About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Pietermaritzburg
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Pietermaritzburg
>>
2018
>>
[2018] ZAKZPHC 36
|
|
Rampersadh and Another v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service and Others (5493/2017) [2018] ZAKZPHC 36; 81 SATC 163 (27 August 2018)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL
DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG
Reportable
Case
No: 5493/2017
In
the matter between:
MANISHA
RAMPERSADH
1
ST
APPLICANT
HEMANTRA
RAMPERSADH
2
ND
APPLICANT
and
THE
COMMISSIONER FOR THE
SOUTH
AFRICAN REVENUE
SERVICE
1
ST
RESPONDENT
JAYASTHRI
PADAYACHEE
NO
2
ND
RESPONDENT
PRINESHA
GOVENDER
NO
3
RD
RESPONDENT
ORDER
1.
By consent, the application against the second and third respondents
is dismissed with costs.
2.
The application against the first respondent is dismissed with costs,
such costs to include those consequent on the employment
of two
counsel where this was done.
JUDGMENT
Delivered on: 27
August 2018
Gorven
J
[1]
The recent tax affairs of the applicants, and of the Close
Corporation of which they are the members, has a turbid history.
At
its heart are the loan accounts of the applicants in the Close
Corporation. The Close Corporation was audited for tax purposes
for
the tax periods 2011 to 2013. The second and third respondents,
employees of the first respondent (SARS), dealt with the matter.
Due
to the loan accounts, the audit was extended to the applicants. The
applicants made representations. They furnished revised
loan accounts
in doing so. Revised assessments for income tax were issued to the
applicants on 23 March 2015. They lodged
an objection dated
15 May 2015. SARS requested further information arising
from the loan accounts. This provoked further
revised loan accounts.
Another objection, dated 20 July 2015, was lodged. In all, no less
than three different versions of the
loan accounts were submitted by
the applicants. In addition to the correspondence, SARS met with the
applicants and their tax advisors
a number of times.
[2]
This finally resulted in SARS sending a response on 1 December 2015
disallowing some of the objections. This amounted to a revised
assessment for each of them (the revised assessments). The applicants
were told that, if they were not satisfied, they could appeal
within
30 days, failing which the revised assessments would become final.
[3]
The
applicants did not appeal. Nor did they request clarity on the
disallowance of certain of their objections. On 6 June 2016,
they
gave notice that they intended to appeal and would seek condonation
for not having appealed in time. SARS informed them that
its power to
condone a late appeal did not extend beyond 75 days. On 30
August 2016, the applicants requested assistance on
how to lodge an
appeal. They still did not do so or approach the tax court for
condonation. Nor did they seek to otherwise resolve
their dispute
with SARS under the Tax Administration Act (the Act).
[1]
[4]
Instead, the applicants made three requests under s 93(1)
(d)
of the Act. These were dated 13 July 2016, 19 October 2016 and 17
January 2017. This section provides:
‘
(1) SARS may make
a reduced assessment if-
(d)
SARS is
satisfied that there is a readily apparent undisputed error in the
assessment by-
(i) SARS; or
(ii) the taxpayer in a
return . . .’.
In
each request, the applicants wanted SARS to reduce the revised
assessments. They claimed that the revised assessments contained
‘readily apparent undisputed error(s)’. SARS disagreed.
It refused all three requests. The last of these three requests
(the
third request) was refused on 10 March 2017. This prompted the
present application, brought in terms of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act (PAJA),
[2]
to review certain of the decisions of SARS.
[5]
At the hearing, the applicants readily conceded that the second and
third respondents should not have been joined. They consented
to an
order dismissing the application against them with costs. This was
entirely appropriate.
[6]
Before the hearing, the applicants had amended the relief sought
twice. The amended relief included the reviewing and setting
aside of
the revised assessments. At the hearing, their counsel informed me
that the applicants did not persist in seeking this
relief. The only
relief sought was against the decision of SARS on 10 March 2017 to
refuse the third request.
[7]
SARS
opposes this relief. Apart from dealing with the merits, SARS has
raised a number of initial points. One is to the effect that,
under
PAJA, a party seeking judicial review is obliged to exhaust any
available internal remedies.
[3]
In support of this point, it was submitted that the applicants had a
right of appeal under the Act against the decision to refuse
the
third request. Another relates to whether this court has jurisdiction
to deal with a review of matters arising under the Act.
