
final order could be granted only if the
facts averred in the
respondents’ affidavits, which have been admitted by the
appellant, together with the facts alleged
by the latter, justified
such order, in accordance with the rule in
Plascon-Evans
.
[3]
However, the appellant has ignored the exceptions to this general
rule: a respondent’s (the appellant in this instance)
allegations may be rejected merely on the papers if they consist of
bald or uncreditworthy denials, raise fictitious disputes of
fact, or
are palpably implausible, far-fetched or clearly untenable.
[4]
[8]
So for
example, the appellant’s bald allegations that he did not
conclude the employment contract; that his dismissal was
unlawful;
and that there was no fundamental breach of the relationship between
him and Mr Viljoen, raised fictitious disputes of
fact, and were
demonstrably implausible and untenable. The appellant’s
signature, which appeared on the employment contract,
is identical to
his signature on various documents in the record, including the
written warnings issued to him and the notice of
his summary
dismissal. Apart from this, the evidence was that all employees of
the farm (including the appellant) were assembled
on 4 November 2011
when the employment contracts were explained to employees by a labour
consultant and signed by the employees.
The appellant laid no basis
for the allegations that the decision to dismiss him was wrong or
that he had referred the matter to
the CCMA, the facts of which were
peculiarly within his knowledge.
[5]
[9]
There
is much to be said for the respondents’ contention that the
appellant’s conduct had a negative impact on other
occupiers on
the farm and that they have been forced to follow a costly and
drawn-out process to evict him. His employment record
was poor. He
has been living rent-free on the farm for more than five years whilst
working and earning an income elsewhere. He
made numerous promises to
vacate the room which he occupies, but failed to do so. It is needed
for other occupiers who are presently
living in overcrowded
conditions. In these circumstances, the appellant’s claim that
there had been no fundamental breach
of the relationship with the
landowner has no foundation, factual or otherwise. Indeed, in
Klaase
[6]
the Constitutional Court held that in circumstances virtually
identical to the present, there was no possibility that the
relationship
between the landowner and the occupier could be
salvaged.
[10]
However,
ESTA contains clear provisions that must be complied with before an
eviction order can be granted. It is to these requirements
that I now
turn. An applicant who seeks the eviction of an ESTA occupier is
required to allege and prove all the elements of its
cause of
action.
[7]
The respondents had
to show that the termination of the appellant’s right of
residence was both lawful, and just and equitable,
as required by s 8
of ESTA. The relevant provisions read as follows:
‘
Termination
of right of residence
(1) Subject to the
provisions of this section, an occupier’s right of residence
may be terminated on any lawful ground, provided
that such
termination is just and equitable, having regard to all relevant
factors and in particular to–
(a)
the
fairness of any agreement, provision in an agreement, or provision of
law on which the owner or person in charge relies;
(b)
the
conduct of the parties giving rise to the termination;
(c)
the
interests of the parties, including the competitive hardship to the
owner or person in charge, the occupier concerned, and any
other
occupier if the right of residence is or is not terminated;
(d)
the
existence of a reasonable expectation of the renewal of the agreement
from which the right of residence arises, after the effluxion
of its
time; and
(e)
the
fairness of the procedure followed by the owner or person in charge,
including whether or not the occupier had or should have
been granted
an effective opportunity to make representations before the decision
was made to terminate the right of residence.
(2) The right of
residence of an occupier who is an employee and whose right of
residence arises solely from an employment agreement,
may be
terminated if the occupier resigns from employment or is dismissed in
accordance with the provisions of the
Labour Relations Act.
(3
)
Any dispute over whether an occupier’s employment has
terminated as contemplated in subsection (2), shall be dealt with
in
accordance with the provisions of the
Labour Relations Act
, and the
termination shall take effect when any dispute over the termination
has been determined in accordance with that Act.’
[11]
The
respondents’ case was that the appellant’s right of
residence arose solely from the employment contract. That right
terminated automatically upon termination of the contract, because
the appellant was dismissed in accordance with the provisions
of the
LRA as contemplated in s 8(2) of ESTA; and he did not challenge his
dismissal in terms of the LRA. Counsel for the respondents
contended
that only ss 8(2) and 8(3) found application in this matter, and that
Clause 17.1 of the employment contract ‘state[d]
unambiguously
that the appellant’s right of residence derived exclusively
from the employer contract’.
