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[2017] ZAFSHC 132
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Cargill RSA (Pty) Ltd v Bibbey N.O. and Others; Cargill RSA (Pty) Ltd v Thunderflex 52 (Pty) Ltd (341/2017, 340/2017) [2017] ZAFSHC 132 (24 August 2017)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Reportable:
NO
Of
Interest to other Judges: NO
Circulate
to Magistrates: NO
Case
number: 341/2017
In
the matter between:
CARGILL
RSA (PTY) LTD
Applicant
and
LOUWRENS
BIBBEY
N.O.
1
st
Respondent
(in
his capacity as trustee of the SUSARA
MAGDALENA
WILHELMINA ODENDAL
TESTAMENTERE
TRUST, MT2576/00)
JOHN
FRANK BIBBEY
N.O.
2
nd
Respondent
(in
his capacity as trustee of the SUSARA
MAGDALENA
WILHELMINA ODENDAAL
TESTAMENTERE
TRUST, MT2575/00)
ADRIAAN
GERHARDUS ODENDAAL
BIBBEY
N.O.
3
rd
Respondent
(in
his capacity as trustee of the SUSARA
MAGDALENA
WILHELMINA ODENDAAL
TESTAMENTERE
TRUST, MT2575/00)
BERNARDUS
JOHANNES DAVEL N.O.
4th Respondent
(in
his capacity as trustee of the SUSARA
MAGDALENA
WILHELMINA ODENDAAL
TESTAMENTERE
TRUST, MT2575/00)
And
in the application of:
CASE
NUMBER: 340/2017
CARGILL
RSA (PTY)
LTD
Applicant
and
THUNDERFLEX
52 (PTY) LTD
Respondent
HEARD
ON:
10
AUGUST 2017
JUDGMENT
BY:
DAFFUE,
J
DELIVERED
ON:
24
AUGUST 2017
I.
INTRODUCTION
[1]
Two applications have been allocated to me for adjudication.
The applicant in both applications seeks payment in the amount
of
just over R60 million together with interest and costs in the one
application from four trustees of a trust that conducts a
farming
business (“the principal debtor”) and in the second
application from the surety. Both the principal debtor
as well
as the surety executed notarial bonds in favour of applicant as their
creditor and consequently, applicant furthermore
seeks orders in
terms whereof the notarial bonds be perfected together with the
customary ancillary relief.
II.
THE PARTIES
[2]
Cargill RSA (Pty) Ltd is the applicant in both applications, it being
a private company that advances money to farmers and/or
third parties
for the credit of farmers, and/or supplies fertiliser and other
agricultural products to farmers. Adv J J Pretorius
argued the
matters before me on behalf of applicant.
[3]
The four trustees of the Susara Magdalena Wilhelmina Odendaal
testamentary trust MT2575/2000 (“the trust”), to wit
Messrs Louwrens Bibbey, John Frank Bibbey, Andriaan Gerhardus
Odendaal Bibbey and Bernardus Johannes Davel are cited as the four
respondents in application 341/2017,
i.e.
the application against the trust as principal debtor.
[4]
Thunderflex 52 (Pty) Ltd (“Thunderflex”), a surety and
co-principal debtor with the trust, is the respondent in
application
340/2017. Adv PR Cronje represented the respondents in both
applications.
[5]
The parties agreed that one set of heads of arguments in respect of
both applications would be prepared and that the court be
requested
to adjudicate both applications
pari
passu
in order to write one judgment.
III.
THE RELIEF CLAIMED
[6]
The following relief is claimed in application 341/2017, this not
being a
verbatim
quotation:
1.
That
first, second, third and fourth respondents in their representative
capacity (herein after “the Trust”) must pay
the amount
of R60 810 009.53 (Sixty million eight hundred and ten
thousand and nine rand and fifty cents) to applicant;
2.
That
the Trust must pay agreed arrear interest on the above amount
calculated at the prime lending rate from time to time per
annum
from
1 November 2016 until date of payment;
3.
That
Notarial Bond, Annexure “C86” to the Founding Affidavit,
be called up;
4.
That
the sheriff of the Court is authorised to attach the movable
assets listed in paragraph 2 of and Annexure “A”
to
annexure “C86” to the Founding Affidavit as well as all
the Trust’s other moveable assets that they may own,
wherever
situated, to remove the same and to hand the same to applicant;
5.
