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[2018] ZAFSHC 114
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Hale v Road Accident Fund (5897/2017) [2018] ZAFSHC 114 (5 July 2018)
FREE STATE HIGH
COURT, BLOEMFONTEIN
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case
No. : 5897/2017
In
the matter between:-
MESA
FRANCIS
HALE
Plaintiff
and
ROAD
ACCIDENT
FUND
Defendant
CORAM:
DAFFUE, J
HEARD:
29 MAY 2018
JUDGMENT
BY
J P DAFFUE
DELIVERED:
5 JULY 2018
I
INTRODUCTION
[1]
On 28 February 2015 Mr Mesa Francis Hale, a 51 year old security
officer residing in Botshabelo, was knocked down by a motor
vehicle
in Bloemfontein.
[2]
He instituted action against the Road Accident Fund (“RAF”)
and after closure of pleadings the matter was set down
for hearing of
both the merits and
quantum.
II
THE PARTIES
[3]
Adv Strydom appeared for the plaintiff, Mr Hale.
[4]
Mr Gcasamba appeared for the defendant, the RAF.
III
STATED CASE
[6]
No evidence was led at the trial and the parties’ legal
representatives handed in a written stated case, requesting
me to
adjudicate the matter without hearing of further arguments.
Defendant conceded the merits 100% and offered to provide
the
customary certificate in terms of s 17(4) of Act 56 of 1996. I
attach the stated case hereto as annexure “A”
in order to
prevent unnecessary repetition.
IV
THE OUTSTANDING DISPUTES
[7]
The only issues in dispute are the award of general damages and the
contingencies to be applied to the agreed loss of income
as
calculated by Mr R J Koch.
[8]
Plaintiff insists on an award of R950 000.00 in respect of
general damages whilst defendant submits that an amount of
R750 000.00 shall be awarded. The parties are therefore
R200 000.00 apart which is a substantial figure.
[9]
Plaintiff submits that contingencies in the usual percentages of 5%
in respect of past loss and 15% in respect of future loss
of income
should be applied and therefore payment in the amount of
R1 574 781.30 should be ordered in respect of total
loss of
income. Defendant submits that the percentages should be 5% and
20% respectively. The difference is a mere
R68 364.60.
V
EVALUATION
[10]
I have carefully considered the agreement in respect of the severity
of plaintiff’s injuries and the consequences thereof
pertaining
to future employment. I have also considered the joint minutes of the
experts as well as the expert summary of Robert
J Koch. It is
not my intention to repeat any of the evidence and/or to evaluate the
evidence in any detail.
[11]
Plaintiff relies on Smit v Padongelukkefonds 2003 (5) QOD E3-11 (T),
Ncama v RAF 2015 (7E3) QOD 7 (ECP) and RAF v Marunga
2003 (5) SA 164
(SCA) in support of the amount claimed in respect of general
damages. Mr Strydom did not try to compare the injuries in
these three cases with the injuries
in casu
or tried to
distinguish those injuries from the injuries of the present
plaintiff. I studied all three judgments and although
differences were detected, the respective injuries are reasonable
similar to those
in casu.
Defendant has not referred me
to any judgments.
[12]
As said, the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs in the above three
judgments are reasonably similar to the plaintiff’s
injuries
in
casu
and therefore the awards may be regarded as guides in
determining general damages
in casu
. In
Smit
R320 000.00 was awarded and the present value of the award is
R719 000.00. In
Ncama
R500 000.00 was awarded
which is equal to R621 000.00 today. In
Marunga
R175 000.00 was awarded on appeal and the present value is about
R520 000.00.
[13]
I do not for one moment wish to be accused of underestimating the
seriousness of plaintiff’s injuries. However,
I am of the
view that an award of R750 000.00 for general damages is more
than generous and fair towards plaintiff and I consider
it to be at
the supreme upper limit of awards for injuries in the broadest terms
close to those suffered by plaintiff. Such
an order shall be
made. The amount suggested by plaintiff is not realistic.
[14]
The “sliding scale” principle relating to contingency
calculations in terms whereof a 1/2 % is allocated for each
year till
retirement was mentioned and explained in RAF v Guedes
2006 (5) SA
583
(A) 588B – C, but although it may be accepted as a guide,
it can never be the alpha and omega. The same court approached
the matter totally different as is apparent from paragraphs [16] –
[19].
[15]
In casu
an expert such as Mr B Mendelowitz accepted the
hearsay evidence of a person at the Human Resources Department of
plaintiff’s
former employer that he would have been promoted to
a more senior position the year after the collision in 2015.
Plaintiff
worked as security guard for the same firm from 2003 and
when his employment terminated he earned approximately R39 000.00
per annum
together with other benefits. On the hearsay
version plaintiff’s salary would increase from 2016 to about
R132 000.00
per annum
plus benefits, an increase of far
in excess of 200%. It is so easy to feed an actuary with
certain information and request
him to calculate loss of income on
such facts. Koch assumed, based on Mendelowitz report –
hearsay upon hearsay - that
plaintiff would be promoted at the
beginning of 2016. The question to be asked is how reliable was
that information.
If plaintiff was indeed interested to improve
himself in order to get a promotion, why did he not do anything about
this in the
previous 12 years? Based on the manner in which
this case was conducted and the RAF’s approach to litigation in
general,
the parties expect the court to accept their agreement on
the facts unconditionally.
[16]
The Supreme Court of Appeal mentioned in
Glenn Marc Bee v RAF
(093/2017)
[2018] ZASCA 52
(29 March 2018) para [30] that a court is
entitled to test the reliability of the joint opinion of experts.
Such agreed opinion
may be rejected if it is based on incorrect
facts. I have no issue with the joint minutes in this regard,
but the principle
remains. Mendelowitz, an expert and
industrial psychologist, received information about plaintiff’s
career prospects
during a telephonic conversation with a person of
the Human Resources Department of plaintiff’s previous
employer.
That information became the basis for calculation of
the claim for loss of income. There was no consultation with
plaintiff’s
direct head or the person in charge of security to
establish whether plaintiff was indeed capable of being promoted.
[17]
However, in light of the agreement by the parties, I decided not to
refer the matter back to Koch to do calculations on the
income that
would have been received, but for promotion. I shall rather try
to see to it that justice is done by refusing
to allow the “normal”
15% contingency deduction as suggested by plaintiff.
[18]
The application of contingencies is largely arbitrary and depends on
the trial judge’s impression of the case. See: Bonesse
v RAF
2014 (7A3) QOD 1 (ECP) at A3-17, a judgment by Pickering J, relying
on the well-known
Bayley
judgment. We all know how
difficult it is to predict the future. The court would have
been in a much better position
to consider the issue of contingencies
if
viva voce
evidence was presented and witnesses properly
cross-examined.
[19]
Having said this, I am satisfied that a 20% contingency deduction in
respect of future income is generous towards plaintiff.
I am
not convinced that Koch’s assumption of a promotion and an
increase in salary of in excess of 200% was realistic. Therefore
even
a higher percentage than 20% might have been justified. In light of
the agreement set out in the stated case it would be unfair
to go
beyond the suggestion of the defendant.
VI
CONCLUSION
[20]
Consequently plaintiff is entitled to the relief agreed upon as well
as payment in his favour as indicated
supra.
The total
amount of the monetary claim is R2 256 417.60, to wit
R750 000.00 for general damages and R1 506 417.60
for
loss of income. There is also no reason why a costs order as
requested shall not be granted.
VII
ORDERS
[21]
It is ordered that
1.
The Defendant shall pay damges to the
plaintiff in the sum of R2 256 417.60 (Two million two
hundred and fifty six thousand
four hundred and seventeen Rand sixty
cent) together with interest thereon at the rate of 10%
per
annum
, calculated from the day
following the lapse of a period of 14 days from the date of the grant
of this order to date of final payment;
2.
The payment referred to in paragraph 1,
supra,
and
the costs referred to in paragraph 4
infra
,
shall be made into the trust account of the Plaintiff’s
attorneys, being SSH Mehlomakulu & Co, with account 53760023945
held at the Sterkspruit Branch of the First National Bank;
3.
The Defendant shall furnish the Plaintiff
with an undertaking, as contemplated in
Section 17(4)(a)
of the
Road
Accident Fund Act, 56 of 1996
, to compensate the Plaintiff for the
costs of the Plaintiff’s future accommodation in a hospital or
nursing home, or for
the treatment of, or rendering of a service or
supply of goods to the Plaintiff, arising from injuries sustained by
Plaintiff in
a motor collision which occurred on the 28
th
day of February 2015, after such costs have been incurred and on
proof thereof;
4.
The Defendant shall pay the Plaintiff’s
taxed or agreed party and party costs on the High Court scale, such
costs to include
the costs occasioned by the employment of the
following expert witnesses, including their reservation and
qualifying fees, fees
for attending court, if any, and the costs of
such expert witnesses attendant upon the consultations between such
expert witnesses
and the Plaintiff’s legal representatives,
inclusive of the travelling and accommodation costs of such legal
representatives
to attend such consultations:-
4.1
Dr Olivier (orthopaedic surgeon);
4.2
Mrs Basson (occupational therapist);
4.3
Mr Mendelowitz (industrial psychologist);
4.4
Dr R Koch (actuary).
_____________
J.
P. DAFFUE, J
On
behalf of applicants: Adv S Strydom
Instructed
by:
SSH
Mehlomakulu& CO
BLOEMFONTEIN
On
behalf of respondents: Mr Gcasamba
Instructed
by:
Maduba
Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN