Molepo and Others v HOD, Department of Education Limpopo Province (2698/2016) [2018] ZALMPPHC 9 (19 March 2018)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Labour Law — Jurisdiction — Dispute regarding educator incentives — Applicants, educators at Gowe Primary School, sought retrospective payment of incentives under Government Gazette no 30678 — Respondent, Head of Department of Education, raised jurisdictional objections, asserting the matter fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council as an unfair labour practice — Court held that the incentive constituted a benefit under section 186(2) of the Labour Relations Act, thus falling within the ambit of the LRA — Jurisdictional point upheld, and application dismissed with costs.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


These proceedings took the form of a motion application in the High Court of South Africa, Limpopo Division, Polokwane. The applicants, Kole Mack Molepo and eight others, approached the court for an order compelling the respondent, the Head of Department, Department of Education, Limpopo Province, to pay them educator incentives retrospectively in terms of clause 8 of Government Gazette No 30678, Volume 511, dated 18 January 2008.


All applicants were educators employed by the Limpopo Department of Education and stationed at Gowe Primary School in Driekop village. The dispute concerned the applicants’ claimed entitlement to incentive payments allegedly applicable to educators working at qualifying schools.


The respondent opposed the application and raised four points in limine, including a jurisdictional objection. The court addressed jurisdiction first, as a threshold issue, and disposed of the matter on that basis without determining the remaining preliminary objections or the merits of the incentive claim.


2. Material Facts


The material facts accepted or relied upon by the court were limited, because the application was resolved on jurisdiction.


It was common cause in the papers that the applicants were educators employed by the Department of Education (Limpopo Province) and were stationed at Gowe Primary School. The applicants’ case was that the school fell under quintile 1, and that, on that basis, they qualified for incentives under clause 8.1(b) of the relevant Government Gazette.


The respondent’s opposition was framed through points in limine rather than a detailed factual rebuttal on eligibility. In argument, the respondent characterised the claim as one concerning the provision of benefits in the sense contemplated by the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, and contended that it therefore belonged in the statutory dispute-resolution system rather than in the High Court.


A procedural fact that became material to the court’s approach was that the applicants did not file a replying affidavit. Instead, they filed a supplementary affidavit without leave. The court treated this as non-compliance with the Uniform Rules of Court and rejected the supplementary affidavit because no leave had been sought and no condonation application had been brought.


To the extent that there was a dispute between the parties, it was not a factual dispute on the school’s quintile status that the court resolved; rather, it was a dispute of legal characterisation: whether the claimed incentive was to be treated as a benefit (suggesting an unfair labour practice dispute) or as a contractual entitlement falling outside the Labour Relations Act framework.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were jurisdictional and classificatory.


The first question was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain a claim by public-sector educators seeking payment of incentives under the Government Gazette, or whether the dispute fell within the exclusive labour dispute-resolution mechanisms created by the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995.


That jurisdictional enquiry depended on a second question: whether the incentive contemplated by clause 8.1(b) of the Government Gazette constituted a “benefit” for purposes of section 186(2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act, in which case the matter would be treated as an unfair labour practice dispute concerning benefits.


The dispute thus predominantly concerned a question of law, namely the correct legal classification of the claimed incentive and the consequences of that classification for forum and jurisdiction, with an element of applying that classification to the incentive scheme described in the Government Gazette.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court dealt first with the respondent’s jurisdiction point in limine, on the basis that jurisdiction must be established before any further consideration of the dispute.


Before addressing jurisdiction, the court determined the status of the applicants’ supplementary affidavit. Referring to Rule 6(5) of the Uniform Rules of Court, the court noted that motion proceedings ordinarily allow three sets of affidavits (founding, answering, and replying). Any further affidavits require the leave of the court. The court also referred to Rule 27(3), which provides for condonation where there has been non-compliance with the Rules. Because the supplementary affidavit had been filed without leave and without a condonation application, the court rejected it and proceeded without regard to its contents.


On the merits of the jurisdictional characterisation, the applicants’ counsel submitted in argument that the incentive did not amount to a benefit but rather constituted a contractual dispute, and that the High Court therefore had jurisdiction. The court identified the decisive enquiry as whether the incentive in clause 8.1(b) could be classified as a benefit.


