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[2018] ZAGPJHC 662
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Absa Bank Limited v Sawyer (2018/17056) [2018] ZAGPJHC 662 (14 December 2018)
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: 2018/17056
In
the matter between:
ABSA
BANK
LIMITED
Applicant/Plaintiff
and
NATALIE
DIANN SAWYER (nee
MURISON)
Respondent/Defendant
JUDGMENT
VAN
EEDEN AJ
:
1.
The plaintiff is a bank
and registered credit provider. It issued a combined summons on
7 May 2018 against the defendant,
claiming payment of an amount of
money from her, as well as an order declaring immovable property
constituting her primary residence
specially executable. The summons
states that the defendant is a major female married out of community
of property with her chosen
domicilium
citandi et executandi
situated
at […] D Road, Bryanston and that the mortgaged property
forming the subject matter of the application, is situated
at […]
C Avenue, Bryanston.
2.
In the summons the
defendant’s attention is drawn to section 26(1) and (3) of the
Constitution, as well as rule 46A of the
High Court Rules. The
defendant was advised to place information before the court if she
contended that the order sought in respect
of execution of the
immovable property infringes upon her right of access to adequate
housing. She was similarly advised
that the court will not
authorise execution unless the court, having considered all relevant
factors, considers that execution
against the immovable property is
warranted. She was advised that should she object to the
immovable property being declared
specially executable, she could in
terms of rule 46A(6)(b) of the High Court Rules defend the relief
sought in the action, or defend
the action and make submissions which
are relevant to the making of an appropriate order by the court, or
without defending the
action, make submissions which are relevant to
the making of an appropriate order by the court. In addition,
she was advised
that the provisions of section 129(3) and (4) of the
National Credit Act, 34 of 2004 applied to the credit agreement.
Finally,
she was advised that she could prevent the loss of the
mortgaged property if she paid to the plaintiff all the arrear
amounts owing.
3.
The particulars of
claim attached to the combined summons gave more detailed information
in relation to amount of money claimed:
3.1.
During February 2014 a
first mortgage loan agreement was concluded between the parties in
terms of which the plaintiff lent and
advanced an amount of R3 560
000.00 to the defendant.
3.2.
A year later, during
March 2015, a second mortgage loan agreement was concluded in terms
of which the plaintiff lent and advanced
the amount of R3 572 560.20
to the defendant.
3.3.
The two loans are
secured by two mortgage bonds over the mortgaged property.
3.4.
The defendant’s
indebtedness is stated to be R3 835 238.56 together
with interest at the rate of 11.10% per
annum, capitalized monthly,
from 30 January 2018 to date of payment on the outstanding amount.
The indebtedness and interest rate
were supported by a certificate of
balance.
4.
The particulars of
claim deal in detail with the order sought declaring the immovable
property executable:
4.1.
The plaintiff could not
confirm whether the immovable property was the defendant’s
primary residence, but conceded that it
was.
4.2.
The defendant’s
last payment towards the mortgage loan instalment was made on 5
January 2018 and she had been in arrears for
approximately ten
months.
4.3.
At the time of
instituting the action the defendant was in arrears in the amount of
R405 335.40 with a monthly repayment instalment
being R38
401.18.
4.4.
Prior to issuing
summons the plaintiff took all reasonable steps in order to conclude
an arrangement with the defendant to enable
her to comply with her
obligations so as to avoid foreclosure.
4.5.
The defendant was not
willing or able to adhere to any arrangements. This effectively left
the plaintiff with only one option, which
was to institute these
proceedings.
4.6.
The defendant was
advised that she may, at any time before the plaintiff has cancelled
the loan agreements, make payment of the
amount that is overdue.
4.7.
The defendant was
informed that the plaintiff will apply for default judgment in the
event that the matter is not defended and will
proceed to apply to
have the immovable property declared executable.
4.8.
At the date of issuing
summons the full balance outstanding amounted to R3 949 984.71.
This amount was stated to be of a substantial
nature and that the
defendant would consequently most probably not be in a position to
make payment of the overdue amount, to reinstate
the loan agreements
and to continue with her monthly obligations.
4.9.
The defendant may
prevent the loss of the immovable property if she pays to the
plaintiff all the arrear amounts.
4.10.
The arrear amount was
not the full amount of the judgment debt, but the amount owing by the
defendant to the plaintiff without reference
to the accelerated
amount.