[12]
In
Snyders
,
[8]
the Constitutional Court held that an owner of land or farm manager
who relies on s 8(2) of ESTA to justify the termination of
an
occupier’s right of residence, bears the onus to prove that the
occupier’s employment was terminated for a fair
reason related
to the occupier’s conduct as an employee and that it was
effected in accordance with a fair procedure as required
by the
LRA.
[9]
[13]
There
is no question that the termination of the appellant’s
employment was both substantively and procedurally fair. It is
common
ground that he received proper notice of the disciplinary hearing. He
had been absent from work without leave or permission
on 4, and 19-20
March 2013. Further, he had a history of delinquent conduct and
received a number of warnings, both oral and written
(including final
written warnings), that his conduct was unacceptable and
counter-productive to the employer’s undertaking,
and could
lead to his dismissal. Contrary to the appellant’s assertion,
there is no evidence that he challenged his dismissal.
[14]
The
appellant’s right of residence however, did not flow from the
employment contract and clause 17.1 thereof does not support
the
respondents’ contention. It provides:
‘
The
employer shall grant to an employee who resides on the farm,
accommodation of 1 (one) month after termination of the employment
contract . . . .’
[10]
(Own translation.)
On
its plain wording clause 17.1 means no more than this: in the case of
an employee who lives on the farm, he or she must be given
free
accommodation for one month after termination of his or her
employment contract.
[15]
This
interpretation is buttressed by the immediate context. The parties
expressly excluded housing in clause 10 of the employment
contract by
drawing a line through that clause and initialling alongside it. So
the parties intended that an employee’s right
of residence
would not be derived from the employment contract. Clause 10
provided:
‘
COMPENSATION
…
Housing
or food shall be provided to the employee for the period during which
the employee is in the employ of the employer. The
employer shall
deduct 10% (ten percent) of the employee’s salary for such
benefit and only if the housing or food complies
with the prescribed
requirements as set out in the determination.’
[11]
(Own translation.)
[16]
Further,
the employment contract itself states that its conclusion after the
employee’s commencement of employment, does not
negate any
former period of service accumulated or existing benefits enjoyed by
the appellant, nor could it.
[12]
Section 25 of ESTA provides, inter alia:
‘
Legal
status of agreements
(1)
The waiver by an occupier of his or her rights in terms of this Act
shall be void, unless it is permitted by this Act or incorporated
in
an order of a court.
(2)
A court shall have regard to, but not be bound by, any agreement in
so far as that agreement seeks to limit any of the rights
of an
occupier in terms of this Act.’
[17]
The
appellant claimed an existing benefit. He alleged that he had enjoyed
a right of residence from the time that he lived with
his mother on
the farm, prior to the allocation of a house to him in 1995. The
respondents denied that he initially exercised his
right of residence
in his mother’s house. They contended that the appellant was
not an occupier in his own right while he
was living with his mother
and that he only became such an occupier when he received express
permission to live in his own house
as head of the household. Stated
differently, before 1995 there was no agreement between the
respondents and the appellant that
gave him a right to occupy the
farm, and he was thus not an occupier under ESTA.
[18]
The
magistrate upheld the respondents’ contention. On the authority
of the LCC’s decision in
Klaasen
,
[13]
she found that family members could never be occupiers because there
was no legal nexus between them and the owner of the land.
That
finding was incorrect. The Magistrate disregarded the definition of
‘occupier’ in ESTA, as well as the provisions
of ss 3(4)
and 3(5) thereof. An occupier is defined as:
‘
a
person residing on land which belongs to another person, and who has
or on 4 February 1997 or thereafter had consent or another
right in
law to do so . . . . ’
Sections 3(4) and
3(5) of ESTA provide:
‘
(4)
For the purposes of civil proceedings in terms of this Act, a person
who has continuously and openly resided on land for a period
of one
year shall be presumed to have consent unless the contrary is proved.
(5)
For the purposes of civil proceedings in terms of this Act, a person
who has continuously and openly resided on land for a period
of three
years shall be deemed to have done so with the knowledge of the owner
or person in charge.’