A third was
whether this application was brought within the 180 day period of the
impugned decision as required by s 7(1)
of PAJA. The applicants
no longer persist in seeking to review decisions earlier than the
refusal of the third request on 10 March 2017.
This
application was brought some 45 days after that decision and was thus
brought timeously. This third point therefore falls
away.
[8]
The first point concerns the exhaustion of internal remedies. It is
based on s 7(2) of PAJA. This provides:
‘
(a)
Subject to paragraph
(c)
, no court or tribunal shall
review an administrative action in terms of this Act unless any
internal remedy provided for in any
other law has first been
exhausted.
(b)
Subject to paragraph
(c)
,
a court or tribunal must, if it is not satisfied that any internal
remedy referred to in paragraph
(a)
has
been exhausted, direct that the person concerned must first exhaust
such remedy before instituting proceedings in a court
or tribunal for
judicial review in terms of this Act.
(c)
A court or tribunal may, in exceptional circumstances and on
application by the person concerned, exempt such person from the
obligation to exhaust any internal remedy if the court or tribunal
deems it in the interest of justice.’
There
are thus only two bases on which a court may consider such a review
application. First, if available internal remedies have
been
exhausted. Secondly, if there are exceptional circumstances
warranting the grant of an exemption from doing so in the interest
of
justice.
[9]
The initial question under this head is whether s 7(2)
(a)
of PAJA applies. This would be so if an objection or appeal under the
Act was available to the applicants. It is common ground
that, in the
present matter, SARS took a decision to refuse the third request. The
crisp issue is: Does the Act allow for an objection
or appeal to lie
from such a decision? I have found no case law on this issue and
neither party referred to any. The provisions
of the Act must be
interpreted in order to yield an answer.
[10]
An
interpretation must be arrived at according to the following
approach: ‘Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning
to the words used in a document, be it legislation, some other
statutory instrument, or contract, having regard to the context
provided by reading the particular provision or provisions in the
light of the document as a whole and the circumstances attendant
upon
its coming into existence. Whatever the nature of the document,
consideration must be given to the language used in the
light of the
ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the
provision appears; the apparent purpose to which it
is directed and
the material known to those responsible for its production. Where
more than one meaning is possible each possibility
must be weighed in
the light of all these factors. The process is objective, not
subjective. A sensible meaning is to be preferred
to one that
leads to insensible or unbusinesslike results or undermines the
apparent purpose of the document. Judges must be alert
to, and guard
against, the temptation to substitute what they regard as reasonable,
sensible or businesslike for the words actually
used. To do so in
regard to a statute or statutory instrument is to cross the
divide between interpretation and legislation;
in a contractual
context it is to make a contract for the parties other than the one
they in fact made. The “inevitable point
of departure is the
language of the provision itself”, read in context and having
regard to the purpose of the provision
and the background to the
preparation and production of the document.’
[4]
[11]
Section
93(1)
(d)
forms part of Chapter 8 of the Act, which deals with assessments.
There are four kinds of assessments which SARS can make. These
are
termed original assessments,
[5]
additional assessments,
[6]
reduced assessments
[7]
and
jeopardy assessments.
[8]
The
mechanism for arriving at these is specified. In certain
circumstances, SARS is entitled to make all four kinds of assessments
based in whole or in part on an estimate.
[9]
As regards jeopardy assessments, these can be made before the due
date of submission of a return by the taxpayer.
[10]
The Commissioner may only do so if satisfied that the collection of
tax would otherwise be jeopardised. A decision to make a jeopardy
assessment can be taken on review to the High Court on certain
grounds.
[11]
The reason for
this is self-evident. As far as I can establish, this is the only
specific provision in the Act allowing for a review
application to
the High Court of a decision taken under the Act.
[12]
There are five bases on which SARS may make a reduced assessment.
Since SARS is, itself, a creature of statute, it may not
do so unless
authorised under the Act. Section 93 reads:
‘
(1) SARS may make
a reduced assessment if-
(a)
the taxpayer
successfully disputed the assessment under Chapter 9;
(b)
necessary to
give effect to a settlement under Part F of Chapter 9;
(c)
necessary to
give effect to a judgment pursuant to an appeal under Part E of
Chapter 9 and there is no right of further appeal;
(d)
SARS is
satisfied that there is a readily apparent undisputed error in the
assessment by-
(i) SARS; or
(ii) the taxpayer in a
return; or
(e)
a senior SARS
official is satisfied that an assessment was based on-
(i) the failure to submit
a return or submission of an incorrect return by a third party under
section 26 or by an employer under
a tax Act;
(ii) a processing error
by SARS; or
(iii) a return
fraudulently submitted by a person not authorised by the taxpayer.
