M.P obo S.P v Member of the Executive Council for Health, Eastern Cape, Province (121/2016) [2018] ZAECMHC 28 (22 May 2018)

85 Reportability
Personal Injury Law - Medical Negligence

Brief Summary

Delict — Medical negligence — Claim for damages arising from hypoxic ischemic injury at birth — Plaintiff, acting as guardian of minor child, sought damages for injuries sustained due to alleged negligence of healthcare providers — Court found defendant liable for damages, allowing plaintiff to prove quantum — Expert evidence utilized extensively, with joint minutes produced by both parties’ experts addressing various aspects of the claim — Court accepted the need for 24-hour care for the child, rejecting the defendant’s expert’s opinion on care requirements — Adjustments made to actuarial certificate of value, including exclusions for remote future needs and application of contingency factors for loss of earnings.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The matter concerned a delictual claim for damages arising from a birth-related injury, brought in the Eastern Cape Division of the High Court, Mthatha. The proceedings were against the Member of the Executive Council for Health, Eastern Cape Province, in respect of alleged negligent obstetric and neonatal management resulting in injury to a minor child.


The plaintiff, M.P., acted in her representative capacity as the grandmother and legal guardian of the minor child S.P., born in 2005. The defendant was the provincial health authority cited through the MEC for Health.


Procedurally, the litigation was managed by a separation of issues. Liability was determined first, separately from quantum. After the close of the evidence on the merits, the court delivered an ex tempore judgment holding the defendant liable for such damages as the plaintiff might prove (or as might be agreed) arising from the hypoxic ischemic injury sustained at birth. Immediately thereafter, the defendant applied from the bar for a postponement of the quantum hearing; this was refused by an ex tempore judgment. The present judgment addressed the assessment of quantum and the structuring of the award, including the establishment of a trust.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was the quantification of compensation for a child living with severe cerebral palsy caused by hypoxic ischemic brain injury, including future medical and care costs, loss of earning capacity, and general damages, as well as ancillary relief concerning administration of the award through a trust and the associated costs.


Material Facts


It was common cause that the minor child sustained a hypoxic ischemic injury to the brain at birth and that, as a consequence, he suffers from cerebral palsy. The severity of the condition was not in dispute. The child was described as affected in a quadriplegic manner, involving the trunk, with profound functional limitations. He was unable to stand without assistance and could move only by rolling, scooting, or limited crawling. He could not feed himself, attend to personal hygiene, and his speech was severely affected.


In quantifying the claim, both parties relied extensively on expert evidence across multiple disciplines. A material feature of the evidence was that, in most fields, corresponding experts produced joint minutes reflecting common or agreed views, which significantly reduced factual controversy about many components of the future-care and expense projections.


An actuarial certificate of value was produced (valuation date 5 February 2018) drawing on the expert joint minutes and addressing a broad range of the child’s projected needs and necessary expenses, including mobility, daily professional care, and dietary supplementation. The evidence of Dr Campbell was relevant to life expectancy and to identifying duplication across overlapping expert recommendations, with the later actuarial certificate reflecting corrections where duplication had occurred.


One duplication issue was identified in relation to future dental expenses, where both parties’ dental estimates were included. During argument, the defendant accepted that the plaintiff’s dental estimate should be retained and the defendant’s discarded, requiring an adjustment to the total.


A discrete disputed factual issue related to the extent of care required. The plaintiff’s paediatric nursing expert recommended 24-hour care, 7 days a week, requiring two suitably trained carers, whereas the defendant’s nursing expert supported only a single daytime carer. The experts otherwise agreed on other matters.


A further issue arose concerning future provisions for schooling and communication support. The evidence accepted by the court included that the child’s brain function operated at a higher level than his physical limitations allowed him to express, informing allowances for assistive technology (including an iPad and related systems) and stimulation, and for school-related costs. The defendant questioned these allowances on the basis that an appropriate school facility was not available in Mthatha.


By contrast, an allowance was made in the actuarial calculation for attendance at a day care centre after age 18. It was common cause that there was no such centre in Mthatha, and there was no evidence addressing relocation to a place where such a facility existed.


The actuary did not apply contingencies to the global future medical and related costs, and a dispute arose on contingencies and assumptions in respect of future loss of earnings, including whether to assume Grade 12 only or Grade 12 plus a tertiary diploma, and whether to apply a 15% or 20% contingency deduction.


Legal Issues


The central legal questions were concerned with the proper quantification of delictual damages in a birth-injury medical negligence matter, given that liability had already been determined. The court was required to decide what amounts were reasonable and necessary to compensate for the minor child’s future needs and losses.


The disputes before the court largely involved the application of legal principles to the facts as established through expert evidence. This included evaluating competing expert recommendations where joint minutes did not resolve differences, determining whether certain projected expenses were too remote to be recoverable, and deciding whether and how to apply a contingency deduction to future loss of earnings.


The court also had to make an evaluative assessment of general damages for pain, suffering, disability, and loss of amenities of life, and to decide whether it was appropriate to order that the award be administered through the creation of a trust, including determining who should bear the costs of administering that trust.


Court’s Reasoning


The court approached quantum primarily through the structured expert evidence and the actuarial modelling that relied on it. It emphasised the practical significance of the parties’ extensive use of expert joint minutes, which reduced the need for the court to choose between competing expert views in most areas. The certificate of value was treated as a central organising document, reflecting the range of agreed needs and costs, as refined by identifying and correcting duplication between overlapping expert inputs.


Where duplication remained, the court dealt with it pragmatically on the basis of common ground reached during argument. In relation to dental expenses, the court accepted the parties’ agreement that the plaintiff’s dental projection should stand and that the defendant’s duplicate estimate should be removed, with a corresponding adjustment to the total.


On the key disputed care issue, the court preferred the plaintiff’s evidence calling for continuous care. The court reasoned that, given the severity and overwhelming extent of the child’s disabilities and his inability to meet basic needs, a 24-hour assistance regime was the more logical and defensible recommendation. The court also attached weight to the fact that the defendant’s nursing expert was not called to testify, while the plaintiff’s expert motivated the recommendation clearly and professionally and had substantial experience in coordinating care placements. The court therefore accepted the plaintiff’s recommendation as both reasonable and necessary, as reflected in the actuarial calculation.


In addressing allowances related to schooling and assistive technology, the court accepted the evidence that the child’s cognitive functioning exceeded his physical ability to communicate and act, and treated this as materially relevant to whether such interventions were reasonable. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the lack of an appropriate facility in Mthatha should preclude the schooling-related allowances, viewing that approach as unduly limiting and potentially contrary to the child’s interests. The evidence supported the appointment of a case manager and the possibility of future placement in appropriate schooling, and the court found no evidential basis to exclude those allowances.


The court drew a distinction, however, in relation to the allowance for attendance at a day care centre after age 18. Given the common cause fact that no such centre existed in Mthatha, the nature of day care as a daily service, and the absence of evidence that the family would relocate to a place with such a facility, the court regarded that possibility as too remote. It directed that the actuarial total be adjusted by deducting R578 998,00.


On contingencies, the court held that no general contingency deduction should be applied to the global future medical and related costs reflected in the certificate of value. The reasoning was that the certificate already reflected careful work addressing the probabilities associated with life expectancy and likely variations in the child’s condition, and no further evidential foundation had been laid for additional contingency adjustments.


The court adopted a different approach to future loss of earnings, holding that a contingency factor should be applied, and then determining the appropriate percentage and educational scenario. It accepted the submission that the defendant’s actuarial calculation was preferable insofar as it took the child’s life expectancy into account, but it found a 20% contingency deduction too high on the evidence. It accepted an approach based on Grade 12 plus a tertiary diploma, but with a 15% contingency rather than 20%, as argued for by the plaintiff with reference to the defendant’s own calculations.


For general damages, the court considered the child’s severe and permanent disability, ongoing suffering, and devastating loss of amenities of life. It also treated as aggravating the evidence that the child was bright and had cognitive awareness not matched by his physical ability to express himself. In determining an appropriate award, the court relied on a Gauteng Division judgment which had awarded R1 800 000,00 for general damages in a comparable context, and which had been referred to with approval previously in the Eastern Cape Division. The court regarded an inflationary adjustment as sufficient and fixed general damages at R2 000 000,00 as fair and reasonable.


Finally, on the structure of the award, the court accepted that it was appropriate to establish a trust to administer the funds for the benefit of the minor child, with termination upon the child’s death (or in accordance with the trust deed), under the supervision and approval mechanisms involving the Master.


Outcome and Relief


The court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff, in her representative capacity for and on behalf of the minor child, R21 589 799,00 within 30 days. The award comprised R18 749 922,00 for future medical expenses and related costs, R839 797,00 for future loss of earning capacity, and R2 000 000,00 for general damages.


The court ordered that, if payment was not made within 30 days, the defendant would be liable for interest at the prescribed rate on the amounts referred to in the award.


In addition to the capital award, the defendant was ordered to pay the costs of administration of the trust to be created to manage the award, quantified at R1 619 234,90 (being 7.5% of the award), and to pay the plaintiff’s costs of suit on the High Court scale to date, including counsel’s costs, travel and subsistence costs for consultations and trial, and the costs related to medico-legal and actuarial reports and joint minutes, together with listed experts’ qualifying and attendance costs where necessary. Interest on taxed or agreed costs was ordered at the prescribed legal rate from fourteen days after allocatur or agreement to date of payment.


The order further directed that the net balance of the funds, after payment of specified costs, be dealt with by establishing an inter vivos trust, the “S. P. Trust”, to be registered by the Master within nine months (or such extended period as the Master might direct), with detailed provisions governing trusteeship, administration, remuneration (capped by reference to curator bonis remuneration contemplated in the Administration of Estates Act, 1965), disclosure of interests, and Master’s approval under the Trust Property Control Act, 1988. The award and costs were made payable into the plaintiff attorneys’ trust account.


Cases Cited


C.S. (obo T.G.S.) v MEC FOR HEALTH, GAUTENG (27452/2009) GPPHC (6 August 2015) was cited as persuasive authority on the assessment of general damages.


N. MGOMENI obo E.N. ZANGWE v MEC FOR HEALTH, EASTERN CAPE PROVINCE (1972/2014) ECHCM (20 June 2017) was cited as an instance where the Gauteng judgment had been referred to with approval in the same division.


Legislation Cited


Administration of Estates Act, 1965 (as amended) was referenced in relation to the remuneration benchmark for trustees, by equivalence to remuneration of a curator bonis contemplated in that Act.


Trust Property Control Act, 1988 (as amended) was referenced in relation to the requirement that the trust provisions be subject to the approval of the Master of the High Court.


Rules of Court Cited


No specific rule of court was cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that the defendant was liable to compensate the plaintiff, acting for the minor child, for the proven damages arising from the hypoxic ischemic brain injury sustained at birth, and quantified those damages by awarding future medical and related costs, future loss of earning capacity (with an appropriate contingency deduction), and general damages.


In determining quantum, the court held that 24-hour daily care was reasonable and necessary given the child’s severe quadriplegic cerebral palsy, that certain schooling and assistive-technology allowances were justified on the evidence, but that the allowance for adult day care attendance after age 18 was too remote and had to be excluded.


The court further held that it was appropriate to structure the award through the creation of a trust for the exclusive benefit of the minor child, under the supervision and approval of the Master, and ordered the defendant to bear the costs associated with establishing and administering that trust, as well as the plaintiff’s costs of suit.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that, once liability is established in a delictual claim, the court must quantify damages by awarding compensation that is reasonable and necessary to address the injured person’s proven and probable future needs, including medical care, assistive support, and related costs, assessed on the evidence.


It applied the principle that expert evidence, particularly where consolidated through joint minutes, is central to quantifying complex future-care claims, and that duplication across overlapping expert inputs must be identified and corrected to avoid overcompensation.


The judgment applied the principle that claimed future expenses may be excluded where they are too remote on the evidence, and that allowances must be grounded in proven probabilities rather than speculative possibilities not supported by evidence.


It further applied the principle that contingency deductions are not automatically applied to all heads of damage, but depend on evidential justification, and that future loss of earnings is typically an area where a contingency deduction is applied, with the percentage and assumptions determined on the facts and probabilities accepted by the court.


In relation to general damages, the judgment applied the principle that awards must reflect the extent of suffering, disability, and loss of amenities of life, with reference to comparable awards as persuasive guidance, adjusted where necessary (including for inflation), to arrive at a fair and reasonable figure.


Finally, the judgment applied the principle that where an award is made for the benefit of a minor with significant lifelong needs, the court may order protective administrative measures, including the creation of a trust under the Master’s oversight, to ensure the award is managed and applied for the beneficiary’s maintenance and benefit.

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[2018] ZAECMHC 28
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M.P obo S.P v Member of the Executive Council for Health, Eastern Cape, Province (121/2016) [2018] ZAECMHC 28 (22 May 2018)

SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN
CAPE DIVISION:
MTHATHA
CASE
NO. 121/2016
M.
P. obo S. P.

Plaintiff
and
MEMBER
OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
FOR
HEALTH, EASTERN CAPE, PROVINCE

Defendant
JUDGMENT
BROOKS
J
[1]
The plaintiff issued a combined summons against the defendant, the
Member of the Executive Council for Health, Eastern Cape
Province.
In doing so, she acted in her capacity as the grandmother and legal
guardian of the minor child S., who was born
on [...] 2005.
[2]
The plaintiff’s claim is for the recovery of damages alleged to
have been suffered by S. as a result of an hypoxic ischemic
injury to
his brain which was sustained at birth.  Issues pertaining to
the liability of the defendant were separated from
issues pertaining
to the
quantum
of the damages alleged to have been suffered by S. and the latter
were allowed to stand down.
[3]
At the closure of both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s
cases on the merits, and after hearing argument, an
ex
tempore
judgment was delivered
in
extenso
and
an order was made to the effect that the defendant is liable to make
payment to the plaintiff of such damages as she may prove,
or it may
be agreed that she has suffered in her representative capacity as a
result of the hypoxic ischemic injury to S.’s
brain on [...]
2005.
[4]
Immediately thereafter, Mr Mtshabe, who appeared on behalf of the
defendant, made an application from the bar for an order postponing

the further conduct of the trial on issues pertaining to the
quantum
of damages.  After hearing argument an
ex
tempore
judgment
in
extenso
was delivered on the application.  It is not necessary for
present purposes to repeat the content thereof.  It is
sufficient
to state that an order was made refusing the application
for a postponement.
[5]
It is common cause between the parties that S. suffers from cerebral
palsy as a consequence of the hypoxic ischemic injury sustained
by
his brain at birth.  There is also no dispute about the severity
of his condition.  He is affected in a quadriplegic
manner which
also involves the trunk of his body.  He is unable to stand
without assistance and is able only to roll, or scoot
or to a certain
extent crawl in order to move.  He is unable to feed himself or
to see to his own personal hygiene.
His speech is severely
affected.
[6]
In assessing the quantum of the damages to be awarded as compensation
in this matter, both parties made extensive use of a number
of
medical experts.  In respect of the vast majority of the
different aspects of the plaintiff’s claim in her
representative
capacity, an expert in a particular field who gave a
report on behalf of the plaintiff was matched by an expert in the
same field
who gave a report on behalf of the defendant.  Of
particular assistance in the determination of an appropriate award of
damages
is the fact that in each instance the corresponding experts
produced a joint minute in which was recorded the expression of a
common
or agreed view on the particular aspect which they had been
called upon to address.  This feature has eliminated the need to

evaluate which expert’s opinion should be accepted and which
rejected in all but few instances.
[7]
A fair summary of the various fields of the enquiry addressed by the
experts in this matter finds expression in the certificate
of value
produced by Robert Koch, a consulting actuary in Cape Town.  The
certificate expresses a valuation date of 5 February
2018.  For
its content it draws on the joint minutes produced by the parties
experts, who addressed the full range of S.’s
needs and
unavoidable necessary medical expenses, ranging from addressing S.’s
need for mobility and daily professional care
to the need for
professional dietary supplementation.
[8]
The content of the actuarial certificate of value was addressed in
the evidence given by Dr Campbell, who within his specialised
field
had produced a calculation of the probable life expectancy of S..
This had been used by the actuary in the calculation
of the various
amounts included in the certificate of value.  Of equal
importance was the process, the outcome of which finds
expression in
the certificate of value, by which Dr Campbell was able to identify
areas in which the joint reports produced by
experts in different but
overlapping fields reflected the same items, leading to duplication
in allowance.  The certificate
of value made use of the same
numbering sequence in addressing the various elements which make up
its content as were used by the
actuary in the production of an
earlier certificate.  A comparison between the two certificates
indicates clearly areas in
which a duplication of allowance occurred
initially.  Both the form and the content of the most recent
certificate of value
demonstrate that this has, on the whole, been
corrected.
[9]
An area where duplication had not been addressed was identified by
counsel during argument.  The future medical expenses
estimated
by dental health practitioners on behalf of both parties are both
included in the certificate of value.  In addressing
the issue,
Mr Mtshabe conceded that the figure estimated by Dr Lofstedt on
behalf the plaintiff should be retained and the estimate
provided by
Dr Galatis on behalf the defendant should be discarded.  On this
counsel were in agreement and the total reflected
on the actuarial
certificate of value falls to be adjusted accordingly.
[10]
Another area of disagreement between the parties’ experts calls
for consideration.  A paediatric nurse with specialist
knowledge
and experience in the field of nursing youngsters with the type of
disabilities which beset S., Miss Anderson, gave evidence
on behalf
of the plaintiff.  This evidence addressed the needs which S.’s
condition and specific circumstances call
for in a wholistic manner.
However, specific to her area of expertise was her recommendation in
respect of the need for carers
to look after S..  In her
opinion, the care required is a twenty-four hours per day, seven days
a week regime.  To enable
this requires two suitably trained
carers.  In her report on the same point, the defendant’s
corresponding expert, Ms
Smit, was of the opinion that only a single
carer was called for during the day.  The joint minute produced
by the two experts
agreed on all other aspects but this.  In my
view, with due regard to the severe nature and overwhelming extent of
S.’s
condition and the devastating effect it has on his ability
to see to any of his own needs, the view which expresses a need for
twenty-four hour assistance on each day of the week is more logical
and defensible.  Moreover, Ms Smit was not called to give

evidence in support of her expert report on the point.  Miss
Anderson motivated her recommendation in a forthright but
compassionate
and professional manner.  She has considerable
experience in the field of the co-ordination and placement of carers
in similar
circumstances and I have no hesitation in accepting her
recommendation as both reasonable and necessary.  It finds full
expression
in the certificate of value produced by the actuary.
[11]
It is apposite to record that Dr Campbell gave his evidence as a
rehabilitation manager, leader and co-ordinator.  He
has
significant experience as a registered medical practitioner.  He
stressed the need for there to be a sustainable life
care plan for
the determinable period of S.’s life expectancy which addresses
the realities of premature ageing and associated
health risks which
come with the condition of cerebral palsy and its quadriplegic
expression.  He endorsed the principle that
it is important to
ensure the availability of a basket of basic care in addressing the
needs of a person such as S..  He confirmed
that S. is always
going to be dependent on qualified carers, throughout the remainder
of his natural life.
[12]
Both Dr Campbell and Miss Anderson highlighted the fact that S.’s
brain functions at a much higher level than his body
enables him to
express.  In my view, this is a vital aspect which informs the
reasonableness of the allowance for an I pad
and associated
technological support systems and the allowance for school fees,
school travel costs and stimulation games and “apps”
for
the I pad.  Mr Mtshabe queried the need for such allowances to
be made as no such school facility as may accommodate S.’s

needs is to be found in Mthatha.  In my view, this approach is
unnecessarily limiting and may do S. a dis-service in the result.

Dr Campbell and Miss Anderson both endorsed most strongly the need
for a case manager to be appointed to co-ordinate and direct
all the
role players in S.’s life care plan.  His grandmother, or
her successor within the family group, will form but
part of a team.
At the moment, it is recorded in some of the expert reports that S.’s
grandmother would be open to
him being sent to an appropriate school
when this would be justified.  The manner in which allowance is
made for this possibility
in the certificate of value takes
cognisance of the fact that it may only happen in the future.
In my view, no basis exists
for the exclusion of this allowance on
the available evidence.
[13]
The same cannot be said of the allowance for the attendance by S. at
a day care centre after reaching the age of eighteen.
It is
common cause that there is no such centre in Mthatha.  By its
very nature, a day care centre does not accommodate persons
who
attend it on anything other than a daily basis.  The prospect
that S. and his family may move to a centre where there
is such a day
care facility is not addressed in any of the available evidence.
Accordingly, it is so remote that it falls
to be excluded.  The
necessary adjustment to the certificate of value must be the
deduction of R578 998,00 from the total
value reflected in the
certificate.
[14]
No allowance for the contingencies was made by the actuary in the
computation of the certificate of value.  In my view,
there
should be no alteration by way of the application of the contingency
factor.  The reason is that it is clear that the
certificate of
value has been produced with due cognisance to the extensive work
done by Dr Campbell to address the probabilities
associated with S.’s
life expectancy and variations in his condition and ability, both
positive and negative.  No evidential
basis has been laid for
any further adjustments to be made by the application of a
contingency factor.
[15]
The same does not apply to the claim for the future loss of
earnings.  Here a contingency factor must be applied.
The
question is whether it should be 15% or 20%.  The second
question is whether the basis of the award should be the attainment

of a Grade 12 pass but for the injury or the attainment of a Grade 12
pass and some sort of diploma at tertiary level.  The

plaintiff’s expert in his report highlights what he describes
as “an upward trend” in children today who wish
to
achieve more and to earn more than their parents.  In addition,
background evidence points to the likelihood that S. would
have
followed his uncle’s example, as a role model, the latter
pursuing tertiary education.  The plaintiff’s experts
did
not take S.’s life expectancy into account, but the defendant’s
actuary, Mr GW Jacobson did.  However, Mr
Jacobson applied a 20%
contingency factor, which, in the absence of a stronger evidential
basis, seems too high.  Mr du Plessis,
who appeared on behalf of
the plaintiff, reasoned in his argument that the best approach was to
adopt the calculation made by the
defendant’s actuary of the
value of a loss of earnings based upon a Grade 12 pass and a tertiary
diploma, but taking cognisance
as he does of the life expectancy of
S. and applying a 15% contingency factor to the award in place of a
20% contingency factor.
In my view, there is merit in the
submission.
[16]
What remains is an assessment of an appropriate award for general
damages.  There can be no doubt that S. experiences
and will
continue to experience an unimaginable level of suffering and
permanent disability.  There has been a devastating
loss of
enjoyment of ordinary amenities of life which a totally healthy
person could reasonably expect and would take for granted.

Adequate compensation is called for.  By all accounts S. is a
bright little person whose deeper cognitive awareness is less

severely affected than his ability to express himself verbally and
physically.  This must be a factor which aggravates his

suffering.  A full assessment of an appropriate award of general
damages afforded by a judgment in the Gauteng Division of
the High
Court of South Africa
[1]
has
been referred to with approval on previous occasions in this
court
[2]
.  There an award
of R1 800 000.00 for general damages was well motivated.
An appropriate adjustment for inflation
is all that is required to
render that judgment highly persuasive in this matter.  In my
view, an award of R2 000 000.00
for general damages would
be fair and reasonable.
[17]
As a focal point in his submissions, Mr du Plessis produced a draft
order which embodies provisions for the establishment of
a trust to
be terminated upon the death of S..  The administration of the
trust will be subject to the scrutiny of the Master
of this court.
In my view, the establishment of such a trust would be appropriate in
the circumstances.
[18]
The following order will issue:
1.
The
defendant shall pay the plaintiff in her representative capacity for
and on behalf of S. P. (“the minor child”)
the amount of
R21 589 799,00 within thirty (30) days of the date of this
order.  The aforesaid amount is made up as follows:
1.1
R18 749
922.00 for future medical expenses and related costs.
1.2
R 839
797,00 for future loss of earnings capacity.
1.3
R2 000 000,00 for general damages.
2
In the event that the defendant fails to pay the amounts referred to
in paragraph 1
above, within 30 days of the date of this order, the
defendant shall be liable to pay interest thereon at the prescribed
rate of
interest.
3.
The defendant is, in addition to paragraph 1 above, ordered to pay
the costs of the administration
of the trust, to be created to manage
the award of the minor child, in the amount of R1 619 234,90,
being 7.5% of the
award of the minor child.
4
The defendant shall pay the plaintiff’s costs of suit (on the
High Court scale)
to the date of this order, such costs to include:
4.1
the costs of counsel;
4.2
the costs of travelling and subsistence of the plaintiff’s
legal representatives and
witnesses for the purposes of consultation
and trial;
4.3
the costs attendant upon the obtaining of payment of the full sums
including any interest
referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above and
including the costs associated with the creation of the aforesaid
trust;
4.4
the costs incurred in obtaining the medico-legal reports including
supplementary
reports, addenda, actuarial reports and joint minutes,
as well as, where necessary, the qualifying, attendance, reservation
and
preparation fees of:
Dr
Hulley

Obstetrician
Prof
Andronikou

Radiologist
Prof
Van Toorn

Paediatric Neurologist
Prof
Odendaal

Gynaecologist
Mr.
Mike Irving

Forensic Document
Ms.
Lesley Fletcher
Nurse
Dr
Malan

Research
Dr
A Ebrahim

Gynaecologist & Obstetrician
Ms.
Bianca Grey

Occupational Therapist
Dr
PJ Lofstedt

Dentist
Mr.
Gregory Shapiro
Industrial psychologist
Ms.
Sue Anderson
Nurse
Ms.
Shobana Singh
Speech Therapy
Mr.
Deon Rademeyer
Mobility Expert
Ms.
Mandy Read
Dietician
Dr
Robert Campbell
Clinical Psychologist
Ms.
Grace Hughes
Physiotherapist
Mr.
Nkanyiso Masondo
Architect
Mr.
Ivan Kramer

Actuary
Mr.
Robert Koch

Actuary
4.5
Any
reserved costs relating to trial proceedings;
5.
The
defendant shall pay interest on the aforesaid costs at the current
prescribed legal rate of interest from a date fourteen days
after
allocatur
or agreement to date of payment thereof;
6.
The
net balance remaining, after paying the costs set out in paragraph 5
above, and recovering all costs and expenses for which
the plaintiff
is liable, including her legal representatives’ fees as between
attorney and own client, shall be dealt with
on the basis that
Nonxuba Inc. attorneys shall cause a deed of trust, to be named the
“S. P. Trust”, is to be registered
by the Master of the
High Court, incorporating the provisions normally to be found in an
inter
vivos
trust, within 9 (nine) months of the date of this order, or such
longer period as the Master may on application direct, with the

following additional provisions:
6.1
the
trustees should be persons of good standing and suitable to act as
trustees in this matter;
6.2
the trustees appointed or their successors in title shall have the
powers of assumption;
6.3
the trustees shall be exempt from furnishing security;
6.4
the trustees shall hold and administer the trust fund for the benefit
of the minor child,
S. P., only;
6.5
the trustees shall apply the net income of the trust fund for the
maintenance and benefit
of the minor (as advised from time to time by
the appointed case manager) and, if at any time it is not adequate
for the purpose,
the capital thereof;
6.6
the Trust shall terminate on the death of the minor, alternatively in
accordance with the
Trust deed;
6.7
the remuneration of the trustees shall be at the rate equivalent to
(and not exceeding)
that of a
curator
bonis
as contemplated in the
Administration of Estates Act, 1965
, as
amended and shall be borne by the defendant.
6.8
the trustees shall disclose any interest in any transaction involving
the Trust.
6.9
The provisions of this paragraph shall, in accordance with the
provisions of Trust Property
Control Act, 1988, as amended, be
subject to the approval of the Master of the High Court.
6.10
This order must be served by the plaintiff’s attorney on the
Master of the High Court and the
trustees.
7.
The
sums of money and any interest thereon referred to in paragraphs 1, 2
and 3 above, and the costs (and any interest) referred
to paragraphs
4 and 5 above, are payable to the plaintiff’s attorneys’
trust account, the particulars of which are:
Name
of account Holder:        Nonxuba
Inc.
Bank
Name:
ABSA BANK LIMITED
Branch
Name:
Eastgate
Branch
Code:
632005
Account
number:         […]
Account
Type:
Trust Account
RWN
BROOKS
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
Counsel
for the plaintiff:

Adv DTvR du Plessis SC
Instructed by

Nonxuba Inc.
c/o Potelwa and Co,
43
Wesley Street
Mthatha
Counsel
for the defendant:
Adv NR Mtshabe
Instructed by

State Attorney
94 Sissons Street
Fortgale
Mthatha
Date
heard:

15 May 2018
Date
delivered:

22 May 2018
[1]
C.S. (obo T.G.S.) v MEC FOR HEALTH, GAUTENG (27452/2009) GPPHC (6
August 2015).
[2]
N. MGOMENI obo E.N. ZANGWE v MEC FOR HEALTH, EASTERN CAPE PROVINCE
(1972/2014) ECHCM (20 June 2017).