Small Enterprise Finance Agency SOC Ltd v Re-Yakgona Transport CC and Another (5579/2017) [2018] ZAFSHC 115 (4 July 2018)

80 Reportability
Banking and Finance

Brief Summary

Summary Judgment — Opposed application — Plaintiff sought summary judgment for loan repayment and return of vehicles following defendants' breach of loan and instalment sale agreements — Defendants disputed the amount owed, claiming lack of evidence regarding the validity of certificates of balance — Court held that the plaintiff had established its case through undisputed facts, and the defendants' failure to challenge the validity of the agreements or the plaintiff's compliance warranted the granting of summary judgment.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The proceedings concerned an opposed application for summary judgment brought in the High Court of South Africa, Free State Division, Bloemfontein. The applicant/plaintiff was Small Enterprise Finance Agency SOC Ltd and the respondents/defendants were Re-Yakgona Transport CC (first defendant) and Joseph Diheke Mphuthi (second defendant).


The procedural posture was that the plaintiff had instituted action on contractual claims arising from a developmental term loan agreement, two instalment sale agreements in respect of heavy load vehicles, and an unlimited deed of suretyship. After the defendants entered an appearance to defend, the plaintiff applied for summary judgment. The summary judgment application was argued on 28 June 2018 and judgment was delivered on 4 July 2018.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was the enforcement of alleged indebtedness under the loan and instalment sale agreements, the cancellation of the instalment sale agreements, the return of the financed vehicles, and the second defendant’s alleged liability as surety and co-principal debtor. The opposition to summary judgment narrowed to whether the plaintiff had adequately proved indebtedness for purposes of summary judgment, given the defendants’ challenge to the certificates of balance relied upon in the particulars of claim.


Material Facts


It was common cause (or effectively not disputed in the summary judgment proceedings) that the plaintiff and the first defendant concluded a written developmental term loan agreement in terms of which the plaintiff advanced funds to the first defendant. The loan amount advanced was alleged to be R 413 430.24, and the total loan amount (inclusive of interest) was payable by 31 May 2017. The plaintiff’s case was that it performed by advancing the monies and that the first defendant breached by failing to pay instalments as required and by failing to settle the loan and interest by the due date.


It was also not disputed that the plaintiff and the first defendant concluded two written instalment sale agreements relating to two Mercedes Benz Actros heavy load vehicles, each at a purchase price of approximately R 1 580 181.02, with a total collectable alleged to be R 2 217 931.78 per agreement. The payment structure alleged was monthly instalments over 57 months, with interest at a fixed rate of 13.50% per annum, calculated daily and debited monthly. The plaintiff alleged that the first defendant took possession of the vehicles and later breached the instalment sale agreements by failing to make regular payment of instalments and other amounts due.


On the same date as the instalment sale arrangements (as pleaded), the second defendant executed an unlimited suretyship, binding himself as surety and co-principal debtor in solidum for the first defendant’s indebtedness to the plaintiff in respect of past, present, and future debts. The terms relied upon included that the surety would, on demand, pay all liabilities due by the first defendant to the plaintiff, including interest and enforcement-related costs and charges.


A further material feature of the contractual framework relied upon by the plaintiff was that each of the agreements contained a clause providing that a certificate signed by a specified category of plaintiff representative (authorised signatory, or director/manager in the case of the suretyship) would constitute prima facie proof of the amount owing, the applicable interest rate, and related facts for purposes including provisional and summary judgment. The plaintiff attached certificates of balance to its particulars of claim, all signed by Fredie Botha (described as a management accountant).


The defendants’ opposition did not substantively dispute the existence of the agreements, their terms, the plaintiff’s performance in advancing funds/delivering the vehicles, the suretyship, the defendants’ obligations to make payments, or the delivery of demands. The opposition instead focused on a targeted challenge: the defendants contended that the certificates of balance were defective because the signatory did not allege (in the certificates or otherwise) that he was an authorised signatory (or, for the suretyship certificate, a director or manager) as required by the relevant contractual clauses. In their papers, the defendants also asserted that payments had been made and that they could not establish the extent of their indebtedness on the papers as they stood, but they did not set out a quantified counter-position or factual reconstruction of the account.


Legal Issues


The central legal issue was whether, on an application for summary judgment, the defendants had satisfied the requirements of Uniform Rule 32(3)(b) by disclosing fully, under oath, a bona fide defence and the material facts relied upon for that defence.


Within that overarching inquiry, the dispute primarily concerned the application of law to the pleaded and undisputed contractual facts, namely whether the defendants’ technical attack on the certificates of balance (based on the signatory’s alleged lack of stated authority/status) constituted a bona fide defence sufficient to defeat summary judgment. The court was also required to assess whether the defendants’ assertions amounted to a bare denial or speculative opposition, as opposed to a properly particularised defence supported by material facts.


Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter on the basis that the defendants had, in substance, left undisputed the foundational elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action: the conclusion of the loan agreement, the two instalment sale agreements, the suretyship, the relevant contractual obligations, the plaintiff’s performance, and the existence of breach in the form of non-payment after demand. The court noted that this narrowing of issues meant the opposition turned on the single point regarding the validity and sufficiency of the certificates of balance.


In addressing that point, the court considered the defendants’ reliance on the proposition that the certificates did not comply with the contractual requirements because the signatory (Fredie Botha) did not state that he was an authorised signatory (and, in relation to the suretyship, did not state he was a director or manager). The court treated this as insufficient to constitute a substantive defence in summary judgment proceedings, particularly where the defendants did not advance a factual basis showing that the amounts claimed were incorrect.


The court applied Uniform Rule 32(3)(b), emphasising that a defendant resisting summary judgment must satisfy the court, by affidavit (or with leave by oral evidence), that a bona fide defence exists, and must disclose fully the nature and grounds of the defence and the material facts relied upon. The court characterised the defendants’ statement that payments were made and that they could not establish the extent of indebtedness as amounting to a bare denial, which did not meet the rule’s threshold because it did not set out material facts demonstrating a triable defence.


The court also had regard to the contractual provisions (including clause 22.2 of the loan agreement and clause 18.2 of the instalment sale agreements) contemplated in the defendants’ own argument, which expressly required a borrower disputing a certificate to adduce evidence in rebuttal. The court held that, notwithstanding those provisions, the defendants did not provide rebuttal evidence challenging the correctness or accuracy of the amounts reflected in the certificates. Instead, they relied on the contention that the certificates were formally defective due to the signatory’s alleged failure to assert authority.


In addition, the court relied on the reasoning in Nedperm Bank Ltd v Verbri Projects CC 1993 (3) All SA 215 (W) to reject an approach in which a defendant merely claims uncertainty about indebtedness and seeks to avoid summary judgment on the basis that something might emerge at trial. The court accepted the principle that a defendant cannot “sit back” and oppose summary judgment on speculative grounds without setting out facts supporting a genuine defence.


Finally, the court reiterated the policy basis of summary judgment, with reference to Maharaj v Barkley’s National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A) and Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint Venture 2009 (5) SA 1 (SCA), namely that summary judgment is aimed at preventing sham defences that delay a plaintiff’s enforcement of clear rights. Applying those principles, the court concluded that the defendants’ objections were “devoid of substance” and did not comply with the requirements of Rule 32(3)(b), and that no plausible and bona fide defence had been established to resist summary judgment.


Outcome and Relief


The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff in terms of prayers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the notice of application.


The relief granted included judgment against the defendants in solidum (the one paying the other to be absolved) for payment of R 366 182.12 together with interest at 13.50% per annum, calculated daily and compounded monthly in arrears from 1 April to date of payment. The court also granted relief against the first defendant confirming cancellation of the instalment sale agreements and ordering the return of the two Mercedes Benz Actros vehicles identified by chassis and engine numbers.


In addition, the order provided that judgment for any further amount to which the plaintiff might ultimately be entitled (as contemplated in prayer 5 of the particulars of claim) was postponed sine die pending the return of the assets, their subsequent disposal, and the calculation of the amount to which the plaintiff would be entitled.


The court ordered costs to follow the result, granting costs on an attorney and client scale.


Cases Cited


Nedperm Bank Ltd v Verbri Projects CC 1993 (3) All SA 215 (W).


Maharaj v Barkley’s National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A).


Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint Venture 2009 (5) SA 1 (SCA).


Legislation Cited


No specific legislation was cited in the judgment.


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rule 32(3)(b).


Held


The court held that the defendants failed to satisfy the requirements of Uniform Rule 32(3)(b) because their opposing affidavit did not fully disclose the nature and grounds of a bona fide defence and the material facts relied upon. The challenge directed at the certificates of balance, based on the signatory’s alleged failure to allege authority or status, was not accompanied by rebuttal evidence disputing the correctness or accuracy of the indebtedness reflected in those certificates.


The court further held that the defendants’ stance amounted to an impermissible bare denial/speculative opposition to summary judgment, and that the plaintiff was therefore entitled to summary judgment, with costs following the event on the attorney-and-client scale.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that summary judgment is available to a plaintiff with an apparently unimpeachable claim where the defendant fails to demonstrate a genuine triable issue. The mechanism is directed at preventing sham defences that serve only to delay enforcement of contractual rights.


The judgment reaffirmed that under Uniform Rule 32(3)(b) a defendant must place before the court, on affidavit (or permitted oral evidence), a defence that is bona fide, and must fully disclose the defence’s nature and grounds as well as the material facts underpinning it. A defendant’s mere assertion of uncertainty about indebtedness, or a generalized statement that payments were made without factual particularisation, is insufficient.


The judgment further applied the principle that where contractual clauses provide for certificates of balance to serve as prima facie proof, a defendant who disputes a certificate’s contents must do more than raise a technical objection; the defendant is required to adduce rebuttal evidence challenging the correctness or accuracy of the claimed indebtedness if it is to establish a bona fide defence in summary judgment proceedings.

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[2018] ZAFSHC 115
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Small Enterprise Finance Agency SOC Ltd v Re-Yakgona Transport CC and Another (5579/2017) [2018] ZAFSHC 115 (4 July 2018)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case
number: 5579/2017
In
the matter between:
SMALL
ENTERPRISE
FINANCE
Plaintiff
AGENCY
SOC LTD
and
RE-YAKGONA TRANSPORT
CC
1
st
Defendant
JOSEPH DIHEKE
MPHUTHI
2
nd
Defendant
CORAM:
MHLAMBI J,
HEARD ON:
28 JUNE 2018
DELIVERED
ON:
04 JULY 2018
MHLAMBI,
J
[1]
This an opposed summary judgment application against:

A: THE
DEFENDANTS, IN SOLIDUM, THE ONE TO PAY, THE OTHER TO BE ABSOLVED,
FOR:
1.
Payment
of the sum of R 366 182.12, together with the interest thereon
at the rate of 13.50% per annum, calculated daily and
compounded
monthly in arrears as aforesaid, calculated from 1 April to date of
payment, both days inclusive;
B: THE FIRST
DEFENDNAT FOR:
2.
Confirmation
of cancellation of the Agreement marked
Annexure “C1”
and “C3”
to Plaintiff’s particulars of
claim and forfeiture of all payment made in terms thereof;
3.
Return
of the asset – a Mercedes Benz Actros Heavy load Vehicle
bearing Chassis number WDB9342416L941664 and Engine number

541944C0965468;
4.
Return
of the assets – Mercedes Benz Actros Heavy Load Vehicle
bearing Chassis number WDB9342416L941666 and Engine number

541944C0965453;
C: THE DEFENDANT,
IN SOLIDUM, THE ONE TO PAY, THE OTHER TO BE ABSOLVED, FOR:
5.
That
judgment for the amount Plaintiff may be entitled to per prayer (5)
of the particulars of claim herein, together with interest
thereon,
be postponed sine dies, pending return of the assets per (3)-(4), its
subsequent disposal and calculation of the amount
to which Plaintiff
is entitled;
6.
Cost
of suite (sic) to be taxed on an attorney & client scale; and
7.
Further
and/or alternative relief.”
[2]
The first claim is based on a written agreement of loan in terms of
which an amount of R 413 430.24 was lent to the first
defendant
at the latter’s special instance and request. The total loan
amount, inclusive of interest, was payable in full
by 31 May 2017.
[3]
It was a term of the agreement that a statement purporting to be
signed by any authorised signatory of the plaintiff (whose

appointment or authority need not be proved) shall for all purposes,
including provisional and summary judgment, be deemed to be
prima
facie
proof of all amounts owing to the plaintiff, and of the
interest rate applicable to the outstanding balance from time to
time.
[4]
The plaintiff complied with its obligations and advanced the monies
as per the loan agreement to the first defendant. The first
defendant
breached the loan agreement by not making payment of the required
instalments as and when due and payable and by not
settling the total
loan amount and interest by 31 May 2017.
[5]
The plaintiff and the first defendant entered into a written
instalment sale agreement in terms of which the plaintiff  sold

to the defendant a certain Mercedes Benz Actros Heavy Load Vehicle
bearing VIN number WDB9342416L941664 and Engine number 541944C0965468

for R 1 580 181.02 and a total collectable of R
2 217 931.78. The first defendant would pay the total
collectable
by way of fifty- seven monthly instalments in the amount
of R 38 240.30 each beginning on 29 February 2016 and a final
payment
of R 38 234.68 on 30 November 2020. Interest on the
principal debt due or the balance thereof would be chargeable at a
fixed
rate of interest of 13.50% per annum from 30 November 2015,
calculated daily and debited monthly.
[6]
A certificate issued by an authorised signatory of the plaintiff
whose appointment need not be proved, stating the amount of
first
defendant’s indebtedness to the plaintiff, the interest rate
charged and the date from which interest is to be calculated
in terms
of the agreement would be sufficient proof of such indebtedness.
[7]
A second written instalment sale agreement was entered into between
the plaintiff and the first defendant in terms of which
the plaintiff
sold to the first defendant a certain Mercedes Ben Actros Heavy Load
Vehicles bearing Chassis number WDB9342416L941666
and Engine number
541944C0965453, for the amount of R 1 580 182.02 and a
total collectable of R 2 217 931.78.
The first defendant
would pay the total collectable in fifty- seven monthly instalments
in the amount of R 38 240.30 each
with effect from 29 February
2016 and a final payment of R 38 234.68 on 30 November 2020.
Interest would be chargeable on
the principal debt due or the balance
thereof at a fixed rate of interest of 13.50% per annum from 30
November 2015, calculated
daily and debited monthly.
[8]
A certificate issued by an authorised signatory of the plaintiff,
whose appointment need not be proved, stating the amount of
the first
defendant’s indebtedness to the plaintiff, the interest rate
charged and the date from which interest was to be
calculated in
terms of the agreement, would be sufficient proof of such
indebtedness.
[9]
The plaintiff met all the relevant terms of the agreement and the
first defendant took position of the vehicle. The first defendant

committed a breach of the agreement in that it failed to make regular
payment of instalments and other amounts due and payable
as per the
agreement.
[10]
On  the same date, the second defendant  bound
himself in writing, to an unlimited amount as surety and co-principal

debtor
in solidum
for the first defendant’s indebtedness
to the plaintiff, whether for past, present or future debts.
[11]
The surety would, on demand, pay to the plaintiff all liabilities,
due by the first defendant to the plaintiff, including
all
interest, cost, commissions, charges and expenses which the plaintiff
might  incur in obtaining payment of the sums of
money due to
the plaintiff from the first defendant arising out of the secured
obligations as defined in the deed of suretyship.
[12]
A certificate signed by a director or manager of the plaintiff, whose
appointment or authority need not be proved, as to the
amount owing
at any time, the date such amount is due and payable, interest and
the rate of interest payable thereon would be
prima facie
proof
of the facts stated therein and of the surety’s indebtedness.
[13]
The defendants opposed the application for summary judgment and
raised the following defences:

CLAIM1-
THE DEVELOPMENTAL TERM LOAN ARGEEMENT
9.
We
dispute the amount alleged to be indebted to the Applicant.
10.
The
applicant does not attach a statement from which the amount and
interest can be ascertained.
11.
The
Applicant, pertaining to evidencing the 1
st
Respondent’s alleged indebtedness, places reliance on the
construction of clause 22 to Annexure “A1”, the
Development
Term Loan Agreement, which provides as follows:
22.1
A certificate issued by an authorized signatory of the Lender, whose
status and designation need not be proven, shall be prima
facie proof
of the status of the facts stated therein with regard to, including
but not limited to, any amount owing to the Lender
by the Borrower,
the interest rate applicable to such loan, the date from which
interest is to be calculated, the cause of action
ad the fact that
the Amount Outstanding is due and payable.
22.2
In the event that the Borrower disputes the correctness or accuracy
of any aspect of the content of the certificate, the Borrower
shall
be obliged to adduce evidence in rebuttal ad the onus to lead and
prove such rebuttal evidence shall similarly rest on the
Borrower.
12.
To
this end the Applicant relies further on the content of Annexure “B”
to its Particulars of Claim as support of our
alleged indebtedness to
the Applicant.
13. Upon perusal of
the papers herein it became apparent that the signatory of Annexure
“B”, one Fredie Botha, made
no allegation that he is an
authorized signatory of the Applicant.
14. In the premise I
submit that the Certificate of Balance, Annexure “B” is
of no consequence and does not prima facie
establish any
indebtedness.
15. In the premise I
submit that the 1
st
claim stands to be
dismissed with costs on this basis alone.”
[14]
The defences raised in respect of claims two and three,
i.e
.
the two instalment sale agreements, were the same as in claim
one. The defences to the suretyship agreement was the same
as in the
previous claims save  that it was alleged, in defence of this
claim, that the said Ferdie Botha made no allegation
that he was a
manager or director of the applicant.
[15]
The defendants arrived at the following conclusion:

CONCLUSION:
37. In the premise I
submit that there is no evidence before Court pertaining to our
indebtedness as alleged or at all.
38. We are prejudiced
I having to respond to the Applicant’s claim as it stands due
to lack statements.
39. Payments were made
to the Applicant and can we not as it stands establish our
indebtedness and extent thereof, to the Applicant.
WHEREFORE
we
pray that the Applicant’s Application for Summary Judgment be
dismissed with costs.”
[16]
It was contended both in the heads of argument and oral address by
the plaintiff’s counsel that the opposing affidavit
to the
application for summary judgment did not dispute the following:

4.2.1 The first
defendant and the Plaintiff entered into and concluded a loan
agreement and this is not disputed.
4.2.2 The First
Defendant and the Plaintiff entered into and concluded two (2)
Instalment Sale Agreements and this is not disputed.
4.2.3 The terms and
conditions of the abovementioned agreements are not disputed.
4.2.4 The First
Defendant’s contractual obligations and in particular that the
First Defendant was obliged to make certain
monthly payments to the
Plaintiff are not disputed.
4.2.5 It is not
disputed that the Plaintiff complied with its contractual
obligations.
4.2.6 The Second
Defendant’s liability towards the Plaintiff is not disputed.
4.2.7 The Plaintiff’s
remedies, should the Defendants breach any of the terms and
conditions of the abovementioned agreements
are not disputed;
4.2.8 It is not
disputed that the Plaintiff delivered letters of demand to the
Defendants and that despite delivering the same no
further payments
were received.”
[17]
Neither in writing nor in oral argument did the defendant’s
counsel contest or dispute this submission made on behalf
of the
plaintiff. The issues were narrowed to the only issue raised by the
defendants, namely, the validity of the various certificates
of
balance annexed to the particulars of claim. The said Ferdie Botha
signed the three certificates of balance in his capacity
as
management accountant
[1]
. The
issue raised by the defendants was that no allegations whatsoever
where made that Mr Botha was duly authorised to issue the