[19]
As was
stated by this court in
Sterklewies
,
[14]
ESTA does not describe an occupier as a person occupying land in
terms of an agreement or contract, but one occupying land with
the
consent of its owner. The approach in
Klaasen
,
[15]
that ‘consent must originate from an agreement, or exist by
operation of law’ unnecessarily restricted the provisions
of
ESTA. Where persons claim protection under ESTA it suffices to show
that the owner has consented to their occupation, regardless
of
whether that occupation arises from an agreement or has its source
elsewhere.
[16]
[20]
Sterklewies
was affirmed by the
Constitutional Court in
Klaase
,
[17]
in which the meaning given to ‘consent’ by the LCC in
Klaasen
,
[18]
namely that ‘the person concerned must be or must have been a
party to a consent agreement with the owner of the land’,
was
held to be an impermissible restriction of ‘consent’ as
contemplated in ESTA. Further, the LCC’s interpretation
ignored
the significance of tacit consent, with the result that many people
who would otherwise qualify as occupiers would be excluded
and
evicted arbitrarily from land, without being afforded their
constitutional guarantees and protection under ESTA.
[19]
[21]
What
all of this shows is that the respondents did not establish that the
appellant’s right of residence flowed exclusively
from the
employment contract and, with the termination of the latter, that his
right to occupy a room on the farm terminated. It
is not their case
that the appellant’s right of residence had been terminated
independently of the employment contract, with
the result that they
failed to make out a case for the appellant’s eviction. In
addition, there is no evidence to gainsay
the appellant’s claim
that prior to the conclusion of the employment contract, he had
consent to reside on the farm. Neither
is there any evidence to rebut
the presumptions in ss 3(4) and 3(5) that he resided on a farm with
the respondents’ consent
and knowledge. On these grounds alone,
the appeal must succeed.
[22]
The
respondents’ claim that it has always been a policy that
employees were entitled to live on the farm only whilst they
were
employed there does not assist them for the following reasons. The
first is that their case was squarely founded on the employment
contract. The second is that the employment contract itself is at
odds with the alleged policy – the parties expressly excluded
housing. And the third is that the respondents did not establish that
the appellant was not an occupier under ESTA before the employment
contract was concluded in 2011: s 25 of ESTA and clause 1.3 of the
employment contract make it clear that the appellant’s
pre-existing rights (which includes the right of residence) were
neither waived nor negated when he entered into the employment
contract.
[23]
It
follows that the respondents failed to show that the termination of
the appellant’s right of residence was just and equitable
as
required in terms of s 8(1) of ESTA. In the result, the purported
termination of the appellant’s right of residence was
unlawful
and invalid.
[20]
And the order
for his eviction as envisaged in s 9(2)
(a)
of ESTA, was incompetent. Section 9, in relevant part, provides:
‘
Limitation
on eviction
(1)
Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, an occupier may be
evicted only in terms of an order of court issued under
this Act.
(2)
A court may make an order for the eviction of an occupier if–
(a)
the
occupier's right of residence has been terminated in terms of section
8 . . . .’
[24]
What
remains is the challenge to the eviction order on the basis that it
was granted without a probation officer’s report,
required in
terms of s 9(3) of ESTA. Although it is not strictly necessary to
decide this issue, it has been the subject of conflicting
judgments
of the LCC, and in the interests of clarity and certainty, we are
obliged to pronounce upon it. Section 9(3) provides:
‘
For
the purposes of subsection 2
(c)
,
the Court
must
request
a probation officer contemplated in section 1 of the Probation
Services Act, 1991 (Act 116 of 1991), or an officer of the
department
or any other officer in the employment of the State, as may be
determined by the Minister, to submit a report within
a reasonable
period–
(a)
on
the availability of suitable alternative accommodation to the
occupier;
(b)
indicating
how an eviction will affect the constitutional rights of any affected
person, including the rights of the children, if
any, to education;
(c)
pointing
out any undue hardships which an eviction would cause the occupier;
and
(d)
on
any other matter as may be prescribed.’(Emphasis added.)
