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[2018] ZAKZDHC 2
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Holden v Assmang Limited (6488/12) [2018] ZAKZDHC 2 (8 February 2018)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL
DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG
CASE
NO. 6488/12
In
the matter between:-
LINDA
HOLDEN
PLAINTIFF
and
ASSMANG
LIMITED
DEFENDANT
ORDERS
1.
The
defendant’s special plea of jurisdiction is dismissed;
2.
The
defendant’s special plea of prescription is dismissed;
3. The defendant is ordered to pay the
costs associated with the hearing of the special pleas, such costs to
include the costs associated
with the application in terms Rule
33(4).
JUDGMENT
HENRIQUES J
Introduction
[1]
The above matter came before me as a defended action enrolled for
hearing on the Trial Roll from 19 to 21 November 2014.
[2]
At the commencement of the trial, the defendant (as applicant)
launched a formal application supported by an affidavit deposed
to by
the defendant’s legal representative, seeking orders for the
separation of the defendant’s special pleas of prescription
and
jurisdiction from the merits of the action.
[3]
Such application was consented to by the plaintiff (respondent),
however, agreement could not be reached on the costs occasioned
by
such application.
[4] I granted a consent order for the
separation in terms of Rule 33(4) of the Uniform Rules of Court and
directed that the defendant’s
special pleas as contained in the
defendant’s plea be determined separately from the main action.
The costs in respect of
such application were reserved.
Plaintiff’s action
[5]
The plaintiff instituted action against the defendant for damages
arising from the defendant’s alleged wrongful and malicious
conduct in pursuing a complaint to the Health Professions Council of
South Africa (HPCSA) against the plaintiff.
[6] The salient averments are
contained in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the plaintiff’s
particulars of claim which reads as follows:-
‘
4.
During
or about 2008 and at or near Cato Ridge, KwaZulu-Natal and/or
Johannesburg, Gauteng, the defendant wrongfully and maliciously
set
the law in motion by:-
4.1
laying false charges with the Health Professions Council of South
Africa (the HPCSA) that the defendant is and has been in gross
breach
of the professional ethics by which her profession is regulated and
is guilty of unprofessional conduct;
4.2
prevailing upon the HPCSA to institute an investigation against the
plaintiff;
4.3
prevailing upon the HPCSA to take action against the plaintiff;
4.4
prevailing upon the HPCSA to account to the defendant’s
attorneys regarding the charges.
5.
When
laying these charges the defendant furnished the HPCSA with the
following disinformation:-
5.1
that the plaintiff (at or near Pietermaritzburg within this Court’s
jurisdiction) had sought to make diagnoses of “manganism”
in respect of eight patients who had been employed by the defendant
and at its Cato Ridge Works and which employees the defendant
had
referred to the plaintiff;
5.2
that the plaintiff’s conduct in doing so had; alternatively
would have; alternatively, could have:
5.2.1
resulted in state institutions improperly compensating persons for
occupational diseases which they do not suffer from and
which have
been wrongly identified;
5.2.2
resulted in patients being subjected to incorrect treatment with
adverse consequences to these patients;
5.2.3
adverse consequences for the defendant and its officers.
6.
When
laying these charges and getting this disinformation the defendant:
6.1
had no reasonable or probable cause for doing so;
6.2
had no reasonable belief in the truth of the information given;
6.3
intended to convey/impute that the plaintiff as a medical
practitioner, was, and continued to be grossly unprofessional;
6.4
intended to convey/impute that the plaintiff, as a medical
practitioner had been conducting herself, and continued to conduct
herself in a grossly unethical manner;
6.5
intended to convey/impute that the plaintiff’s conduct was
unbecoming of a medical practitioner and particularly of a
psychologist;
6.6
intended to convey/impute that the plaintiff was unfit to continue
practicing as a psychologist;
6.7
intended to injure the plaintiff in her reputation and/or in her
general standing with her disciplinary and governing body (the
HPCSA);
6.8
set in motion a strategy maliciously designed to intimidate the
plaintiff and to neutralise her from exposing information regarding
these patients which the defendant had referred to her from its Cato
Ridge manganese division, by compelling her to defend herself
instead;
6.9
intended to cause Plaintiff to lose her job.’
