About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: High Court, Northern Cape Division, Kimberley
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: High Court, Northern Cape Division, Kimberley
>>
2018
>>
[2018] ZANCHC 50
|
|
Dundi Lodge (Pty) Ltd v Compensation Insure International Consultants (Pty) Ltd and Others (2080/2015;1749/2017) [2018] ZANCHC 50 (3 August 2018)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTHERN
CAPE HIGH COURT, KIMBERLEY)
Case
No: 2080/2015 &1749/2017
Heard
on: 16/02/2018
Delivered:
03/08/2018
NOT
REPORTABLE
NOT
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES
CIRCULATE
TO MAGISTRATES
CIRCULATE
TO REGIONAL MAGISTRATES
In
the matter between
DUNDI
LODGE (PTY)
LTD
1
st
Applicant
SOUTHERN
CROSS MARKETING AND
MANAGEMENT
SERVICES (PTY)
LTD
2
nd
Applicant
KALAHARI
ADVENTURES (PTY)
LTD
3
rd
Applicant
TRAWAL
FRESH FRUIT COMPANY
(PTY)
4
th
Applicant
SOUTHERN
CROSS GAME RESEVE (PTY)
LTD
5
th
Applicant
SOUTHERN
FARMS (PTY)
LTD
6
th
Applicant
THE
STEENKAMP FAMILY TRUST t/a ORANGE
FALLS
7
th
Applicant
and
COMPENSATION
INSURE INTERNATIONAL
CONSULTANTS
(PTY)
LTD
1
st
Respondent
THE
STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA
LTD
2
nd
Respondent
GERALD
CUPIDO
3
rd
Respondent
MONICA
CUPIDO
4
th
Respondent
CYRIL
TEE
5
th
Respondent
NEDBANK
LTD
6
th
Respondent
JUDGMENT
PAKATI
ADJP
[1]
This matter consists of two applications, firstly an application for
reconsideration of the
rule nisi
granted by Lever AJ on 31 July 2017 which I confirmed on 22 September
2017 against the respondents under Case Number 1749/2017
and
secondly, a summary judgment application under Case Number 2080/2017
against the third to fifth respondents. On 31 July 2017
the
applicants, Dundee Lodge (Pty) Ltd (‘Dundee Lodge’),
Southern Cross Marketing and Management Services (Pty) Ltd,
Kalahari
Adventures (Pty) Ltd, Trawal Fresh Fruit Company (Pty) Ltd), Southern
Cross Game Reserve (Pty) Ltd, Southern Farms (Pty)
Ltd and the
Steenkamp Family Trust t/a Orange Falls, first to seventh applicants
respectively, approached court on urgent basis
seeking an order
freezing the bank accounts of the first respondent, Compensation
Insure International Consultants (Pty) Ltd (‘CIIC’),
pending the outcome of an action to be instituted against the
respondents claiming amounts of monies allegedly obtained and/or
stolen from the applicants by fraudulent means. The applicants apply
for summary judgment for payment of various amounts of monies
allegedly stolen from each of the applicants as part of a fraudulent
scheme conducted by the respondents.
[2]
The Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd, Mr Gerald Cupido, the deponent
to the reconsideration application and director of CIIC,
Ms Monica
Cupido, Mr Cyril Tee, and Nedbank Ltd, are second to sixth
respondents respectively. For convenience, I will refer to
the
parties as cited herein.
[3]
CIIC now seeks to have the order granted on 31 July 2017 and
confirmed on 22 September 2017 reconsidered in terms of Rule 6
(12)
(c)
[1]
after the Workmen’s
Compensation Commissioner of the Department of Labour (‘the
Commissioner’) has been joined
in these proceedings and further
papers have been filed. It also applies for condonation of the late
filing of the reconsideration
application whose notice of set down is
dated 01 November 2017.
[4]
Both parties oppose the respective applications. Ms Cupido, the
fourth respondent, does not oppose the application for summary
judgment.
BACKGROUND
FACTS
[5]
The applicants are entities that carry on business as fruit
farm-exporters and are in the business of tourism and hospitality,
thus they employ various employees. In terms of section 82 of the
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, 130
of 1993
(‘the Act’), the applicants are obliged to furnish the
commissioner with a return showing the amount of earnings
in respect
of each employee and in terms of section 83 read with section 85 of
the Act they ought to make contributions to the
Compensation Fund
based on an assessment calculated on the basis of such percentage of
the annual earnings of its employees.
CLAIM
A
[6]
CIIC, a private company and an agent assisting in the submission of
returns of earnings to the Department of Labour (‘the
department’), administers payments made to it on behalf of its
clients. It was appointed to act on behalf of Dundi
Lodge, a
company duly incorporated in terms of the South African Company Law,
for the 2016 and 2017 years of assessment. During
2016 the
respondents were provided with the return of earnings in respect of
Dundi Lodge indicating a total amount of R1 025 873-59
as
earnings. The applicants state that the respondents fraudulently
alternatively negligently and unlawfully represented that;
(a) they
submitted the returns to the Department of Labour in accordance with
Dundi Lodge’s instructions; (b) a reduction
of 20% was awarded
by the department in terms of s 85 of the Act; (c) an amount of R
18 875-34 was assessed as payable to
the department and (d) fees
to the amount of R 707-83 was payable to CIIC. According to the
applicants the representation was false
in that the return submitted
was less than that provided by Dundi Lodge, no reduction was awarded
by the department and no fees
were due to CIIC and the amount
assessed as payable to the department was less than R18 875-34.
[7]
Dundi Lodge, labouring under the impression that the said amounts
were due and payable to the department and CIIC, paid an amount
of
R18 875-34 to the department on 31 May 2016 and a sum of R707-83
as fees earned into an account specified by CIIC, the
Cupido’s
and Cyril Tee. It later transpired that only an amount of R 2 083-94
was paid by the respondents to the department
in respect of 2016 tax
year on behalf of Dundi Lodge. The applicants allege that the
Cupido’s as well as Mr Tee misappropriated
the difference
between the amount paid to the department and the amount actually
paid namely, R19 583-17 and therefore suffered
damages to the
amount of R17 499-23. They allege further that the respondents
are jointly and severally liable for the said
amount plus interest at
the
mora
rate as well
as costs from date of service of summons.
[8]
The applicants allege that the same
modus
operandi
as mentioned in Claim “A”
was used by the respondents. The following table indicates the
amounts alleged to have been
misappropriated with regards to each
applicant:
CLAIM
APPLICANT
TAX YEAR
AMOUNT INVOLVED
B
First Applicant
2017
R 6 138-19
C
Second Applicant 2016-2017
R 66 114-63
D
Second Applicant
2017
R 95 173-11
E
Third Applicant
2016-2017
R 6 699-73
F
Fourth Applicant 2016-2017
R 14 629-64
G
Fourth Applicant 2017
R180 081-87
H
Fifth Applicant
2016
R 6 868-98
I
Fifth Applicant
2017
R 3 278-38
J
Sixth Applicant
2017
R858 253-24
K
Sixth Applicant
2016
R491 586-46
L
Seventh Applicant 2016-2017
R222 359-22
[9]
As a result of the alleged misappropriation of funds mentioned
supra
the applicants approached this court on an urgent basis seeking an
interim order against the respondents on 31 July 2017 as alluded
to
earlier.
[10]
On 01 August 2017 the Sheriff served the interim order granted on 31
July 2017 upon Standard Bank Ltd and Nedbank Ltd. On 12
September
2017 the notice of motion and the interim order which was on 01
September 2017 extended to 22 September 2017 were served
upon Mrs
Stander on behalf of Ms Cupido and Mr Tee. The Sheriff’s return
indicates that Ms Stander is a niece but does not
mention whose niece
she is. Importantly is the fact that the address of Ms Cupido is
different from that of Mr Tee. On 20
September 2017 the said
notice and the interim order were also served by the Sheriff upon Mr
Cupido who also accepted service on
behalf of CIIC. The respondents
had an option to anticipate the return date of 01 September 2017 in
48 hours’ written notice
to the applicants’ attorneys of
record.
[11]
As a result of non-service of the interim order the respondents
neither filed a notice of intention to oppose the urgent application
nor did they file an answering affidavit. The interim order was
served upon Mr Cupido on 20 September 2017, two days before 22
September 2017 when the interim order was confirmed as alluded to
earlier. The respondents submit that at all relevant times they
intended to oppose the urgent application.
[12]
The respondents also apply for condonation of the late filing of the
reconsideration application. Mr Cupido’s explanation
for the
delay is that on 19 September 2017 he returned from Durban and had
attended a long meeting with business partners from
Cape Town. He
found the notice of motion, the interim court order dated 31 July
2017 and the one extending it to 01 September 2017
with annexures on
top of his desk on 20 September 2017. He instructed Mr Groenewaldt of
Towell & Groenewaldt Attorneys to act
on behalf of the
respondents and oppose the urgent application as per CIIC’s
resolution dated 20 September 2017. He alleges
further that at his
request, his office made numerous telephonic follow-ups and sent
emails to Towell & Groenewaldt Attorneys
regarding the progress
of the case without success. Despite numerous telephone calls and
correspondences regarding the progress
of the matter no response was
forthcoming.
[13]
Consequently, Mr Cupido terminated the mandate of Towell &
Groenewaldt Attorneys regarding Case Number 2080/2017 as per
email
dated 31 October 2017. The same day he instructed Sharuh Attorneys
wherein CIIC sought the applicants’ consent regarding
the
reconsideration application and a response to be furnished on or
before 10h30 a.m. on 01 November 2017. He further requested
the
applicants to withdraw the summary judgment application, which was
not done.
[14]
Rule 27 (3) of the Uniform Rules of Court provide that the court may,
on good cause shown, condone any non-compliance with
these rules. The
application must be
bona
fide
and should not be made with the intention of delaying the other
party’s claim.
[2]
The
Constitutional Court in
VAN
WYK v UNITAS HOSPITAL
[3]
had this to say regarding condonation:
“
[20] This court
has held that the standard for considering an application for
condonation is the interest of justice. Whether it
is in the
interests of justice to grant condonation depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case. Factors that are relevant
to this enquiry
include but are not limited to the nature of the relief sought, the
extent and the cause of the delay on the administration
of justice
and other litigants, the reasonableness of the explanation for the
delay, the importance of the issue to be raised in
the intended
appeal and the prospects of success.
[22] An applicant for
condonation must give a full explanation for the delay. In addition,
the explanation must cover the entire
period of delay. And, what is
more, the explanation given must be reasonable.”
[15]
The applicants neither opposed nor argued the condonation
application. Be that as it may condonation should be granted in the
interest of justice taking into account that CIIC was only served
with the interim order and the one extending it two days before
the
hearing on 22 September 2017.
URGENCY
[16]
CIIC contends that the applicants have failed to describe the
circumstances which rendered the main application urgent as urgency
was self-created. For this contention it relies on
LUNA
MEUBEL VERVAARDIGERS (EDMS) BPK v MAKIN (t/a MAKIN’S FURNITURE
MANUFACTURERS)
[4]
where Coetzee J held that:
“
Practitioners
should carefully analyse the facts of each case to determine, for the
purposes of setting the case down for hearing,
whether a greater or
lesser degree of relaxation of the Rules and of the ordinary practice
of the Court is required. The degree
of relaxation should not be
greater than the exigency of the case demands. It must be
commensurate therewith. Mere lip service
to the requirements of Rule
6 (12) (b) will not do and an applicant must make out a case in the
founding affidavit to justify the
particular extent of the departure
from the norm, which is involved in the time and day for which the
matter may be set down.”
[17]
The applicants submit that they first learned of the alleged fraud
during the first part of July 2017. At the time investigations
were
conducted and enquiries to CIIC regarding the outstanding payments
were delayed. They could not give notice to the respondents;
hence
they brought the matter
ex parte
and on urgent basis to prevent the withdrawal of the funds held in
the two abovementioned bank accounts to their prejudice. Therefore
notifying the respondents of the intended litigation would have
served no purpose instead they would have suffered irreparable
harm,
the argument goes.
[18]
Rule 6 (12) (b) of the Uniform Rules of Court provide that in every
application or petition filed in support of any application
under
paragraph (a) of this subrule, the applicant shall set forth
explicitly the circumstances which he avers render the matter
urgent
and the reasons why he claims that he could not be afforded
substantial redress at the hearing in the ordinary course. According
to CIIC the applicants have other remedies available to them.
[19]
In my view the applicants’ concern that if the matter was not
brought
ex parte
and
on urgent basis the monies held in the banks would have been
withdrawn to their disadvantage is unreasonable in the circumstances.