That
applicant may sell such assets, or any part thereof, in the manner,
at the price and against such terms and conditions that
applicant may
deem meet;
6.
That
applicant may transfer ownership in and to the assets sold to the
purchaser or purchasers thereof;
7.
That
applicant may receive the proceeds of such sale and set the same off
against the said amount due by the Trust to applicant,
interest
thereon and legal costs;
8.
That
applicant must pay the balance of such proceeds, if any, to the
Trust;
9.
That
should such proceeds be less than the balance due by the Trust to
applicant, the outstanding balance remains a due and payable
debt by
the Trust to applicant;
10.
The
trust shall pay the costs of this application on the scale as between
attorney and own client.
The
same relief is claimed against Thunderflex in application 340/2017,
save insofar as the reference to the notarial bond in paragraph
3 of
the notice of motion is to annexure “C87” of the
particular founding affidavit and the word “Trust”
was
substituted with “respondent.”
IV.
THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE PARTIES
[7]
The respondents raised in essence two defences: firstly, a denial of
liability in that incorrect invoices were issued to the
trust and
secondly, privilege insofar as any offers made on behalf of the trust
in settlement of its alleged indebtedness are privileged,
these
having been made during
bona
fide
settlement
negotiations.
[8]
Mr Pretorius on behalf applicant anticipated that he might not be
able to persuade the court to grant judgment in the full amount
of
R60 810 009.53 plus interest and as a result submitted in his
written heads of argument that judgment should be granted
in the
amount of R44 909 828.20 – an amount allegedly
accepted by the trust to be correct after having done a
reconciliation - and that the dispute in respect of the balance of
the claim be referred for oral evidence, alternatively trial.
[9]
During oral argument Mr Pretorius made further concessions and
submitted that at best for respondents the amount due might be
reduced to R24 328 580.99 calculated as follows:
Original
Invoice
Reduced
Invoice
Reduced
Amount
1.
Annexure
“C4” p105
Annexure
“C4” p105
R4,922,862.00
2.
Annexure
“C5” p106
Annexure
“C96” p367
R5,900,849.14
3.
Annexure
“C6” p107
Annexure
“C98” p369
R5,865,392.25
4.
Annexure
“C7” p108
Annexure
“C101” p372
R2,399,997.60
5.
Annexure
“C9” p110
Annexure
“C104” p375
R2,712,018.00
6.
Annexure
“C12” p113
Annexures
“C107.1 – 107.4” PP378 – 381
4
x R168,028.00 = R672,112.00
7.
Annexure
“C14” p117
Annexure
“C109” p383
R1,855,350.00
R24,328,580.99
V.
MATERIAL COMMON CAUSE FACTS
[10]
Respondents successfully showed that
bona
fide
disputes
exist pertaining to several of applicant’s invoices and I shall
again refer to these aspects
infra
.
However, several facts are common cause and/or cannot be
disregarded. When objectively considered, these appear to
be
correct and no defence was raised in this regard. I shall deal
with these
infra
.
[11]
The validity and enforceability of the two notarial deeds is not in
dispute. Thunderflex shall stand or fall by the defences
raised
by the trust as the principal debtor.
[12]
The parties,
i.e.
applicant and the trustees on behalf of the trust entered into a
Master Input Advance Agreement (“the agreement”.
In
terms hereof applicant agreed to advance an agreed portion of the
purchase prices of the products needed by the trust to plant,
either
by way of cash payment made to the trust and/or to third parties to
the credit of the trust, or to supply fertilizer and/or
other
agricultural input products directly to the trust. The trust
agreed to cultivate certain grain products (sunflower
and white and
yellow maize) on farm land of which it was the owner or lessee and
agreed to sell the crops so cultivated to applicant.
[13]
Applicant made advance payments to the trust and/or to third parties
on behalf of the trust and agricultural products such
as
inter
alia
seed,
fertilizer, diesel and chemicals were delivered to the trust.
This allowed the trust to cultivate the crops agreed upon.
[14]
The trust sold and delivered crops (sunflower and white and yellow
maize) to applicant as it was obliged to do in accordance
with the
parties’ agreement. It needs to be mentioned at this
stage that it is alleged by applicant that the trust
failed to
deliver in full as a result of which it suffered damages, being the
increase purchase price of substituting products.