[7] The plaintiff further contends
that as a consequence of the defendant’s aforesaid conduct, she
suffered damages relating
to inter alia legal and professional costs,
loss of income and
contumelia
, impugning of professional
dignity and reputation, and deterioration of professional confidence.
Defendant’s plea
[8]
The defendant in resisting the plaintiff’s action filed two
special pleas and a plea to the merits of the plaintiff’s
claim.
[9]
The special pleas raised by the defendant relate to the alleged
prescription of the plaintiff’s claim in terms of the
Prescription Act 68 of 1969
and the lack of jurisdiction of this
court to entertain the plaintiff’s action.
[10] The defendant’s special
pleas were couched in the following terms:-
‘
1
.
PRESCRIBED CLAIM
1.1
The Plaintiff pleads that during or about 2008, the Defendant
wrongfully and maliciously laid a complaint with the Health
Professions
Council of South Africa (HPCSA) against the Plaintiff
(paragraph 4 of the Particulars of Claim);
1.2
The complaint was, in fact, lodged on 30
th
June 2008;
1.3
The Plaintiff responded to the complaint on 29
th
September
2008;
1.4
The Plaintiff’s alleged claim against the Defendant therefore
arose on or about 30
th
June 2008, alternatively, and at
the latest, on 29
th
September 2008;
1.5
The Summons in this matter was issued on 06
th
August 2012,
more than three years after the debt, which gave rise to the
Plaintiff’s alleged claim arose;
1.6
In terms of
Section 11
of the
Prescription Act, 1969
, any claim which
the Plaintiff may have had against the Defendant (which, in any
event, is denied) prescribed three years after
30
th
June
2008, alternatively, 29
th
September 2008;
1.7
In the premises, the Plaintiff’s alleged claim against the
Defendant has been extinguished by prescription.
2.
JURISDICTION
2.1
As appears on paragraph 2 of the Particulars of Claim, the Defendant
is a Company with limited liability, with its registered
office at 24
Impala Road, Chislehurston, Johannesburg, Gauteng;
2.2
The Defendant’s principal place of business is also 24 Impala
Road, Chislehurston, Johannesburg, Gauteng;
2.3
The complaint which forms the basis of the Plaintiff’s alleged
claim against the Defendant was lodged with the HPCSA in
Pretoria,
Gauteng;
2.4
In the premises, the Defendant does not reside within the
jurisdiction of this Court nor did the Plaintiff’s alleged
cause of action arise in the jurisdiction of this Court;
2.5
This Court therefore does not have jurisdiction to entertain this
action.’
Common cause facts
[11] At the commencement of the
hearing, the parties submitted the following as common cause facts:-
[11.1] That the complaint was
lodged with the HPCSA in June 2008;
[11.2] That the complaint was
responded to by the plaintiff on 29 September 2008;
[11.3] The action was instituted
on 6 August 2012;
[11.4] The summons and
particulars of claim was served on the defendant at its registered
office in Johannesburg on 21 August
2012 and on the defendant’s
Cato Ridge Works on 29 August 2012;
[11.5] The complaint served
before the committee of preliminary enquiry of the HPCSA and the
plaintiff appeared before such
committee of preliminary enquiry on 30
October 2009;
[11.6] On 13
November 2009, the HPCSA addressed a letter to the plaintiff’s
then counsel in which she was advised that
no further action would be
taken against her and the complaint was dismissed.
[12] The evidence intended to be led
by the parties was to be constrained to the issues raised in the
defendant’s special
pleas.
Evidence of the plaintiff
[13]
Linda Jane Holden, a duly qualified psychologist and the plaintiff
testified that she was registered with the HPCSA and obtained
her
qualifications in counselling psychology in 1994. She did her
internship in Durban and has been in private practice since 1994.
Throughout that period she was formally registered and a paid up
member of psychologists of the HPCSA.
[14]
She testified that it was in February 2007 when she first saw
patients employed by the defendant at her practice in
Pietermaritzburg.
They had been referred to her by doctors employed
by the defendant being Dr P E Erasmus and Dr Do Vale. Her fees were
paid for
by the defendant’s accounts department at its Cato
Ridge offices. This was until the end of August 2008 as at the
beginning
of August 2008, she was informed that with effect from the
end of August 2008 the defendant would no longer be paying her
accounts.
[15]
Thereafter she received a letter from the defendant which indicated
that they were unhappy with her diagnosis of Manganese
poisoning.
