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[2018] ZAKZPHC 49
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Afrisun KZN (Pty) Ltd t/a Sibaya Casino and Entertainment Kingdom v KwaZulu-Natal Gaming and Betting Board and Others (14370/2017P) [2018] ZAKZPHC 49 (5 October 2018)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL
DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG
Not
Reportable
Case No: 14370/2017P
In the
matter between:
AFRISUN
KZN (PTY) LTD t/a SIBAYA CASINO
AND
ENTERTAINMENT KINGDOM
APPLICANT
and
KWAZULU-NATAL
GAMING
AND
BETTING BOARD
1
ST
RESPONDENT
VARIOUS
APPLICANTS FOR LICENCES/
AUTHORISATIONS TO OPERATE
ELECTRONIC
BINGO TERMINALS
2
ND
& 3
RD
RESPONDENTS
ORDER
1.
The application to file a supplementary founding affidavit is
dismissed with costs, including
those consequent upon the employment
of two counsel where this was done.
2.
The main application is dismissed with costs, including those
consequent upon the employment
of two counsel where this was done.
3.
No costs shall be recoverable in respect of the authorities which any
party sought to provide
to the court.
JUDGMENT
Delivered
on: 5 October 2018
Gorven J
[1]
This application concerns the gambling game of
bingo. An entity offering this game has required a licence. The
licensing was governed
by the KwaZulu-Natal Gambling Act 10 of 1996
and its successor, the KwaZulu-Natal Gaming and Betting Act 8 of 2010
(the Act). Initially,
this game was played making use of physical
cards (paper bingo). At a certain point, what are referred to as
electronic bingo terminals
(EBTs) were introduced. This proved to be
fertile contested terrain. It has spawned a great deal of litigation
since at least 2006.
In October 2017, the Act was amended to deal
expressly with EBTs. Among other things, the definition of ‘bingo’
was
amended to include:
‘a
game, whether played in whole or in part by electronic means or
otherwise-
(a)
for
consideration, using cards or other devices, including devices that
depict cards . . .’.
This
brought about disputes concerning permissions required to use EBTs.
Those disputes spawned this application. It should be said
at the
outset that much of what purports to be evidence in the affidavits is
legal argument. The papers are unnecessarily prolix,
exceeding 1 200
pages.
[2]
The parties who have entered the lists in this
application shall be referred to as follows. The applicant shall be
referred to as
Sibaya and the first respondent as the Board. Two
other entities, not specifically joined or named in the application,
have become
involved. The first is Vitubyte (Pty) Ltd, which trades
as Goldrush Bingo and Entertainment Malvern, which shall be referred
to
as Goldrush. The other is Galaxy Bingo KZN (Pty) Ltd, which shall
be referred to as Galaxy. How this came about is that Sibaya did
not
cite and join entities using, or wishing to use, EBTs. It was
considered sufficient to informally serve the application on
the
attorneys of those entities which had previously been involved in
litigation concerning EBTs. As will be seen below, entities
other
than Galaxy and Goldrush are using, or wishing to use, EBTs.
[3]
The application was launched on 19 December 2017
and set down as a matter of urgency on 21 December 2017. The relief
sought
was in two parts:
‘FIRST
ORDER PRAYED
1.
That the rules and forms relating to service and time limits are
hereby dispensed
with in terms of Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of
Court and that this application be heard as a matter of urgency.
2.
That a rule
nisi
do issue calling upon the Respondents to show
cause, if any, on the day of
2018 at 09h30, or so soon thereafter as Counsel may be heard, why an
Order in the following terms should not be made:
2.1
That the First Respondent is interdicted and restrained from:
2.1.1
Granting any licences or authorisations to use, operate or make
electronic bingo terminals available for
play in any bingo hall in
the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, arising from applications it has
received and which are referred to in
its letter dated 14 December
2017 . . . and any further applications that may be submitted
thereafter, until it has:
2.1.1.1
advertised the applications in the Provincial Gazette and in at least
two newspapers circulating in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal;
2.1.1.2
made the applications available for public inspection;
2.1.1.3
afforded interested parties the opportunity to make representations
in regard to the applications;
2.1.1.4
held a public hearing into the applications;
2.1.1.5
made a decision after considering the representations made by
interested parties;
pending
the final determination of this application for the relief in the
second order prayed of the Notice of Motion.