(2) SARS may reduce an
assessment despite the fact that no objection has been lodged or
appeal noted.’
[13]
The first three arise from invoking the mechanisms for dispute
resolution in Chapter 9. The last two require SARS to be ‘satisfied’
on various scores. It seems, therefore, that there are four
procedures by which an assessment can be reduced by SARS. The first
two are by way of objection or appeal. The next by way of SARS
mero
motu
deciding to do so without the taxpayer having objected or
appealed. The fourth and final one is by the taxpayer requesting a
reduction.
Section 91(5)
(b)
of the Act provides:
‘
[T]he taxpayer in
respect of whom the assessment has been issued may, within 30
business days from the date of assessment, request
SARS to issue a
reduced assessment or additional assessment by submitting a complete
and correct return’.
This
relates to an assessment arising from an estimate. It does not
specifically cover a request where the assessment is based on
a
return or an audit such as in the present matter. However, the basis
on which a taxpayer can have a matter considered under s 93(1)
(d)
is clearly not by way of objection to, or appeal against, an
assessment. A separate procedure is available for these. Neither does
it envisage a formal application. It seems to me that it is simply by
way of a request.
[14]
The
question which arises is whether the refusal of such a request gives
rise to a right of objection or appeal under the Act. Chapter
9 of
the Act deals with dispute resolution. Part B of that Chapter
provides for objections and appeals in certain circumstances.
Parts C
and D set up machinery to deal with objections and appeals. This
includes the establishment of a tax board and the constitution
of a
tax court. The tax court is a creature of statute. The ambit of its
jurisdiction, including whether any appeal lies to it,
is determined
by the Act.
[12]
An appeal
against a decision of the tax court lies to a Division of the High
Court or, on leave being granted, to the Supreme Court
of Appeal.
[13]
[15]
The procedure for dispute resolution is governed by Part B of Chapter
9. Section 104(1) to (3) provide:
‘
(1) A taxpayer who
is aggrieved by an assessment made in respect of the taxpayer may
object to the assessment.
(2) The following
decisions may be objected to and appealed against in the same manner
as an assessment:
(a)
a decision
under subsection (4) not to extend the period for lodging an
objection;
(b)
a decision
under section 107 (2) not to extend the period for lodging an appeal;
and
(c)
any other
decision that may be objected to or appealed against under a tax Act.
(3) A taxpayer entitled
to object to an assessment or “decision” must lodge an
objection in the manner, under the terms,
and within the period
prescribed in the “rules”.’
From
this it is clear that objections precede any appeal. They may be
lodged against assessments and certain decisions. The decisions
referred to in sections 104(2)
(a)
and
(b)
clearly
do not apply to the present matter. The question is whether a
decision to refuse a request under s 93(1)
(d)
falls
within the ambit of s 104(2)
(c)
. In other words, does
such a decision amount to ‘any other decision that may be
objected to or appealed against under a tax
Act.’?
[16]
Chapter 9
has a definitions section. This defines a ‘decision’ as
‘a decision referred to in section 104(2)’.
[14]
This is circular and unhelpful because it simply refers back to the
section where the word is used. The question resolves itself
into
whether a tax Act makes such a decision subject to objection or
appeal. The words ‘tax Act’ are defined to mean
‘this
Act or an Act, or portion of an Act, referred to in section 4 of the
SARS Act, excluding customs and excise legislation’.
As far as
I can make out, the only possible Act which may apply is ‘this
Act’. It does not appear as if the SARS Act
[15]
applies.
[17]
Clearly, if
an assessment is reduced, it qualifies under s 104(1) for the
dispute resolution procedure. All assessments qualify.
The question
is whether a refusal to reduce an assessment qualifies. There are at
least three refusals where the Act makes it plain
that the dispute
resolution procedure in Chapter 9 applies. SARS is empowered in
certain circumstances to remit a penalty imposed
under the Act for
administrative non-compliance. Section 220 provides that: ‘A
decision by SARS not to remit a “penalty”
in whole or in
part is subject to objection and appeal under Chapter 9.’