4.11.
The loan agreements
were called up on 19 March 2018 and a computerised copy of the
account printout was attached. From the
computerised printout
it appeared that when the loan agreements were called up, the
defendant was in arrears in the amount of R290
131.86 and when legal
action was instituted, the defendant was in arrears in the amount of
R405 335.40.
4.12.
To the best of the
plaintiff’s knowledge the immovable property was occupied by
the defendant.
4.13.
The indebtedness arose
as a result of a loan that the defendant obtained from the plaintiff
to purchase the property.
4.14.
There is a business
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff
is a public company and has various financial
obligations that it
must meet. It cannot comply with its obligations if it does not
generate an income, which may happen if the
plaintiff is unable to
recover monies legitimately lent and advanced to the defendant.
4.15.
The plaintiff was
unable to establish whether the defendant has any other assets which
can be attached to settle the outstanding
amount. Given the
substantial outstanding amount, it was unlikely that movables would
satisfy even a small portion of the outstanding
amount.
4.16.
The plaintiff was of
the view that attachment and sale of movable property would only
delay the inevitable sale of the property.
4.17.
The plaintiff would
suffer more than the defendant would if the court refused to grant
execution against the immovable property.
4.18.
The plaintiff relies on
the sanctity of contracts, which must be upheld in order to secure
the future lending of credit to prospective
borrowers.
4.19.
Should this prospective
lending process in any way be prejudiced by the court not declaring
the immovable property especially executable,
the very basis of
credit and borrowing in South Africa comes under pressure, which
entails that the future provision of credit
becomes impossible.
4.20.
The defendant would
suffer minimal prejudice and the defendant’s right to adequate
housing will not be affected when declaring
the property especially
executable. The defendant will still be able to procure immovable
property in line with her budgetary constraints,
which will suffice
as adequate housing for residential purposes. Access to adequate
housing must not be equated to home ownership.
4.21.
Accordingly, the
defendant will not be rendered homeless and destitute if the court
should declare the property executable.
4.22.
Should it be declared
executable, the defendant cannot immediately be evicted. Once the
immovable property is registered in the
name of the new owner, such
new owner still has to institute an application for eviction and
ejectment should the defendant remain
in unlawful occupation of the
property.
4.23.
The plaintiff was
unable to state whether there is a household headed by women,
disabled persons, aged persons or if there were
children living on
the property.
4.24.
On 23 January 2018 the
plaintiff’s legal representatives addressed various emails to
the defendant drawing the defendant’s
attention to the legal
proceedings with the purpose of making an arrangement for settling
the arrears.
4.25.
The defendant’s
attention was drawn to section 21(6) and (3) of the Constitution
which affords everyone the right to adequate
housing and provides
that no one may be evicted from their home without an order of court
after consideration of all the relevant
circumstances. The defendant
was called upon to place information regarding relevant circumstances
within the meaning of section
26(3) of the Constitution before the
court.
4.26.
In addition, the
defendant’s attention was drawn to rule 46A(2)(b), which
provides that no writ of execution shall be issued
against the
primary residence unless the court orders execution against such
property.
4.27.
If the defendant
objects to the residence being declared executable, the defendant
must place facts and submissions before the court
to enable the court
to consider them in terms of rule 46A(2)(b). Should the defendant
fail to do so, this may result in an order
declaring the residence
specially executable being granted, consequent upon which the
defendant’s residence may be sold in
execution.
5.
On 25 May 2018 the
defendant’s attorneys of record filed a notice of intention to
defend. This triggered the application for
summary judgment, which is
supported by an affidavit:
5.1.
The deponent stated
that he is the Vice President in the employ of the plaintiff’s
Legal Home Loans: Defendant Portfolio.
5.2.
He provides some
details relating to his personal knowledge of the matter. He
verified both the cause of action as set out
in the summons and the
amounts claimed in respect thereof.
5.3.
In his opinion, he
stated, the defendant did not have a good and
bona
fide
defence to the
plaintiff’s claim and appearance had been entered solely for
the purposes of delay.
6.
An affidavit resisting
summary judgment was deposed to by the defendant:
6.1.
She states that she is
an adult female Chief Operating Officer.
6.2.
