Hale v Road Accident Fund (5897/2017) [2018] ZAFSHC 114 (5 July 2018)

80 Reportability
Personal Injury Law - Road Accident Fund

Brief Summary

Damages — Road Accident Fund — General damages and loss of income — Plaintiff injured in motor vehicle accident — Defendant conceded merits of claim but disputed quantum — Plaintiff claimed R950,000 for general damages and R1,574,781.30 for loss of income, while defendant offered R750,000 and R1,506,417.60 respectively — Court held that R750,000 for general damages was fair and reasonable, and applied a 20% contingency deduction for future loss of income — Total award granted was R2,256,417.60, including costs.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This was a delictual damages action arising from a motor vehicle collision, instituted against the Road Accident Fund (RAF) in terms of the statutory scheme governing compensation for road accident victims. The proceedings concerned the determination of quantum after the RAF conceded liability.


The plaintiff was Mr Mesa Francis Hale, a 51-year-old security officer. The defendant was the Road Accident Fund, cited in its capacity as the statutory compensator for loss caused by the driving of motor vehicles.


After the close of pleadings, the matter was enrolled for hearing on both merits and quantum. At trial, however, no viva voce evidence was led. The parties’ legal representatives presented a written stated case and requested the court to adjudicate the matter on that basis without further oral argument. The RAF conceded the merits 100% and tendered to furnish the customary undertaking in terms of section 17(4) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996.


The dispute ultimately concerned only the appropriate awards for general damages and the appropriate contingency deductions to be applied to an actuarially calculated loss of income.


2. Material Facts


On 28 February 2015, the plaintiff was knocked down by a motor vehicle in Bloemfontein. At the time, he was employed as a security officer and resided in Botshabelo. These background facts formed the context for the claim and were not treated by the court as controversial.


In the litigation posture placed before the court, liability for the collision was not in issue. The RAF conceded the merits in full, resulting in the court being required to determine quantum only.


The court proceeded on the basis of agreed and/or uncontested material contained in the stated case and expert material, including the joint minutes and an actuarial computation. The plaintiff’s loss of income was calculated by actuary Mr R J Koch, but the parties differed on the contingency deductions to be applied to that agreed computation.


The plaintiff sought R950,000.00 for general damages, while the defendant contended for R750,000.00. In relation to loss of income, the parties were agreed on the actuarial approach as presented, but not on contingencies: they agreed on a 5% deduction for past loss, and differed on future loss (the plaintiff contending for 15%, the defendant for 20%).


A key feature bearing on contingencies, as evaluated by the court, was that the actuarial calculation incorporated an assumption (originating from industrial psychological material) that the plaintiff would have been promoted shortly after the accident, with a significant increase in remuneration. The court noted that this assumption was based on hearsay information obtained from a human resources source at the plaintiff’s former employer and not corroborated by evidence from direct supervisory personnel.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were confined to quantum and were essentially questions of application of law to fact coupled with discretionary evaluation. The court was required to determine, first, what amount constituted fair and reasonable general damages for the plaintiff’s injuries when guided by comparable awards.


Second, the court was required to determine what contingency deductions should be applied to the agreed actuarial calculation of loss of income, particularly in circumstances where the underlying factual premise for a promotion-related earnings increase was viewed as potentially unreliable.


Although the parties had placed joint expert material and agreed computations before the court, the matter also raised the extent to which a court may test the reliability of expert agreements and assumptions when performing the judicial function of determining compensation.


4. Court’s Reasoning


On general damages, the court approached the matter by considering the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries and their employment consequences as reflected in the agreed material and expert joint minutes, while expressly stating that it did not intend to repeat or evaluate the evidence in detail. The plaintiff relied on three prior decisions as comparators. The court indicated that, although there were differences between those cases and the present matter, the injuries were reasonably similar, making the awards useful as guides.


The court took account of the historical awards in those matters and the present-day value of the awards as placed before it. On that comparative exercise, the court concluded that R750,000.00 was “more than generous and fair” and represented the upper limit of awards for broadly similar injuries. The court rejected the plaintiff’s proposed R950,000.00 as unrealistic in the circumstances assessed.


On contingencies, the court reiterated that contingency deductions are not mechanically determined and that the so-called “sliding scale” described in Road Accident Fund v Guedes could serve as a guide but could not be treated as determinative. The court emphasised the inherently uncertain nature of predicting future events and earnings and recorded that the application of contingencies is largely arbitrary, depending on the trial judge’s impression of the case.


The court’s primary concern was directed at the reliability of the earnings premise embedded in the loss-of-income calculation, particularly the assumption that the plaintiff would have been promoted with an increase in remuneration of well in excess of 200%. The court noted that the industrial psychologist had accepted hearsay information from a human resources source, which became foundational for the actuarial modelling. The court questioned the reliability of that information, including the absence of enquiry with personnel directly responsible for security operations and the absence of evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff was in fact likely to be promoted after many years in the same position.


In addressing the parties’ expectation that the court should accept their agreed factual basis, the court referred to authority indicating that a court may test the reliability of joint expert opinions and that such opinions may be rejected where based on incorrect facts. While the court stated it had no issue with the joint minutes as such, it treated the underlying promotion assumption as a factor justifying a more conservative approach through contingencies.


Rather than referring the matter back to the actuary to recompute the loss on a different factual scenario, the court elected, in light of the parties’ agreement and the way the case had been presented without oral evidence, to adjust the outcome by refusing to apply what the plaintiff described as the “normal” 15% future contingency. The court concluded that a 20% future contingency deduction (as proposed by the RAF) was generous to the plaintiff, while adding that an even higher deduction might have been justified but would be unfair given the contours of the parties’ stated positions.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court awarded the plaintiff a total sum of R2,256,417.60, comprising R750,000.00 for general damages and R1,506,417.60 for loss of income (reflecting, on the court’s approach, a 20% future contingency deduction and 5% past contingency deduction as advanced in the parties’ dispute).


The court ordered interest on the capital amount at 10% per annum, calculated from the day after the lapse of 14 days from the date of the order to the date of final payment. Payment was directed to be made into the trust account of the plaintiff’s attorneys identified in the order.


The RAF was ordered to furnish the plaintiff with an undertaking in terms of section 17(4)(a) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 to compensate for qualifying future medical and related costs arising from the injuries, after such costs have been incurred and on proof thereof.


The RAF was ordered to pay the plaintiff’s taxed or agreed party-and-party costs on the High Court scale, including the costs associated with the employment of specified expert witnesses, together with their qualifying, reservation, and attendance fees (where applicable), and associated consultation, travelling, and accommodation costs as described in the order.


Cases Cited


Smit v Padongelukkefonds 2003 (5) QOD E3-11 (T).


Ncama v Road Accident Fund 2015 (7E3) QOD 7 (ECP).


Road Accident Fund v Marunga 2003 (5) SA 164 (SCA).


Road Accident Fund v Guedes 2006 (5) SA 583 (A).


Glenn Marc Bee v Road Accident Fund (093/2017) [2018] ZASCA 52 (29 March 2018).


Bonesse v Road Accident Fund 2014 (7A3) QOD 1 (ECP).


Legislation Cited


Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996, section 17(4) and section 17(4)(a).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The RAF’s concession of merits resulted in the court determining quantum only. General damages were fixed at R750,000.00 as a fair and generous award within the upper range suggested by comparable cases. The loss-of-income award was determined by applying contingencies that included a 20% deduction for future loss, in circumstances where the court regarded the underlying promotion assumption in the actuarial modelling as insufficiently reliable. The plaintiff was awarded R2,256,417.60 in total, together with interest, a statutory section 17(4)(a) undertaking, and party-and-party costs including specified expert costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


In assessing general damages, previous awards in matters involving reasonably similar injuries may serve as guides, while the final determination remains a value judgment directed at fairness and reasonableness in the circumstances of the particular case.


A contingency deduction is not determined by rigid formula. The “sliding scale” approach mentioned in Road Accident Fund v Guedes may be used as a guide but is not conclusive, and the quantification of contingencies remains largely discretionary and dependent on the trial judge’s assessment of the case.


A court is entitled to test the reliability of expert opinions, including joint expert opinions, and may decline to adopt them where they are premised on incorrect or unreliable facts, consistent with the approach referred to in Glenn Marc Bee v Road Accident Fund (093/2017) [2018] ZASCA 52 (29 March 2018).