2.2
That the First Respondent disclose the identities of the applicants
that have made the applications
it has received and which are
referred to in its letter dated 14 December 2017 referred to above,
and the identities of the applicants
in further applications that may
have been submitted thereafter, together with their addresses and
contact details, within five
days of service of this Order;
2.3
That the First Respondent shall pay the costs of the application for
the First Order Prayed,
save in the event that any other Respondents
oppose such relief that the costs shall be payable by the Respondents
jointly and
severally the one paying the other(s) to be absolved,
such costs to include the costs consequent upon the employment of two
counsel.
3.
That the Order in 2.1 above shall operate as an interim interdict
with immediate
effect.
4.
Further or alternative relief.
SECOND
ORDER PRAYED
5.
It is declared that the First Respondent is obliged in terms of the
KwaZulu-Natal
Gaming and Betting Act 8 of 2010 (“the KZN Act”)
as well as the Regulations promulgated in terms thereof, and/or the
agreement concluded in June 2012 between inter alia the Applicant and
the erstwhile Gambling Board . . . and/or
section 4
of the
Promotion
of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000
, before granting any licences
or authorisations to use, operate or make electronic bingo terminals
available for play in any bingo
hall in the Province of
KwaZulu-Natal, arising from applications it has received and which
are referred to in its letter dated
14 December 2017 . . . and any
further applications that may have been submitted thereafter, to –
5.1
advertise the applications in the Provincial Gazette and in at least
two newspapers circulating
in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal;
5.2
make the applications available for public inspection;
5.3
afford interested parties the opportunity to make representations in
regard to the applications;
5.4
hold a public hearing into the applications;
5.5
make a decision after considering the representations made by
interested parties.
6.
That the First Respondent is directed to:
6.1
ensure that proper notice is published to inform interested parties
of the above applications,
in the Provincial Gazette and in at least
two newspapers circulating in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal;
6.2
make the above applications available for public inspection and to
inform interested parties
including the Applicant of the period when
and the place where the applications will lie open for inspection;
6.3
inform interested parties including the Applicant, of the opportunity
that is afforded to
them to make representations in regard to the
applications;
6.4
inform interested parties including the Applicant of the dates of the
public hearings relating
to the above applications;
6.5
make its decision in each of the applications, only after it has
considered the representations
made by interested parties including
the Applicant;
6.6
inform the Applicant of its decisions in each application, once it
has made its decisions,
forthwith, and also simultaneously provide
its reasons for its decisions.
7.
It is declared that the First Respondent is obliged to require all
applications
for the use of electronic bingo terminals to be
submitted for consideration in terms of the process described in this
Order, before
any prospective or existing licence holder is permitted
to make use of electronic bingo terminals at any location in
KwaZulu-Natal.
8.
That the First Respondent shall pay the costs of the application for
the Second
Order Prayed, save in the event that any of the other
Respondents oppose such relief, in which event the costs shall be
payable
by the Respondents jointly and severally the one paying the
other(s) to be absolved, such costs to include the costs consequent
upon the employment of two counsel.
9.
Further or alternative relief.’
[4]
Goldrush and Galaxy deposed to answering
affidavits on 20 December 2017 and the Board to one on
21 December 2017.
These were, perforce, deposed to as a
matter of urgency. They did not purport to be complete answers to the
founding papers. On
21 December 2017, Chetty J struck the
application from the roll to allow the respondents to deliver further
answering
affidavits. He found that the application was not so urgent
as to warrant being heard on such short notice. At that point, Sibaya
had the option of invoking practice rule 9.1 which provides:
‘If
the applicant wishes to seek interim relief pending the opposed
hearing, and the matter cannot be accommodated or placed
. . . on the
ordinary motion court roll, representations shall be made to the
senior civil judge on duty to give the necessary
directions for an
urgent hearing.’
Sibaya
did not do so. The matter was only set down again once all of the
affidavits had been delivered.
[5]
The last of the supplementary answering
affidavits was delivered on 2 February 2018. Sibaya
delivered its replying affidavit
on 16 March 2018. It was
obliged under the rules to do so by 14 or 15 February 2018. I mention
this because, at the hearing,
it was submitted on Sibaya’s
behalf that the matter remains urgent. I shall deal with this in due
course. The replying affidavit
ran to 177 pages, with an additional
349 pages of annexures. Galaxy has applied to strike out certain
paragraphs in the replying
affidavit on the basis that much of it was
hearsay. It was submitted that the deponent had made it clear that
she did not bear
personal knowledge of the subject matter. In the
view I take of the matter, it is not necessary to decide this issue.
