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[2018] ZAECMHC 28
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M.P obo S.P v Member of the Executive Council for Health, Eastern Cape, Province (121/2016) [2018] ZAECMHC 28 (22 May 2018)
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN
CAPE DIVISION:
MTHATHA
CASE
NO. 121/2016
M.
P. obo S. P.
Plaintiff
and
MEMBER
OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
FOR
HEALTH, EASTERN CAPE, PROVINCE
Defendant
JUDGMENT
BROOKS
J
[1]
The plaintiff issued a combined summons against the defendant, the
Member of the Executive Council for Health, Eastern Cape
Province.
In doing so, she acted in her capacity as the grandmother and legal
guardian of the minor child S., who was born
on [...] 2005.
[2]
The plaintiff’s claim is for the recovery of damages alleged to
have been suffered by S. as a result of an hypoxic ischemic
injury to
his brain which was sustained at birth. Issues pertaining to
the liability of the defendant were separated from
issues pertaining
to the
quantum
of the damages alleged to have been suffered by S. and the latter
were allowed to stand down.
[3]
At the closure of both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s
cases on the merits, and after hearing argument, an
ex
tempore
judgment was delivered
in
extenso
and
an order was made to the effect that the defendant is liable to make
payment to the plaintiff of such damages as she may prove,
or it may
be agreed that she has suffered in her representative capacity as a
result of the hypoxic ischemic injury to S.’s
brain on [...]
2005.
[4]
Immediately thereafter, Mr Mtshabe, who appeared on behalf of the
defendant, made an application from the bar for an order postponing
the further conduct of the trial on issues pertaining to the
quantum
of damages. After hearing argument an
ex
tempore
judgment
in
extenso
was delivered on the application. It is not necessary for
present purposes to repeat the content thereof. It is
sufficient
to state that an order was made refusing the application
for a postponement.
[5]
It is common cause between the parties that S. suffers from cerebral
palsy as a consequence of the hypoxic ischemic injury sustained
by
his brain at birth. There is also no dispute about the severity
of his condition. He is affected in a quadriplegic
manner which
also involves the trunk of his body. He is unable to stand
without assistance and is able only to roll, or scoot
or to a certain
extent crawl in order to move. He is unable to feed himself or
to see to his own personal hygiene.
His speech is severely
affected.
[6]
In assessing the quantum of the damages to be awarded as compensation
in this matter, both parties made extensive use of a number
of
medical experts. In respect of the vast majority of the
different aspects of the plaintiff’s claim in her
representative
capacity, an expert in a particular field who gave a
report on behalf of the plaintiff was matched by an expert in the
same field
who gave a report on behalf of the defendant. Of
particular assistance in the determination of an appropriate award of
damages
is the fact that in each instance the corresponding experts
produced a joint minute in which was recorded the expression of a
common
or agreed view on the particular aspect which they had been
called upon to address. This feature has eliminated the need to
evaluate which expert’s opinion should be accepted and which
rejected in all but few instances.
[7]
A fair summary of the various fields of the enquiry addressed by the
experts in this matter finds expression in the certificate
of value
produced by Robert Koch, a consulting actuary in Cape Town. The
certificate expresses a valuation date of 5 February
2018. For
its content it draws on the joint minutes produced by the parties
experts, who addressed the full range of S.’s
needs and
unavoidable necessary medical expenses, ranging from addressing S.’s
need for mobility and daily professional care
to the need for
professional dietary supplementation.
[8]
The content of the actuarial certificate of value was addressed in
the evidence given by Dr Campbell, who within his specialised
field
had produced a calculation of the probable life expectancy of S..
This had been used by the actuary in the calculation
of the various
amounts included in the certificate of value. Of equal
importance was the process, the outcome of which finds
expression in
the certificate of value, by which Dr Campbell was able to identify
areas in which the joint reports produced by
experts in different but
overlapping fields reflected the same items, leading to duplication
in allowance. The certificate
of value made use of the same
numbering sequence in addressing the various elements which make up
its content as were used by the
actuary in the production of an
earlier certificate. A comparison between the two certificates
indicates clearly areas in
which a duplication of allowance occurred
initially. Both the form and the content of the most recent
certificate of value
demonstrate that this has, on the whole, been
corrected.