Prior to this letter and for as long as she had treated the patients
no complaints were raised with her. She had never
met or spoken to Mr
Broekman
[1]
either before or after the letter was sent. On receipt of the
complaint she responded to same and was assisted by a legal
practitioner.
Her response is annexed to the papers. Following this,
her counsel forwarded her a copy of the letter indicating that the
complaint
proceedings had terminated and she accepted at the time
that the complaint was found to be without merit by the HPCSA. She
testified
that even though she is not a South African citizen, she is
resident in Pietermaritzburg and has regarded it as her permanent
home
since 1970. She has held permanent residence in South Africa
since then.
[16]
She testified that the effects of the complaint were felt by her
personally, professionally and psychologically. As such, she
spoke to
a psychiatrist, Dr Grobler, and subsequently a clinical psychologist
based in Pietermaritzburg who helped her deal with
the issue. When
the complaint was lodged, she heard rumours of unethical conduct
doing the rounds amongst practitioners in Pietermaritzburg.
The
number of referrals diminished as well as her finances. She found the
whole situation very unpleasant.
[17]
The plaintiff testified that she was also financially affected. Her
income decreased as the number of referrals and patients
diminished.
She still had to maintain her expenses including her legal expenses,
expenses in respect of the maintenance of her
child, her home and
business expenses, as well as support her two elderly parents.
Because work practically dried up, she procured
work overseas and
incurred additional expenses.
[18]
During cross-examination she testified that she assumed that because
Mr Broekman sometimes came to the Cato Ridge Works of
the defendant
he was based there. She could not dispute any evidence that the
registered office of the defendant and principle
place of business
were in Johannesburg and similarly that Mr Broekman was based
Johannesburg.
[19]
She could also not dispute that the complaint had been prepared in
Johannesburg by Mr Broekman and his legal advisors. She
confirmed
that the complaint was sent from the HPCSA to her from their Arcadia
offices and that they are based there. She acknowledged
that as at 29
September 2008 and when she sent the subsequent letter on 26 November
2008 she considered it a ‘malicious’
complaint.
The complaint served before the committee of preliminary enquiry
before the HSPCA and the plaintiff was summoned on 30 October
2009 to
appear before the HSPCA. She learnt that on that date the HPCSA had
resolved the complaint as a decision was taken that
she had acted
within the scope of her practice and it would not be taking any
further steps.
[20] She was aware that Prof Olanow, a
movement disorder specialist, was based in Hillcrest and that Mr
Broekman was based in Cato
Ridge and that the labour hearings and
enquiry into Manganese poisoning of the defendant’s employees
all occurred within
the Cato Ridge area. She also assumed that
because Mr Broekman often attended at the Cato Ridge Works he was the
CEO stationed
at Cato Ridge.
Evidence of the defendant
[21]
The defendant led the evidence of Bryan Robert Broekman. He is no
longer in the full time employment of the defendant but is
employed
by them as a consultant. He was employed by African Rainbow Minerals
and was an executive director of the defendant from
2002 to 2009. He
had been seconded from African Rainbow Minerals to the Michael Grow
Works and Cato Ridge Works from 1996 to 2000.
He testified that
between 2008 and 2012 he was based in Johannesburg at the defendant’s
head office which is situate at Chislehurston,
Sandton. This is also
where the board of directors and the sub-committee, being the
operations committee which consists of four
executive directors is
based. He is an executive director of the operations committee which
is based in Johannesburg.
[22]
He confirmed that he, together with his legal advisor Willem Le Roux,
and another attorney Paul Anderson, prepared the complaint
against
the plaintiff in Johannesburg. At the time they were all in Sandton.
The complaint was reviewed by the sub-committee of
the board of
directors of the defendant and was approved by them before it was
forwarded to the HPCSA. He presently lives and works
in Johannesburg
and has done so for approximately twenty eight (28) years. From 2000
he was permanently based in Sandton at the
Chislehurston offices but
was seconded for certain periods of time such as in the 1980s when he
was seconded to the Northern Cape
and between 1996 and 2000 when he
was seconded to the Cato Ridge Works.
[23]
During cross–examination he confirmed that he drafted the
letter of 18 February 2008 which was addressed to the plaintiff.
He
confirmed that problems were experienced at the plant at Cato Ridge
Works which surfaced in approximately 2005/2006 in relation
to
Manganese poisoning. The defendant facilitated treatment of people
who displayed symptoms of Manganese poisoning and these employees
were assessed by practitioners in Pietermaritzburg, Durban and Cato
Ridge. The Cato Ridge Works employed two doctors, namely Drs
Erasmus
and Do Vale who referred the employees to the plaintiff. He confirmed
that the defendant paid the plaintiff’s fees
for services which
she rendered as a psychologist. The choice of psychologist was made
by Drs Erasmus and Do Vale and the defendant
acquiesced to such
decision. Even though the board sat in Johannesburg, he confirmed
that at times he would visit the Cato Ridge
Works for operational
reasons. The senior general manager of Cato Ridge Works reported to
him and he was appointed as CEO of the
Cato Ridge Works.
[24]
Mr Broekman confirmed that he was fully responsible for health and
safety issues at the Cato Ridge Works but that these responsibilities
were delegated to the general manager.
[25]
He colloquially stated that ‘the buck stopped with me’
and that he bore the ultimate responsibility. In February
and
November 2008 he went down to the Cato Ridge Works while the labour
hearings were proceeding. He personally attended the hearings
as he
was the main witness for the defendant and his task was to draft a
letter
[2]
to the plaintiff in relation to the problems experienced. The factual
input insofar as the letter was concerned was given by him
but he
also relied on information received from people at the Cato Ridge
Works. This information was collated by him.
Issues
for adjudication
[26]
As alluded to earlier, the specific issues for determination are only
in respect of the special pleas raised by the defendant,
being that
of jurisdiction and prescription.
[27] In order to determine such
issues, the court was requested to consider the formulation of the
plaintiff’s claim in juxtaposition
with the documents in the
Trial Bundles entered into the record as exhibits ‘A’ and
‘B’ respectively.
Submissions
[28]
As already indicated, the crux of the issues in this matter is the
formulation of the plaintiff’s claim.
[29]
Mr Hartzenburg for the plaintiff submitted in argument that the
plaintiff’s claim is a delictual one for the recovery
of
compensation for loss and damage suffered by her as a consequence of
the infringement of her personality rights. The claim is
for
contumelia
and loss of income and consequently, as a permanent resident of South
Africa she is entitled to institute such claim.
[30]
He submitted that the effects of the complaints were felt by the
plaintiff in Pietermaritzburg as the dispute originated at
the Cato
Ridge Works, the referrals were done at the Cato Ridge Works and she
was further paid at Cato Ridge. Relying on the decision
in
Thomas
v BMW South Africa (Pty) Ltd
1996
(2) SA 106
(C), it was submitted that considerations of convenience
dictated that this court has jurisdiction.
[31]
Insofar as the issue of prescription is concerned, Mr Hartzenburg
submitted that the plaintiff’s claim would only accrue
once she
became aware of the decision of the HPCSA not to proceed. This
occurred in November 2009 and consequently that is when
prescription
started to run. The complaint filed by the defendant constituted
continuous proceedings and only when the HPCSA made
a final decision
not to continue with such proceedings is when the plaintiff’s
right would accrue. He placed reliance on
the decision in
Unilever
Bestfoods Robertsons (Pty) Ltd & others v Soomar & another
2007
(2) SA 347
(SCA) wherein Farlam JA remarked
obiter
that because a complaint had the potential to develop into a criminal
complaint, she would have had to wait for the finalisation
of these
proceedings before instituting her claim.
[32]
Mr Bothma for the defendant submitted however that the plaintiff’s
claim had prescribed and accepted that the onus was
on the defendant
to prove this. If one considers the fact that the claim is based on
malicious prosecution, then the minute the
plaintiff received the
complaint, the
injuria
was finalised, and in terms of the principle in
Truter
& another v Deysel
[2006] ZASCA 16
;
2006
(4) SA 168
, the claim would therefore have arisen during or about
July 2008. That is when her claim would accrue and when prescription
would
start to run.
[33] He submitted that support for
this submission is to be found in the
Unilever
decision and
also in the case of
Gregory v Portsmouth City Council
[2000] UKHL 3
;
[2000] 1
AC 419
heard in the House of Lords. He disputed that this case is one
of malicious prosecution and consequently, if one accepts the
principal
place of business of the defendant being in Johannesburg,
it is only the Johannesburg court that would have jurisdiction.