[6]
On 15 August 2018, Sibaya brought an
interlocutory application for leave to file a supplementary founding
affidavit (the
new affidavit). Apart from costs, this was the sole
relief claimed in the notice of application. The proposed new
affidavit was
annexed. The new affidavit sought to inform the court
that, after the matter was struck from the roll, the Board had gone
ahead
and authorised the installation and use of EBTs. In support,
Sibaya annexed a letter from the attorneys for the Board dated
13 April 2018
detailing various decisions concerning EBTs
that had been made. Sibaya complained that this had been done while
the application
was pending. In argument, however, counsel conceded
that unless interdicted from doing so, the Board was obliged to
attend to all
matters within its remit.
[7]
In the new affidavit, Sibaya said that a separate
application would be launched to review and set aside the decision or
decisions
in question. No amendment to the relief set out in the
notice of motion (the original relief) was foreshadowed in the
affidavit.
No amended relief was sought in the notice of application
to introduce the new affidavit. In particular, Sibaya did not
indicate
that it would seek to impugn any of those decisions in the
present application. It set down the interlocutory application to be
heard with the main application on 14 September 2018.
[8]
On 30 August 2018, Sibaya delivered
heads of argument running to almost 100 pages. These dealt with the
original relief.
The other three parties delivered heads of argument
on 4 September 2018. These, likewise, dealt with the
original relief.
This was, of course, the only relief being sought at
this stage. On 7 September 2018, Sibaya delivered a
document styled
‘Revised draft order that will be sought on
14 September 2018’ (the 7 September document). The
order sought
is:
‘1.
That the rules and forms relating to service and time limits are
hereby dispensed
with in terms of Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of
Court and that this application be heard as a matter of urgency.
2.
It is declared that the decision of the KwaZulu-Natal Gaming and
Betting Board
(“the Board”) of 8 March 2018 to renew the
bingo licences with new conditions that removed the conditions that
restricted
the licences to only engage in paper bingo and excluded
the use of electronic bingo terminals, and the decisions to grant the
applications
for operational approvals for the use of electronic
bingo terminals, as reflected in the letter 13 April 2018 . . . are
invalid,
due to the Board’s failure to follow a fair process
before making such decisions.
3.
Whether the decisions ought to be set aside and what further
consequential relief
ought to be granted arising from this Order, are
reserved for determination in the review application to be instituted
by the applicant.
4.
Any outstanding applications for operational approvals by any bingo
licensees
as at the date hereof, are hereby stayed pending the
outcome of the review application.
5.
The applicant is directed to institute such application within 15
days of this
Order if it has not done so as at the date hereof.
6.
That the First Respondent together with Vitubyte (Pty) Ltd and Galaxy
Bingo KwaZulu-Natal
(Pty) Ltd shall jointly and severally pay the
costs of the application, the one paying the others to be absolved,
such costs to
include the costs consequent upon the employment of
three counsel where employed, and otherwise of two counsel.
7.
Alternatively to paragraphs 2 to 6 hereof, an order as follows.
8.
It is declared that the decision of the KwaZulu-Natal Gaming and
Betting Board
(“the Board”) of 8 March 2018 to renew the
bingo licence of Vitubyte (Pty) Ltd t/a Goldrush Bingo and
Entertainment
Malvern, with new conditions that remove the conditions
that restricted the licence to only engage in paper bingo and
excluded
the use of electronic bingo terminals, and the decisions to
grant the applications for operational approvals made by Vitubyte
(Pty)
Ltd for the amendment of internal control systems, amendment of
the approved floor and surveillance system plans, the transport
of
gaming equipment, and the certification of installation of electronic
bingo terminals, as reflected in the letter dated 13 April
2018
. . . are invalid, due to the Board’s failure to follow a fair
process before making such decisions.
9.
Whether the decisions ought to be set aside and what further
consequential relief
ought to be granted arising from this Order, are
reserved for determination in the review application to be instituted
by the applicant.
10.
The applicant is directed to institute such application within 15
days of this Order if
it has not done so as at the date hereof.
11.
That the First Respondent together with Vitubyte (Pty) Ltd shall
jointly and severally pay
the costs of the application, the one
paying the others to be absolved, such costs to include the costs
consequent upon the employment
of three counsel where employed, and
otherwise of two counsel.
12.
That no order for costs is made as regards the involvement of Galaxy
Bingo KwaZulu-Natal
(Pty) Ltd in this matter.