[9]
An area where duplication had not been addressed was identified by
counsel during argument. The future medical expenses
estimated
by dental health practitioners on behalf of both parties are both
included in the certificate of value. In addressing
the issue,
Mr Mtshabe conceded that the figure estimated by Dr Lofstedt on
behalf the plaintiff should be retained and the estimate
provided by
Dr Galatis on behalf the defendant should be discarded. On this
counsel were in agreement and the total reflected
on the actuarial
certificate of value falls to be adjusted accordingly.
[10]
Another area of disagreement between the parties’ experts calls
for consideration. A paediatric nurse with specialist
knowledge
and experience in the field of nursing youngsters with the type of
disabilities which beset S., Miss Anderson, gave evidence
on behalf
of the plaintiff. This evidence addressed the needs which S.’s
condition and specific circumstances call
for in a wholistic manner.
However, specific to her area of expertise was her recommendation in
respect of the need for carers
to look after S.. In her
opinion, the care required is a twenty-four hours per day, seven days
a week regime. To enable
this requires two suitably trained
carers. In her report on the same point, the defendant’s
corresponding expert, Ms
Smit, was of the opinion that only a single
carer was called for during the day. The joint minute produced
by the two experts
agreed on all other aspects but this. In my
view, with due regard to the severe nature and overwhelming extent of
S.’s
condition and the devastating effect it has on his ability
to see to any of his own needs, the view which expresses a need for
twenty-four hour assistance on each day of the week is more logical
and defensible. Moreover, Ms Smit was not called to give
evidence in support of her expert report on the point. Miss
Anderson motivated her recommendation in a forthright but
compassionate
and professional manner. She has considerable
experience in the field of the co-ordination and placement of carers
in similar
circumstances and I have no hesitation in accepting her
recommendation as both reasonable and necessary. It finds full
expression
in the certificate of value produced by the actuary.
[11]
It is apposite to record that Dr Campbell gave his evidence as a
rehabilitation manager, leader and co-ordinator. He
has
significant experience as a registered medical practitioner. He
stressed the need for there to be a sustainable life
care plan for
the determinable period of S.’s life expectancy which addresses
the realities of premature ageing and associated
health risks which
come with the condition of cerebral palsy and its quadriplegic
expression. He endorsed the principle that
it is important to
ensure the availability of a basket of basic care in addressing the
needs of a person such as S.. He confirmed
that S. is always
going to be dependent on qualified carers, throughout the remainder
of his natural life.
[12]
Both Dr Campbell and Miss Anderson highlighted the fact that S.’s
brain functions at a much higher level than his body
enables him to
express. In my view, this is a vital aspect which informs the
reasonableness of the allowance for an I pad
and associated
technological support systems and the allowance for school fees,
school travel costs and stimulation games and “apps”
for
the I pad. Mr Mtshabe queried the need for such allowances to
be made as no such school facility as may accommodate S.’s
needs is to be found in Mthatha. In my view, this approach is
unnecessarily limiting and may do S. a dis-service in the result.
Dr Campbell and Miss Anderson both endorsed most strongly the need
for a case manager to be appointed to co-ordinate and direct
all the
role players in S.’s life care plan. His grandmother, or
her successor within the family group, will form but
part of a team.
At the moment, it is recorded in some of the expert reports that S.’s
grandmother would be open to
him being sent to an appropriate school
when this would be justified. The manner in which allowance is
made for this possibility
in the certificate of value takes
cognisance of the fact that it may only happen in the future.
In my view, no basis exists
for the exclusion of this allowance on
the available evidence.
[13]
The same cannot be said of the allowance for the attendance by S. at
a day care centre after reaching the age of eighteen.
It is
common cause that there is no such centre in Mthatha. By its
very nature, a day care centre does not accommodate persons
who
attend it on anything other than a daily basis. The prospect
that S. and his family may move to a centre where there
is such a day
care facility is not addressed in any of the available evidence.
Accordingly, it is so remote that it falls
to be excluded. The
necessary adjustment to the certificate of value must be the
deduction of R578 998,00 from the total
value reflected in the
certificate.