Analysis
[34] The jurisdiction of the High
Court is governed by the provisions of s 19 of the Supreme Court Act
(as it was then known). Section
19(1)
(a)
reads as follows:-
‘
Persons
over whom and matters in relation to which provincial and local
divisions have jurisdiction
(1)
(a)
A provincial or local division shall have jurisdiction over all
persons residing or being in and in relation to all causes arising
and all offences triable within its area of jurisdiction and all
other matters of which it may according to law take cognizance,
and
shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (2), in addition to
any powers or jurisdiction which may be vested in it by
law, have
power. . . .’
[3]
[35]
Of relevance is the phraseology ‘causes arising’ and
whether the plaintiff’s cause of action did in fact
arise
within the jurisdiction of this court.
[36]
The
locus
of a delict for jurisdiction purposes (
ratio
delicti
)
must be determined with reference to the materiality and the number
of ingredients thereof which have occurred in the court’s
area
of jurisdiction.
[37]
It is not necessary that all elements of a delict must have occurred
in a court’s area of jurisdiction for it to be able
to assume
jurisdiction (see
Thomas
v BMW South Africa
above
at 125G–H).
[38] In
Cordiant Trading CC v
Daimler Chrysler Financial Services (Pty) Ltd
2005 (6) SA 205
(SCA) para 11, Jafta JA stated as follows:-
‘
Plainly,
what is meant in the above interpretation is that “causes
arising” does not refer to causes of action but to
all factors
giving rise to jurisdiction under the common law.’
[39]
An analysis of the pleadings, and in particular the plaintiff’s
particulars of claim, reveals that the dispute arose
as a direct
consequence from the engagement of the plaintiff by the defendant to
render professional services to the defendant’s
employees based
at Cato Ridge within the jurisdiction of this court.
[40]
The subsequent complaint by the defendant to the HPCSA emanated from
the dissatisfaction of the defendant in regards to such
services
rendered by the plaintiff. It is clear that the thrust of the
complaint is premised on the services rendered by the plaintiff
and
it axiomatically follows that such complaint would not have emanated
had the plaintiff not been engaged to render services
to the
defendant.
[41]
The fact that the complaint submitted by the defendant to the HPCSA
was prepared in Gauteng and lodged with the HPCSA’s
offices
based in Pretoria, outside the territorial jurisdiction of this
court, does not detract from the fact that such complaint
was
premised on the alleged dissatisfaction with the plaintiff’s
services, which services it is common cause was rendered
at Cato
Ridge.
[42]
A common sense approach dictates that the parochial jurisdiction of
this court cannot be excluded in such circumstances. Further,
I align
myself with the submissions by Mr Hartzenburg that the dictates of
convenience coupled with the fact that the underlying
circumstances
emanated from the defendant’s Cato Ridge Works, lends support
to a finding that this court does in fact have
jurisdiction.
[43] In the circumstances it is not
necessary to consider as to whether the defendant resides within the
jurisdiction of this court
and in particular, whether the defendant’s
registered office and principal place of business is situate within
the jurisdiction
of this court.
Prescription
[44]
The defendant’s contention that the plaintiff’s claim has
prescribed is premised on its submission that the plaintiff’s
claim is based on the
actio
iniuriarum
and
is accordingly subject to a prescriptive period of three years from
the date the plaintiff had knowledge of all the facts from
which the
debt arose, which it alleges as being 30 June 2008, the date when the
complaint was lodged with the HPCSA.
[45]
The plaintiff counters such argument on the basis that her cause of
action is based upon both the
actio
iniuriarum
and
the
actio
legis aquiliae
and/or malicious prosecution.
[46]
An analysis of the plaintiff’s particulars of claim as set out
above reveals the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s
alleged wrongful and malicious conduct when laying the charges with
the HPCSA.
[47] The requirements for malicious
prosecution have been articulated in various authorities as follows:-
[47.1] that the defendant set the law
in motion, that it instigated or instituted the proceedings;
[47.2] that the
defendant acted without reasonable and probable cause;
[47.3] that the
defendant acted with malice or
animo
iniuriandi;
[47.4] that the
prosecution has failed; and
[47.5] that the
plaintiff suffered damages.
(
See
Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development v Moleko
[2008]
3 All SA 47
(SCA)).
[48]
If an unfounded complaint is laid with a quasi-judicial body such as
a professional disciplinary body against a professional
person
registered with such a body, the communication will be ‘privileged’,
unless such person can show that the complainant
acted with an
improper motive such as ill-will, spite or malice. (See J Neethling,
J M Potgieter & P J Visser
Law
of Delict
4 ed (2001) at 338 – 350).
[49]
Accordingly the sustainability of the plaintiff’s action as
pleaded is dependent upon the plaintiff proving that the
defendant’s
action was motivated with malicious or improper intent. (See
Michael
& another v Linksfield Park Clinic (Pty) Ltd & another
2001
(3) SA 1188
(SCA)).
[50]
It is neither relevant nor germane to the enquiry before this court
to make any finding or comment on whether the plaintiff
will in fact
be able to successfully discharge the onus of proving that the
defendant acted with malice or improper motive. It
is further
instructive to note that no challenge or exception has been taken by
the defendant in regards to the sustainability
of the plaintiff’s
cause of action.
[51]
The plaintiff has clearly pleaded a case premised on malicious
prosecution and in such circumstances the prescriptive period
would
commence to run once the plaintiff was notified by the HPCSA on 30
October 2009 that no further action would be taken against
her.
[52]
A cause of action for the purpose of prescription has been defined as
‘every fact which it would be necessary for the
plaintiff to
prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of
the Court. It does not comprise every piece
of evidence which is
necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be
proved.’ (See
Truter
v Deysel
above
para 19).
[53]
It accordingly follows in my view that the plaintiff obtained
knowledge of all the essential facts, specifically that the HPCSA
had
resolved not to pursue any further action on 30 October 2009, from
which date the prescriptive period of three years would
commence.
[54] The plaintiff’s summons
commencing action was instituted within the three year period in
terms of
s 12(1)
of the
Prescription Act. I
accordingly find that the
plaintiff’s claim in these circumstances has not prescribed.
Costs
[55]
The issue of costs falls within the discretion of the court. The
general rule is that the successful party is entitled to his/her
costs. There are however exceptions to this rule and ultimately same
is dependent on the facts of a matter and falls within the
discretion
of the presiding officer.
[56] I can find no reason, why I
should deviate from the general principle that costs should follow
the result.
Order
[57]
In the result I grant the following order:-
1.
The
defendant’s special plea of jurisdiction is dismissed;
2 The defendant’s
special plea of prescription is dismissed;
3 The defendant is ordered to pay the
costs associated with the hearing of the special pleas, such costs to
include the costs associated
with the application in terms
Rule
33(4).
_______________________
HENRIQUES
J
Case
Information
Date
of Trial: 19 November 2014
Date of Judgment: 8 February 2018
Appearances:
Counsel
for the Plaintiff: C.J. Hartzenberg SC
Instructed by: Linda Payne Attorneys
Block
A, Hilltops Office Park
73
Villiers Drive
Pietermaritzburg
Tel:
033 342 3707
Ref:
L/H003/2012
Counsel
for the Defendant: H.C. Bothma
Instructed by: ENS
150
West Street
Sandton
Ref.MsK
Simpson.Mokoena/0343076
Email:
ksimpson@ensafrica.com
c/o
Shepstone and Wylie
Suite
2, The Crest Redlands Estate
1
George MacFarlane Lane
Wembley,
Pmbg
Tel:
033 355 1780
Ref:
J Finger
[1]
Bryan Robert
Broekman had been seconded to Cato Ridge Works from 1996 to 2000. He
was based in Johannesburg but he was the CEO
of the Cato Ridge
Works. He was responsible for health and safety issues at the Cato
Ridge Works and the general manager of Cato
Ridge Works reported to
him even though he was based in Johannesburg.
[2]
Exhibit A, pages 8 to 10 - the letter
addresses the diagnosis of manganism in respect of one of ten
patients treated by the plaintiff,
Mr B Anderson, the plaintiff’s
letter of 15 January 2008 and certain medical reports completed by
the plaintiff in which
she diagnoses manganism amongst employees at
the Cato Ridge Works.
[3]
Jursidiction is now dealt with in
section 21
of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
as of 23 August
2013.The provisions of
s 21
have remained more or less the same as
those of the repealed Supreme Court Act. The cause of action arose
when the old act was
still in effect and was still in place when the
summons commencing action was issued in 2012.