[25]
Section
9(2)
(c)
of ESTA provides that a court may make an order for the eviction of
an occupier if the conditions for an order for eviction in
terms of s
10 or s 11 have been complied with. The respondents relied on the
condition in s 10(1)
(c)
of ESTA: an order for the appellant’s eviction was appropriate
because he had committed a fundamental breach of the relationship
between him and Mr Viljoen that was not practically possible to
remedy.
[26]
The
clerk of the civil court had requested a probation officer’s
report in May and October 2014, and again in March 2016,
but the
report had not been furnished. Following the LCC’s decision in
Theewaterskloof
Holdings
[21]
in which it held that s 9(3) did not require a probation officer’s
report before an eviction order could be made but simply
that it be
requested, the magistrate found that the report was not available
within a reasonable time of its request, and decided
the case without
it. It appears that the holding in
Theewaterskloof
Holdings
was motivated by long delays encountered before reports were
provided.
[22]
[27]
The
LCC has subsequently in
Cillie
[23]
held that a probation officer’s report was not a mere
formality. It found that the issues in s 9(3) of ESTA that had to be
addressed in the report were necessary to assist a court in deciding
whether an eviction was just and equitable; that the importance
of
the report in an eviction could not be overemphasised; and that it
ensured that the constitutional rights of those affected
by eviction
were not overlooked. Likewise, in
Drakenstein
Municipality
,
[24]
the LCC noted that s 9(3) was cast in peremptory terms; that the
court’s ability to discharge its function was frustrated
without a report by a probation officer; and that the absence of the
report negatively affected the interests of occupiers, since
the
purpose of ESTA was to protect occupiers from unlawful eviction and
where eviction was inevitable, to ameliorate its adverse
impact.
[28]
The
respondents contended that the only peremptory requirement in s 9(3)
of ESTA was the
request
of a probation officer’s report, and that this court’s
finding in
Magubane
[25]
that the failure of the LCC to consider a report by the probation
officer before making an eviction order where such report is
requested but not filed, would result in injustice as neither the
court, landowners nor farmworkers have much control over how
and when
reports are produced. The court in
Magubane
held that the failure of the LCC to consider a probation officer’s
report before making an order for eviction, was a material
misdirection.
[26]
[29]
The
respondents are however mistaken. It is a settled rule that when
interpreting legislation, what must be considered is the language
used; the context in which the relevant provision appears; and the
apparent purpose to which it is directed.
[27]
It is also settled that ESTA is a remedial legislation with its
genesis in the Constitution.
[28]
Its purposes include protecting those who do not have secure tenure
of land and are therefore vulnerable to unfair evictions that
lead to
great hardship, conflict and social instability; and regulating
evictions in a fair manner, while recognising the right
of landowners
to apply for an eviction order in appropriate circumstances.
[29]
[30]
Consistent
with the overall purpose of ESTA, s 9(3) forms part of provisions
that impose limitations on eviction and prescribe the
circumstances
in which an eviction order may be made. The factors listed in
9(3)
(a)
-
(d)
that should be contained in the report by a probation officer, such
as the availability of suitable alternative accommodation,
the effect
of an eviction order on constitutional rights including the rights of
children, and any hardship which an eviction would
cause, are highly
relevant to the question whether an eviction order would be just and
equitable. The former interpretation of
the LCC that a court is
entitled to proceed with an eviction application in a case where a
probation officer’s report is
not filed within a reasonable
time, rendered the provisions of s 9(3) nugatory: it could never have
been the legislature’s
intention that an eviction order could
be granted without the report. It follows that
Cillie
[30]
and
Drakenstein
Municipality
[31]
were correctly decided.
[31]
The
following order is issued:
1 The appeal is
upheld.
2 Paragraph 2 of the
order of the Land Claims Court is set aside and replaced with the
following:
‘
The
order of the Worcester Magistrate’s Court for the eviction of
the first respondent from Millhurst Farm in De Doorns, Western
Cape,
is set aside and replaced with the following:
‘
The
application is dismissed. There is no order as to costs.’