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
>>
2018
>>
[2018] ZAFSHC 114
|

|

Hale v Road Accident Fund (5897/2017) [2018] ZAFSHC 114 (5 July 2018)

FREE STATE HIGH
COURT, BLOEMFONTEIN
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case
No. : 5897/2017
In
the matter between:-
MESA
FRANCIS
HALE
Plaintiff
and
ROAD
ACCIDENT
FUND
Defendant
CORAM:
DAFFUE, J
HEARD:
29 MAY 2018
JUDGMENT
BY
J P DAFFUE
DELIVERED:
5 JULY 2018
I
INTRODUCTION
[1]
On 28 February 2015 Mr Mesa Francis Hale, a 51 year old security
officer residing in Botshabelo, was knocked down by a motor
vehicle
in Bloemfontein.
[2]
He instituted action against the Road Accident Fund (“RAF”)
and after closure of pleadings the matter was set down
for hearing of
both the merits and
quantum.
II
THE PARTIES
[3]
Adv Strydom appeared for the plaintiff, Mr Hale.
[4]
Mr Gcasamba appeared for the defendant, the RAF.
III
STATED CASE
[6]
No evidence was led at the trial and the parties’ legal
representatives handed in a written stated case, requesting
me to
adjudicate the matter without hearing of further arguments.
Defendant conceded the merits 100% and offered to provide
the
customary certificate in terms of s 17(4) of Act 56 of 1996.  I
attach the stated case hereto as annexure “A”
in order to
prevent unnecessary repetition.
IV
THE OUTSTANDING DISPUTES
[7]
The only issues in dispute are the award of general damages and the
contingencies to be applied to the agreed loss of income
as
calculated by Mr R J Koch.
[8]
Plaintiff insists on an award of R950 000.00 in respect of
general damages whilst defendant submits that an amount of
R750 000.00 shall be awarded. The parties are therefore
R200 000.00 apart which is a substantial figure.
[9]
Plaintiff submits that contingencies in the usual percentages of 5%
in respect of past loss and 15% in respect of future loss
of income
should be applied and therefore payment in the amount of
R1 574 781.30 should be ordered in respect of total
loss of
income.  Defendant submits that the percentages should be 5% and
20% respectively.  The difference is a mere
R68 364.60.
V
EVALUATION
[10]
I have carefully considered the agreement in respect of the severity
of plaintiff’s injuries and the consequences thereof
pertaining
to future employment. I have also considered the joint minutes of the
experts as well as the expert summary of Robert
J Koch.  It is
not my intention to repeat any of the evidence and/or to evaluate the
evidence in any detail.
[11]
Plaintiff relies on Smit v Padongelukkefonds 2003 (5) QOD E3-11 (T),
Ncama v RAF 2015 (7E3) QOD 7 (ECP) and RAF v Marunga
2003 (5) SA 164
(SCA) in support of the amount claimed in respect of general
damages.  Mr Strydom did not try to compare the injuries in
these three cases with the injuries
in casu
or tried to
distinguish those injuries from the injuries of the present
plaintiff.  I studied all three judgments and although

differences were detected, the respective injuries are reasonable
similar to those
in casu.
Defendant has not referred me
to any judgments.
[12]
As said, the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs in the above three
judgments are reasonably similar to the plaintiff’s
injuries
in
casu
and therefore the awards may be regarded as guides in
determining general damages
in casu
. In
Smit
R320 000.00 was awarded and the present value of the award is
R719 000.00.  In
Ncama
R500 000.00 was awarded
which is equal to R621 000.00 today.  In
Marunga
R175 000.00 was awarded on appeal and the present value is about
R520 000.00.
[13]
I do not for one moment wish to be accused of underestimating the
seriousness of plaintiff’s injuries.  However,
I am of the
view that an award of R750 000.00 for general damages is more
than generous and fair towards plaintiff and I consider
it to be at
the supreme upper limit of awards for injuries in the broadest terms
close to those suffered by plaintiff.  Such
an order shall be
made. The amount suggested by plaintiff is not realistic.
[14]
The “sliding scale” principle relating to contingency
calculations in terms whereof a 1/2 % is allocated for each
year till
retirement was mentioned and explained in RAF v Guedes
2006 (5) SA
583
(A) 588B – C, but although it may be accepted as a guide,
it can never be the alpha and omega.  The same court approached