The plaintiff’s
attorneys set the matter down as a liquidation application. She
submitted that the uncertainty caused by this
ought to be sufficient
for the application to be dismissed with costs.
6.3.
Nevertheless, she
proceeded to set out submissions relating to the summary judgment
application. Apart from denying that she was
indebted to the
applicant, either in the amount claimed or at all, she also denied
that she does not have a
bona
fide
defence and
that she had entered an appearance to defend solely for the purpose
of delay.
6.4.
She stated that she had
“
numerous
points
in limine”
to the application for summary
judgment, the first of which was that the particulars of claim were
excipiable. A notice to remove
cause of complaint in terms of rule
23(1) was served on 19 June 2018. The period within which the
plaintiff could remove the cause
of complaint expired on 10 July
2018, but the plaintiff did not amend the particulars of claim.
6.5.
The defendant claimed
that the deponent’s designation as
“
Vice
President”
did
not exist. She had made enquiries with the plaintiff’s offices
to verify the designation and was told that it did not
exist.
Furthermore, she stated that such a designation
“
is
a very senior position within an organisation or division and not one
which would necessitate and/or require the person holding
such a
position to become acquainted with the cause of action and amount
claims, to the degree necessary for the purposes of Summary
Judgment”
.
6.6.
She admitted that she
had entered into the mortgage loan agreement of February 2014 and
that the first mortgage bond was properly
registered. During March
2015 she faced cash flow constrains and entered into negotiations
with the plaintiff to restructure the
first loan agreement. She
admitted that she signed documents placed before her by the
plaintiff, but stated that her understanding
was that the
documentation was necessary to facilitate the restructuring of the
first loan agreement. She did not read the documentation,
as she
trusted that she was simply signing a restructuring agreement.
It has now transpired that she had entered into a second
loan
agreement with a second mortgage bond having been registered over the
property in issue. She therefore stated that there
had been a
bona fide contractual mistake in that she and the plaintiff were not
ad idem
with regards to the terms that were to apply to the second
agreement.
6.7.
She took issue with the
amount being claimed. She drew attention thereto that at
different dates the outstanding amount differed.
These various
amounts were stated to be conflicting and could therefore not be said
to have met the test required at summary judgment
level. She stated
that the plaintiff had failed to make out a proper case and again
denied being indebted to the plaintiff, either
in the amount claimed
or at all.
7.
When the application
for summary judgment was enrolled the plaintiff’s attorney had
to comply with chapter 10.17 of this division’s
Practice
Manual. The heading of this chapter reads
“
Foreclosure
(and execution when property is, or appears to be, the defendant’s
primary home)”
.
The rule states that chapter 10.17 is applicable to all applications
for foreclosure. The directive must be read in conjunction
with the
amended rule 46A which came into operation on 22 December 2017. In
every matter where a judgment is sought for execution
against
immovable property, which might be the defendant’s primary
residence or home, an affidavit is required. The affidavit
shall be
attached to the Notice of Set Down. Where action proceedings
have been instituted and the provisions of rule 31(5)
are applicable,
the registrar shall refer the application for the money judgment and
the declaration that the property is executable,
to open court. The
affidavit shall contain details of attempts made by the plaintiff to
contact the defendant in order to
negotiate terms of settlement to
prevent foreclosure. The plaintiff must also, in the affidavit,
provide the information referred
to in rule 46A(5) and (9)(b).
8.
The plaintiff’s
attorney filed such an affidavit:
8.1.
Once again, the
defendant’s attention was drawn to section 26(1) and (3) of the
Constitution and rule 46A of the Uniform Rules.
She was advised that
no writ of execution shall be issued against her primary residence
unless a court having considered all the
relevant circumstances,
orders execution.
8.2.
She was further advised
that if she objects to the home being declared executable, she is to
place facts and submissions before
the court to enable the court to
consider them in terms of rule 46A(6)(a)(i) of the Rules of Court and
that her failure to do so
may result in an order declaring the
defendant’s home especially executable, consequent upon which
the home may be sold in
execution.
8.3.
Paragraph 4.10 of the
affidavit recorded that the defendant has multiple properties
registered to her name, in support of which
a report was attached
reflecting a property registered in the defendant’s name, being
55 The River Road, Bryanston.
8.4.