Likewise, SARS is empowered to impose a penalty
if a tax liability is
understated. Section 224 of the Act provides that the imposition of
such a penalty, as well as a decision
not to remit such a penalty, is
subject to objection and appeal under Chapter 9. A similar provision
exists in s 231(2) of
the Act where a senior SARS official
decides to withdraw relief granted under a voluntary disclosure
programme as well as to pursue
criminal prosecution for a tax
offence. These decisions are ‘subject to objection and
appeal.’
[16]
[18]
It is
clear, therefore, that certain decisions refusing relief are made
subject to the objection and appeal procedure in Chapter
9. They each
accordingly fall within the provisions of s 104(2)
(c)
of the Act as being a ‘decision that may be objected to or
appealed against under a tax Act.’ There is no similar
provision for a decision to refuse relief under s 93(1)
(d)
of the Act. The inclusion of one provision may indicate that the
legislature intended to exclude other provisions. However, for
this
principle of
expressio
unius est exclusio alterius
to apply, it must be concluded that the legislature formed this
specific intention.
[17]
[19]
To assist in determining whether this is the case, recourse must be
had to the approach to interpretation set out above. The
language of
s 104(2)
(c)
indicates that a tax Act must make a decision
subject to objection or appeal. Section 105 of the Act reads:
‘
A taxpayer may
only dispute an assessment or ‘decision’ as described in
section 104 in proceedings under this Chapter,
unless a High Court
otherwise directs.’
This
ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with assessments or
decisions unless the High Court directs otherwise. There
is a strong
presumption against the ouster of the High Court’s
jurisdiction.
[18]
As was held
in
Minister
of Law and Order & others v Hurley & another
:
[19]
‘
The Court will,
therefore, closely examine any provision which appears to curtail or
oust the jurisdiction of courts of law.’
Section
105 ousts it only where an assessment or ‘“decision”
as described in section 104’ is disputed. The
range of
decisions which can and must be dealt with under Chapter 9, absent a
High Court order, is circumscribed. If the legislature
had intended
to make all decisions subject to the dispute resolution procedures in
Chapter 9, it would have been a simple matter
to do so. The three
categories of decisions mentioned in s 104(2) would not have
been mentioned. The Act does not make a decision
to refuse a request
under s 93(1)
(d)
subject to objection or appeal. It is
therefore not a decision referred to in s 104(2)
(c)
. This
means that the objection and appeal provisions in Chapter 9 were not
available to the applicants. The language and context
of the
provision supports this interpretation.
[20]
Would this in any way undermine or run counter to the apparent
purpose of Chapter 9? The answer is no. Clearly decisions which
change the tax liability of a taxpayer are made subject to the
machinery of the Act for dispute resolution. The tax board and tax
court have specific expertise in this area. So too, where a penalty
has been imposed, the refusal to reduce or do away with it
has an
impact additional to the assessment. This, too, is an area where the
internal machinery would be more adept at resolving
the dispute. As I
have mentioned, a decision to refuse a request under s 93(1)
(d)
does not change the tax liability of a taxpayer. The taxpayer can
object to the assessment and invoke the appeal machinery. The
interpretation that a refusal of a request to reduce an assessment
under s 93(1)
(d)
does not fall within the third category
of decisions mentioned in s 104(2)
(c)
would also not lead
to unbusinesslike results.
[21]
I accordingly find that the decision of SARS to refuse the third
request under s 93(1)
(d)
is not subject to the machinery
set up in Chapter 9 of the Act. This, then, means that internal
objection and appeal remedies under
the Act were not available to the
applicants. No other jurisdiction is given to either the tax board or
tax court to deal with
any issues arising from such a refusal. The
applicants had no internal remedies available to them. They are
accordingly not disqualified
from bringing an application for
judicial review under PAJA.
[22]
It
therefore becomes necessary to determine whether this court has
jurisdiction to entertain a review of decisions made under the
Act
and, in particular, a decision to refuse a request under s 93(1)
(d)
.
I have found that the specialist machinery set up under the Act does
not apply. The jurisdiction of the High Court to deal with
such an
application is not ousted by s 105. Section 6(1) of PAJA
allows any person to institute proceedings in a court
for the
judicial review of administrative action. It was not disputed that
the decision in question amounts to administrative action
under
PAJA.
[20]
The High Court
therefore has jurisdiction to deal with this application.
[23]
Having dealt with the initial points relied on by SARS, the
substantive issue comes into focus. In this, the applicants must
make
out a case for a review of the refusal of the third request. They
call in aid certain provisions of s 6 of PAJA. The
relevant
sections read:
‘
(2) A court or
tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative
action if —
. . .
(d)
the action was
materially influenced by an error of law;
. . .
(e)
the action was
taken —
. . .
(iii) because irrelevant
considerations were taken into account or relevant considerations
were not considered;
. . .
(vi) arbitrarily or
capriciously;
. . .
(h)
the exercise
of the power or the performance of the function authorised by the
empowering provision, in pursuance of which the
administrative action
was purportedly taken, is so unreasonable that no reasonable person
could have so exercised the power or
performed the function . . .’.
[24]
The first basis relied on by the applicants is s 6(2)
(d)
of PAJA. They claim that the decision was ‘materially
influenced by an error of law’. This can readily be disposed
of. No error of law was pointed to in the papers or in argument. The
claimed errors related to calculations. The next is s 6(2)
(e)
(iii),
that ‘irrelevant considerations were taken into account
or relevant considerations were not considered’.
The third was
that the action was taken ‘arbitrarily or capriciously’
and thus falls foul of s 6(2)
(e)
(vi). The last is based
on s 6(2)
(h)
. The applicants claim that the exercise of
the power by SARS in refusing the third request was so ‘unreasonable
that no reasonable
person could have so exercised’ it. These
shall each be dealt with after analysing the third request and the
response of
SARS.
[25]
Section
93(1)
(d)
says that SARS ‘may’ reduce an assessment if it is
‘satisfied that there is a readily apparent undisputed error’
in the assessment. However, the word ‘may’ does not
necessarily give rise to a general discretion. Sometimes it denotes
the grant of a power along with a corresponding duty to exercise that
power.
[21]
Van
Rooyen
approved the approach in a line of cases beginning with
Schwartz
v Schwartz
,
[22]
which held:
‘
A statutory
enactment conferring a power in permissive language may nevertheless
have to be construed as making it the duty of the
person or authority
in whom the power is reposed to exercise that power when the
conditions prescribed as justifying its exercise
have been satisfied.
Whether an enactment should be so construed depends on,
inter
alia
, the language in which it is couched, the context in which
it appears, the general scope and object of the legislation, the
nature
of the thing empowered to be done and the person or persons
for whose benefit the power is to be exercised.’
It
seems to me that if SARS is satisfied that a readily apparent
undisputed error has been made, it would be obliged to reduce the
resultant assessment. It is unlikely that it has a discretion to
refuse to do so. However, in the view I take of the matter, it
is not
necessary to pronounce finally on this issue.
[26]
Only if SARS is satisfied that there is a readily apparent undisputed
error may it reduce the assessment. The first hurdle
for the
applicants to surmount is to show that the claimed errors were in
fact readily apparent and undisputed. Only then can it
be contended
that SARS should have been so satisfied. It was readily conceded by
counsel for the applicants that, in the third
request, the applicants
did not identify specific items which they say constituted the
readily apparent undisputed errors relied
on by them. They instead
raised four issues.
[27]
In the first place, they contended that SARS duplicated drawings from
the Close Corporation reckoned as lifestyle expenditure
and items in
their personal bank statements. They did not say which specific items
had been duplicated. SARS averred in its answering
affidavit that the
applicants had themselves submitted the bank payments reflected in
SARS documents as lifestyle expenditure.
It averred further that many
of the expenses claimed by the applicants were not supported by
documentation as is required under
the Act. These two averments were
admitted by the applicants in reply.
[28]
Secondly, the applicants raised an issue concerning the treatment of
a property. In answer, SARS pointed out that the applicants
had
included conveyancing fees as part of the cost of the property which
was impermissible. Again, it said, no source documents
were provided
to support any such claim. These averments were not dealt with by the
applicants in reply and thus stand uncontested.
[29]
Thirdly, the applicants raised an issue about bond transfers. SARS
pointed out that this issue had never been raised in all
of the
communication resulting in the revised assessments. Nor were any
source documents provided. In addition, more bond transfers
were
depicted in the loan accounts of the applicants and not the one or
two suggested by the applicants in the request. These averments
were
also not challenged by the applicants in reply.
[30]
Fourthly and finally, the applicants claimed that insurance payments
had been duplicated by SARS in the accounting of their
personal
effects. SARS answered that the applicants had misunderstood the
capital reconciliation exercise. They had believed that
they could
freely draw money from the Close Corporation to offset their personal
debts without these being regarded as lifestyle
expenses. This is
what led to the multiple amendments to the loan accounts of the
applicants mentioned above. These averments were
likewise not dealt
with by the applicants in reply. They are therefore uncontested.