In analysing the meaning of “benefit”, the court relied on the distinction drawn in Northern Cape Provincial Administration v Hambidge NO and Others [1999] 7 BLLR 698 (LC) between remuneration (as an essential element of the employment contract) and “benefits” (as additional advantages or perquisites, often characterised as non-wage benefits). The court noted, with reference to Hambidge, that a benefit is something “extra” apart from remuneration and may be part of the naturalia of employment rather than the essentialia.


The court then considered the incentive scheme itself as described in the Government Gazette. It noted that the incentives were published with a heading indicating an improvement in conditions of service for educators and that the scheme applied to employees who met criteria and was conditional upon the employee signing an incentive contract. The court reasoned that once such an incentive contract is signed, it would form part of the employee’s terms and conditions of employment. The court further referred to clause 12 of the Government Gazette, which states that the employer must pay the incentive as a non-pensionable allowance, in cash or in kind. On that basis, the court concluded that the incentive is an allowance for employees working in remote schools who meet the prescribed criteria and, accordingly, constitutes a benefit.


Having classified the incentive as a benefit, the court applied section 186(2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act, which defines an unfair labour practice to include unfair conduct relating to the provision of benefits. The court concluded that the applicants’ dispute fell within the ambit of section 186(2) of the Act.


The court then considered forum. It stated that disputes arising between employer and employee that fall within the provisions of the Labour Relations Act must be resolved through the Act’s dispute-resolution mechanisms. In support, the court referred to Chirwa v Transnet Ltd and Others [2007] ZACC 23; 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC), noting the Constitutional Court’s statement that a dispute concerning alleged non-compliance with the Labour Relations Act must be determined in the specialist labour fora and cannot be avoided by reframing it as an administrative-law or constitutional claim. The court also relied on Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 (1) SA 238 (CC) for the proposition that labour issues should be dealt with in specialised fora using the mechanisms created by the Labour Relations Act.


On that basis, the court reasoned that the appropriate forum was the relevant public service bargaining council. Referring to section 35 of the Labour Relations Act (empowering the establishment of a bargaining council for the public service), the court held that because the Department of Education falls within the public service, the dispute should be dealt with in the General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council (GPSSBC). The court therefore upheld the point in limine that it lacked jurisdiction.


Because the jurisdiction point was dispositive, the court expressly found no need to address the remaining points in limine.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court upheld the respondent’s point in limine that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the dispute.


The application was dismissed with costs.


Cases Cited


Northern Cape Provincial Administration v Hambidge NO and Others [1999] 7 BLLR 698 (LC)


SA Chemical Workers Union v Longmile/United (1999) 20 ILJ 244 (CCMA)


Chirwa v Transnet Ltd and Others [2007] ZACC 23; 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC)


Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 (1) SA 238 (CC)


Legislation Cited


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (sections 186(2)(a), 35, and 213)


Employment of Educators Act, 1998


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (section 33)


Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (referred to as “PAJA”)


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 6(5)


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 27(3)


Held


The court held that the educator incentive claimed under clause 8.1(b) of the relevant Government Gazette constituted a benefit rather than remuneration, and that a dispute concerning the alleged failure to provide such a benefit fell within section 186(2)(a) of the Labour Relations Act as an unfair labour practice dispute relating to benefits.


It further held that such disputes must be pursued through the specialised dispute-resolution mechanisms established by the Labour Relations Act and, in the context of the public service, in the appropriate bargaining council forum. The High Court therefore lacked jurisdiction, and the application was dismissed with costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A claim framed as an entitlement to an employment-related incentive may constitute a dispute about the provision of a benefit, particularly where the incentive operates as a non-pensionable allowance and forms part of the employee’s conditions of service through an incentive arrangement.


Where a dispute falls within the scope of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, including disputes concerning unfair labour practices relating to benefits under section 186(2)(a), it must be resolved through the Act’s specialised fora and procedures, and litigants cannot secure High Court jurisdiction by characterising the dispute as purely contractual or by attempting to reframe it as an administrative-law complaint.


In motion proceedings, affidavits beyond the founding, answering, and replying sets require leave of the court, and non-compliance with the Uniform Rules of Court should be addressed by seeking condonation where appropriate; failing this, such affidavits may be rejected.