[14]
No allowance for the contingencies was made by the actuary in the
computation of the certificate of value. In my view,
there
should be no alteration by way of the application of the contingency
factor. The reason is that it is clear that the
certificate of
value has been produced with due cognisance to the extensive work
done by Dr Campbell to address the probabilities
associated with S.’s
life expectancy and variations in his condition and ability, both
positive and negative. No evidential
basis has been laid for
any further adjustments to be made by the application of a
contingency factor.
[15]
The same does not apply to the claim for the future loss of
earnings. Here a contingency factor must be applied.
The
question is whether it should be 15% or 20%. The second
question is whether the basis of the award should be the attainment
of a Grade 12 pass but for the injury or the attainment of a Grade 12
pass and some sort of diploma at tertiary level. The
plaintiff’s expert in his report highlights what he describes
as “an upward trend” in children today who wish
to
achieve more and to earn more than their parents. In addition,
background evidence points to the likelihood that S. would
have
followed his uncle’s example, as a role model, the latter
pursuing tertiary education. The plaintiff’s experts
did
not take S.’s life expectancy into account, but the defendant’s
actuary, Mr GW Jacobson did. However, Mr
Jacobson applied a 20%
contingency factor, which, in the absence of a stronger evidential
basis, seems too high. Mr du Plessis,
who appeared on behalf of
the plaintiff, reasoned in his argument that the best approach was to
adopt the calculation made by the
defendant’s actuary of the
value of a loss of earnings based upon a Grade 12 pass and a tertiary
diploma, but taking cognisance
as he does of the life expectancy of
S. and applying a 15% contingency factor to the award in place of a
20% contingency factor.
In my view, there is merit in the
submission.
[16]
What remains is an assessment of an appropriate award for general
damages. There can be no doubt that S. experiences
and will
continue to experience an unimaginable level of suffering and
permanent disability. There has been a devastating
loss of
enjoyment of ordinary amenities of life which a totally healthy
person could reasonably expect and would take for granted.
Adequate compensation is called for. By all accounts S. is a
bright little person whose deeper cognitive awareness is less
severely affected than his ability to express himself verbally and
physically. This must be a factor which aggravates his
suffering. A full assessment of an appropriate award of general
damages afforded by a judgment in the Gauteng Division of
the High
Court of South Africa
[1]
has
been referred to with approval on previous occasions in this
court
[2]
. There an award
of R1 800 000.00 for general damages was well motivated.
An appropriate adjustment for inflation
is all that is required to
render that judgment highly persuasive in this matter. In my
view, an award of R2 000 000.00
for general damages would
be fair and reasonable.
[17]
As a focal point in his submissions, Mr du Plessis produced a draft
order which embodies provisions for the establishment of
a trust to
be terminated upon the death of S.. The administration of the
trust will be subject to the scrutiny of the Master
of this court.
In my view, the establishment of such a trust would be appropriate in
the circumstances.
[18]
The following order will issue:
1.
The
defendant shall pay the plaintiff in her representative capacity for
and on behalf of S. P. (“the minor child”)
the amount of
R21 589 799,00 within thirty (30) days of the date of this
order. The aforesaid amount is made up as follows:
1.1
R18 749
922.00 for future medical expenses and related costs.
1.2
R 839
797,00 for future loss of earnings capacity.
1.3
R2 000 000,00 for general damages.
2
In the event that the defendant fails to pay the amounts referred to
in paragraph 1
above, within 30 days of the date of this order, the
defendant shall be liable to pay interest thereon at the prescribed
rate of
interest.
3.
The defendant is, in addition to paragraph 1 above, ordered to pay
the costs of the administration
of the trust, to be created to manage
the award of the minor child, in the amount of R1 619 234,90,
being 7.5% of the
award of the minor child.
4
The defendant shall pay the plaintiff’s costs of suit (on the
High Court scale)
to the date of this order, such costs to include:
4.1
the costs of counsel;
4.2
the costs of travelling and subsistence of the plaintiff’s
legal representatives and
witnesses for the purposes of consultation
and trial;
4.3
the costs attendant upon the obtaining of payment of the full sums
including any interest
referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above and
including the costs associated with the creation of the aforesaid
trust;
4.4
the costs incurred in obtaining the medico-legal reports including
supplementary
reports, addenda, actuarial reports and joint minutes,
as well as, where necessary, the qualifying, attendance, reservation
and
preparation fees of:
Dr
Hulley
Obstetrician
Prof
Andronikou
Radiologist
Prof
Van Toorn
Paediatric Neurologist
Prof
Odendaal
Gynaecologist
Mr.