13.
Further or alternative relief.’
[9]
The first issue to decide is whether to admit the
new affidavit. On the basis that it was delivered purely to provide
information,
the Board did not object to its introduction. It
delivered an answering affidavit in anticipation of the new affidavit
being admitted.
Goldrush responded in similar fashion.
[10]
Galaxy opposed its introduction on two bases.
First, that the new affidavit was irrelevant to the relief sought.
The original relief
concerned the procedure which Sibaya contended
the Board should follow. This contrasted with the new affidavit which
stated what
procedure Sibaya said had been followed. Secondly, that
Galaxy would be prejudiced if the affidavit was introduced. This is
because
Galaxy had not previously seen the Board’s letter of
13 April 2018 or the other annexures of the new affidavit.
The new affidavit alleged a basis to review the decisions mentioned.
Galaxy had not been involved in these decisions. It had not
had the
opportunity to research the facts referred to in the new affidavit or
obtain relevant documents and could thus not respond
to them. Sibaya
had not tendered a postponement of the main application if the court
admitted the new affidavit. If the new affidavit
was admitted, the
averments contained in it would stand unchallenged.
[11]
Over time, various tests have been posited for
the introduction of affidavits additional to those allowed as of
right. It has been
recognised that this is not simply for the asking.
However, the test or approach is not capable of being reduced to a
finite list
with boxes to be ticked. Each case depends on its own
facts. It is trite that the court has a discretion whether or not to
do so.
That discretion must be exercised judicially. The most
reliable guiding principle in exercising that discretion is fairness
to
all parties.
[1]
[12]
As to the first ground of objection raised by
Galaxy, the new affidavit is termed a supplementary founding
affidavit. Such an affidavit
ordinarily serves to supplement the
cause of action advanced in the notice of motion. New evidence is
adduced in support of the
relief already claimed or in support of
amended relief. In the present matter, the new affidavit sets out
steps which the Board
has taken since the launch of the application.
These have no bearing on the original relief. The original relief
reflects what
Sibaya says the Board is obliged to do when granting
permissions to operate EBTs. As such, the new affidavit does not
relate to,
or advance, the original relief. No amended relief was
sought in the interlocutory application. This has the inevitable
result
that, at the time the interlocutory application was launched,
the new affidavit was irrelevant to the relief sought. Galaxy’s
first ground of objection was therefore well founded.
[13]
As to the second ground, Galaxy complained that
it would not have the opportunity to put up an answer if the new
affidavit was admitted.
This presentiment was confirmed at the
hearing. Sibaya contended that, if the new affidavit was admitted,
the court should decide
the matter without affording Galaxy the
opportunity to put up an answering affidavit. Sibaya claimed that
Galaxy had had sufficient
time to answer. Unlike the Board and
Goldrush, it had not availed itself of this opportunity. The
submission was that Galaxy should
have followed suit in case the new
affidavit was admitted.
[14]
This is a most extraordinary position to adopt.
Sibaya was out of time in delivering its replying affidavit. It
became aware of
the decisions mentioned in the new affidavit when it
received the letter dated 13 April 2018 on 15 April 2018.
Despite
this, Sibaya waited until 15 August 2018, a period
of four months, before launching the interlocutory application. The
interlocutory application was set down on the same date as the main
application. No attempt was made to have it decided in time
to allow
the delivery of further affidavits, even with abridged time limits.
The new affidavit did not seek to make out a case
that it be
introduced as a matter of urgency. It did not seek to abridge the
usual time limits for delivering answering affidavits.
The notice of
motion for its admission did not request an order dispensing with the
usual time limits.
[2]
Nor did
the new affidavit or the notice of the interlocutory application even
purport to place the other parties on terms to put
up answering
affidavits by a specific date.
[15]
Unless and until the new affidavit is admitted,
it does not form part of the papers. Before that, there is no
obligation on any
other party to answer it. Once admitted, if other
parties have not delivered answering affidavits in anticipation, they
would ordinarily
be entitled to an adjournment to do so. But the
basis on which Sibaya sought the introduction of the new affidavit
was that Galaxy
should not be afforded this opportunity. It
made no attempt to justify this procedure in the circumstances of the
matter.
That Sibaya did so on that basis, militates against the
admission of the new affidavit. To admit the new affidavit would
offend
the
audi alteram partem
principle which is fundamental to the rule of law.
