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[2017] ZAFSHC 244
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Mafube Local Municipality v South African Municipal Workers' Union National Provident Fund (4836/2016) [2017] ZAFSHC 244 (6 April 2017)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case
number: 4836/2016
In
the matter between:
MAFUBE
LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY
Applicant
and
SOUTH
AFRICAN MUNICIPAL WORKERS' UNION
NATIONAL
PROVIDENT
FUND
Respondent
HEARD
ON:
16 FEBRUARY 2017
JUDGMENT
BY:
MOTIMELE , AJ
DELIVERED
ON:
06 APRIL 2017
[1]
The applicant, Mafube Local Municipality ("Mafube") seeks
to interdict the respondent the South African Municipal
Workers Union
National Provident Fund ("the Fund") from executing on a
judgment debt of R16 249 215.75 plus interest
and costs, obtained
against it on the 5 May 2016. The Judgment debt represents arrear
contributions to the Fund on behalf of the
applicant's
employee-members and due in terms of the statute. The applicant does
not dispute that the debt is owed.
[2]
The applicant, also seeks a supervisory order against itself imposing
a 60-month repayment plan on the Judgment Debt with effect
from 7
November 2016. The supervisory order is ancillary to, and dependent
on, the interdict being granted.
[3]
The applicant alleges that the basis for the application is;
3.1 the severe financial
constrains which it experienced;
3.2 its inability to pay
the judgment amount;
3.3 the fact that it is
unable to secure an undertaking by the respondent to accept payment
by way of instalments; and
3.4 the fact that it has
no alternative remedy.
[4]
It is contended on behalf of the applicant that where a breach of a
statutory right is at stake, including a socio-economic
rights, a
court is under a duty to ensure that an effective relief is granted.
The argument continues that this case is an appropriate
case for a
structural interdict to be granted, in order to secure compliance
with a declaratory order and the relief sought, more
so, that the
Mafube is under a constitutional obligation to provide services to
the community, as the custodian of the community
interest.
[5]
The respondent opposes the application on various grounds chief among
those is that the applicant does not provide a lawful
bases for any
of the relief it seeks. It specifically does not set out the cause of
action, as a result this application is without
merit and should be
dismissed. Furthermore the respondent argues that the remedy sought
(structural interdict) cannot be used to
obtain relief when
established criteria for the relief sought,
to wit
an
interdict exists but cannot be met. To do otherwise would be to
attempt to circumvent established law so contends the respondent.
[6]
Were the relief to be granted the court would condone,
inter alia,
1. on-going and
noncompliance with a judgment debt, and
2. on-going breach of the
Pension Fund Act of 1956 without any evidence that the rights will be
infringed and what the extend thereof
is.
[7]
The seriousness of the applicant's default in paying the judgment is
further compounded by three issues;
7.1. the importance of
the state honouring its debts and court orders;
7.2. the extra ordinary
statutory nature of provident funds contributions; and
7.3. the applicant's
history of non-payment of contributions to the Fund.
In
casu
the
applicant did not prove that the service delivery would be impacted
by its compliance with the judgment and its agreements to
the
respondents and cannot renege on its obligations which where agreed
to voluntarily. In this regard, see the Constitutional
Court Judgment
in the Ekurhuleni matter
[1]
.
"To allow the
municipality to escape liability by extricating itself from the
bargain, when it has failed to established the
threatened rights or
even advance a cogent reasons for its failure to comply with its
contractual obligation, would constitute
an injustice for the Fund."
[8]
The constitutional court held that to do so would frustrate the
principle of
pacta sunt servanda
and the very purpose the rule
was intended to achieve. This is so, because when the municipality
agreed to the bargain, it did so
as a contributing employer for the
benefit of its employees in a bargaining process that is at the very
heart of the employment
relationship.
[9]
Non-payment of contributions is a statutory offence and can attract
criminal penalties. The Fund contributions form part of
the employees
renumeration and terms and conditions of their employment.
Notwithstanding the fact, the Applicant collects contribution
from
its employees, it fail to pay them over to the Respondent. This
constitute a serious breach of trust, which underpins the
employer-employee relationship.
[10]
The applicant continues to default on the payment of the employees
renumeration, to grant the relief sought is to condone this
on-going
default of payment renumeration.
[11]
Non-payment also prejudices the affected members employee who cannot
benefit from
inter alia
the capital amount, or the investment
interest thereon, or the insured benefits which premiums are deducted
from the contributions
or the full amount that they are entitled to
upon exit from the Fund. Should they resign, retire or be retrenched
during the applicant's
default period, this will adversely affect
their interest.
[12]
It is common cause between the parties that continued non
payment of premiums is a serious matter.
[13]
The applicant failed to establish a clear right accordingly the
applicant cannot suffer any harm as a result of any breach
of such a
right not established. The applicant has mandatory or alternative
remedies in terms of the statute. National legislation
expressly
provides for the appropriate steps to be taken by the municipality as
a result of the crisis in its financial affairs.
[14]
Both the constitution and the Municipal Finance Management Act
("MFMA") provide for mandatory, not discretional
intervention by the provincial government. Should the provincial
government fail to intervene, the national government would be
required to intervene.
[15]
Section 139(5) of the Constitution requires provincial intervention
as follows:
"(5) If a
municipality, as a result of a crisis in its financial affairs, is in
serious or persistent material breach of its
obligations to provide
basic services or to meet its financial commitments, or admits that
it is unable to meet its obligations
or financial commitments, the
relevant provincial executive
must
(a)
Impose a recovery plan aimed at securing the municipality's ability
to meet its obligations to provide basic services or its
financial
commitments, which
(i) is to be prepared
in accordance with national legislation; and
(ii) binds the
municipality in the exercise of its legislative and executive
authority, but only to the extend necessary to solve
the crisis in
its financial affairs[...}'.
[16]
Section 139 of the MFMA similarly provides for mandatory intervention
by the provincial executive. It provides as follows:
"139.
Mandatory
provincial interventions arising from financial crises.
(1)
If
a
municipality,
as a
result of
a
crisis in its
financial affairs,
is in serious or persistent material
breach of its
obligations to provide basic
services or meet its financial commitments
. Or admits that
it is unable to meet its obligations or financial commitments, the
provincial executive
must
promptly.
(a)
request
the Municipal Financial recovery Service
(i)
to
determine the reasons for the crisis in its financial affairs;
(ii)
to
assess the municipality's financial state;
(iii)
to
prepare an appropriate recovery plan for the municipality;
(iv)
to
recommend appropriate changes to the municipality's budget and
revenue raising measures that will give effect to the recovery
plan;
and
(v)
to
submit to the MEG for finance in the province
(aa) the determination
and assessment referred to in subparagraphs (i) and (iij as
a
matter of urgency; and
(bb) the recovery plan
and recommendations referred to in subparagraphs (iii) and (iv)
within
a
period, not to exceed 90 days, determined by the MEG
for finance; and
(b)
consult the mayor of the municipality to obtain the
municipality's cooperation in implementing the recovery plan,
including the
approval of
a
budget and legislative measures
giving effect to the recovery plan. [111]"
[17]
Section 146 of the MFMA sets out the further detailed steps and
consequences of the imposition of a mandatory recovery plan
envisaged
in section 139 of the MFMA, which does not include or impose a
moratorium on the execution of judgment debts, automatic
or
otherwise. The legislature thus did not contemplate that the
execution of judgment debts against a municipality be suspended
if it
is facing financial constraints.
[18]
The provincial intervention is the appropriate remedy to follow in
the applicant's circumstances and the applicant has the
right to
compel the provincial executive to intervene accordingly.
[19]
Should the provincial executive fail to intervene, there is a further
alternative remedy: The national executive is
required
to
intervene. Section 150 provides:
"150. National
interventions.