___________________
A
Schippers
Judge
of Appeal
APPEARANCES
For
Appellant: P Hathorn
Instructed
by:
J
D van der Merwe Attorneys, Stellenbosch
Webbers,
Bloemfontein
For
Respondents: A Montzinger
Instructed
by:
Terblanche
Attorneys, Belville
Symington
& De Kok Bloemfontein
[1]
Section 19(3)
of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA)
provides, inter alia:
‘
Any
order for eviction by a magistrate's court in terms of this Act, …
shall be subject to automatic review by the Land
Claims Court which
may–
(a)
confirm
such order in whole or in part;
(b)
set
aside such order in whole or in part;
(c)
substitute
such order in whole or in part; or
(d)
remit the
case to the magistrate's court with directions to deal with any
matter in such manner as the Land Claims Court may think
fit.’
[2]
Snyders &
others v De Jager & others
[2016]
ZACC 55; 2017 (3) SA 545 (CC).
[3]
Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA 623
(A) at 634H-I.
[4]
Plascon-Evans
fn
2 at 635C;
Fakie NO v
CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd
[2006] ZASCA 52
;
2006 (4) SA 326
(SCA) para 55.
[5]
Wightman t/a JW Construction
v Headfour (Pty) Ltd & another
[2008] ZASCA 6
;
2008
(3) SA 371
(SCA) para 13.
[6]
Klaase &
another v Van der Merwe NO & others
[2016]
ZACC 17
;
2016 (6) SA 131
(CC) para 43.
[7]
Land en
Landbouontwikkelingsbank van Suid-Afrika v Conradie
2005
(4) SA 506
(SCA) para 15.
[8]
Footnote 2.
[9]
Snyders
fn
2 para 57.
[10]
Clause 17.1 reads:
‘
Die werkgewer sal aan die
werknemer wat op die plaas woonagtig is, vir 1 (een) maand
akkommodasie verleen, na die beëindiging
van die dienskontrak .
. . .’
[11]
Clause 10 provided:
‘
VERGOEDING
...
‘
Behuising of kos sal aan
die werknemer voorsien word vir die tydperk wat die werknemer in
diens van die werkgewer is. Die werkgewer
sal 10% (tien persent) van
die werknemer se salaris aftrek vir sodanige voordeel en slegs
indien die behuising of kos voldoen
aan die voorgeskrewe vereistes
soos uiteengesit in die Vasstelling.’
[12]
Clause 1.3
reads:
‘
Die
ondertekening van hierdie ooreenkoms nadat die werknemer in diens
getree het, negeer geen vorige tydperk van diens opgeloop
of
bestaande voordele voor die aangaan van die ooreenkoms nie. Die
werknemer se datum van aanstelling is 06-01-1995.’
[13]
Landbounavorsingsraad
v Klaasen
2005
(3) SA 410 (LCC).
[14]
Sterklewies (Pty) Ltd t/a
Harrismith Feedlot v Msimanga & others
[2012]
ZASCA 77
;
2012 (5) SA 392
(SCA) para 3.
[15]
Footnote 11.
[16]
Sterklewies
fn
12 para 3.
[17]
Footnote 6
para 56.
[18]
Footnote 11.
[19]
Klaase
fn
6 paras 54-56.
[20]
Snyders
fn
2 para 75.
[21]
Theewaterskloof Holdings
(Edms) Bpk, Glaser Afdeling v Jacobs en andere
2002
(3) SA 401 (LCC).
[22]
Theewaterskloof Holdings
fn 19 para 13.
[23]
Cillie NO
& others v Volmoer & others
[2016]
ZALCC 5
para 18.
[24]
Drakenstein Municipality v CJ
Cillie en Seun (Pty) Ltd
[2016]
ZALCC 9
para 15.
[25]
Magubane & another v Twin
City Developers (Pty) Ltd & others
[2017]
ZASCA 65
para 9.
[26]
Magubane
fn
23 para 9.
The
court noted that the jurisprudence of the LCC that it was entitled
to proceed with an eviction application if a probation
officer’s
report was not filed within a reasonable period of time was correct,
but that statement was
obiter
.
[27]
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
[2012] ZASCA 13
;
2012 (4) SA 593
(SCA) para 18.
[28]
Department of Land Affairs &
others v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd
[2007] ZACC 12
;
2007
(6) SA 199
(CC);
2007 (10) BCLR 1027
para 53.
[29]
See
the preamble to ESTA.
[30]
Footnote 21.
[31]
Footnote 22.