I wish to
emphasise that the issue of damages is certainly contentious and as
will be indicated
infra
,
I am not prepared to adjudicate the dispute in respect of the alleged
breach of contract and/or damages. Consequently I
am not
prepared to grant judgment for damages at this stage of the
proceedings.
[15]
Respondents have shown that several invoices, making up applicant’s
claim, are disputed on
bona
fide
grounds and I am not prepared to find that applicant is entitled to
rely on clause 29 of the agreement which stipulates that in
the event
of a failure to dispute any entry on a statement in writing within
sixty days,
“
such
entry shall be regarded as correct and will be conclusive proof of
the correctness of such entry.”
For
the same reason the customary certificate of balance annexed to the
papers, signed by the secretary and a director of applicant,
pertaining to the alleged outstanding amount is unacceptable at this
stage of the proceedings. As indicated, Mr Pretorius
made
several concessions in this regard and it is unnecessary to consider
the effect of clause 29 or the certificate any further.
VI.
EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE
[16]
I have evaluated the evidence in light of the submissions of counsel
and the authorities referred to
infra
.
[17]
I need to point out that the trust felt aggrieved by allegations in
the replying affidavit which were regarded as requiring
a response.
Consequently it sought leave to file a rejoinder in answer to
applicant’s replying affidavit, costs of
that application to be
costs in the main application. Applicant did not oppose the
application and I consequently granted
the relief. In the
rejoinder the trust again attempted to show that the invoices relied
upon by applicant were incorrect
and/or inaccurate and/or that items
were claimed such as
inter
alia
administration costs to which the applicant was not entitled.
Again, in this affidavit the trust makes a huge issue of the
fact
that the registration numbers of the trucks that delivered products
to it were not inserted on the invoices provided to it.
[18]
In evaluating the facts presented by the parties I shall bear in mind
the Plascon Evans rule. I accept that a final order
can only be
granted if the facts averred in the applicant’s affidavits
which have been admitted by the trust together with
the facts alleged
by the trust justify such an order, obviously also bearing in mind
that the trust’s version may be rejected
on the papers, should
it be found to be far-fetched, untenable or false.
[19]
I am also mindful of the
dictum
of Harms DP in
National
Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma
[2009] ZASCA 1
;
2009
(2) SA 277
(SCA) at para
[26]
where he said the following:
“
[26]
Motion proceedings, unless concerned with interim relief, are all
about the resolution of legal issues based on common cause
facts.
Unless the circumstances are special they cannot be used to resolve
factual issues because they are not designed to determine
probabilities.”
[20]
If one considers the thousands of tonnes of grain sold and delivered
by the trust to applicant, which is not in dispute, there
can be no
doubt that the trust farms on a very large scale and managed to
cultivate thousands of hectares of crops with fertiliser,
seed,
chemicals, diesel and other agricultural inputs financed by
applicant. The trust failed to dispute relevant facts,
such as
the deliveries of all these agricultural inputs, but clutched at
straws by nit-picking several invoices, analysing each
invoice and
questioning minor discrepancies. As will become clear, I
accepted all queries to be correct for purposes of arriving
at my
conclusion.
[21]
Several offers were made by Mr Louwrens Bibbey on behalf of the trust
pertaining to payment of the applicant’s claim.
It is in
dispute whether these offers were made during privileged and
bona
fide
settlement
negotiations and/or whether conditional offers were made which were
not accepted subject to the conditions attached to
the offers.
It might be an interesting debate whether or not the offers should be
accepted as admissible evidence, but bearing
in mind the conclusions
to which I have arrived, it is unnecessary to consider the arguments
in this regard. The topic may
again become relevant when the
matter goes on trial.
[22]
I do not intend to find that the trust should be held liable for
payment of the amount of R45 million, but it is not insignificant
that Mr Louwrens Bibbey made an offer my way of an sms dated 23
December 2016 to applicant’s attorney, that the amount of
R45
million would be paid in instalments of R5 million on 1 July
2017 and R20 million each on 1 September 2018 and 1 September
2019
respectively, and that the balance of the account would be paid on 1
September 2020, but only after an audit of the account.
I have
noted that the offer was made “without prejudice”.
