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[2018] ZAKZPHC 40
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H.B.L v C.G.L (12178/2015) [2018] ZAKZPHC 40 (21 September 2018)
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL
DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG
Not
Reportable
Case
No: 12178/2015
In
the matter between:
HBL
PLAINTIFF
and
CGL
DEFENDANT
ORDER
1. A decree of divorce is
granted.
2. The plaintiff is
directed to pay maintenance to the defendant for a period of three
years from date of divorce or until her remarriage
or cohabitation,
whichever occurs first:
2.1 In the sum of R15 000
per month, escalating annually at the rate of increase of the
Consumer Price Index on the anniversary
of the date of divorce.
2.2 By payment of the
monthly premium required to retain the defendant on his medical aid
scheme.
2.3 By payment of the sum
of R272 per month towards the defendant’s cellphone.
3. The plaintiff is
directed to pay the defendant the sum of R85 000 in respect of
the loan from the defendant to the plaintiff,
along with interest
thereon at the legally applicable rate from date of service of the
claim in reconvention until date of payment.
4. The plaintiff is
directed to pay a sum of R50 000 towards the costs of suit of
the defendant. This is in addition to the
contribution to costs paid
pursuant to the initial Rule 43 application.
5. The plaintiff is
directed to pay the costs of the initial Rule 43 application.
JUDGMENT
Delivered on: 21
September 2018
Gorven
J
[1]
The parties both seek a divorce. There remain two
issues. The first is a maintenance claim by the defendant (the wife).
This claim
is for R29 570 per month until death or remarriage.
The amount should escalate annually. In addition she seeks to be
retained
on the husband’s medical aid scheme at his expense.
The second is a claim for repayment of an amount which she claims she
loaned the plaintiff (the husband). The amount is R136 900,
being an initial loan of R151 900 less R15 000 which
was
repaid. And costs of suit.
[2]
There is much common ground. The parties met in
1988. They married on 6 April 1996. The marriage was out of community
of property
with the application of the accrual system. No accrual
claim lies either way. Twin boys were born on […] February
1998.
I shall not name them. They both require support. The husband
undertakes this obligation. This will be needed for four to six
years.
One of them was born with a rare, serious, heart condition
which still requires ongoing management. The wife did not work during
the marriage apart from one or two part time periods which will be
mentioned later. The wife has just turned 50 and the husband
is 49.
[3]
Section 7(2)
of the Divorce Act
[1]
governs a
claim for maintenance. This reads:
‘
In the absence of an order made
in terms of subsection (1) with regard to the payment of maintenance
by the one party to the other,
the court may, having regard to the
existing or prospective means of each of the parties, their
respective earning capacities,
financial needs and obligations, the
age of each of the parties, the duration of the marriage, the
standard of living of the parties
prior to the divorce, their conduct
in so far as it may be relevant to the break-down of the marriage, an
order in terms of subsection
(3) and any other factor which in the
opinion of the court should be taken into account, make an order
which the court finds just
in respect of the payment of maintenance
by the one party to the other for any period until the death or
remarriage of the party
in whose favour the order is given, whichever
event may first occur.’
Subsection 7(1)
relates to agreements between the parties and thus does not apply.
Subsection 7(3) concerns an asset redistribution
order if the
accrual system does not apply. That, likewise, is not relevant here.
Section 7(2) confers a wide discretion on
a court.
[2]
While a ‘clean break’ from financial dealings between the
parties is desirable, it cannot always be achieved. In the
present
matter, the parties both have negligible assets far exceeded by their
liabilities. It is common ground that some form of
order for
maintenance is appropriate. The husband says that this should be for
a limited period. The wife says it should persist
until death or
remarriage.
[4]
In
Pienaar
v Thusano Foundation and another
,
[3]
Friedman JP said the following:
‘
In its plain, grammatical
meaning, “just” means
inter alia
correct,
appropriate, fair-minded, sound, deserved, fitting, reasonable,
justified and “equitable” means
inter
alia
even-handed, fair, honest, reasonable, right.’
This
was said in the context of insolvency proceedings. Satchwell J has
affirmed this approach in the context of s 7(2) of
the Divorce
Act.
[4]
I agree.
[5]
Although each party sought to cast aspersions on
the conduct of the other, no serious misconduct was proved. In the
heat of disagreements,
the parties both became angry and directed
unsavoury language at the other. For the most part, however, it seems
clear that they
attempted to work together as a family unit. It was
agreed that the wife would not take up employment once the boys were
born.
She would stay at home and care for them. For much of the
marriage she undertook all household tasks with limited assistance.
She
assisted the husband in his business of a supermarket and when he
managed a farm in Weenen. Her contribution to the marriage was
therefore considerable and must not be underestimated. At no stage
during the marriage did the husband request that she take up
employment.
[6]
The wife studied for a Basic Secretarial Course
with Computer and Word procession at the Vryheid Technical College in
1987. In 1988
she obtained N4 and N5 level qualifications in a
secretarial course at the Pietermaritzburg Technical College,
studying communication,
typing, audio typing and tourism and hotel
reception. In 1989 she studied at Maritzburg Business College in
basic principles of
public relations, business communication and
typing. She completed a course in the widely used Pastel accounting
software in 2005.
At the beginning of 2018 she began an eighteen
month qualification in Montessori pre-school education.
[7]
Between 1988 and 1998, when the boys were born,
the wife worked in an administrative position. After that, the
husband alone provided
for the family. At the time, he was working at
Electromatic Shurlok Alarms. They lived in Pietermaritzburg. When the
boys were
about 18 months old, the family moved to Umhlanga, where
they rented a home. The husband started a supermarket business at the
Arcadia Centre in Durban North. After a few months, they returned to
Pietermaritzburg where the husband opened a second supermarket
in
Alexandra Road. When the boys started at nursery school, during
mornings the wife assisted in the supermarket. She checked in
stock,
packed shelves, cashed up, did some administrative work and, if
necessary, worked on tills. After school, she cared for
the boys.
[8]
In 2005, the boys were enrolled for Grade 1 at
Clifton School in Nottingham Road. The wife obtained her Pastel
qualification that
year. She ferried them from and to
Pietermaritzburg for about 18 months. After this, the family moved to
Rosetta, nearby the school.
During this period, the wife occasionally
had paid help with the household tasks. The husband was running his
two supermarkets
and some bottle stores. At the end of 2011 the boys
finished Grade 7 and the family moved to a farm in Weenen. The
husband had
lost all his businesses. He became employed as farm
manager. The boys were boarded at St Charles College in
Pietermaritzburg. The
wife was employed to do administrative work in
the farm office on Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays. This involved
filing and
working on Pastel software. She was paid R3 000 per
month. In 2013 they returned to Pietermaritzburg. They had not been
able
to continue working for the farm owner who had a psychological
illness.
[9]
The wife moved into a duplex with the boys, who
then attended St Charles College as day scholars. The husband was
employed by Macsteel
in Zambia from February 2013 at a monthly salary
of about R102 000. He has worked in Zambia to this day. The plan
was for
the wife to join him there but this never eventuated. The
parties agreed that, in 2015, the boys would resume boarding at St
Charles
College. The husband said that, in order to afford this, he
had to terminate the lease of the duplex. The wife perforce moved to
a farm near the Swaziland border with KwaZulu-Natal. There she stayed
with her mother, who lived on the farm.
[10]
The farm is owned by the Alan Goss Oasis Trust
(the trust). The wife’s mother conducts a game hunting business
on it for her
profit. Prior to his demise in early 2018, the wife’s
father was also involved in the business. The wife is one of three
remaining capital beneficiaries of the trust. The other two are her
sisters, one of whom lives with her mother on the farm. The
trustees
are accorded the discretion to distribute income or profits to any of
these beneficiaries. None have received any capital
or income to
date. She accepts that she is entitled to reside there at any time
and will be supported when she does so. The wife
did no work on the
farm. She has no knowledge of the financial affairs of the trust.
[11]
In September 2015, the wife received the summons
in this matter. She was advised by the attorney representing the
husband at the
time to return to Pietermaritzburg and find a job. She
did so but did not find work. She resided with a friend. In January
2016,
she commenced unpaid employment with a friend who owned a
jewellery store. This was intended to make her more employable. This
work terminated in October 2017 when she moved to Johannesburg. On 11
October 2017, she completed ten online applications in response
to
advertisements for administrative positions in Johannesburg. The
salaries offered ranged from R10 000 to R16 000 per
month.
When these bore no fruit, she began her Montessori training in
January 2018. Such employment commands a salary of about
R4 000
a month in Johannesburg and less in KwaZulu-Natal.
[12]
The issues which require decision are as follows.
What monthly amount does the wife reasonably need in order to
maintain her? Is
she likely to obtain an income? If so, when is this
likely to be? If so, what will she be likely to earn? What amount can
the husband
reasonably afford to pay?
[13]
The wife put up a list of what she said were her
present monthly expenses. These total the sum claimed. These greatly
exceed amounts
for the listed items paid from the three months of
bank statements she provided. When challenged on this, she said that
they were
what she used to spend during the marriage. But none of
this was supported by vouchers and she did not say at what stage of
the
marriage this was supposedly the case. The list is entirely
unconvincing. I accept that she has clearly been relying on the
charity
of various people. But she was unable to give any clarity on
actual amounts needed for various items.
[14]
She has received R17 000 per month since
April 2016 when the Rule 43 application resulted in an order for that
amount. In addition,
she has been retained on the husband’s
medical aid scheme and he pays R272 per month for her cellphone
account. She has had
to take out some loans during this period. One
is from her bank for the deposit for her present course. This had
almost been repaid.
The other is by way of an indication that she is
liable to her attorney in the sum of R240 000. Although this is
an estimate,
she is required to liquidate whatever is owed at the
rate of R3 000 per month.
[15]
The wife’s counsel attempted to rely on the
Rule 43 application to arrive at an amount for maintenance. In it,
the husband
said that her reasonable monthly expenses totalled
R14 650. It was submitted on the wife’s behalf that to
this sum should
be added amounts for electricity and water,
cellphone, her course of study and loan repayment, pension provision
and the like.
None of these had been included at the time. However,
since that time, the husband’s income from employment has
reduced from
about R102 000 per month to between R47 000
and R55 000 per month. As I have said, no evidence was led
concerning
most of the expenses claimed.
[16]
The financial position of the husband is not
seriously challenged. He was retrenched by Macsteel in June 2017. He
is currently employed
by SMC Zambia Ltd. His income from employment
is a nett monthly amount of US$ 4 000. His salary slips are
reflected in
Zambian Kwacha. This entire amount is deposited by his
employer into his South African bank account held with First National
Bank
Ltd. He is unsure whether the US dollar amount is converted into
Rands at the ruling exchange rate or whether the Kwacha amount
is so
converted. On 29 May 2018, the amount was R47 044, on 31 July it
was R49 628 and on 20 August it was R55 480.
His employer
pays for his vehicle expenses, including fuel, and for his cellphone.
He lives with his girlfriend in her accommodation.
She pays for this
and for his daily upkeep in Zambia. When he visits South Africa, his
girlfriend accompanies him and pays for
his expenses.
[17]
The husband directly related each item of his
schedule of monthly expenses of R66 414.62 to his bank statement
dated 28 August
2018. All of the amounts recur monthly. In addition,
he has to pay for medical expenses for one of the boys not covered by
the
medical aid and gap cover. These include consultations with an
ear nose and throat specialist and with a paediatric cardiologist.
These generally take place once or twice a year each. On
19 September 2018, this boy is having a surgical procedure
which will not be fully covered. Until 6 August 2018, the
husband had made provision for these expenses in a dollar denominated
bank account with First National Bank. On that date, the account was
closed and the Rand equivalent of the balance was paid into
his
current account in reduction of his overdraft. This came to
R82 760.76.
[18]
The husband’s expenditure exceeds his
income every month. He recently took a loan from his employer of
R85 000 to pay
his attorney. He is repaying this by way of a
deduction from his nett salary at the rate of US$ 200 per month. He
has no fixed
assets. The limit of his overdraft facility with the
bank is R103 000. As at August 2018, the debit balance on that
account
was R34 061.32, an amount of R10 599.04 was due on
his Discovery credit card and an amount of R8 240.80 was due on
his First National Bank credit card. His total indebtedness from
these three sources adds up to R52 901.16 which is more than
half of his overdraft limit.
[19]
I turn to the earning potential of the wife. The
wife relied on the evidence of Dr Sonia Hill, an industrial
psychologist. She had
conducted certain tests. The wife’s
personality was suitable for a caring position. She was also able to
learn new skills.
Although she had moderate to severe depression,
this could be treated. Dr Hill did not say that this militated in any
way against
the wife’s future employment. The wife would be
suitable as a Montessori pre-school educator. Dr Hill had not been
told of
the administrative qualifications or skills of the wife. In
particular, she had not been told that, during her Montessori course,
the wife had applied for such work in Johannesburg by letter dated
14 March 2018. In it, she wrote:
‘
I
am tri-lingual and am proficient in Word and Excel. I have worked on
PowerPoint and Pastel but would need a little guidance again,
as I
haven’t used (these) in the last 2 years.’
At
the very latest, the wife used Pastel in 2011, while on the farm at
Weenen. Dr Hill had also not been told of the range of work
performed
by the wife in the husband’s supermarket or in the Weenen farm
office. She simply was not asked to, and did not,
comment on an
administrative position as a potential avenue of employment.
[20]
Dr Hill readily conceded that she has no
expertise in what is available in the job market, either in
KwaZulu-Natal or Gauteng. This,
too, of the recruitment and placement
field. As such, she was unable to shed professional light on the
probability of the wife
obtaining employment given her age,
qualifications and work history. She likewise has no expertise in the
kind of salaries which
persons with a Montessori qualification
command. She opined that the wife would not be likely to be employed
when younger people
applied for the same position in a competitive
job market. In general terms she may be right. However, as she
conceded, this opinion
does not arise within her area of expertise.
As a result, her evidence is of limited assistance.
[21]
The employability of the wife is probably the
central issue in her claim for maintenance. If she is likely to
find employment
at some stage, it would be inequitable to saddle the
husband with lifelong maintenance. On the contrary, if she is
unlikely to
do so, it would be equally inequitable to order the
payment of maintenance for a limited period only. I am required to
sail between
this Scylla and Charybdis in arriving at a
determination.
[22]
All other things being equal, the goal of any
maintenance order is to maintain a similar lifestyle to that enjoyed
during the marriage.
All too often, however, this goal is simply
impossible of achievement. That is clearly the case at present. The
husband has proved
that his monthly expenditure amounts to
R66 414.62. This includes R17 000 as interim maintenance to
the wife, a cellphone
subscription for her of R272.36 and her
retention on his medical aid scheme. The wife claims an additional
sum of R12 570
but no longer claims the cellphone subscription
as a separate amount. She says this represents her previous lifestyle
during the
marriage. If this were to be awarded, the monthly expenses
of the husband would total R78 984.62.
[23]
It is simply untenable for the husband to
continue indefinitely in this manner. Already, he is in debt and,
each month, his indebtedness
increases by between R9 000 and
R17 000, depending on the exchange rate. If maintenance in the
sum requested by the wife
was ordered, he indebtedness would increase
by an additional amount of R12 570 to between R21 500 and
R29 500. If
he is ordered to pay what is requested by the wife,
the longest period it will take for him to reach his overdraft limit
will be
two and a half months.
[24]
The wife is currently unemployed. I am not
convinced that she has done sufficient to address that situation. She
has received maintenance
pendente lite
since April 2016. She registered with two employment agencies in
Pietermaritzburg at the end of 2015. She made ten online applications
in October 2017 for administrative positions in Gauteng. She applied
for an administrative position in Gauteng in March 2018 and
for a
Montessori placement in April 2018. She led no evidence of any other
steps taken by her. Her claim required evidence from
a recruitment
and work placement specialist as to the options open to the wife.
Most unfortunately, this was not provided. With
the lack of evidence,
I am perforce left to manufacture, polish and gaze into a crystal
ball to make the best estimate possible
on these issues.
[25]
The choice of training as a Montessori
pre-school educator may well suit the personality of the wife. It is,
however, poorly paid
and such educational institutions are vastly
outnumbered by other pre-school facilities. The fact that she has not
been more diligent
in applying for work should not result in the
husband having to support her for a longer period than would
otherwise be the case.
It is incumbent on a person in her position to
find work and, if necessary, to upskill herself for that purpose. The
wife is far
more likely to find work of an administrative nature. All
of her work to date has been in this area. However, it will serve no
purpose to require the wife to abandon her present training by
ordering that she maintain herself immediately. Her course concludes
in July 2019. She will require maintenance until at least then. There
is certainly no evidence to the effect that she is likely
to be
permanently unemployed. No such appropriate evidence was led.
[26]
Taking into account the lack of concrete evidence
to the contrary and the facts and factors set out above, I see no
good reason
why the wife cannot obtain employment within a period of
three years from the date of divorce. She does not need to wait until
she completes her course to begin this search. The only indications
as to a likely salary in this area are the advertisements she
responded to in October 2017. As I said, these ranged between R10 000
and R16 000. The best I can estimate is that a
starting
position, given her background and experience, is likely to command a
salary in that range. I am alive to the evidence
of the wife that she
wants to return to KwaZulu-Natal but I was not told of likely
salaries in this province. The wife struck me
as intelligent, level
headed and personable with high levels of integrity. Once she has
found employment, I have little doubt that
she will be regarded as a
valuable employee and is likely to progress to a higher salary after
a relatively short time.
[27]
Turning to the husband. It was pointed out that,
apart from medical aid contributions, he pays R32 460 per month
to maintain
the boys. This covers accommodation, living expenses,
cellphones and gym membership totalling R10 532.74 each.
Educational
fees average R5 700 per month per child. In other
words, the husband is supporting each of them to the tune of over
R16 000
per month. Counsel for the wife could not point to any
of these expenses which could be reduced. Neither can I find any. The
best
that might be done is if the boys are able to find part time
employment while pursuing their studies. Even this is not assured
given their poor academic record so far and the health challenges
faced by one of them. No evidence was led that they would be able
to
manage but I take the view that they should attempt to do so.
Assuming that they can each earn R2 000 per month that way,
this
would only serve to reduce the monthly deficit of the husband by
R4 000. In a month where his salary realises R55 000,
any
amount in excess of R7 000 for the wife would still see his
indebtedness increase. In months where it realises less than
that,
even a lower sum would do so.
[28]
In the light of all of the above, I would
probably have awarded maintenance in the sum of R13 000 per
month for a period of
three years, escalating annually at the
Consumer Price Index on the anniversary of the award. In
addition, I would have required
the husband to retain the wife on his
medical aid for the same period. This I would have done on the basis
that, without taking
into account their tuition expenses of R5 700
each, the boys each receive R10 532. In addition, she requires a
further
R1 933 per month until July 2019 for the Montessori
course. Rounding up the total gives R13 000.
[29]
However, the husband made an open tender for
maintenance in terms of Rule 34. This was to elapse after three years
or at her remarriage
or cohabitation, whichever takes place first.
The tender comprised three items. First, payment of R15 000 per
month, escalating
annually at the rate of the Consumer Price Index on
each anniversary of the order. Secondly, the retention of the wife on
his medical
aid. Thirdly, an amount of R272 in respect of the wife’s
cellphone. In the light of that offer, I must conclude that the
husband can somehow make provision for such payments for that period.
Since it exceeds what I would probably have awarded the wife
in the
light of his financial situation, I regard it as a reasonable amount
in the difficult circumstances of this matter.
[30]
I turn to the wife’s claim for repayment of
a loan. The wife testified that she exchanged some gold coins owned
by her so
as to lend money to the husband. This realised about
R100 000. She could be no more precise than this. He used this
to pay
the boys’ school fees in April 2014 and to buy one of
the boys a set of bagpipes. In addition, her mother loaned the
husband
R50 000 which she has asked the wife to recover from the
husband. He had agreed to repay both loans. It is common cause that
the husband paid the wife R15 000 for her to buy goats and start
farming them on the trust’s farm. She instead used
this money
to purchase a vacuum sealer. She intended at the time to build a
business cutting up and packing the meat of game shot
on the farm.
This, she says, was abandoned by her as unlikely to succeed since the
hunters take the game back to their own butchers.
She now regards
this as a part repayment of the loan.
[31]
These are two different loans on her evidence.
The first relates to her sale of the gold coins. The second relates
to R50 000
lent by the wife’s mother to the husband. This
latter claim is that of the wife’s mother. It was readily and
correctly
conceded by the wife’s counsel that the wife has no
claim arising from it.
[32]
The claim
arising from the gold coins stands on a different footing. Here, the
wife asserted in evidence that there had been a clear
agreement that
the money realised was loaned to the husband and he undertook to
repay it. This evidence was not challenged. The
closest he came to
challenging it was when his counsel put to the wife that she, too,
had an obligation to pay for the school fees
of the boys and to
provide gifts such as the bagpipes to one of them. Her response was
that it had been agreed between them that
the husband would be
responsible for these expenses. In his evidence, the husband also did
not challenge her evidence. He said
that he might have said that he
would repay it when he could. Since his ability to pay was not put to
the wife as being a term
of the agreement, it is my view that the
wife proved that a loan agreement was concluded. The loan was for
R100 000 of which
R15 000 was repaid. Since the agreement
was silent on the date of repayment, the common law position must
prevail. That is
to the effect that such a loan is repayable on
demand. Demand was made with the service of the claim in
reconvention
[5]
and, as a
result, interest on the loan must run from that date.
[33]
As for costs, there are three aspects to deal
with. The costs of the action, the reserved costs of the application
in terms of Rule
43 and the reserved costs of the application in
terms of Rule 43(6). The Divorce Act provides:
‘
In a divorce action the court
shall not be bound to make an order for costs in favour of the
successful party, but the court may,
having regard to the means of
the parties, and their conduct in so far as it may be relevant, make
such order as it considers just,
and the court may order that the
costs of the proceedings be apportioned between the parties.’
[6]
[34]
Costs are generally regarded as something to be
paid from assets although this is by no means an invariable approach.
In the present
matter, neither party has any assets which might
satisfy a costs order. They both have serious indebtedness to
satisfy. In addition,
as has been exhaustively dealt with, neither
party has income which can easily cover a costs order. In the light
of the near intractable
situation concerning maintenance reflected
above, it cannot be said that either party has acted unreasonably in
pursuing their
claims. In a commercial matter, the open tender would
ordinarily result in the party who declined it paying the costs
incurred
after they had had a reasonable time to consider it.
However, the open tender did not include one for repayment of the
wife’s
loan. In those circumstances, it seems to me just and
equitable that the husband should pay the amount tendered as costs in
the
sum of R50 000 and, for the rest, to require each to pay
their own costs of the action.
[35]
As regards the first Rule 43 application, the
husband had reduced the amount he had been paying to the wife to
R6 000 per month.
She had not alternative source of income. On
any version, she could not survive on that sum and was obliged to
incur the costs
of that application. The husband must pay those
costs.
[36]
The Rule 43(6) application raises different
considerations. It was brought by the husband. He sought a reduction
in the interim
maintenance payable on the basis that he had been
retrenched by Macsteel Zambia and that his salary from MSC Zambia was
significantly
less. This prompted a counter-application by the wife
for a further contribution to her costs, in addition to the initial
one of
R15 000. Both of these applications were dismissed. In my
view, no order for costs should be made on this application.
[37]
In the result:
1. A decree of divorce is
granted.
2. The plaintiff is
directed to pay maintenance to the defendant for a period of three
years from date of divorce or until her remarriage
or cohabitation,
whichever occurs first:
2.1 In the sum of R15 000
per month, escalating annually at the rate of increase of the
Consumer Price Index on the anniversary
of the date of divorce.
2.2 By payment of the
monthly premium required to retain the defendant on his medical aid
scheme.
2.3 By payment of the sum
of R272 per month towards the defendant’s cellphone.
3. The plaintiff is
directed to pay the defendant the sum of R85 000 in respect of
the loan from the defendant to the plaintiff,
along with interest
thereon at the legally applicable rate from date of service of the
claim in reconvention until date of payment.
4. The plaintiff is
directed to pay a sum of R50 000 towards the costs of suit of
the defendant. This is in addition to the
contribution to costs
ordered by way of the initial Rule 43 application.
5. The plaintiff is
directed to pay the costs of the initial Rule 43 application.
_________________
Gorven
J
Date
of Hearing: 17, 18 and 19 September 2018
Date
of Judgment: 21 September 2018
Appearances
For
the Plaintiff: EM Bezuidenhout
Instructed
by Thomson Wilks
Locally
represented by Macgregor Erasmus Attorneys
For
the Defendant: MA Sponneck
Instructed
by Shepstone & Wylie
Locally
represented by Shepstone & Wylie, Pietermaritzburg
[1]
Divorce Act 70 of 1979
.
[2]
Beaumont v Beaumont
1987
(1) SA 967
(A)
at
987E.
[3]
Pienaar v Thusano
Foundation & another
1992 (2) SA 552 (B)
at 580D–F.
[4]
Botha v Botha
2009
(3) SA 89
(W) para 46.
[5]
West Rand Estates Ltd v New
Zealand Insurance Company Ltd
1926 AD 173
at 183.
[6]
Section 10.