In terms of rule
46A(5)(a) the market value of the property was stated to be R5 500
000.00. In support of this contention a
report provided by a
Professional Associated Valuer was attached. The local
authority valuation of the property was stated
to be R2 710 000.00
and the Win Deed valuation for an expected low was R4 070
000.00.
8.5.
The total amount owing
on the bond was R4 211 783.27 and the amount owed to the local
authority for rates and taxes as at 3
October 2018 was R46 777.13.
8.6.
The combined summons
was served on a domestic worker at the mortgaged property, being […]
C Avenue, Bryanston.
9.
The chapter 10.17
affidavit was served on the defendant’s attorneys on 23
November 2018. A few days later, on 29 November
2108, the defendant
filed a supplementary affidavit stating that she wanted to submit
information in accordance with rule 46(6)(a)(ii):
9.1.
She confirmed that she
was residing at […] C Avenue, Bryanston with her family and
that it was her primary residence.
9.2.
She stated that she had
no alternative accommodation for her and her family. She is the
mother of two minor children age 2 years
and 2 months respectively,
who had become accustomed to living at the property and who consider
same as their home. The eldest
child attends school close to home
while she attends to nursing the youngest child. In the circumstances
it is not desirable for
the property to be declared specifically
executable.
9.3.
In addition, she stated
that the plaintiff failed to comply with rule 46A as the application
to have the property declared executable
was not served upon her
personally as was required by rule 46A(3)(d), nor did the plaintiff
endeavour to obtain a court order authorising
an alternative method
of service.
9.4.
Should the court should
find that there was sufficient service, she claimed that the
application was short served and that it did
not comply with the
periods referred to in rule 46A(4)(a)(ii) as read with 46A(4)(b).
9.5.
In addition, she
complained that the plaintiff’s founding papers do not disclose
the market value of the property. She stated
that the plaintiff’s
papers do not refer to any evidence as to the amounts owing on the
mortgage bond as is required by rule
46A(5)(c) and also that the
plaintiff failed to attach evidence of any amounts owed to a local
authority in terms of rule 46A(5)(d).
9.6.
Finally, she stated
that the plaintiff neglected to allege or attach evidence of any
amounts owed in respect of levies or other
charges as required in
terms of rule 46A(5)(e).
9.7.
The supplementary
affidavit continued to set out a case for the court to exercise its
discretion in terms of rule 6(5)(e) to allow
the filing of the
supplementary affidavit.
9.8.
With
reference to the recent full court judgment of 12 September 2018
[1]
,
she drew attention to the finding that the issue of liability and
execution should be determined in one hearing as opposed to
on a
piecemeal basis. She thus requested that the supplementary affidavit
be permitted as same brings relevant facts to the court’s
attention. She stated that the plaintiff would suffer no prejudice by
the admission of the further affidavit and that it would
permit the
full ventilation and proper adjudication of the present matter.
10.
During argument I
indicated to counsel that the supplementary affidavit will be
allowed. A defendant in an opposed application for
summary judgment
should not only put facts before court pertaining to the money
judgment. Such a defendant is compelled to deal
with the desirability
of declaring the property executable or not, in addition to the money
judgment. That it so, because following
on the full court decision,
the court hearing the application must decide both issues in one
hearing. Although the particulars
of claim dealt at length with
the plaintiff’s reasons in support of the order of
executability, the defendant did not deal
with these issues when
filing her affidavit resisting summary judgment.
11.
The plaintiff’s
affidavit in terms of chapter 10.17 had to be filed together with the
Notice of Set Down. It follows that
when the defendant deposed to her
affidavit resisting summary judgment, she could not deal with the
averments contained in the
chapter 10.17 affidavit. The procedure
prescribed by the Practice Manual thus invites the filing of a
supplementary affidavit in
opposed matters. In such circumstances a
court should allow the filing of a supplementary affidavit.
12.
On behalf of the
defendant Mr Scott submitted that the procedure adopted by the
plaintiff should not be countenanced. He submitted
that an
application under rule 46A was necessary and that the affidavit filed
in terms of chapter 10.17 was insufficient for the
court to grant the
order of executability. In his submission the chapter 10.17 was
not properly before court in an application
under rule 32.
13.
Mr Scott’s
submission correctly identified an uneasiness between action
procedure and a subsequent opposed application for
summary judgment
on the one hand, and the provisions of rule 46A on the other. A
plaintiff is fully within its rights to pursue
an application for the
money judgment and the order of executability in terms of rule 32,
but rule 46A requires an application
on notice of motion for the
order of executability substantially in accordance with Form 2A of
Schedule 1 (rule 46A(3)(a)). In
addition, the Practice Manual
requires the chapter 10.17 affidavit.
14.
In
my view the uneasiness is more apparent than real. A plaintiff
pleading its cause of action in a combined summons is compelled
to
plead both circumstances entitling it to the money judgment and
circumstances entitling it to an order of executability. Although
the order of executability is ancillary to the money judgment, the
latter relief forms an integral part of the cause of action.
[2]
It follows that when summary judgment is applied for and the cause of
action is verified, the deponent verifies both the money
judgment and
the order of executability. The chapter 10.17 affidavit is a separate
affidavit not falling foul of rule 32, which
supports the relief
sought in respect of executability. A court is eventually faced with
a hybrid procedure requiring adherence
to rule 32, rule 46A and the
Practice Manual.
15.
I do not read rule 46A
as excluding a plaintiff’s right to apply for summary judgment,
nor that the plaintiff must institute
a further application under
rule 46A in order to follow Form 2A. In my view the summary
judgement application and affidavit
filed in compliance with chapter
10.17 constitute substantial compliance by the plaintiff of its
obligations contained in rule
46A. Together they allow the court to
discharge its duties imposed by rule 46A and to strike a balance
between the competing interests
of the plaintiff and defendant in a
matter where the executability of a primary residence is at stake. In
this matter the defendant
also availed herself of the opportunity to
place a supplementary affidavit before court after receipt of the
chapter 10.17 affidavit.
In my view nothing would be achieved
by insisting that the plaintiff should follow the motion procedure
prescribed by rule 46A.
All the information required by rule
46A is already before court.
16.
In the premises I find
that the plaintiff was fully entitled to apply for both orders in
summary judgment proceedings in terms of
rule 32. The summary
judgment application, read with the affidavit filed in terms of
chapter 10.17, constitute substantial compliance
with the provisions
of rule 46A. Rule 46A does not exclude action proceedings for an
order declaring a primary residential property
executable, but the
requirements of rule 46A must still be complied with before the
primary residence of the defendant can be declared
executable.
17.
I now return to the
application for summary judgment. There is no reason whatsoever to
dismiss the application because it was set
down as a liquidation
application and nothing more needs to be said about this. The notice
to remove the cause of complaint had
lapsed by the time when this
application was heard. Besides, the affidavit resisting summary
judgment did not claim prejudice by
the manner in which the
particulars of claim were drawn, nor did Mr Scott draw attention to
any such prejudice. The contention
that the summary judgment
application should be dismissed because there is no such designation
as
“
Vice
President”
cannot
be upheld. Apart from the vagueness with which this allegation was
made, the documents attached as “MVD” to the
chapter
10.17 application contain such designation in their email address.
The contention of a
bona
fide
contractual
mistake in relation to the second loan agreement can equally not be
regarded as fully disclosing a
bona
fide
defence.
The existence of the first mortgage bond is not disputed, nor are the
advances pursuant to the two loan agreements
disputed. The issues
raised as defences clearly indicate that a defendant without a
bona
fide
defence is
attempting to delay the inevitable. In my view summary judgment
should be granted in respect of the money judgment.
18.
An order of
executability no longer automatically follows a money judgment. It is
quite conceivable that a court reaches the conclusion
that a money
judgment should be granted, but that it is of the view that the
primary residence should not be declared executable,
for example
because of a paucity of information. In this matter the defendant
could have been of more assistance. She could
have confirmed
her marital status and place of work. She could have disclosed
her financial position, indicating her monthly
income, possible joint
income from her spouse and income from other assets.
19.
Ms Bhabha for the
plaintiff submitted that if I reached such a conclusion, I should
nevertheless grant the money judgment. Given
the full court’s
judgment, it is not clear to me whether such a plaintiff can approach
a court for a second time under rule
46A to declare the very same
property executable if new facts have become available.
Prima
facie
this would
appear possible to me, but it might have the effect of diluting the
full bench’s decision. On the other
hand, the full bench
has recognised a two-tier approach in matters concerning unsecured
creditors. Once an unsecured creditor has
executed against the
movables, the full court held that it can approach a court in terms
of rule 46A to obtain execution of an
immovable property which is a
primary residence.