(1)
If the conditions for
a
provincial intervention in
a
municipality in terms of section 139 (4) or (5) of the
Constitution are met and the provincial executive cannot or does not
or does
not adequately exercise the powers or perform the functions
referred to in that section, the national executive must
(a)
consult the relevant provincial executive; and
(b)
act
or intervene in terms of that section in the stead of the provincial
executive [. ..]".
[20]
Section 151 of the MFMA expressly protects creditors rights. It
provides:
"151. Legal
rights. Except as expressly provided for in this Part, nothing in
this Chapter limits or affects
(a)
the rights of any creditor or other person having a claim
against a municipality;
(b)
any person's access to ordinary legal process in accordance
with the common law and relevant legislation".
[21]
Finally section 152 and 153 of the Municipal Management Act permits a
municipality to apply for a temporary stay of the legal
proceeding
for a period not exceeding 90 days. The applicant has not sought to
exhaust this remedy.
COSTS
[22]
Special considerations in respect of both the applicant's conduct and
the circumstances which gave rise to this application
are present
which merit a cost order against the applicant on attorney-client
scale. These considerations include:
22.1 The applicant's
constitutional duty to comply with court orders;
22.2 Failure to make out
a cause of action in this application;
22.3 Requiring the Fund
to incur further costs by bringing this application;
22.4 Contemplating in its
relief sought that the Fund may incur even further costs in enforcing
the payment of one or many instalments
of the Judgment Debt; and
22.5 Requesting the Fund
to waive statutory interest on arrear contributions.
[23]
It is not competent to seek relief which contemplates that the Fund
may agree to an extension of the period of repayments when
the PFA
expressly provides for the terms of payment of contributions. The
Fund cannot agree to different terms or interest rates:
to do so
would be a breach of its board members' fiduciary duties and of the
PFA.
[24]
To date, extensive legal costs have been incurred by the Fund to
require the applicant to meet its statutory obligations.
24.1 First, the Fund had
to seek the requisite outstanding schedules in terms of section
13A(2) from the applicant which the applicant
opposed.
24.2 Second, the
applicant failed to meaningfully oppose the application of the
outstanding amount which lead to the Judgment Debt
which the
applicant agrees is due and owing.
24.3 Third, the Fund has
to incur further costs to oppose this application brought by the
applicant despite having obtained the
Judgment Debt.
24.4 Fourth, the
applicant itself foresees in its relief that further litigation may
be necessary should it default on any of its
instalments. The
applicant has crafted its proposed relief in a manner that
contemplates further litigation should the applicant
default on one
or many of its proposed repayments. The applicant thus foresees that
it may default on some of its future payments
and expects the Fund to
incur even further costs to enforce such payment.
[25]
Fund expenses are borne by members. Legal costs incurred by the Fund
to collect arrear payments are ultimately borne by the
members of the
Fund. It doubly prejudices the affected members that they have not
received arrear contributions, and that they
are required to bear
costs to collect it from their employer - in this case more than once
in respect of the same debt.
[26]
As a result, the applicant's conduct falls within the broader meaning
of 'vexatious for the purpose of awarding costs on an
attorney-client
scale. In
Re Alluvial Creek Ltd,
Gardiner J said in the
context of punitive costs order, that
"proceedings may be
regarded
as
vexatious when they put the other side to
unnecessary trouble and expense which the other side ought not to
bear".
This is so even if the intent may not have been that
the proceedings be vexatious.
[27]
The Applicant has failed to establish a cause of action. For the
reason set above, I make the following order;
1. The Application is
dismissed .
2. The Applicant to pay
the cost of this application , on the scale as between attorney and
client, and such costs to include the
costs concomitant upon the
employment of two counsel.
On
behalf of applicant: Louis Radley
Instructed
by: c/o Peyper Attorneys
Bloemfontein
On
behalf of respondent: MCV Gerdener
Instructed
by: McIntyre Van der Post
Bloemfontein
[1]
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Germiston Municipality
Retirement Fund CCT (226/15)
(2017) ZACC 1
(17 January 2017)