[31]
It cannot by any stretch of the imagination be held that the
applicants showed that the claimed errors were in fact errors.
They
certainly did not show that the claimed errors were not disputed on
reasonable grounds. None of the claimed errors was specifically
identified in the third request. None were even clearly pointed to in
this application. The ‘errors’ contended for
by the
applicants were disputed to be errors by SARS in the answering
affidavit. The basis of the disputes was not challenged in
reply.
[32]
Reverting,
then, to the grounds under PAJA relied on by the applicants. It is
clear that they failed to show that SARS took into
account irrelevant
considerations or failed to consider relevant ones.
[23]
They failed to show that the actions of SARS were arbitrary or
capricious.
[24]
They failed to
show that the refusal of the third request by SARS was so
unreasonable that no reasonable person could have refused
it.
[25]
The applicants have accordingly failed to make out a case that the
refusal of the third request to reduce the assessment should
be
reviewed and set aside.
[33]
The application must therefore be dismissed with costs. Counsel for
SARS submitted that, in view of the voluminous papers,
running to
some 943 pages, and the novelty and complexity of the matter,
costs of two counsel should be awarded. Counsel for
the applicants
did not seek to counter this submission. In the circumstances of the
application, it appears to me that such an
order is warranted.
[34]
In the result:
1. By consent, the
application against the second and third respondents is dismissed
with costs.
2. The application
against the first respondent is dismissed with costs, such costs to
include those consequent on the employment
of two counsel where this
was done.
_________________
Gorven
J
Date
of Hearing: 13 August 2018
Date
of Judgment:27 August 2018
Appearances
For
the Applicants: CJ Snyman SC
Instructed
by Nagesh Maharaj Attorneys
For
the Respondents: AA Gabriel SC, with her R Athmaram
Instructed
by Tembe Kheswa Nxumalo Inc.,
locally
represented by Kunene Attorneys
[1]
Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011
.
[2]
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000
.
[3]
Section 7(2)
(a)
of PAJA.
[4]
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
2012 (4) SA 593
(SCA) ([2012]
2 All SA 262
;
[2012] ZASCA 13)
para 18
(references omitted). Cited with approval in
Trinity
Asset Management (Pty) Ltd v Grindstone Investments 132 (Pty) Ltd
2018 (1) SA 94
(CC) para 52.
[5]
Section 91
of the Act.
[6]
Section 92
of the Act.
[7]
Section 93
of the Act.
[8]
Section 94
of the Act.
[9]
Section 95
of the Act.
[10]
Section 94(1)
of the Act.
[11]
Section 94(2)
of the Act.
[12]
Wingate-Pearse
v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service
2017 (1) SA 542
(SCA) para 6. Any appeal under the Act in the
present matter would lie to the tax court, rather than the tax
board, because the
amount in dispute exceeds R1 million. This
amount was determined by the Minister in Gen N 1196 in
GG
39490
of 17 December 2015, pursuant to the provisions of
s 109(1)
(a)
of the Act. If below this amount, any appeal would lie to the board.
[13]
Sections 133
and
135
of the Act. There are certain exceptions to
leave being required to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal but
these are not germane
to this matter.
[14]
Section 101
of the Act.
[15]
The SARS Act is defined in s 1 of the Act as the
South African
Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997
.
[16]
Section 231(2)
of the Act.
[17]
Da
Silva & another v Coutinho
1971 (3) SA 123
(A) at 136B-C.
[18]
De
Bruin v Director of Education
1934 AD 252
at 258.
[19]
Minister
of Law and Order & others v Hurley & another
1986
(3) SA 568
(A)
at
584A-B.
[20]
Section 1 of PAJA, definition of administrative action.
[21]
Van
Rooyen & others v The State & others (General Council of the
Bar of South Africa Intervening
)
[2001] ZACC 8
;
2002
(5) SA 246
(CC)
(2002
(2) SACR 222
;
2002 (8) BCLR 810)
paras 180-182 .
[22]
Schwartz
v Schwartz
[1984] ZASCA 79
;
1984 (4) SA 467
(A) at 473I-474B. Cited with approval in
South
African Police Service v Public Servants Association
2007
(3) SA 521
(CC)
para
15.
[23]
Under s 6(2)
(e)
(iii)
of PAJA.
[24]
Under s 6(2)
(e)
(vi)
of PAJA.
[25]
Under s 6(2)
(h)
of PAJA.