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[2018] ZALMPPHC 9
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Molepo and Others v HOD, Department of Education Limpopo Province (2698/2016) [2018] ZALMPPHC 9 (19 March 2018)

REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(LIMPOPO
PROVINCIAL DIVISION, POLOKWANE)
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
/NO
(2)
OF
INTEREST TO THE JUDGES:
YES
/NO
(3)
REVISED.
DATE…………
SIGNATURE:…………
.
CASE
NO:   2698/2016
In
the matter between:
KOLE
MACK MOLEPO & 8 OTHERS

APPLICANTS
And
HOD,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

RESPONDENT
LIMPOPO
PROVINCE
JUDGMENT
KGANYAGO
J
[1]
The applicants have brought an application seeking an order that the
respondent be ordered to pay them incentives in terms of
clause 8 of
the Government Gazette no 30678, volume 511 dated 18 January 2008
retrospectively. All the applicants are educators
at Gowe Primary
School in Driekop village, employed by the Department of Education
Limpopo Province.
[2]
According to the applicants, Gowe primary school falls under quintile
1, and as such they are eligible for incentives in terms
of clause
8.1(b) of the gazette.
[3]
The respondent is the Head of the Department of Education, Limpopo
Province who has been cited in his official capacity. The
respondent
is opposing the applicants’ application and has raised four
points
in
limine.
The first point
in
limine
is that there is a dispute of fact; the second one is that this Court
has no jurisdiction to hear this matter; the third one is
that the
applicants have failed to exhaust internal remedies before
approaching this court and the fourth one is that the applicants’

application is defective.
[4]
I will deal with the second point
in
limine
first as the parties must first establish jurisdiction before their
matter could be heard. According to the respondent, the applicants’

claim relate to an unfair conduct relating to provision of benefits
in terms of section 186(2) of the Labour Relations act No.66
of 1995
(“the LRA”). The respondent therefore contends that such
claim falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Public Service
Co-ordinating Bargaining Council.
[5]
The applicants did not file a replying affidavit, but opted to file a
supplementary affidavit without the leave of the court.
In terms of
Rule 6(5) of the Uniform Rules of Court ( the Rules), three sets of
affidavits are permitted, which are the founding
affidavit, answering
affidavit and a replying affidavit. Any further affidavits should be
with the leave of the Court.
[6]
Rule 27 (3) makes provision for a party who has failed to comply with
the Rules to make an application for condonation. However,
the
applicants have failed to invoke the remedy provided in that Rule.
Since the applicants’ supplementary affidavit was
filed without
the leave of the Court, and there was no condonation application for
non-compliance with the rules, the Court has
rejected the applicants’
supplementary affidavit.
[7]
The applicants’ counsel argued from the bar that the incentive
that the applicants’ are claiming does not amounts
to a
benefit, but amounts to a contractual dispute. The counsel for the
applicants contends that the applicants’ dispute
is not based
on the LRA and therefore the Court has jurisdiction to entertain
their claim.
[8]
The question which must first be determined by this Court is whether
the incentive as stated in clause 8.1(b) of the Gazette
can be
classified as a benefit.
[9]
In
Northern
Cape Provincial Administration v Hambidge No & Others
[1999] 7
BLLR 698(LC)
at paragraph 12-14 Landman J said:

[12]
It is unnecessary for me to consider the meaning of the term benefit
exhaustively. It was not argued in detail. For a useful
compilation
of the authorities and opinions on the meaning of benefit see SA
Chemical Workers Union v Longmile/ United (1999) 20
ILJ 244 (CCMA) at
248-253.

[13]
A salary or wage or payment in kind is an essential element in a
contract of service. See Basson et al Essential Labour Law
Vol 1 at
22-23. The definition of remuneration read with the definition of
employee in section 213 of the Act makes this clear.
“Remuneration”
in section 213 means: “any payment in money or kind or both
money and in kind…”remuneration
is an essentialia of a
contract of employment. Other rights or advantages or benefits
accruing to an employee by agreement are
termed naturalia to
distinguish them from the essentialia of the contract of employment.
Some naturalia are subject of individual
or collective bargaining.
Others are conferred by law. In my view a benefit may be part of the
naturalia. It is not part of the
essentialia. Some support for this
distinction may be derived from the definition of fringe benefits in
the shorter Oxford Dictionary.
It reads:

Fringe benefits-
a perquisite or benefit paid by an employer to supplement a money
wage or salary”.
[14]
The ILO Wages – A worker’s Education Manual (1988) at 70
makes point that a fringe benefit is a supplement for
which no work
is done. Labour Law (1987) at 158 speaks of wages and non-wage
benefits. The word “benefit” in item 2(1)(b)
means, at
least, a non-wage benefit. The decision of my sister Revelas J in
Samsung case is to the same effect. She says at 1102
J – 1103
A:

Remuneration
is different from ‘benefits’. A benefit is something
extra, apart from remuneration.
Often
it is a term and condition of an employment contract and often not.
Remuneration is always a term and condition of employment
contract”.
[10]
These incentives were published in the government gazette of the 18
th
January 2007. The heading of the covering letter of the Minister is
titled:

Improvement
in conditions of service for Educators employed in terms of the
Employment of Educators Act, 1998
: Teachers incentives”.
[11]
This incentives is applicable to employees who meet a certain
criteria, and it is also conditional upon an employee signing
an
incentive contract. Upon the incentive contract been signed, in my
view that incentive contract will now form part of the terms
and
conditions of employment.
[12]
Clause 12 of the government gazette state that the employer must pay
the incentive in the form and to the extent of a non-pensionable

allowance, in cash or in kind. In other words this incentive is an
allowance for employees working in remote schools that meet
the
criteria set out in the government gazette. Therefore, in my view
that incentive is a benefit.
[13]
In terms of
section 186(2)
(a) of the LRA, unfair labour practice
means any unfair act or omission that arises between an employer and
an employee…
relating to the provision of
benefits
to
an employee. As I have already held that the incentive in this matter
is a benefit, it then follows that it is a dispute that
falls within
the ambit of
section 186(
2) of the LRA.
[14]
In
Chirwa
v Transnet Ltd and Others
[2007] ZACC 23
;
2008 (4) SA 367
(CC)
at paragraph 125 Ngcobo J said:
“…
a
dispute concerning the alleged non-compliance with the provisions of
the LRA is a matter which under the LRA, must be determined

exclusively by the Labour Court. This result cannot be avoided by
alleging, as the applicant does, that the conduct of Transnet

violates the provisions of the LRA in question and violates a
constitutional right to a just administrative action in
s33
of the
constitution and is therefore reviewable under PAJA”.
[15]
Disputes between employer and employee that falls within the
provisions of the LRA must be resolved within the dispute resolutions

mechanisms provided for in the LRA. In
Gcaba
v Minister for Safety and Security
2010
(1) SA 238
(CC)
the court held that labour issues are to be dealt within the
specialized fora and pursued through the purpose-built mechanisms

established by the LRA.
[16]
I have already held in paragraph 12
supra
,
that the applicants’ dispute is a benefit that falls within the
ambit of
section 186(2)
(a) of the LRA.
Section 35
of the LRA
empowers the public service to establish a Bargaining Council. The
Department of Education is a sector that falls within
the public
service, and the bargaining council of the public service as a whole
is the General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining
Council (GPSSBC).
In my view the appropriate forum to deal with the applicants’
dispute is the GPSSBC. The respondent’s
point
in
limine
of jurisdiction stands to be upheld. This point alone disposes the
applicants’ dispute and I don’t find any reason
to deal
with the other points
in
limine.
[17]
In my result I
make the following order:
17.1
The respondent’s point
in
limine
that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the applicants’
dispute is upheld.
17.2
The applicants’ application is dismissed with costs.
_________________________
MF
KGANYAGO J
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH
AFRICA, LIMPOPO
DIVISION,
POLOKWANE
Appearances
1.
For
the applicant
:
M. Schnehage
2.
Instructed
by
:
A.M Carrim Attorneys
3.
Telephone
no
:
(015) 293 1700
4.
For
the Respondents
:
Adv S Mphahlele
5.
Instructed
by
:
The State Attorney
6.
Telephone
numbers
:
(015) 230 6310/16
7.
Date
of Argument
:
27 February 2018
8.
Date
of Judgment
:
20
th
March 2018