However, it is apparent from this sms that at least
an amount of R45
million was conceded to be payable by the trust to applicant.
[23]
The importance of the offer communicated by way of sms on 23 December
2016 becomes apparent when the e-mail dated 15 September
2016 of Ms
Elbie Louwrens on behalf of the trust to applicant’s Ms Yvette
Nel - annexure “C94” on page 365 of
the papers - is
considered with annexure “C95” on page 366 of the papers,
together with the allegations contained in
the replying affidavit.
On annexure “C95” – a statement of applicant –
Ms Louwrens on behalf of the
trust clearly indicated in her
handwriting which invoices were disputed and eventually wrote the
following at the bottom of the
invoice – “
Fakture
( in English; invoices) R44 909 828.20”
.
No doubt, this resulted in Mr Louwrens Bibbey accepting the
reconciliation and thereupon making the offer to applicant’s
attorney.
[24]
I painstakingly perused the trust’s answering affidavit as well
the rejoinder filed in response to the replying affidavit
of the
applicant, but could not find any allegation that any delivery
mentioned in any of the invoices was placed in dispute.
In
fact, there can be no doubt that, once Ms Louwrens did her
reconciliation as mentioned
supra,
she effectively conceded that the trust was liable for payment of the
amount of R44 909 828.20. She deposed to
a
confirmatory affidavit to the rejoinder filed on behalf of the trust
and I quote the following:
“
3.
I never admitted that any statement, invoice or delivery note is
correct. …
4.
I in fact never received any delivery notes as everything went to
the
Applicant.
5.
I informed Ms Nel that I am not able to reconcile the documentation
provided to me with what
appears on the statement. This much is
clear from the email I sent to her. Where I did not include
other queries, it
was mainly due to the fact that I did not have
proof of delivery or assurance that it is due.”
I
find these allegations highly improbable in the light of her e-mail
of 15 September 2016, annexure “C94” on page 365.
Clearly, she was in possession of the invoices of the suppliers
mentioned in the e-mail which allowed her to query the differences
between the invoices of the suppliers and the amounts debited on the
statements of applicant. Not a single delivery in respect
of
any of the invoices was queried at that stage or at any other stage
prior to the adjudication of this application.
[25]
In motion proceedings the affidavits not only serve as the pleadings,
but must also contain the essential evidence which will
ordinary be
led at the trial. See
Transnet
Ltd v Rubenstein
2006
(1) SA 591
(SCA) at para [28]. The following dictum in
Wightman
t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Others
[2008] ZASCA 6
;
2008
(3) SA 371
(SCA) at para
[13]
is also apposite:
“
[13]
A
real, genuine and bona fide dispute of fact can exist only where the
court is satisfied that the party who purports to raise the
dispute
has in his affidavit seriously and unambiguously addressed the fact
said to be disputed.
There
will of course be instances where a bare denial meets the requirement
because there is no other way open to the disputing
party and nothing
more can therefore be expected of him. But even that may not be
sufficient if the fact averred lies purely within
the knowledge of
the averring party and no basis is laid for disputing the veracity or
accuracy of the averment. When the facts
averred are such that the
disputing party must necessarily possess knowledge of them and be
able to provide an answer (or countervailing
evidence) if they be not
true or accurate but, instead of doing so, rests his case on a bare
or ambiguous denial the court will
generally have difficulty in
finding that the test is satisfied. I say 'generally' because factual
averments seldom stand apart
from a broader matrix of circumstances
all of which needs to be borne in mind when arriving at a decision. A
litigant may not necessarily
recognise or understand the nuances of a
bare or general denial as against a real attempt to grapple with all
relevant factual
allegations made by the other party.
But
when he signs the answering affidavit, he commits himself to its
contents, inadequate as they may be, and will only in exceptional
circumstances be permitted to disavow them. There is thus a serious
duty imposed upon a legal adviser who settles an answering
affidavit
to ascertain and engage with facts which his client disputes and to
reflect such disputes fully and accurately in the
answering
affidavit. If that does not happen it should come as no surprise that
the court takes a robust view of the matter.”