20.
I now turn to subrule
46A(2) to determine whether an order of executability can be granted.
As already stated, the property in issue
is the primary residence of
the defendant. There was no personal service of the defendant
as required by subrule 46A(3)(d).
The circumstances of this
case indicate the subrule may safely be relaxed as the defendant got
notice of this application in time
to oppose it.
21.
The defendant did not
put up facts to indicate alternative means of satisfying the judgment
debt. The plaintiff provided the
information required by
subrule 46A(5) relating to the market value of the property, the
local authority valuation, the amounts
owing on the mortgage bonds
and the local authority. The property does not form part of a
body corporate and no levies are
due. The court can give effect
to subrule 46A(8). I accept the plaintiff’s contention that the
debt owing to it cannot
be satisfied by alternative means other than
execution of the judgment debtor’s primary residence. In
the premises
I must order execution in terms of subrule 46A(8)(d).
22.
The full court has held
that it is only in exceptional circumstances that a reserve price
should not be set. The paucity of information
provided by the
defendant for the court to set a reserve price in terms of rule
46A(8)(e) and (9) was a cause of concern for me.
I referred Mr Scott
to paragraph [59] of the full court’s judgment, which requires
a defendant to place facts before the
court. When I asked Mr
Scott why the defendant did not provide more information and whether
the defendant claimed prejudice
in relation to the procedure
requiring a defendant to disclose facts relating to executability,
whilst the money judgment is still
being defended, his response was
that I should approach the matter on the basis that the plaintiff had
an onus to discharge. The
defendant he stated, was not there to
educate the plaintiff on how to comply with its obligations in terms
of the rule. When
a defendant fails to place facts before a
court, the court is nevertheless bound to determine the matter
without the benefit of
the defendant’s input. The valuations of
the property reflect considerable value and in all likelihood the
judgment debt
and debt owed to the local authority will be
extinguished by a sale in execution. In the premises I think it
is fair to set
the reserve price in the amount of the debt owed to
the plaintiff.
23.
In the premises I make
the following orders:
23.1.
Judgment is granted
against the defendant in favour of the plaintiff in the amount of
R3 835 238.56;
23.2.
The defendant is
ordered to pay interest on the aforesaid amount at the rate of 11.10%
per annum and capitalised monthly, from 30
January 2018 to date of
payment;
23.3.
The following property
is declared especially executable: Erf […] Bryanston Township,
Registration Division IR, the Province
of Gauteng, measuring 4302
(four thousand three hundred and two) square metres, held by Deed of
Transfer No 26855/2014, subject
to the conditions therein contained;
23.4.
A writ of execution in
respect of the property referred to above is authorised;
23.5.
A copy of this order is
to be served on the defendant as soon as is practicable after this
order is granted;
23.6.
The defendant is
advised that the provisions of section 129(3) and (4) of the National
Credit Act, 34 of 2005 (“the NCA”),
apply to the judgment
granted in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant may prevent the
sale of the property described above, if
she pays to the plaintiff
all the arrear amounts owing by her to the plaintiff together with
all enforcement costs, default charges,
prior to the property being
sold in execution;
23.7.
The arrear amounts and
enforcement costs referred to above may be obtained from the
plaintiff. The defendant is advised that the
arrear amount is not the
full amount of the judgment debt, but the amount owing by the
defendant to the plaintiff, without reference
to the accelerated
amount;
23.8.
The defendant is
further advised that the provisions of rule 46 and 46A of the Uniform
Rues of the High Court apply to this order;
23.9.
In terms of rule
46A(8)(e) the reserve price is set in the amount of R3 835 238.56;
23.10.
The defendant is to pay
the costs of suit on the attorney and client scale.
H
VAN EEDEN
ACTING
JUDGE
Counsel
for applicant/plaintiff: Adv B Bhabha
Instructed
by: Lowndes Dlamini Attorneys
Counsel
for respondent/defendant: Adv T Scott
Instructed
by: Schindlers Attorneys
Date
of hearing: 6 and 7 December 2018
Date
of judgment: 14 December 2018
[1]
Absa
Bank Ltd v Dokkie Kenneth Mokebe and other matters
2018/00612,
per Tsoka, Pretorius et Wepener JJ
.
[2]
Full
Court judgment paragraph [12].