[16]
In the document delivered on 7 September 2018,
the original relief was abandoned. This is presumably because events
have overtaken
that application. In response to my enquiry during his
initial argument, counsel for Sibaya confirmed that Sibaya was no
longer
seeking the original relief. He indicated that only the new
relief was being sought. The new relief relates to decisions taken
subsequent to the launch of the application. A decision is said to
have been made on 8 March 2018. The only basis for
the new
relief arises in the new affidavit. This relies on a statement in the
letter of 13 April 2018 from the Board’s attorneys
to the
following effect:
‘As
the nature of the decisions did not mean the increase in approved
gaming positions of the said licensees, neither the
KZN Act nor the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000
required any form
of public participation. As such, our client did not publish the said
applications.’
It
is on the basis that no public participation process took place that
Sibaya seeks to have the decisions in question declared
invalid. It
is also on this basis that Sibaya said that it would launch review
applications to set aside those decisions.
[17]
The attitude of both the Board and Goldrush to
the introduction of the new affidavit was premised on its simply
providing information.
As mentioned, the new affidavit did not seek
the new relief or any amendment of the original relief. However, when
the 7 September
document was delivered, the new affidavit took on a
different hue. It was then no longer only to be introduced to furnish
information.
It was to be relied upon to found the new relief. In
their provisional affidavits answering the new affidavit, the Board
and Goldrush
had both indicated that they would oppose any review
applications launched by Sibaya. As a result of the change in the use
of the
new affidavit, they both withdrew their consent to its
admission during argument. It seems to me that they were perfectly
justified
in doing so in the light of the history of this litigation.
[18]
The new affidavit says that the decision of 8
March 2018 is invalid. It seeks to impugn other decisions of the
Board mentioned in
the 13 April 2018 letter. These include
the following. First, the approval, on 26 March 2018 and
9 April 2018
respectively, of applications for amendments
of what are termed ICS by Goldrush and Galaxy Bingo Amanzimtoti (Pty)
Ltd respectively.
Secondly, the approval, on 23 and 29 March 2018
respectively, of applications in terms of
Rules 20.1
and
24.1
promulgated under the Act for amendment of system floor plans by
Poppy Ice Trading 18 (Pty) Ltd (Poppy Ice) and Goldrush. Thirdly,
the
authorisations in respect of transportation of gaming equipment
granted, on 14 and 15 March 2018 respectively, to Goldrush,
Poppy Ice
and Galaxy Bingo Amanzimtoti (Pty) Ltd. Finally, the certification of
installations of EBTs, on 29 March 2018 and 5 April
2018
respectively, granted to Goldrush and Poppy Ice.
[19]
Other than Goldrush, none of the entities
receiving the various permissions has participated in the
application. The point of non-joinder
was taken in respect of the
main application. The response of Sibaya was twofold. It said it had
informally notified attorneys
who have been acting for these entities
in other litigation and none of them had shown any interest in the
application. Secondly,
these entities fell under groups of companies
which included Galaxy and Goldrush and must be taken to be aware of
the application.
I do not consider it necessary to decide those
points. What cannot be gainsaid, however, is that none of the
entities in question
was given any kind of notice that the new relief
would be sought. None was given notice of the application to
introduce the new
affidavit. Sibaya says that it will apply to review
at least some of these decisions and set them aside. These entities
might then
be confronted with a review application where this court
has already declared that the permissions were invalid.
[20]
It seems to me that, in the circumstances, those
entities not before the court may be prejudiced by the introduction
of the new
affidavit.
[3]
For
declaratory relief to be competent, an affected party must ordinarily
be cited.
[4]
I do not need to,
nor do I, decide the point of non-joinder. The absence of notice to
those entities does, however, have a bearing
on the exercise of my
discretion. Another factor to be weighed is that Sibaya wanted the
matter to be dealt with without any adjournment.
[21]
I see no prejudice resulting to Sibaya if the new
affidavit is excluded. It intends to review the decisions of the
Board referred
to in the new affidavit. It says it will do so on the
basis set out in this application, viz. that a public participation
process
is required for each of the decisions. If it succeeds, this
will include a finding on what procedure is required by the relevant
legislative provisions. This will deal with the issues raised in the
original relief and the new relief. Clarity will be obtained
as to
how the Board must proceed in the future. All parties who are
affected will be joined and have their say. The record of the
decisions will be available, as will any other relevant documents.