(emphasis
added)
[26]
The disputed issues, such as applicant’s entitlement to claim
administration costs and/or fees and/or interest on disputed
amounts
and/or damages because of the trust’s alleged breach of
contract cannot and shall not be adjudicated by me in favour
of
applicant on the papers. However, the application should not be
dismissed only because a
bona
fide
dispute exists pertaining to these aspects. In order to
adjudicate these disputes, the matter shall be referred to trial.
[27]
I have carefully listened to the arguments of counsel and I have also
perused the invoices, annexures “C4”,”
C5”
read with “C96”, “C6” read with “C98”,
“C7” read with “C101”,
“C9” read
with “C104”, “C12” read with “C107. –
107.4” and “C14”
read with “C109”
carefully. If the amounts contained in these invoices are
reduced to the actual capital and
also bearing in mind the comments
by Ms Louwrens referred to
supra
,
I am satisfied that applicant has proven that the amount of
R24 328 580.99 is not in dispute. The trust has not
complied with the warnings sounded in
Wightman
supra.
It
failed to comprehensively set out its defence in respect of these
invoices, save for the minor discrepancies shown, and failed
to
present the evidence needed to persuade me that a real and
bona
fide
dispute
exists. Consequently, applicant is entitled to judgment for
payment of this amount.
VII.
CONCLUSION
[28]
Applicant is substantially successful in respect of its monetary
claim against both the trust as well as the surety.
Although
the amount to be awarded at this stage of the proceedings is less
than 50% of the amount claimed, applicant’s substantial
success
entitles it to its costs as well. The parties agreed in the
agreement that in the event of action to be instituted
by applicant,
it would be entitled to attorney and own client costs and there is no
reason by such an order shall not be made.
[29]
Furthermore applicant is also entitled to orders in terms whereof the
two notarial bonds are perfected and therefore the orders
in
paragraphs 3 to 9 of both notices of motion shall granted.
[30]
Mr Cronje argued strenuously that the applications should be
dismissed with costs because of the manner in which applicant
approached the applications and the fact that I should find that
respondents have a
bona
fide
defence, bearing in mind the principles set out in Plascon Evans.
He argued that if I do not find in respondents’ favour,
applicants should be penalised by not allowing them all their costs.
Mr Pretorius submitted that the remainder of the disputes
be referred
to oral evidence, alternatively trial. I am satisfied that the
matter should be referred to trial and an appropriate
order will be
made to deal with all pre-trial procedures to be undertaken to ensure
the matter is indeed ripe for hearing.
[31]
After oral argument I requested counsel to obtain trial dates that
suit the parties in the event of an order being made for
the matter
to be referred to trial. The agreed trial dates allocated to
the parties are 17, 18 and 20 October 2017.
The time available
to comply with all pre-trial procedures is restricted and my orders
shall provide for deadlines in order to
prevent surprise to any of
the parties.
VIII.
ORDERS
[32]
Therefore the following orders are issued.
In
respect of application 341/2017.
1.
First,
second, third and fourth respondents in their representative
capacities as trustees of the Susara Magdalena Wilhelmina Odendaal
testamentary trust MT2575/1999 (“the Trust”) shall pay to
applicant the amount of R24 328 580.99, jointly
and
severally with the respondent in application 340/2017, the one to
pay, the other to be absolved;
2.
The
Notarial Bond, Annexure “C86” to the Founding Affidavit,
is hereby perfected;
3.
The
sheriff of the Court is authorised to attach the movable assets
listed in paragraph 2 of and Annexure “A”
to annexure
“C86” to the Founding Affidavit as well as all the
Trust’s other moveable assets that they may own,
wherever
situated, to remove the same and to hand the same to applicant;
4.
Applicant
may sell such assets, or any part thereof, in the manner, at the
price and against such terms and conditions that applicant
may deem
meet;
5.
Applicant
may transfer ownership in and to the assets sold to the purchaser or
purchasers thereof;
6.
Applicant
may receive the proceeds of such sale and set the same off against
the said amount due by the Trust to applicant and its
legal costs;
7.
Applicant
shall pay the balance of such proceeds, if any, to the Trust;
8.
Should
such proceeds be less than the balance due by the Trust to applicant,
the outstanding balance remains a due and payable debt
by the Trust
to applicant;
9.
The
Trust shall pay the costs of this application on the scale as between
attorney and own client;
10.