Mike Irving
Forensic Document
Ms.
Lesley Fletcher
Nurse
Dr
Malan
Research
Dr
A Ebrahim
Gynaecologist & Obstetrician
Ms.
Bianca Grey
Occupational Therapist
Dr
PJ Lofstedt
Dentist
Mr.
Gregory Shapiro
Industrial psychologist
Ms.
Sue Anderson
Nurse
Ms.
Shobana Singh
Speech Therapy
Mr.
Deon Rademeyer
Mobility Expert
Ms.
Mandy Read
Dietician
Dr
Robert Campbell
Clinical Psychologist
Ms.
Grace Hughes
Physiotherapist
Mr.
Nkanyiso Masondo
Architect
Mr.
Ivan Kramer
Actuary
Mr.
Robert Koch
Actuary
4.5
Any
reserved costs relating to trial proceedings;
5.
The
defendant shall pay interest on the aforesaid costs at the current
prescribed legal rate of interest from a date fourteen days
after
allocatur
or agreement to date of payment thereof;
6.
The
net balance remaining, after paying the costs set out in paragraph 5
above, and recovering all costs and expenses for which
the plaintiff
is liable, including her legal representatives’ fees as between
attorney and own client, shall be dealt with
on the basis that
Nonxuba Inc. attorneys shall cause a deed of trust, to be named the
“S. P. Trust”, is to be registered
by the Master of the
High Court, incorporating the provisions normally to be found in an
inter
vivos
trust, within 9 (nine) months of the date of this order, or such
longer period as the Master may on application direct, with the
following additional provisions:
6.1
the
trustees should be persons of good standing and suitable to act as
trustees in this matter;
6.2
the trustees appointed or their successors in title shall have the
powers of assumption;
6.3
the trustees shall be exempt from furnishing security;
6.4
the trustees shall hold and administer the trust fund for the benefit
of the minor child,
S. P., only;
6.5
the trustees shall apply the net income of the trust fund for the
maintenance and benefit
of the minor (as advised from time to time by
the appointed case manager) and, if at any time it is not adequate
for the purpose,
the capital thereof;
6.6
the Trust shall terminate on the death of the minor, alternatively in
accordance with the
Trust deed;
6.7
the remuneration of the trustees shall be at the rate equivalent to
(and not exceeding)
that of a
curator
bonis
as contemplated in the
Administration of Estates Act, 1965
, as
amended and shall be borne by the defendant.
6.8
the trustees shall disclose any interest in any transaction involving
the Trust.
6.9
The provisions of this paragraph shall, in accordance with the
provisions of Trust Property
Control Act, 1988, as amended, be
subject to the approval of the Master of the High Court.
6.10
This order must be served by the plaintiff’s attorney on the
Master of the High Court and the
trustees.
7.
The
sums of money and any interest thereon referred to in paragraphs 1, 2
and 3 above, and the costs (and any interest) referred
to paragraphs
4 and 5 above, are payable to the plaintiff’s attorneys’
trust account, the particulars of which are:
Name
of account Holder: Nonxuba
Inc.
Bank
Name:
ABSA BANK LIMITED
Branch
Name:
Eastgate
Branch
Code:
632005
Account
number: […]
Account
Type:
Trust Account
RWN
BROOKS
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
Counsel
for the plaintiff:
Adv DTvR du Plessis SC
Instructed by
Nonxuba Inc.
c/o Potelwa and Co,
43
Wesley Street
Mthatha
Counsel
for the defendant:
Adv NR Mtshabe
Instructed by
State Attorney
94 Sissons Street
Fortgale
Mthatha
Date
heard:
15 May 2018
Date
delivered:
22 May 2018
[1]
C.S. (obo T.G.S.) v MEC FOR HEALTH, GAUTENG (27452/2009) GPPHC (6
August 2015).
[2]
N. MGOMENI obo E.N. ZANGWE v MEC FOR HEALTH, EASTERN CAPE PROVINCE
(1972/2014) ECHCM (20 June 2017).