[22]
I do not believe that admitting the new affidavit
would be fair to all parties in the light of all the factors set out
above. I
accordingly exercise my discretion against granting the
relief sought in the interlocutory application. The new affidavit is
not
admitted to form part of the papers.
[23]
In its material parts,
s 21(1)
(c)
of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
provides:
‘A
Division . . . has the power-
. . .
(c)
in its discretion, and at the instance of any interested person, to
enquire into and determine any existing, future
or contingent right
or obligation, notwithstanding that such person cannot claim any
relief consequential upon the determination.’
This
wording follows that of the old Supreme Court Act.
[5]
It is clear that, even if a case is made out for such a right or
obligation, the court is vested with a discretion whether or not
to
grant declaratory relief.
[24]
If the new affidavit is excluded, there is no
basis for granting any of the new relief. There are simply no facts
before the court
concerning the taking of any of the decisions sought
to be declared invalid. The new relief would at least require the
admission
of the new affidavit. Counsel for Sibaya accepted this to
be the position. However, in reply, he submitted that the original
relief
could nevertheless be granted. Based on the document of
7 September 2018 and the election of counsel for Sibaya at
the
outset, counsel for all the parties limited their argument on the
substantive issues to the new relief. In the circumstances,
accordingly,
it would be impermissible to allow Sibaya to resurrect
its prayer for the original relief when it had been indicated that it
was
no longer sought and no argument on it had been advanced.
[25]
It is therefore unnecessary to traverse the
contours of when declaratory relief is appropriate. The lack of any
factual foundation
means that the application must fail. All of the
parties made use of at least two counsel. The Board made use of
three. I do not
regard this as having been necessary. It follows,
accordingly, that the costs of two counsel should be allowed in the
order.
[26]
Before granting the order, I believe it to be
appropriate to make certain comments on the procedures followed in
this matter. As
I indicated, the papers ran to almost 1 200 pages.
Much of this was taken up by judgements and legislation being annexed
and with
legal argument as opposed to evidence. This was
inappropriate. It was all the more so in an application where all of
the parties
agreed that the issue was a legal one arising from the
interpretation of documents of one form or another. In addition,
Sibaya
and the Board sought to deliver photocopies of authorities
comprising in the main South African case law. These totalled nearly
1 800 pages. It was indicated that these would not be received. It
may be appropriate to make a copy available to the court where
specific foreign case law, which might not be readily accessible, is
referred to. It is clearly not appropriate to run up costs,
either to
a client or to other parties, by photocopying South African case law.
This practice is to be deplored and no such costs
will be recoverable
in the present matter. I trust that the legal personnel concerned
will not seek to recover those costs from
their clients but that is
not a matter on which I can pronounce.
[27]
In the result:
1.
The application to file a supplementary founding affidavit is
dismissed with costs, including
those consequent upon the employment
of two counsel where this was done.
2.
The main application is dismissed with costs, including those
consequent upon the employment
of two counsel where this was done.
3.
No costs shall be recoverable in respect of the authorities which any
party sought to provide
to the court.
Gorven J
Date
of Hearing:
14 September 2018
Date
of Judgment: 5
October 2018
Appearances
For
the Applicant:
N Singh SC, with him T Dalrymple
Instructed by Knowles Husain Lindsay Inc.
Locally represented by Cajee Setsubi Chetty Inc.
For the 1
st
Respondent: AE
Potgieter SC, with him K Gounden
and G Mamvura
Instructed by Venns Attorneys
For
Goldrush Malvern:
B Roux SC, with him M Smit
Instructed by Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Inc.
Locally represented by Ayoob Attorneys
For
Galaxy Bingo KZN:
M Pillemer SC, with him P Farlam SC
Instructed by Edward Nathan Sonnebergs
Locally represented by Mason Inc.
[1]
Milne, NO v Fabric House (Pty) Ltd
1957 (3) SA 63
(N) at 65A.
[2]
This is done if a case can be made out for requiring truncated time
limits. If the court agrees and a party has neglected to
comply with
the time limits set by the applicant, that party assumes the risk.
See
Republikeinse Publikasies (Edms) Bpk v Afrikaanse Pers
Publikasies (Edms) Bpk
1972
(1) SA 773
(A) 782C-D.
[3]
Morudi & others v NC Housing Services and Development Co
Limited & others
[2018] ZACC 32
para 29.
[4]
National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Intervalve (Pty)
Ltd & others
2015 (2) BCLR 182
(CC) paras 53 and 58.
[5]
Section 19(1)
(a)
(iii) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959.