All
disputes between the parties pertaining to the remainder of
applicant’s claim, including whether or not there was an
admission of liability and offer to pay are referred for trial, such
hearing to take place on 17, 18 and 20 October 2017, and there
shall
be compliance with the following:
1.
The
founding, answering and replying affidavits and the rejoinder shall
be regarded as the combined summons, plea, replication and
rejoinder
respectively;
2.
Both
parties shall file their discovery affidavits not later than 31
August 2017;
3.
In
the event of any party being of the view that full discovery has not
been made, notice in terms of rule 35 (3) shall be served
and filed
not later than 6 September 2017 and in the event that an application
in terms of rule 35 is required, such application
shall be set down
for hearing not later than 28 September 2017;
4.
Any
request for further particulars shall be filed by not later than 31
August 2017 to which the other party shall respond by not
later than
14 September 2017;
5.
Any
party intending to make use of expert evidence shall give notice in
terms of rule 36(9)(a) on or before 7 September 2017 and
the required
opinions and summaries of such experts shall be filed by not later
than 14 September 2017;
6.
Any
party intending to make use of plans, photographs or the like, shall
give the required notice in terms of the provisions of
rule 36 (10)
by not later than 14 September 2017;
7.
The
parties shall arrange a rule 37 conference to be held on or before 29
September 2017 and the minutes thereof shall be filed
with the
registrar of the court on or before 5 October 2017.
In
respect of application 340/2017.
1.
Respondent
shall pay to applicant the amount of R24 328 580.99,
jointly and severally with the trustees of the trust in
application
341/2017, the one to pay, the other to be absolved;
2.
The
Notarial Bond, Annexure “C87” to the Founding Affidavit,
is hereby perfected;
3.
The
sheriff of the Court is authorised to attach the movable assets
listed in paragraph 2 of and Annexure “A”
to annexure
“C87” to the Founding Affidavit as well as all the
respondent’s other moveable assets that it may
own, wherever
situated, to remove the same and to hand the same to applicant;
4.
Applicant
may sell such assets, or any part thereof, in the manner, at the
price and against such terms and conditions that applicant
may deem
meet;
5.
Applicant
may transfer ownership in and to the assets sold to the purchaser or
purchasers thereof;
6.
Applicant
may receive the proceeds of such sale and set the same off against
the said amount due by the respondent to applicant
and its legal
costs;
7.
Applicant
shall pay the balance of such proceeds, if any, to the respondent;
8.
Should
such proceeds be less than the balance due by the respondent to
applicant, the outstanding balance remains a due and payable
debt by
the respondent to applicant;
9.
The
respondent shall pay the costs of this application on the scale as
between attorney and own client;
10.
All
disputes between the parties pertaining to the remainder of
applicant’s claim, including whether or not there was an
admission of liability and offer to pay, are referred for trial, such
hearing to take place on 17, 18 and 20 October 2017, and there
shall
be compliance with the following:
1.
The
founding, answering and replying affidavits and the rejoinder shall
be regarded as the combined summons, plea, replication and
rejoinder
respectively;
2.
Both
parties shall file their discovery affidavits not later than 31
August 2017;
3.
In
the event of any party being of the view that full discovery has not
been made, notice in terms of rule 35 (3) shall be served
and filed
not later than 6 September 2017 and in the event that an application
in terms of rule 35 is required, such application
shall be set down
for hearing not later than 28 September 2017;
4.
Any
request for further particulars shall be filed by not later than 31
August 2017 to which the other party shall respond by not
later than
14 September 2017;
5.
Any
party intending to make use of expert evidence shall give notice in
terms of rule 36(9)(a) on or before 7 September 2017 and
the required
opinions and summaries of such experts shall be filed by not later
than 14 September 2017;
6.
Any
party intending to make use of plans, photographs or the like, shall
give the required notice in terms of the provisions of
rule 36 (10)
by not later than 14 September 2017;
7.
The
parties shall arrange a rule 37 conference to be held on or before 29
September 2017 and the minutes thereof shall be filed
with the
registrar of the court on or before 5 October 2017.
____________
JP
DAFFUE, J
On
behalf of applicant:
Adv JJ Pretorius
Instructed
by:
Christo Dippenaar Attorneys
Bloemfontein
On
behalf of respondents: Adv PR Cronje
Instructed
by:
Phatshoane Henney Attorneys
Bloemfontein