certificates.
[2]
The
certificates were therefore not sufficient for purposes of the
provisions of the various written agreements and were fatal
to the
plaintiff’s case.
[18]
In support of his argument, the defendant’s counsel referred to
the case of
Nedperm
Bank Ltd v Verbri Projects CC
[3]
.
This
decision does not assist the defendants as it was stated in that case
that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to rely upon
the
certificate to have established the indebtedness relied upon. A
defendant in summary judgment proceedings “
cannot
sit back supinely and justifiably say: ‘Well you took my
documents. I don’t know whether I owe you any money.
I might, I
might not, but don’t give summary judgment against me because
when it comes to a trial I might be able to find
in the documents
that you provide some basis for saying that I don’t owe you any
money anyway’.
That is
not good enough if one has to demonstrate bona fides as the Rule
requires, nor is it good enough if one has to set out one’s

defence fully by way of facts as opposed to speculative
oppositions”
[4]
[19]
Uniform Rule 32 (3) (b) provides that:
Upon the hearing of an
application for summary judgment the defendant may-
(a) …….
(b) Satisfy the court
by affidavit (which shall be delivered before noon on the court day
but one preceding the day on which the
application is to be heard) or
with the leave of the court by oral evidence of himself or of any
other person who can swear positively
to the fact that he has bona
fide defence to the action; such affidavit or evidence shall disclose
fully the nature and grounds
of the defence and the material facts
relied upon therefor.”
[20]
In paragraph 39 of the opposing affidavit the defendants state that

Payments
were made to the applicant and can we not as it stands establish our
indebtedness and extent thereof, to the applicant.”
This
represents a bare denial which does not disclose fully the nature and
grounds of and the material facts relied upon by the
defendant for
his defence. Summary judgment is granted on supposition that the
plaintiff’s claim is unimpeachable because
the defendant has no
proper defence.
[5]
It was
intended to prevent sham defences from defeating the rights of
parties by delay, and at the same time causing great loss
to
plaintiffs who were endeavouring to enforce their rights.
[6]
[21]
Despite the provisions of clauses 22.2 of the developmental term loan
agreement and 18.2 of the two instalment sale agreements
the
borrower, as he was obliged to do, failed to adduce evidence in
rebuttal of the correctness or accuracy of any aspect of the
content
of the certificates of balance. The defendants were content with the
allegations that Ferdie Botha did not allege that
he was an
authorised signatory of the applicant. These defences are devoid of
substance and failed to comply with the requirements
of Rule 32 (3)
(b). I am of the view that no plausible and bona fide defence was
established to stave off the application for summary
judgment. In the
circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment as
claimed in the notice of set down. The costs should
follow the event.
[22]
I therefore make the following order:
Order
An
order is granted in terms of prayers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the
notice of application.
____________
MHLAMBI,
J
Counsel
for the Applicant: Adv. JC Coetzer
Instructed
by: Honey Attorneys
Northridge
Mall
Kenneth
Kaunda Road
Bloemfontein
Counsel
for Respondents: Adv A Sander
Instructed
by: Peyper Attorneys
Dynarc
House
200
Nelson Mandela Avenue
Brandwag
Bloemfontein
[1]
Annexures
“E1”, “E2”, “E3” pages 81 to 83
of the indexed bundle
[2]
Paragraph 12 page 7 of the respondents heads of argument
[3]
1993 (3) All SA 215
W
[4]
Nedperm page 223 paragraphs B-D
[5]
Maharaj v Barkley’s National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A)
[6]
Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint Venture
2009 (5) SA 1
(SCA) para 31