About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
>>
2017
>>
[2017] ZAFSHC 81
|
|
FBS Electronics Bk v HSH Construction Africa (Pty) Ltd (4787/2016) [2017] ZAFSHC 81 (24 May 2017)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH
AFRICA,
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case
number: 4787/2016
In
the matter between:
FBS
ELECTRONICS
BK
Applicant
(Registration
number: 92/02415/23)
and
HSH
CONSTRUCTION AFRICA (PTY) LTD
Respondent
(Registration
number: 2004/008250/07)
HEARD
ON:
15 DECEMBER 2016
JUDGMENT
BY:
RAMPAI, J
DELIVERED
ON:
24 MAY 2017
[1]
These are motion proceedings. The applicant sues the respondent
for payment of an amount of R213 993.67 together
with interest
thereon at the rate of 10,25% per annum plus costs. The claim
is based on the work done and services rendered.
The amount is
said to be the balance of the debt owed, by the respondent to the
applicant. The respondent opposes the application.
[2]
On 15 December 2016 I granted the application. I ordered the
respondent to pay the capital claim plus interest thereon
with
costs. On 6 January 2017 the respondent filed notice in terms
of Rule 49(1)(c) whereby I was called upon to give reasons
for the
order. The notice was brought to my attention but I
inadvertently neglected to note the matter on my list of reserved
judgments as I usually do. It was not until Thursday 11 May
2017 that my secretary brought the file to my attention following
an
enquiry she received from one of the parties. I apologise for
the awful delay. It is not a reflection of how I ordinarily
do
business.
[3]
The respondent invited public tenders. The tender invitation
was signed on 25 July 2013. On 5 August 2013 the tender
document was completed and signed on behalf of the applicant.
The applicant’s quotation also dated 5 August 2013 was
submitted to the respondent – see “anx fbs2”.
[4]
The respondent accepted the applicant’s tender. The
respondent notified the applicant about the acceptance of the
tender
in writing on 15 May 2014. Later on two of the three types of
the agreed installations were cancelled by agreement
between the
parties. After such cancellation, the applicant performed
certain works in connection with the supply, delivery
and
installation of the required fire detection electronic system.
[5]
On 19 February 2015 the applicant certified that it had installed the
required electronic system – see “anx fbs4”,
a
document described as an installation certificate.
[6]
The applicant billed the respondent on a few occasions. The
respondent paid the first two bills but refused to pay the
following three bills:
Invoice
No. 3477 dated 15 April 2015 R75830.46
Invoice
No. 3494 dated 11 May 2015 R58346.34
Invoice
No. 3521 dated 8 June 2015 R79816.87
[7]
The respondent’s refusal was based on two defences. In
the first place it alleged that the fire detectors installed
by the
applicant were defective and that the applicant was informed about
the defects during the course of July 2016. The
essence of the
defence was that, the applicant failed to comply with its contractual
obligations to that extent. See par
13.1 of the answering
affidavit.
[8]
The applicant furnished the respondent with the certificate of
completion way back on 19 February 2015. Upon receipt of
the
certificate the respondent did not immediately complain to the
applicant that, contrary to the import of the certificate, the
applicant had rendered defective performance. Instead the
respondent’s case was that the applicant was informed about
the
defective fire detectors during July 2016, some 17 months after the
applicant had completed the project and had accordingly
notified the
respondent. The respondent did not venture to explain why it
had taken such a long time to complain about the
alleged defective
performance, if indeed there was any.
[9]
The applicant’s third invoice was rendered to the respondent on
15 April 2015, the fourth on 11 May 2015 and fifth and
last on 8 June
2015. The respondent admitted receipt of all those three
invoices. Notwithstanding receipt of each invoice,
the
respondent did not complain about the alleged defective fire
defectors. Those three further lost opportunities of protesting
about the alleged shoddy work done by applicant, were inconsistent
with the respondent’s belated complaint.
[10]
On 14 April 2015, Mr Willem Meintjies, acting on behalf of the
respondent, wrote and circulated an email which reads:
“
Dear
all
Please
provide us with your claims for Careline by not later than 12H00 on
Monday 20 April 2015.
Regards
Willem
Meintjies
Cell:
082 498 7880”
Among
those that Mr Mentjies had emailed was a certain Tersia Stevenson, of
the applicant. The email was more important for
what it did not
say than what it actually said. Instead of raising any query,
however trivial, about the respondent’s
performance, the
applicant was called upon to submit its claim before 20 April 2015.
[11]
The email was a spontaneous declaration of a debtor’s intention
to make an unconditional payment provided a creditor’s
claim
was submitted before the specified deadline. Well, Ms Tersia
Stevenson, acting on behalf of the applicant, did just
that on 15
April 2015 – see “anx fbs5”. The question has
to be asked. Why did the respondent volunteer
to call upon the
applicant to submit its claim if the applicant was in material breach
of the contract? Nowhere in the respondent’s
answering
affidavit, could I find a semblance of an answer to that question.
The email was telling against the respondent’s
belated defence
concerning the alleged defect in the fire detectors.
[12]
The respondent’s defence about the alleged defect was,
according to the applicant, raised for the very first time in
the
answering affidavit filed on 15 November 2016. Mr Cronje
attacked the respondent’s claim that in July 2016 he informed
the applicant about the defective fire detectors. Indeed par
13.1 of the respondent’s answering affidavit contained
dry
bones without any flesh. There was no indication as to who on
behalf of the respondent complained? who on behalf
of the
applicant received the complaint? precisely where, when and how
the complaint was conveyed to the applicant?
The defence of the
defective fire detectors was cast in disturbingly vague terms.
[13]
The applicant’s last and still unpaid invoice was issued on 8
June 2015. The applicant was never informed that
the respondent
was withholding payment pending proper completion of the work.
The applicant’s case was that every invoice
became due and
payable within 30 days after the rendering thereof and not after the
completion of the work or project. The
applicant previously
invoiced the respondent on 7 July 2014 for R12654 and the respondent
paid. Even though the respondent
made that first payment on 12
December 2014, more than five months later, it did so before the
applicant had completed the project.
[14]
On 13 March 2015 the respondent also made another payment less than
30 days after the applicant’s invoice of 19 February
2015.
Again there was no explanation as to why the respondent paid invoice
3439 in spite of the alleged breach of the contract
by the
applicant. All these are material considerations. They
compel the conclusion that the respondent’s defence
concerning
the fire detectors was a belated afterthought. In view of all
these considerations, I am inclined to dismiss the
respondent’s
first defence.
[15]
In the second place, the respondent alleged that the applicant did
not comply with the contract in that the applicant failed
to give the
hospital personnel the necessary training in connection with the fire
alarms.
[16]
At par 13.2 of the answering affidavit, the respondent’s
deponent said the following:
“
13.2
Die Applikant versuim het om die nodige opleiding aan personeel van
die hospitaal te verskaf ten aansien van die brandalarms,
wat deur
Applikant ge-installeer is, soos meer volledig blyk uit paragraaf 9
van Aanhangsel “FSB1”, waar sodanige opleiding
deur die
Applikant in die tenderdokument vervat is.”
[17]
At par 11.2 of the replying affidavit, the applicant’s deponent
replied as follows:
“
11.2
Ek
verwys die Agbare Hof ook na aanhangsel “
RFS5
”
op ‘n dokument wat ‘n uiteensetting gee van die Applikant
se kwotasie, die bestelling wat die Respondent geplaas
het en die
Applikant se bestelling bevestiging welke per e-pos ontvang is, die
hof sal bemerk dat daar onder by “5 Bill Nr
4
Commissioning
and
training
(Phase
1
+ 2)” geen bedrag ingevul is nie. Daar is dus geen
bestelling vir die opleiding geplaas nie.”
[18]
The respondent’s version was not supported by any confirmatory
affidavit by the maintenance manager or any responsible
senior
functionary of the careline clinic. On the contrary, the
applicant’s version was supported by the respondent’s
terrain foreman, Lazarus Sekele. During the course of argument,
Ms Collins could not combat the contention that in terms
of “anx
rfs5” the applicant was not contractually bound to render the
alleged training in fire alarms.
[19]
As earlier indicated, the applicant furnished the respondent with the
required certificate of completion on 19 February 2015.
In
addition to the certificate, the applicant also furnished the
respondent with the installation information sheet and the site
information sheet – vide “anx fbs4”. Twenty
three days later, on 13 March 2015 to be exact, the respondent
paid.
The respondent did not refuse to pay. The respondent did not
withhold payment on the ground that the applicant,
in breach of the
contract, had neglected to provide the training as agreed. The
respondent simply paid without any protest.
It is important to
stress that the respondent paid after having been provided with the
certificate of completion. The document
presupposed that the
applicant had done and finished all its contractual obligations.
That would, of course, have included
personnel training, if the
applicant was contractually bound to render such training.
[20]
On 31 August 2015 the aforesaid three documents, “anx fbs4”
were again mailed to the respondent. By then
there were 3
unpaid invoices. The respondent did not acknowledge receipt of
the applicant’s annexure consisting of
three documents, among
them a certificate of completion. On 10 September 2015 the
respondent sent an email, “anx rfb1”,
to the applicant.
There was no query, complaint or protest noted as far as training was
concerned. On 10 October 2015,
the applicant once more
furnished the respondent with the same documentation, “anx fbs
4”. Ever since then until
the current proceedings were
initiated on 10 October 2016 there was deafening silence on the part
of the respondent in connection
with the question of training.
Enough about the respondent’s second defence. I am not
impressed. I would,
therefore, dismiss the second defence as
well.
[21]
Attached to the founding affidavit, was “anx fbs 8”, a
summary which shows how the total sum of the applicant’s
claim
of R213 993.67 is made up and calculated. The applicant’s
averments to this effect were set out in par 13.
The respondent
admitted the
quantum
of the applicant’s claim –
vide par 15 answering affidavit where the respondent answered:
“
Ek
erken die inhoud van hierdie paragraaf. In terme van die
ooreenkoms tussen die Respondent en Applikant, is die Respondent
geregtig om betaling van die Applikant te weerhou, tot en met finale
voltooiing van die tender. Applikant het tot op hede
versuim om
die dienste te lewer en toerusting behoorlik te installeer,
ooreenkomstig Applikant se tender en is die Applikant bygevolg
nie
geregtig op die betaling van die bedrag van R213 993.67 nie.”
[22]
The representatives of the parties seemingly had a telephonic
conversation on 18 January 2016 – vide “anx rfs 3”.
During the course of such conversation the respondent’s
representative advanced the dispute between the respondent and a
third party as the reason for the non-payment of the applicant’s
outstanding balance. The respondent asked for an extension
of
time. The applicant acceded to the respondent’s request
and undertook to delay legal action until 31 March 2016.
[23]
All those aspects of the conversation were confirmed by the applicant
in an email to the respondent sent on 19 January 2016.
The
applicant’s representative reminded the respondent’s
representative that the applicant had executed its obligations
in
terms of the contract and expected to be paid. The respondent
did not repudiate those averments. On 17 March 2016,
fourteen
days before the expiry of the extension, the applicant reminded the
respondent about its telephonic undertaking of 18
January 2016 to pay
the outstanding balance on 31 March 2016. Yet again the
respondent did not deny. It is trite that
failure to answer an
unfavourable letter may have adverse implications.
[24]
In the instant matter the respondent failed, not once but twice, to
answer to emails whose contents were highly prejudicial
to its case.
According to the email of 19 January 2016 the respondent hardly ever
complained about the alleged defective
or incomplete performance
rendered by the applicant in breach of the contract. Instead
the respondent undertook to pay the
applicant’s claim on a
specific date. All that the respondent did was to ask for an
extension of time in order to pay
and not in order to contest the
claim.
[25]
In my view the conversation of 18 January 2016 strongly militates
against the defences raised by the respondent on 15 November
2016.
The whole argument relative to the respondent’s defence was
nothing but a storm in the tea cup. It was
a classic example of
a fabricated ploy to delay the finalization of the matter. The
sole purpose of the respondent’s
opposition of the relief
sought, is to frustrate the applicant. On the merits, I am
satisfied that the applicant has an unassailable
case. I would,
therefore, be inclined to grant the relief as set out in the notice
of motion.
[26]
Now I turn to the preliminary points taken by the respondent.
As regards the first preliminary point, the respondent
contends that
this court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
[27]
The foundation of the contention is to be found at par 3 of the
respondent’s answering affidavit.
“
3.3
Die Applikant se kwotasie is aanvaar te Kimberley en is alle werk wat
verrig is deur die Applikant, ten aansien van die kwotasie/tenders,
het geskied binne die jurisdiksie van die Noord-Kaap en was die
Applikant bygevolg nie geregtig om bogemelde Hof te nader vir die
regsverligting, soos uiteengesit in hierdie aansoek nie.”
[28]
The contrary contention is to be found at par 17 of the applicant’s
replying affidavit.
“
Die
Respondent handel nie met die jurisdiksionele aspek van die
skuldoorsaak naamlik dat betaling in die Vrystaat moes geskied nie.
Ek is geadviseer dat slegs een element van ‘n skuldoorsaak
binne die regsgebied van hierdie Hof hoed (sic) te bestaan ten
einde
aan hierdie Hof jurisdiksie te verleen.”
[29]
The respondent raised the technical defense that this court lacked
jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. The following
were the
respondent’s grounds of objection:
29.1
that the respondent’s registered address and principal place of
business were situate outside jurisdiction of this
court;
29.2
that the agreement between the parties was concluded in Kimberley,
Northern Cape Province;
29.3
that all the services rendered by the applicant were rendered in the
said province;
29.4
that breach of contract was committed in that province;
29.5
that the amount of the applicant’s claim was justiciable in the
regional court of the said province.
[30]
At par 7 of the founding affidavit, the applicant alleged, through
its deponent:
“
Hierdie
Hof het jurisdiksie om die aansoek aan te hoor uit hoofde daarvan dat
die Applikant die bestelling van die Respondent binne
die grense van
die Hof aanvaar het en betaling deur die Respondent aan die Applikant
binne die grense van die Vrystaat geskied.”
[31]
At par 9 of the answering affidavit, the respondent alleged, through
its deponent:
“
Die
bewerings hierin vervat word ontken en word Applikant tot bewys
daarvan geplaas.
9.2
Die Respondent het die Applikant se tender (aanbod) te Kimberley
aanvaar en is die Applikant daarvan in kennis gestel.
9.3
Applikant het die goedere en dienste gelewer te Kimberley ten aansien
van die tender en ontken Respondent derhalwe dat die Agbare
Hof oor
enige jurisdiksie beskik om hierdie aangeleentheid te bereg, soos
reeds hierbo vermeld.”
[32]
Ms Collins submitted that it was incumbent upon the applicant to
prove, not only the conclusion of the contract and its terms
but also
the specific district in which the breach occurred – Jones &
Buckle: Volume 1: The Act, 54-5.
[33]
Mr Cronje argued that in this particular matter the applicant was
obliged to make payment into the respondent’s bank
account held
in Bloemfontein and not Kimberley, and that the applicant made no
such payment whatsoever. Consequently he submitted
that breach
occurred within the jurisdiction of this court.
[34]
I am persuaded by Mr Cronje’s submission. The respondent
was obliged to render performance within the jurisdiction
of this
court. Although the applicant was obliged to render performance
outside the jurisdiction of this court, that fact
alone was not
decisive.
Geyser
v Nedbank Limited
:
In re
Nedbank
Limited v Geyser
2006 (5) SA 355
(W) at 360E – 362J.
[35]
In
Veneta
Mineraria Spa v Carolina Collieries (Pty) Ltd
1985 (3) SA 633
(D) at 643B-D the court, per Kumblen J held:
“
Turning
to the other ground relied upon by Mr
Shaw
for
submitting that this Court has jurisdiction, it is well established
that for breach of contract a plaintiff may sue in
the Court of the
place where the contract was entered into, the
forum
contractus
,
which in the wide sense is understood to include the place where the
contract is to be performed.
”
[36]
In
Frank
Wright (Pty) Ltd v Corticas ‘BLM’ Ltd
1948 (4) SA 456
(c) at 462-3 Searle J, considering whether the court
had jurisdiction or not, said:
“
The
only one of these which is arguable as applicable in the present case
is
ratione
contractus
,
which covers not only the place where the contract was made but also
the
locus
solutionis
,
where the contract has to be performed either in whole or in part
-
vide
Cape Explosives Works, Ltd v SA Oil & Fats Industries,
Ltd
.
(supra)
,
per KOTZE, J.P., at pp. 269, 273;
Ex
parte Filen: In re The Angus
(1908,
E.D.C. 51)
;
Ex
parte Provincial Administration, O.F.S v John Adams & Co
.
(1929 OPD 35
at pp. 43 - 4), etc., but the breach in respect of which
the defendant is sued must be a breach of a duty which he was bound
to
perform within the jurisdiction -
vide
Taboryski v Schweizer & Aspirion, N.O
.
(supra);
Walker v Taylor
(1934,
W.L.D. 101).
”
[37]
It was common cause that the respondent was a
peregrinus
of
this court; that the respondent was
domiciled
in the
Northern Cape Province; that the work had to be performed in
that province and that it was the applicant’s primary
duty to
perform the agreed work over there. The
ratione contractus
was one cardinal consideration –
Veneta Minerania,
supra
.
It
was also common cause that the applicant was an
incola
of this court; that the applicant was
domiciled
in the Free State Province; that it was the primary duty of the
respondent to pay the agreed remuneration or contract price;
that the respondent’s acceptance of the offer was conveyed to
the applicant in Bloemfontein where the business order was
also
placed and that the respondent had furnished the applicant with
details of a bank account held within the area of jurisdiction
of
this court. It follows, therefore, that the contract partially
had to be performed in Bloemfontein as well. The
locus
solutionis
was, therefore a material consideration from which this court derived
its jurisdiction to entertain the matter –
Frank
Wright
,
supra. That was another cardinal consideration.
[38]
The contractual breach complained of concerned a duty whereby the
respondent was bound to perform by paying the respondent
within the
jurisdiction of this court. I am not persuaded, that the
applicant’s infringed contractual right to payment
did not flow
from a contract that has direct connection with the area of
jurisdiction of this court. To find otherwise would
disregard
the respondent’s choice of an outside contractant and its tacit
acceptance of the offer within the area of the
jurisdiction of this
court. The respondent’s duty to render performance by
paying at the specific or implicit place
was of no less
importance than the applicant’s duty to render performance by
doing the work at the specific place.
[39]
Similarly the respondent’s breach concerned an infringement of
a contractual right directly connected with an area within
the
jurisdiction of this court. Let me assume, for instance, that
the contract was concluded in Durban; that the work
had to be
done in Kimberley and that the respondent whose contractual
obligation it was to do the work had failed to render complete
performance. The applicant would have been entitled to sue the
respondent out of the Northern Cape Province on the ground
that the
respondent’s breach concerned an infringement of a contractual
right directly connected with an area within the
jurisdiction of the
court in that Province.
[40]
In those circumstances, the respondent would not have successfully
raised the objection that the Northern Cape Province had
no
jurisdiction because Durban was the
forum
contractus
.
The point being that breach of the duty to render performance at a
particular place, confers jurisdiction on the court of
the place
concerned. The court of the place where the contract was
concluded is not always necessarily the court with exclusive
jurisdiction to entertain a dispute. Such court may have such
jurisdiction depending on the peculiar circumstances of the
particular case -
Frank
Wright
,
supra
.
[41]
Let me conclude the topic by pointing out that the courts, in the
Veneta
Mineraria
,
supra
and the
Frank
Wright
,
supra
were grappling with the issue of jurisdiction where both parties
involved were foreign
peregrini
.
In such situations courts are, more often than not, called upon to
apply foreign law to adjudicate the dispute. To
make matters
worse, there may even be a preceding dispute as to which foreign law
must be applied. The situation is different
in this instance.
The applicant is an
incola
of this court. Although the respondent is a
peregrinus
of this
court, the law of the two jurisdictions is nonetheless the same.
[42]
In the founding affidavit the applicant alleged:
“
Op
of ongeveer
15
Mei 2014
het
die Respondent die kwotasie aanvaar en ‘n skriftelike
bestelling met nr.
H.S.H.
(sic)
57803
uitgereik en aan die Applikant versend. ‘n Ware afskrif
van die bestelling word hierby aangeheg as aanhangsel “
FBS3
”.
Die Nurse Call en Security Installation deel van die bestelling is
later gekanselleer en is daar net voortgegaan
met die installasie van
die Fire Detection deel van die order.”
[43]
In the answering affidavit, the respondent answered as follows:
“
12.1
Die bewerings hierin vervat word erken, behalwe ontken Respondent dat
die kwotasie deur Respondent per bestelling opgevolg
is.”
[44]
The
respondent’s denial was inconsistent with “anx fbs3”.
[45]
I deem it necessary to quote par 10 applicant’s heads of
argument.
“
Die
Respondent ontken dat hy die bestelling geplaas het, maar versuim om
te verduidelik waarom Applikant in besit geplaas is van
‘n
bestelling met nommer
57803
,
gedateer
15
Mei 2014
.
Die ontkenning is aanduidend dat dit die finale stap van sluiting van
die ooreenkoms in die Vrystaatse Provinsie wil ontduik.”
There
was substance in the submission.
[46]
For the reasons enumerated above, I would dismiss the first point
in
limine
.
The point was not well taken, in my view.
[47]
As regards the second preliminary point, the respondent contended
that, in view of the material factual dispute of which the
applicant
was fully aware, the applicant should have brought the matter to
court by way of action instead of motion procedure.
[48]
The respondent articulated this second preliminary point as follows:
“
The
cause of action based on the breach of a contract entails that a
Plaintiff should prove the following to become entitle to judgment
in
its favour:
the
conclusion of the contract and the breach of contract.
Thus, a Plaintiff suing on a contract must allege and prove both the
conclusion of the contract and its terms, as well as
that the breach
of the contract occurred within a specific district. The
parties to a contract are bound to respect the agreement
and to
perform all the obligations that be depose upon them:
pacta
sunt servanda
.
If either party, by an act or omission and without lawful excuse,
fails in any way to honour his or her contractual obligations,
he or
she commits a breach of contract.”
[49]
The applicant denied the respondent’s allegation. The
denials were amplified at para 10 of the respondent’s
affidavit.
[50]
I deem it unnecessary to labour this point save to say that I have
thoroughly considered the substantive merits of the matter.
I
have already determined the merits in favour of the applicant.
I have found that the proven facts were against the respondent’s
version. The defensive version of the respondent was
unmeritorious. It dismally failed the test of real, genuine and
bona
fide
measuring yardstick of dispute which delineates the defining boundary
between motion proceedings and action proceedings.
Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA 623
(A);
Wightman
t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd & Another
[2008] ZASCA 6
;
2008 (3) SA 371
(SCA).
[51]
On the facts, I am satisfied that the former and not the latter was
well-suited for the fair adjudication of the matter at
hand.
There was no really genuine dispute on the material facts in the
instant matter. In this instance, the facts
averred by the
applicant which have been admitted by the respondent together with
the facts alleged by the respondent justify a
final order.
Moreover, the denials by the respondent of material facts averred by
the applicant raised no real, genuine and
bona
fide
dispute
of fact to warrant
viva
voce
evidence
-
Plascon-Evans
,
supra. Therefore, decisions such as
Standard
Bank of South Africa v Efrocken & Newman
1924 AD 171
;
Guggenstein
v Rosenbaum
(2)
1961 (4) SA 21
(WLD) 31;
Ex
Parte Spenazze & Another N.N.O
1985 (3) SA 650
(AD) are of no assistance to the respondent.
[52]
In the absence of a meritorious defence, there could have been no
real, genuine and
bona
fide
dispute to underpin or validate action procedure. I have
considered the alleged factual dispute in the present matter.
However, I could find no genuine factual dispute which could not be
fairly adjudicated without recourse to the hearing of oral
evidence
- Plascon-Evans,
supra
at 634I;
Peterson
v Cuthbert Co. Ltd
1945 AD 420
on 428. It being the case here, the second point
in
limine
cannot be sustained. It was not well-taken. I would be
inclined to dismiss it as well.
[53]
These are the reasons for the order that I gave
ex
tempore
.
I deem it necessary to repeat the order for the sake of
completeness. I ordered the respondent to pay to the applicant
53.1
The capital sum of R213 993.67;
53.2
Interest thereon at the rate of 10.25% per annum and
53.3
The costs of the application.
_____________
M.H
RAMPAI, J
On
behalf of applicant: Adv PR Cronje
Instructed
by: L & V Prokureurs
Bloemfontein
On
behalf of respondent: Adv L Collins
Instructed
by: Kramer Weihmann & Joubert Inc
Bloemfontein
and
Engelsman
Magabane Inc
Kimberley