This is so because such allegation is unsubstantiated. The 48 hours’
notice given to the respondents to file opposing papers
was too short
a notice taking into account that the matter was brought to court
without notice. Notably, the urgent application
was launched on 31
July 2017 and granted the same day and yet the applicants did not set
out explicitly the circumstances that
rendered the matter so urgent
such that no notice was given. An applicant should make out a case in
the founding affidavit to justify
the particular extent of the
departure from the norm as required in the Luna Meubel’s case
supra,
which is not
the case
in casu
. For
the reasons stated above it is my view that urgency was indeed
self-created. This is confirmed by Ms Labuschagne’s averment
in
paragraph 208 of the founding affidavit where she states that once
the interim order is granted it would be possible to set
the urgent
application down in the normal course. This clearly shows abuse of
the court process.
[20]
Regarding the reconsideration application the respondents recorded
the following grounds summarised thus:
20.1 Ms Cupido has no
direct and substantial interest in these proceedings and ought not to
have been cited;
20.2 The order was sought
and granted
ex parte
in the absence of the respondents. CIIC became aware of the
urgent application and the order for the first time on 20 September
2017.
20.3 The Commissioner, a
party with direct and substantial interest in the proceedings, has
not been cited.
[21]
The respondents state that on 01 September 2017, the return date, the
notice and/or the interim order was still not served
upon it for a
period of more than thirty days. CIIC submits that the
applicants misled the court and made inaccurate, fallacious
and
unfounded allegations of fraud in order to obtain the interim order.
It seeks an opportunity to file supplementary affidavits
in terms of
Rule 6 (6) of the Uniform Rules of Court in order to deal
comprehensively with all the material issues which could
not be dealt
with due to time constraints. It submits further that interests of
justice would be better served if it is allowed
to set out
substantial facts in response to the applicants’ allegations.
[22]
The respondents claim further that their long-earned goodwill,
freedom of trade and fame has been threatened and negatively
affected
by the order of 22 September 2018 resulting in the loss of their
current and potential clients including a monthly income
of R
5million. Therefore the balance of convenience favours the granting
of the reconsideration application and that no alternative
relief is
available.
[23]
The respondents deny committing fraud and/or theft. They contend that
the Commissioner ought to be joined as a party for the
direct and
substantial interest that it has in the matter and that Ms Cupido,
who is no longer a director of CIIC since 18 August
2017, lacks
direct and/or substantial interest in the proceedings. In paragraphs
33.1 to 33.3 of its founding affidavit the respondents
state that the
Commissioner should explain the following:
“
33.1 its
automatic system generated certificate with last five digitally
unique number: 044984 validly issued by the Commission
to second
applicant on 10 June 2016, the same certificate 044984 was issued to
Neo Solutions (Pty) Ltd allegedly on 02 June 2017;
33.2 its automatic
system generated certificate with last five digitally unique number:
044976 validly issued by the Commissioner
to [the] third applicant on
10 June 2016, same certificate 044976 was issued to Mphe E Ya Lapisa
(Pty) Ltd allegedly on 02 June
2017; and
33.3 its automatic
system generated certificate with last five digitally unique number:
082452 validly issued by the Commissioner
to [the] fourth applicant
on 14 November 2016, same certificate 082452 was issued to Jacker
Sound & Lighting CC allegedly on
14 September 2017 as evinced
from the relevant print out attached herewith marked cumulatively
“GC6A-C”.”
[24]
Mr Cupido denies that Ms Lizette Labuschagne, the deponent to the
founding affidavit in the urgent application on behalf of
the
applicants and an employee of the second applicant (Southern Cross)
the Risk Implementation and Secretarial Manager, has knowledge
regarding the service engagement between the applicants and CIIC. The
respondents argue that the urgent application is fatally
flawed. They
argue further that the applicants have failed to comply with Rules of
Court and their application constitutes an abuse
of court process.
[25]
According to the applicants CIIC has failed to make out a case for
the reconsideration application and it should be dismissed
with
costs. They deny CIIC’s allegations as set out in its affidavit
in support of the application. The applicants submit
further that the
respondents failed to oppose the urgent application taking into
account that they were aware of the return day
before 22 September
2017. They state that the respondents should show; (a) returns of
earnings received from the applicants and
the amounts they paid to
the Commissioner in respect of each applicant; (b) documents received
from the Commissioner; and (c) assessments
received from the
Commissioner in respect of each applicant.
[26]
In my view, the information from the office of the Commissioner is of
vital importance. There is no reason why the it should
not be joined
under the circumstances to show the amounts paid, documents sent to
the respondents and the assessments received
in respect of each
applicant. This kind of information is relevant and confidential. It
is in the knowledge of the Commissioner
only. It can only be divulged
if the Commissioner is a party to the proceedings. It therefore
cannot be said that the Commissioner
has no direct and substantial
interest in these proceedings. There is therefore no reason why the
Commissioner should not provide
and explain all relevant documents at
its disposal. On the other hand this cannot be said of Ms Cupido. She
was a director of CIIC
and that makes her a party having direct and
substantial interest in this matter. She is therefore not wrongly
cited in these proceedings.
[27]
Rule 6 (12) (c) of the Uniform Rules of Court provides that
“
A person
against whom an order was granted in his absence in an urgent
application may by notice set down the matter for reconsideration
of
the order.”
[28]
Southwood J in
LOURENCO
AND OTHERS v FERELA (PTY) LTD AND OTHERS
[5]
defined
the term ‘reconsideration’ thus:
“
In
terms of Rule 6(12) (c) a person against whom an order was granted in
his absence in an urgent application may by notice set
down the
matter for reconsideration of the order. This Rule is very widely
framed and I have no doubt that the word `reconsideration'
must
bear its widest meaning. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary gives
the following three meanings for the word `reconsider':
`1.
To consider (a matter or thing) again; (b) to consider (a decision,
etc) a second time with a view to changing or amending it;
to
rescind, alter.
2.
To reflect on one's conduct with a view to . . . amendment.’”
[29]
In
ISDN
SOLUTIONS (PTY) LTD v CSDN SOLUTIONS CC AND OTHERS
[6]
Farber AJ held:
“
The
Rule has been widely formulated. It permits an aggrieved person
against whom an order was granted in an urgent application
to
have that order reconsidered, provided only that it was granted in
his absence. The underlying pivot to which the exercise of
the power
is coupled is the absence of the aggrieved party at the time of the
grant of the order.
Given
this, the dominant purpose of the Rule seems relatively plain. It
affords to an aggrieved party a mechanism designed to redress
imbalances in, and injustices and oppression flowing from, an order
granted as a matter of urgency in his absence. In circumstances
of
urgency where an affected party is not present, factors which might
conceivably impact on the content and form of an order may
not be
known to either the applicant for urgent relief or the Judge required
to determine it. The order in question may be
either interim or
final in its operation. Reconsideration may involve a deletion of the
order, either in whole or in part, or the
engraftment of additions
thereto.
The
framers of the Rule have not sought to delineate the factors which
might legitimately be taken into reckoning in determining
whether any
particular order falls to be reconsidered. What is plain is that
a wide discretion is intended. Factors relating
to the reasons for
the absence, the nature of the order granted and the period during
which it has remained operative will invariably
fall to be considered
in determining whether a discretion should be exercised in favour of
the aggrieved party. So, too, will questions
relating to whether an
imbalance, oppression or injustice has resulted and, if so, the
nature and extent thereof, and whether redress
is open to attainment
by virtue of the existence of other or alternative remedies. The
convenience of the protagonists must
inevitably enter the equation.
These factors are by no means exhaustive. Each case will turn on its
facts and the peculiarities
inherent therein.
Something
need be said about procedure. Although no hard and fast rule need be
laid down, it seems desirable that a party seeking
to invoke the Rule
ought in an affidavit to detail the form of reconsideration
required and the circumstances upon which it
is based.”
[30]
The court has a wide discretion to exercise in a reconsideration
application and the factors which may determine whether an
order
falls to be reconsidered include the reasons for the absence, the
nature of the order granted and the period during which
it has
remained operative. Other factors to be considered would be whether
an imbalance, oppression or injustice has resulted,
and if so, the
nature and extent thereof, and whether alternative remedies are
available.
[7]
[31]
It is common cause that the interim order was granted in the absence
of the respondents on an urgent basis. It is also common
cause that
the orders were not served upon the respondents timeously. Their
reasons for their absence on 22 September 2017 when
the order was
confirmed are, in my view, reasonable. They had insufficient time to
comprehensively deal with the allegations two
days before the
hearing.
[32]
There is a factual dispute regarding the fraud allegations which is
impossible to resolve on paper without referring the matter
for oral
evidence. The balance of convenience also favours the respondents and
it is also in the interests of justice that the
reconsideration
application be granted with costs.
APPLICATION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[33]
On 07 September 2017 the applicants issued summons against the
respondents, the Cupido’s and Cyril Tee, the third to
fifth
respondents for monies allegedly obtained by fraud or stolen from the
applicants as alluded to earlier.
[34]
The summons was served by the Sheriff on 12 September 2017 upon the
niece of the Cupido’s, Ms Stander, and Ms Tee, the
wife of Mr
Tee. On 28 September 2017 Mr Cupido and Mr Tee filed a notice of
intention to defend. The applicants filed an application
for summary
judgment in terms of Rule 32 (3) of the Uniform Rules of Court on 16
October 2017 which was set down for 03 November
2017. It was then
postponed to 16 February 2017 when it was argued. Ms Lizette
Labuschagne deposed to the affidavit verifying the
cause of action
and the amount claimed. She averred that the respondents have no
bona
fide
defence to the applicants’ claim
and have entered an appearance to defend solely for the purpose of
delay.
[35]
Summary judgment application is regarded as extraordinary and a very
stringent remedy in that it closes the door of the court
to a
defendant in that a judgment is given without a trial. Navsa JA in
JOOB
JOOB INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD v STOCKS MAVUNDLA ZEK JOINT VENTURE
[8]
had this to say about summary judgment:
“
[31] The
rational for summary judgment proceedings is impeccable. The
procedure is not intended to deprive a defendant with a triable
issue
or a sustainable defence of her/his day in court. After almost a
century of successful application in our courts, summary
judgment
proceedings can hardly continue to be described as extraordinary. Our
courts, both of first instance and at appellate
level, have during
that time rightly been trusted to ensure that a defendant with a
triable issue is not shut out. In the Maharaj
case at 425G –
426E, Corbett JA was keen to ensure, first, an examination of whether
there has been sufficient disclosure
by a defendant of the nature and
grounds of his defence and the facts upon which it is founded. The
second consideration is that
the defence so disclosed must be both
bona fide and good in law. A court which is satisfied that this
threshold has been crossed
is then bound to refuse summary judgment.
Corbett JA also warned against requiring of a defendant the precision
apposite to pleadings.
However, the learned judge was equally astute
to ensure that recalcitrant debtors pay what is due to a creditor.
Having regard to its
purpose and its proper application, summary judgment proceedings only
hold terrors and are ‘drastic’
for a defendant who has no
defence. Perhaps the time has come to discard these labels and to
concentrate rather on the proper application
of the rule, as set out
with customary clarity and elegance by Corbett JA in the Maharaj case
at 425G – 426E.”
[36]
Taking into account my earlier finding that there is a dispute of
fact in this matter, it is therefore unnecessary for me to
entertain
the summary judgment application as it is, in my view, pre-mature to
do so. In the circumstances the application ought
to be dismissed
with costs.
In
the circumstances I grant the following order:
1. The order granted
by this Court on 22 September 2017 is reconsidered and set aside with
costs.
2. The applicants are
directed to join the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner of the
Department of Labour as a party in these
proceedings and serve all
copies of the relevant notices and processes on or before 17 August
2018.
3. The applicants are
ordered to set the matter down as a matter of semi-urgency for a date
to be allocated in consultation with
the Judge President of this
Division.
4. The application for
summary judgment is dismissed with costs.
5. The respondents are
granted leave to defend the action.
_____________
BM
PAKATI
JUDGE-
NORTHERN CAPE DIVISION, KIMBERLEY
For
the Applicant: ADV LN WESSELS
Instructed
by: VAN DE WAAL & PARTNERS
For
the Respondents: ADV DL PETERSEN
Instructed
by: ENGELSMAN MAGABANE INC.
[1]
Uniform
Rules of Court which provide that a person against whom an order was
granted in his absence in an urgent application may
by notice set
down the matter for reconsideration of the order.
[2]
Smith NO v Brummer NO
1954 (3) SA 352
(O) at 358A
[3]
[2007] ZACC 24
;
2008 (2) SA 472
(CC) at 477 para [20] and [22]
[4]
1977 (4) SA 135
(W) at 137E-F
[5]
1998 (3) SA 298
(T) at 290C-E
[6]
1996 (4) SA 484
(W)
[7]
Rule 6 (12) (c) of the Uniform Rules of Court at B1-56C
[8]
2009 (5) SA 1
(SCA) at para 31