Strauss N.O. and Another v Terblanche N.O. and Others (5315/2017) [2018] ZAFSHC 105 (7 June 2018)

80 Reportability
Contract Law

Brief Summary

Contract — Impossibility of performance — Plaintiffs sought cancellation of sale agreement and restoration of property ownership — Defendants, as trustees, entered into sale agreements despite lack of ownership of property — Plaintiffs failed to serve written demand as required by agreement prior to cancellation — Court held that plaintiffs' action was premature due to non-compliance with contractual terms, upholding defendants' exception with costs.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings took the form of an exception to the plaintiffs’ particulars of claim in an action instituted in the High Court of South Africa, Free State Division, Bloemfontein. The plaintiffs (Sandra Strauss N.O. and Johann Wolmarans N.O.) acted in their representative capacities as trustees of the Sandra Trust. The defendants included Charl Jean Terblanche N.O. and Mark John Azar N.O. (as trustees of the Pro-Spes Business Trust), the Registrar of Deeds, Bloemfontein, and further defendants cited in the summons, including Charl Jean Terblanche (in his personal capacity) and Wynand Daniël Botha.


The plaintiffs instituted action seeking, in substance, the cancellation of a deed of transfer relating to the farm Damplaats No. 49 (district Ventersburg, Free State) and the restoration of ownership to the plaintiffs (alternatively an order compelling transfer of the property back to the Sandra Trust trustees). The defendants raised several grounds of exception, contending that the particulars of claim failed to disclose a cause of action and that the action was premature.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned the contractual consequences of a sequence of written agreements for the sale of an enterprise and/or immovable property, in which payment was linked to a contemplated transfer of another property (Oubos 28), and the plaintiffs’ reliance on impossibility of performance and a claimed entitlement to cancellation and restitutio in integrum.


2. Material Facts


The material facts, as relied upon by the court, were largely common cause and were drawn from the pleaded agreements attached to the particulars of claim.


On 23 October 2014, the trustees of the Sandra Trust (as seller) and the trustees of the Pro-Spes Business Trust (as purchaser) entered into a written agreement styled a “koopkontrak van vaste eiendom”, in terms of which the seller sold to the purchaser the business or letting enterprise operated on the farm Damplaats 49 as a going concern. This agreement was attached to the particulars of claim as annexure “B”.


Thereafter, the parties concluded a written cancellation agreement, attached as annexure “C”, in terms of which the parties jointly cancelled the 23 October 2014 agreement.


On 19 December 2014, the parties concluded a further written agreement, annexure “D”, for the sale of the farm Damplaats at a reduced purchase price. Clause 3.1 of annexure “D” recorded that set-off (skuldvergelyking) would be applied in respect of the purchase price of Oubos 28 Landgoed, Bloemfontein, which property, according to the clause, would be sold by the purchaser to the seller on a date when the purchaser was able to do so. Annexure “D” also contained a term (referred to by the court as paragraph/clause 14) which required the plaintiffs to serve a written demand calling upon the defendants to take steps to effect transfer of Oubos 28 to the plaintiffs within seven days, failing which the plaintiffs would be entitled to cancel.


The plaintiffs alleged (and pleaded as part of their case) that the first and second defendants were not the owners of Oubos 28 when annexures “B” and “D” were entered into, that the first defendant knew Oubos 28 was registered in the name of another person, and that he knew he could not sell and transfer Oubos 28 to the plaintiffs. The particulars of claim also alleged that the first defendant, as author of annexures “B”, “C”, and “D”, acted mala fide with an intention to deceive the trustees of the Sandra Trust.


The judgment recorded the objective position regarding Oubos 28: it had been transferred to Jacubus Francois Opperman on 22 October 2010 (Deed of Transfer ST 1963/2010), and Opperman later sold it to Dirk Johannes Malan on 24 June 2015 (Deed of Transfer ST 10064/2015). The court treated the pleaded consequence relied upon by the plaintiffs as being that performance under annexure “D” (in relation to the transfer of Oubos 28) was impossible.


A fact treated as decisive for the exception was that, on the plaintiffs’ own case and on the terms of annexure “D”, the plaintiffs had not complied with the contractual procedure requiring a written demand prior to either instituting action or cancelling the agreement.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were directed to whether the plaintiffs’ particulars of claim disclosed a cause of action in light of the contractual terms and the pleaded reliance on impossibility. In particular, the court had to determine whether, assuming the pleaded allegations to be true for purposes of exception, the plaintiffs were entitled to claim cancellation and restitution without complying with the contractual demand mechanism contained in annexure “D”.


The dispute involved a combination of legal questions (the effect of impossibility of performance on contractual obligations; the consequences of a party causing impossibility; and the enforceability of contractual procedural requirements) and the application of law to the pleaded facts (whether the plaintiffs’ pleaded case could succeed despite non-compliance with the demand clause).


Although the defendants raised several grounds of exception, the court’s determination focused on the legal consequence of the plaintiffs’ pleaded reliance on impossibility together with their failure to follow the contractually stipulated enforcement and cancellation procedure.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the exception on the basis of principles applicable to impossibility of performance in contract, including the proposition that a party who causes impossibility cannot take advantage of it and may remain liable on the contract. The court referred to authority for the proposition that where impossibility is caused by a party, that party may be held liable and the other party may be entitled to enforce the contract.


In articulating the relevant doctrinal framework, the court adopted the formulation that impossibility must be absolute (not merely probable), absolute rather than relative, not due to the fault of either party, and subject to any contrary common intention of the parties. The judgment emphasised that where a party promises to do something which can be done in general but cannot be done by that party, that party remains liable; and where that party has caused the impossibility, the party cannot escape liability by invoking impossibility.


Applying these principles, the court concluded that it was “evident” that the first defendant and/or the Pro-Spes Business Trust would be liable on the contract, with the consequence that the plaintiffs were, in principle, free to enforce the agreement. However, the court held that enforcement had to occur in accordance with the contract’s own terms.


The court treated clause/paragraph 14 of annexure “D” as imposing a procedural step: the plaintiffs were obliged to serve a written demand before either issuing summons or cancelling the agreement. The plaintiffs’ failure to comply with that demand mechanism meant that their action, as pleaded, was premature.


On that basis, the court held that the exception was well-founded and that it disposed of the action as a whole. The court further held that costs should follow the result.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court upheld the defendants’ exception and thereby disposed of the action in the form in which it had been instituted. The court ordered that the exception is upheld with costs.


Cases Cited


Wireohms SA (Pty) Ltd v Greenblatt 1959 (3) SA 909 (C) at 912A–B.


Quinella Trading (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Rural Developments 2010 (4) SA 308 (LCC).


Legislation Cited


No legislation was cited in the judgment.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that, even accepting the plaintiffs’ reliance on impossibility of performance as pleaded, the plaintiffs were required to act in terms of the contract. Because annexure “D” required the service of a written demand prior to summons or cancellation, and because the plaintiffs did not comply with that requirement, the action was premature. The exception was accordingly upheld with costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that impossibility of performance operates within defined limits: the impossibility must be absolute rather than probable, absolute rather than relative, and not attributable to the fault of a party who seeks to rely upon it, subject to the parties’ contrary intention.


The judgment further applied the principle that a party who has caused the impossibility cannot take advantage of it to escape contractual responsibility and may remain liable on the contract, leaving the innocent party free to pursue contractual enforcement.


Finally, the judgment applied the principle that contractual rights (including cancellation or enforcement remedies) must be exercised in accordance with agreed contractual procedures, and that failure to comply with an express procedural precondition (here, a required written demand) can render litigation premature and susceptible to exception.

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[2018] ZAFSHC 105
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Strauss N.O. and Another v Terblanche N.O. and Others (5315/2017) [2018] ZAFSHC 105 (7 June 2018)

SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case
number:   5315/2017
In
the matter between:
SANDRA
STRAUSS N.O
1
St
Plaintiff
JOHANN
WOLMARANS N.O
2
nd
Plaintiff
and
CHARL
JEAN TERBLANCHE N.O
1
st
Defendant
MARK
JOHN AZAR N.O
2
nd
Defendant
THE
REGISTRAR OF DEEDS,
3
rd
Defendant
BLOEMFONTEIN
CHARL
JEAN TERBLANCHE
4
th
Defendant
WYNAND
DANIëL BOTHA
5
th
Defendant
CORAM:

MHLAMBI J,
HEARD
ON:
11 MAY 2018
DELIVERED
ON:
7
JUNE 2018
MHLAMBI,
J
[1]
The Plaintiffs, respondents in the exception, in their representative
capacities as trustees of the Sandra trust, instituted
action against
the defendants and sought the following main relief as against first
and fifth defendants:

1. The Deed of
Transfer
[T...]
be
cancelled and that the ownership of Plaintiffs be restored,
alternatively,
that First Defendant be ordered to transfer the following property to
the Trustees for the time being of the
Sandra
Trust- TMP 3846
namely:
The farm Damplaats
no. 49
District
Ventersburg
Free State Province
Measuring
569,2083 (five hundred and sixty nine coma two zero eight three)
hectares
Held by:
First
and Second Defendants in terms of Deed of Transfer
[T...];”
[2]
As background, the trustees of the Sandra Trust and the Pro-Spes
Business Trust, entered into a written sale agreement styled

koopkontrak
van vaste eiendom”
dated
23 October 2014 in terms of which the former, as seller, sold to the
latter, as purchaser, the business or

verhuringsonderneming
wat bedryf word op die Plaas Damplaats 49, distrik Ventersburg,
Provinsie Vrystaat, Groot 549 2083 hektaar
(hierna gonoem die
“Eiendom”)”
as
a going concern. The agreement was attached to the particulars of
claim and marked annexure “B”. Attached to the
said
particulars of claim and marked as annexure “C” was a
cancellation agreement in which the parties jointly cancelled
the
sale agreement dated 23 October 2014.
[3]
On 19 December 2014 the parties entered into a third written sale
agreement for the farm

Damplaats”
for a
reduced purchase price. The manner of payment was stated as follows
in the agreement:

3. WYSE VAN
BETALING
Die gesegde koopprys
sal betaalbaar wees deur die KOPER aan die VERKOPER as volg:
3.1
Partye plaas op rekord dat ten opsigte van die betaling van die
koopprys van die eiendom wat hierkragtens verkoop
word,
skuldvergelyking toegepas sal word ten opsigte van die koopprys van
die eiendom bekend as Deel Oubos 28 Landgoed, Bloemfontein,
welke
eiendom deur die Koper aan die Verkoper verkoop sal word op ‘n
datum soos en wanneer die Koper daartoe in staat is.”
[4]
The purchaser was the Trustees of the Pro-Spes Business Trust, as
represented by Charl Jean Terblanche, the sole and only authorised

trustee. The sale agreement was annexed to the Particulars of Claim
and marked annexure “D”. In terms of clause 9 of
the
agreement, the seller recorded that the Trust was aware and consented
that the property be transferred to the purchaser without
the
delivery of any guarantees by the seller for the payment of the
purchase price.
[5]
The registration of Oubos 28 and Damplaats would not take place
simultaneously.However, Oubos 28 was transferred to one Jacubus

Francois Opperman on 22 October 2010 as per Deed of Transfer ST
1963/2010. On 24 June 2015, the said Opperman sold Oubos 28 to
a
certain Dirk Johannes Malan as per Deed of Transfer ST 10064/2015.
[6]
The plaintiffs concluded in paragraph 14 of the particulars of claim,
that:-
14.
In conclusion:
14.1
First and Second Defendants were not the owners of
Oubos 28
when
annexures “
B
” and “
D
” were
entered into.
14.2
First Defendant knew that
Opperman
was the registered owner of
Oubos 28
when annexures “
B
” and “
D

were entered into.
14.3
First Defendant knew he could not sell and transfer
Oubos
28
to
the trustees of the
Sandra
Trust.
[7]
First Defendant, as the author of annexures “B”, “C”
and “D”, prepared annexures “B”
and “D”
to benefit himself and/or  Second Defendant as trustees of the
Pro-Spes  Besigheidstrust. The Fifth
Respondent therefore acted
mala fide
with the intention to deceive the trustees of the
Sandra Trust in believing that he is in a position to enter into a
Deed of Sale
in regard to Oubos 28 and give transfer thereof.
[8]
In support of the grounds of exception, various points were raised by
the defendants. For the sake of this judgement I shall
not traverse
all save to mention but the following:
(i)    The
plaintiffs did not pray that annexures “B”, “C”
or “D” be declared void,
but allege that annexures “B”
and “D” were voidable, which claim was bad in law as
annexures “B”
was cancelled by both annexures “C”
and “D”. Annexure “D” as an agreement between
the parties
stood and was void.
(ii)    The
conclusion, plea and claim that the first defendant (or Pro-Spes
Business Trust) could not sell and transfer
Oubos 28 to the Trustees
of Sandra Trust were bad in law and could not sustain an action by
reason of the following:
1.
The parties
to a contract of sale must agree on the property, whether movable or
immovable, which may form the subject matter of
a sale;
2.
It is
possible for a person to sell another’s property;
3.
Judged on
the terms of the alleged sale, it was not impossible for the first
and second defendants to have the property transferred
to the
Plaintiffs;
4.
The
plaintiff failed to, in terms of clause 14 of annexure “D”,
serve a written demand on the first and second defendants
in which
they were requested to, within seven (7) days of the demand, take the
necessary steps to effect transfer of Oubos 28 Landgoed
to the
plaintiffs. The said clause also provided that in the event of the
defendant failing to react positively to the said demand
within seven
(7) days, the plaintiffs would be entitled to cancel the agreement.
[9]
In response to the above, the plaintiffs contended as follows:
(i)
Annexure “B” and “D” was clear that such deed
of sale would only be concluded (in
future) when the first defendant
(as trustee) was in a position to sell the said property.
(ii)
The argument that one could sell the property of another was
therefore totally irrelevant since on a proper
construction of
annexures “B” and “D”, such an agreement must
still be concluded.
(iii)   Due to
the impossibility of performance as set out it the particulars of
claim, it was not necessary to pray that
annexure “D” in
particular be declared void.
(iv)  With reference
to paragraph 23.1 of defendants’ Heads of arguments, no notice
was necessary when it was objectively
proven that performance was
impossible.
(v)   It was
submitted that, seen in the light of this exception and the
resistance to returning the farm Damplaats to
the trustees of Sandra
Trust, even if seven days’ demand were given, defendants would
not have agreed thereto. They could
plead that they would have agreed
thereto or that they were capable of selling Oubos 28 to plaintiffs.
(vii)  It was
submitted that once it was objectively proven that performance was
impossible,
restitutio
in integrum
must
take place.
[10]
The centre piece of the submissions of the plaintiff’s counsel,
both written and oral, was in paragraph 17.1 of the particulars
of
claim which read as follows:

Due to the
impossibility of Defendant to sell and transfer
Oubos
28
when
annexures “
B

and “
D

were entered into, performance by First and Second Defendants in
terms of annexure “
D

is impossible and Plaintiff is entitled to cancellation of annexure

D

and restoration (restutio in integrum)”
[11]
The one who caused the impossibility cannot take advantage of it and
so will be held liable on the contract:
Wireohms
SA (Pty) LTD v Greenblatt
[1]
,
Quinella Trading (Pty) LDT v Minister of Rural Developments
[2]
.
In the law of Contract
[3]
the following is stated:

First, the
impossibility must be absolute as opposed to probable. The mere
likelihood that performance will prove impossible is
not sufficient
to destroy the contract.  Second, the impossibility must be
absolute as opposed to relative. If I promise to
do something which,
in general, can be done, but which I cannot do, I am liable on the
contract. Third, the impossibility must
not be the fault of either
party.  A party who has caused the impossibility cannot take
advantage of it and so will be liable
on the contract. Fourth, the
principle must give way to the contrary common intention of the
parties. This intention may be expressed,
as when, for example, a
seller expressly represents or guarantees that the goods sold exist.
If they are found not to have been
in existence at the time the
contract was made, the seller will be liable for damages for the
false representation, if fraudulent
or negligent, or for breach of
the contractual undertaking.”
[12]
It is therefore evident that first defendant and/or Pros-Spes
Business Trust is liable on the contract and the plaintiffs are
free
to enforce it. However, in order to do so, they must act in terms
thereof. Paragraph 14 enjoins them to serve a written demand
before
either issuing a summons or cancelling the contract. Plaintiffs
failed to comply with this term or condition. Consequently,
the
plaintiff’s action was premature.
[13]
In the light of the circumstances set out above, I find that the
exception is well-founded and goes to dispose of the action
as a
whole. It therefor stands to be upheld.
[14]
In the result, costs should follow the event.
[15]
I therefore make the following order:
Order:
The
exception is upheld with costs.
____________
MHLAMBI, J
Counsel
for Plaintiff:

Adv.  P.J Heymans
Instructed
by:

Adrie Hechter  Attorney
113A Albrech Street
Dan Pienaar
BLOEMFONTEIN
Counsel
for Respondents:
Adv. A.J.R Van Rhyn SC
Instructed
by:

Kramer
Weihmann Joubert Inc.
24
Barnes Street
Westdene
BLOEMFONTIEN
[1]
1959 (3) SA 909
(C) at 912 A-B
[2]
2010 (4) SA 308
LCC
[3]
The Law of Contract in South Africa: GB Bradfield 7
th
edition: 2016  Chapter 2: Initial Impossibility