the matter totally different as is apparent from paragraphs [16] –
[19].
[15]
In casu
an expert such as Mr B Mendelowitz accepted the
hearsay evidence of a person at the Human Resources Department of
plaintiff’s
former employer that he would have been promoted to
a more senior position the year after the collision in 2015.
Plaintiff
worked as security guard for the same firm from 2003 and
when his employment terminated he earned approximately R39 000.00
per annum
together with other benefits.  On the hearsay
version plaintiff’s salary would increase from 2016 to about
R132 000.00
per annum
plus benefits, an increase of far
in excess of 200%.  It is so easy to feed an actuary with
certain information and request
him to calculate loss of income on
such facts.  Koch assumed, based on Mendelowitz report –
hearsay upon hearsay - that
plaintiff would be promoted at the
beginning of 2016.  The question to be asked is how reliable was
that information.
If plaintiff was indeed interested to improve
himself in order to get a promotion, why did he not do anything about
this in the
previous 12 years?  Based on the manner in which
this case was conducted and the RAF’s approach to litigation in
general,
the parties expect the court to accept their agreement on
the facts unconditionally.
[16]
The Supreme Court of Appeal mentioned in
Glenn Marc Bee v RAF
(093/2017)
[2018] ZASCA 52
(29 March 2018) para [30] that a court is
entitled to test the reliability of the joint opinion of experts.
Such agreed opinion
may be rejected if it is based on incorrect
facts.  I have no issue with the joint minutes in this regard,
but the principle
remains.  Mendelowitz, an expert and
industrial psychologist, received information about plaintiff’s
career prospects
during a telephonic conversation with a person of
the Human Resources Department of plaintiff’s previous
employer.
That information became the basis for calculation of
the claim for loss of income.  There was no consultation with
plaintiff’s
direct head or the person in charge of security to
establish whether plaintiff was indeed capable of being promoted.
[17]
However, in light of the agreement by the parties, I decided not to
refer the matter back to Koch to do calculations on the
income that
would have been received, but for promotion.  I shall rather try
to see to it that justice is done by refusing
to allow the “normal”
15% contingency deduction as suggested by plaintiff.
[18]
The application of contingencies is largely arbitrary and depends on
the trial judge’s impression of the case. See: Bonesse
v RAF
2014 (7A3) QOD 1 (ECP) at A3-17, a judgment by Pickering J, relying
on the well-known
Bayley
judgment.  We all know how
difficult it is to predict the future.  The court would have
been in a much better position
to consider the issue of contingencies
if
viva voce
evidence was presented and witnesses properly
cross-examined.
[19]
Having said this, I am satisfied that a 20% contingency deduction in
respect of future income is generous towards plaintiff.
I am
not convinced that Koch’s assumption of a promotion and an
increase in salary of in excess of 200% was realistic. Therefore
even
a higher percentage than 20% might have been justified. In light of
the agreement set out in the stated case it would be unfair
to go
beyond the suggestion of the defendant.
VI
CONCLUSION
[20]
Consequently plaintiff is entitled to the relief agreed upon as well
as payment in his favour as indicated
supra.
The total
amount of the monetary claim is R2 256 417.60, to wit
R750 000.00 for general damages and R1 506 417.60
for
loss of income.  There is also no reason why a costs order as
requested shall not be granted.
VII
ORDERS
[21]
It is ordered that
1.
The Defendant shall pay damges to the
plaintiff in the sum of R2 256 417.60 (Two million two
hundred and fifty six thousand
four hundred and seventeen Rand sixty
cent) together with interest thereon at the rate of 10%
per
annum
, calculated from the day
following the lapse of a period of 14 days from the date of the grant
of this order to date of final payment;
2.
The payment referred to in paragraph 1,
supra,
and
the costs referred to in paragraph 4
infra
,
shall be made into the trust account of the Plaintiff’s
attorneys, being SSH Mehlomakulu & Co, with account 53760023945

held at the Sterkspruit Branch of the First National Bank;
3.
The Defendant shall furnish the Plaintiff
with an undertaking, as contemplated in
Section 17(4)(a)
of the
Road
Accident Fund Act, 56 of 1996
, to compensate the Plaintiff for the
costs of the Plaintiff’s future accommodation in a hospital or
nursing home, or for
the treatment of, or rendering of a service or
supply of goods to the Plaintiff, arising from injuries sustained by
Plaintiff in
a motor collision which occurred on the 28
th
day of February 2015, after such costs have been incurred and on
proof thereof;
4.
The Defendant shall pay the Plaintiff’s
taxed or agreed party and party costs on the High Court scale, such
costs to include
the costs occasioned by the employment of the
following expert witnesses, including their reservation and
qualifying fees, fees
for attending court, if any, and the costs of
such expert witnesses attendant upon the consultations between such
expert witnesses
and the Plaintiff’s legal representatives,
inclusive of the travelling and accommodation costs of such legal
representatives
to attend such consultations:-
4.1
Dr Olivier (orthopaedic surgeon);
4.2
Mrs Basson (occupational therapist);
4.3
Mr Mendelowitz (industrial psychologist);
4.4
Dr R Koch (actuary).
_____________
J.
P. DAFFUE, J
On
behalf of applicants: Adv S Strydom
Instructed
by:
SSH
Mehlomakulu& CO
BLOEMFONTEIN
On
behalf of respondents: Mr Gcasamba
Instructed
by:
Maduba
Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN