S v Le Grange and Others (040/2008) [2008] ZASCA 102; 2009 (1) SACR 125 (SCA) 2009 (2) SA 434 (SCA) ; [2010] 1 All SA 238 (SCA) ; 2010 (6) BCLR 547 (SCA) (18 September 2008)

80 Reportability
Criminal Law

Brief Summary

Criminal Law — Right to a fair trial — Judicial impartiality — Appellants convicted of murder and accessory after the fact — Application for recusal of trial judge refused — Appeal against convictions and sentences on grounds of unfair trial — Court finds trial proceedings invalid due to judicial bias — Convictions and sentences set aside and matter remitted for retrial before a different judge.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This was a criminal appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal arising from proceedings in the High Court of South Africa, Kimberley (Kgomo JP sitting as court of first instance). The appellants were Joseph Le Grange (first appellant), Hendrik Lourens van der Westhuizen (second appellant), and Pieter Jakobus Le Grange (third appellant). The respondent was the State.


The appellants had been indicted on a charge of murder. The first appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to 24 years’ imprisonment. The second and third appellants were convicted as accessories after the fact to murder and sentenced to eight years’ and seven years’ imprisonment respectively, with two years conditionally suspended in each case.


Leave to appeal was granted by the trial court only to the first appellant and only in relation to sentence. On petition, the Supreme Court of Appeal extended the appeal to cover all convictions and sentences in respect of all three appellants.


The general subject-matter of the appeal was not a re-evaluation of the merits, but whether the conduct of the presiding judicial officer in the trial court resulted in the appellants not receiving a fair trial, particularly in light of an unsuccessful recusal application brought during the trial. The case concerned whether the proceedings were rendered invalid by irregularities indicative of a lack of judicial impartiality.


2. Material Facts


On the merits, the trial concerned the death of Biron Phetlo, a 13-year-old boy who was fatally stabbed on 24 March 2004 in Prieska. He had spent the day at the Prieska Golf Course with friends, including Curtis Maritz and Jaco Botha, and later they went into the town centre. Curtis and the deceased sat on the steps of a sports shop in Stewart Street.


It was common cause that an interaction occurred between the appellants and the two boys at or near the sports shop steps. The State’s case, supported principally by the evidence of Curtis (and related observations by Jaco), was that the first appellant restrained the deceased with a walking stick/sword cane, unsheathed it, and stabbed him multiple times, while the second appellant prevented Curtis from leaving to alert police.


The appellants’ version was materially different. They contended that they found the boys attempting to steal from the shop; the second appellant restrained Curtis; the first appellant used his walking stick to prevent the deceased from rising; and the appellants then left the boys seated on the steps uninjured.


The post-mortem (Dr George Isaacs) identified a penetrating wound to the chest (ending in the heart) and two defensive wounds to the hand/wrist, with the cause of death being cardiac tamponade due to a stab wound of the heart. The trial court treated guilt as turning essentially on credibility, accepted the State’s witnesses, rejected the defence version, and convicted accordingly.


However, the appeal turned on procedural events during the trial. After the trial was “well on its way”, a substantive application was made for Kgomo JP to recuse himself, prompted by extensive questioning of the first appellant by the Judge President at the end of his evidence. The recusal application was refused. The record further reflected (i) repeated judicial interruptions/curtailment of defence cross-examination of key State witnesses, (ii) a dispute about whether the defence had been afforded adequate time to consult with a defence witness (Emmanuel Bosman, “Bolla”) who became available only at the close of the State case, and (iii) extensive questioning by the presiding judge of the appellants after cross-examination, in a manner alleged to be aligned with discrediting the defence.


In addition, passages from the trial court’s later remarks (including in judgment) were relied upon in argument to show that the presiding judge appeared to have formed a firm view on guilt, the inevitability of convictions, and the propriety of defence counsel’s conduct before the completion of the evidential process.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions before the Supreme Court of Appeal were whether, having regard to the manner in which the trial was conducted, the appellants had been denied the constitutional right to a fair trial, and whether the conduct of the presiding judicial officer revealed a lack of impartiality (including whether the judge had effectively “descended into the arena”).


Closely related to this was whether the irregularities complained of were of such a nature that they rendered the proceedings invalid (a nullity), in which event the convictions and sentences could not stand without the appellate court engaging the merits.


A further legal question (arising if the trial was invalidated) was whether a retrial would offend the constitutional protection against double jeopardy in section 35(3)(m) of the Constitution, and how section 324 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 operated where convictions are set aside for a “technical irregularity or defect”.


The dispute was primarily concerned with the application of legal standards (fair trial and impartial adjudication) to the recorded conduct of the trial, with an evaluative assessment of whether the cumulative conduct demonstrated that the judicial officer was not open-minded, impartial, or fair.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The Supreme Court of Appeal approached the matter from the premise that a fair criminal trial presupposes a presiding officer who is fair and unbiased and who conducts the proceedings in accordance with required procedural rules and principles. The court reiterated that the disqualifying standard is not confined to actual bias; the appearance of bias may suffice to disqualify a judicial officer from presiding. The judgment nonetheless stated that it was not necessary, in this appeal, to decide the recusal question in isolation or to determine whether the refusal of recusal alone rendered subsequent proceedings a nullity, because the principal contention on appeal was framed more broadly as a denial of a fair trial.


The court emphasised constitutional anchoring for these requirements, particularly the right to a fair trial in section 35(3) of the Constitution, and the principle that justice must not only be done but be seen to be done. It also reiterated that fairness concerns both the accused and the public (represented by the State), and that public confidence in the judicial process depends on conspicuous impartiality.


In assessing the record, the court recognised the pressures on a trial judge, including public interest and the risk of protracted cross-examination, but stressed that impatience is a judicial weakness that must be controlled because it can impede perception, blunt judgment, and create an impression of hostility or prejudice.


The court applied the principles articulated in S v Rall 1982 (1) SA 828 (A) regarding judicial questioning: the presiding officer must conduct the trial so that impartiality is manifest; must not question witnesses to such an extent that detached adjudication is compromised; and must avoid intimidation or undue influence over witnesses’ answers. The court considered that the record demonstrated breaches of these canons.


The judgment acknowledged that some judicial questions were legitimately directed at clarification, but held that the overall questioning (of each appellant) also included questions intended to discredit the defence, frequently marked by scepticism and disbelief, and resembling cross-examination designed to obtain answers favourable to the State. The court underscored that exposing inconsistencies is ordinarily counsel’s function, not the trial judge’s, and that the style and tenor of questioning supported an inference that the presiding judge had aligned himself too closely with the prosecution case.


This conclusion was reinforced by certain comments made by the presiding judge (including remarks about the “inevitability” of convictions and criticism of defence counsel and the attorney), which the Supreme Court of Appeal understood as suggestive that the judge had formed a closed view of credibility and outcome before all evidence and argument had been completed. While the court accepted that judges form provisional impressions, it stressed that the duty remains not to close one’s mind until the evidential process is complete. The court also rejected the trial judge’s suggestion of a conflict of interest in the legal representation on the facts before it, noting that the appellants advanced a consistent version amounting to a denial of the charge.


The Supreme Court of Appeal treated the various complaints (curtailing cross-examination, limiting consultation time, and extensive hostile questioning) as potentially insufficient individually, but decisive when viewed cumulatively, leading to the conclusion that the presiding officer was not fair and impartial, and that the proceedings were therefore invalid. On that approach, the court stated that it would set aside the convictions and sentences without considering the merits.


Finally, the court addressed retrial and double jeopardy. It referred to the distinction (as expressed in S v Naidoo [1962] 4 All SA 322 (A)) between gross irregularities that per se vitiate a trial (allowing retrial because there has been neither a conviction nor an acquittal on the merits) and lesser irregularities where an appellate court can separate “good” from “bad” and decide the merits (in which case setting aside may amount to an acquittal). The court held that the irregularity in the present matter fell into the first category. Accordingly, a retrial would not infringe section 35(3)(m) of the Constitution. Given the seriousness of the charge and the public interest in a proper adjudication, the matter was remitted for retrial under section 324 of the Criminal Procedure Act, with the proviso that the original presiding judge must not participate.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the appeal. It set aside the convictions and sentences imposed on each appellant.


It ordered that proceedings in respect of the same offence may again be instituted, either on the original charge (suitably amended where necessary) or on any other charge, as if the appellants had not previously been arraigned, tried and convicted, provided that the judge who presided in the original trial shall not take part in the new proceedings.


The order reflected the court’s conclusion that the original proceedings were invalid due to unfairness; the judgment did not determine guilt or innocence on the merits. The extracted order in the report does not reflect any separate costs order (consistent with criminal appeal practice).


Cases Cited


Take and Save Trading CC v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2004 (4) SA 1 (SCA).


S v Roberts 1999 (2) SACR 243 (SCA).


S v Basson [2007] ZACC 10; 2007 (3) SA 582 (CC).


S v Sallem 1987 (4) SA 772 (A).


S v Tyebela 1989 (2) SA 22 (A).


S v Rall 1982 (1) SA 828 (A).


S v Meyer 1972 (3) SA 480 (A).


President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union [1999] ZACC 9; 1999 (4) SA 147 (CC).


BTR Industries SA (Pty) Ltd v Metal & Allied Workers’ Union [1992] ZASCA 85; 1992 (3) SA 673 (A).


R v S (R.D.) (1997) 151 DLR (4th) 193 (Supreme Court of Canada).


Strickland, Superintendent, Florida State Prison et al v Washington [1984] USSC 146; 466 US 668 (United States Supreme Court).


R v Gough [1993] UKHL 1; [1993] 2 All ER 724 (House of Lords).


Yuill v Yuill [1945] 1 All ER 183 (CA).


Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Mtshweni 2007 (2) SACR 217 (SCA).


S v Naidoo [1962] 4 All SA 322 (A).


S v Moodie 1962 (1) SA 587 (A).


S v Jaipal [2005] ZACC 1; 2005 (4) SA 581 (CC).


Legislation Cited


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 35(3).


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 35(3)(m).


Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 204.


Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 324.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the cumulative effect of the presiding judge’s conduct during the trial, including excessive and adversarial questioning of the accused, interruptions and curtailment of cross-examination, and conduct giving rise to an impression that the judge had aligned himself with the prosecution, demonstrated that the appellants did not receive a fair trial and that the presiding judge was not fair and impartial.


On that basis, the proceedings were treated as invalid, requiring that the convictions and sentences be set aside without an assessment of the merits. The court further held that because the invalidity fell within the category of gross irregularities that vitiate the trial, a retrial would not violate the protection against double jeopardy in section 35(3)(m) of the Constitution, and a retrial could be instituted under section 324 of the Criminal Procedure Act, before a different judge.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A criminal accused is entitled to a fair trial, which presupposes adjudication by a presiding officer who is open-minded, impartial, and fair, and whose impartiality must be manifest to those concerned with the trial, particularly the accused.


Not only actual bias but also the appearance of bias may disqualify a judicial officer. Where improper conduct during the trial sustains the inference that the presiding officer was not open-minded, impartial, or fair, appellate intervention may follow, and in an appropriate case the proceedings may be declared invalid without considering the merits.


Judicial questioning must be exercised within strict bounds. A presiding officer should avoid questioning that compromises the appearance of impartiality, prevents detached appreciation of the issues, intimidates or disconcerts a witness, or resembles cross-examination aimed at producing answers favourable to one party. Excessive intervention risks the judge “descending into the arena” and losing the advantage of detached observation.


Irregularities may be categorised into those so gross as to vitiate the trial per se (in which case there is no conviction or acquittal on the merits and retrial is competent under section 324), and lesser irregularities where a merits assessment remains possible (where setting aside may amount to an acquittal on the merits). In the former category, retrial does not infringe the constitutional protection against being tried twice for the same offence.

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
>>
2008
>>
[2008] ZASCA 102
|

|

S v Le Grange and Others (040/2008) [2008] ZASCA 102; 2009 (1) SACR 125 (SCA) 2009 (2) SA 434 (SCA) ; [2010] 1 All SA 238 (SCA) ; 2010 (6) BCLR 547 (SCA) (18 September 2008)

Links to summary

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case Number: 040 / 2008
JOSEPH LE GRANGE 1
st
Appellant
HENDRIK LOURENS VAN DER
WESTHUIZEN 2
nd
Appellant
PIETER JAKOBUS LE GRANGE 3
rd
Appellant
and
THE STATE Respondent
Neutral citation:
Le
Grange v The State
(040/2008)
[2008] ZASCA
102
(18 September 2008)
Coram : MPATI P, BRAND,
PONNAN and CACHALIA JJA and MHLANTLA AJA
Heard: 21 August 2008
Delivered: 18 September 2008
Summary:
Criminal
proceedings – right to a fair trial – judicial officer –
not fair and impartial during trial –
proceedings held to be
invalid – convictions and sentences set aside – matter
remitted for retrial.
___________________________________________________________________
ORDER
___________________________________________________________________
On
appeal from:
High
Court, Kimberley (Kgomo JP sitting as court of first instance)
1
The
appeal succeeds.
2
The
convictions and sentences imposed on each of the appellants are set
aside.
3
It
is ordered that proceedings in respect of the same offence may again
be instituted either on the original charge, suitably amended
where
necessary, or upon any other charge as if the appellants had not
previously been arraigned, tried and convicted: provided
that the
judge before whom the original trial took place shall not take part
in such proceedings.
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
PONNAN JA (MPATI P, BRAND
and CACHALIA JJA and MHLANTLA AJA concurring):
[1] The first appellant, his son – the third appellant, and the
latter’s friend, the second appellant, were indicted
before the
Kimberley High Court (per Kgomo JP), on one count of murder. The
first appellant, who was convicted as charged, was
sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of 24 years. The remaining two appellants
were convicted of being accessories after the fact
to murder and were
sentenced to imprisonment for terms of eight and seven years
respectively, a period of two years of which in
each instance was
conditionally suspended. The effective sentence imposed on the second
and third appellants was thus imprisonment
for terms of six and five
years, respectively. Leave to appeal was granted by the trial court
to the first appellant solely in
respect of the sentence imposed on
him. This court, on petition to it, extended the scope of the appeal
to encompass all of the
convictions as well as the sentences imposed
pursuant thereto in respect of all of the appellants.
[2] The deceased, 13 year old Biron Phetlo, had spent the greater
part of Sunday, 24 March 2004, at the Prieska Golf Course in
the
company of his two friends, 14 year old Curtis Maritz and 17 year old
Jaco Botha. Two of the three had managed to secure work
as caddies.
At the end of the day, they made their way on foot to the city
centre. Once in the city centre, Jaco entered the Prieska
Cafe to
purchase refreshments, whilst the other two made their way to a
sports shop in Stewart Street. Having arrived at the sports
shop,
which was closed for trade, Curtis and the deceased seated themselves
on the front steps. At about that time the defence
witness Emmanuel
Bosman, who was referred to in the evidence as Bolla, was on his way
into what he described as the Chinese shop,
when he observed the
deceased and Curtis who both appeared to him to be normal. That was
no longer the case when Bolla emerged
from the shop.
[3] Whilst seated on the steps, it would appear that one of the
youths attempted to fish goods out of the sports store through
a hole
in the front glass door. They were observed however by the appellants
who were at that stage out for a walk on the opposite
side of the
street. The appellants made their way across the street to the two
boys. The interaction between the three appellants
and the two boys
on the stairs of the sports shop lasted no more than two minutes for,
that is how long Bolla’s excursion
into the shop lasted during
which time he purchased a cold drink.
[4] According to Curtis, he knew the first appellant or ‘the
oupa’ as he put it, as the husband of Annelise of Pep
Store and
his son, the third appellant. Curtis testified that the third
appellant accused them of having previously stolen from
a certain
greengrocer. The deceased tried to flee but he was prevented from
doing so by the first appellant who pinned him back
with his walking
stick or rather what came to be described in the evidence as a sword
cane. The first appellant then succeeded
in unsheathing the blade of
his sword cane and stabbed the deceased three times in quick
succession. Curtis tried to get away to
alert the police, but he was
prevented from doing so by the second appellant. The three appellants
then quickly departed from the
scene. Once they had done so, Curtis
summoned Jaco and reported to him that the deceased had been stabbed.
When Curtis returned
with Jaco, the deceased was lying some 11 metres
from the stairs of the sports store. According to Jaco, his
examination of the
deceased revealed a chest wound from which blood
was bubbling. Angered by what he saw, Jaco removed his t-shirt and
discarded his
sandals and thereafter set off in what Curtis had
claimed was the direction taken by the deceased’s assailants.
When Jaco
first came upon the appellants, according to him, they were
running. The third appellant asked him what he wanted and picked up
a
stone which was thrown at Jaco. In response, Jaco told them that they
could run away now as he had seen them. Like Curtis, he
also knew the
first and third appellants. By the time Jaco returned to the
deceased, the police were already in attendance and
the deceased was
thereafter removed to the hospital.
[5] The appellants on their version had left the home of the first
appellant at approximately 17:45 that evening, with the intention
of
visiting the latter’s grandson who was reportedly ill. As the
first appellant’s daughter was not at home, the three

appellants decided to take a walk. En route, they came upon the
deceased and Curtis who were endeavouring to steal from the sports

shop. The appellants approached the youths, both of whom attempted to
flee when confronted by the appellants. The second appellant

physically restrained Curtis, whilst the first appellant utilised his
walking stick with which he prodded the deceased to prevent
the
latter from getting to his feet. When the appellants had departed the
scene, the two boys were sitting injury free on the steps
as they had
found them. En route, they observed a bare-bodied youth who appeared
to be pursuing them. The second appellant enquired
what he wanted and
the youth turned around and left. They then proceeded to the home of
the in-laws of the first appellant’s
daughter and, after having
satisfied themselves that first appellant’s grandson was well,
the three then set off for the
home of the first appellant.
[6] Later that evening, having been informed that the deceased had
died in hospital, detective Francois Schutte, interviewed Jaco
and
Curtis. On the strength of information furnished by them, he visited
the home of the first appellant. After examining the dozen
or so
walking sticks in the appellant’s home and not finding any that
fitted the description furnished by Curtis, he arrested
the first
appellant. He then requested the second and third appellants to
furnish him with statements which in due course they
did via their
attorney.
[7] The chief findings of Dr George Isaacs, who performed the post
mortem examination on the body of the deceased, were a:
(1) 2 x 1 cm wound on the left front of the chest, penetrating the
5
th
rib and ending in the heart;
(2) 1 x 1 cm wound on the right wrist; and
(3) 1.5 x 1 cm wound on the back of the right hand.
According to Dr Isaacs the first wound was 4 cm deep, whilst the
other two, which he described as defensive wounds, were each 1
cm
deep. He concluded that the cause of death was cardiac tamponade due
to a stab wound of the heart.
[8] From this brief summary it will be apparent that the issue of
guilt was essentially one of credibility. In resolving it Kgomo
JP
believed the state witnesses and rejected the evidence of the
appellants and their witnesses. He accordingly convicted the first

appellant of murder and the other two appellants of being accessories
after the fact to murder.
[9] When the trial was well on its way, a substantive application for
the Judge President’s recusal was launched. The application
was
refused. What triggered the application for recusal in this case, was
the questioning of the first appellant by the learned
Judge President
at the end of his testimony. The allegation being that while the
first appellant was testifying in his defence,
the learned Judge
questioned him in a manner that, having regard to his judicial
functions, was impermissible or excessive. Although
the alleged
irregular questioning of the first appellant prompted the
application, it did not stand alone.
[10] The first ground was that the Judge President interrupted or
curtailed the cross-examination by Mr Van Heerden (who represented

all of the appellants) of state witnesses on important aspects.
Reliance in this regard was placed on the following as illustrative

of such conduct:
First,
apropos
the cross-examination of Curtis Maritz;

MNR VAN HEERDEN
:
Was dit ‘n koeëlronde gat of het die gat skerp punte
gehad? --- Hy was koeël Mister maar hy het so ‘n bietjie

skerp punte.
Hoe het Biron die draad daar
ingesteek? --- So ingesteek Mister toe trek hy die goeters af.
HOF
:
Mnr van Heerden ek weet nie, hy sê hulle het dit gedoen en
hulle was stout en alles, so nou waar lei ons heen? Hulle wou
steel,
hulle het nie daarin geslaag nie, nou weet ons, maar ek weet nie
waarheen lei die vrae nie. Ek het gewag, ‘n vraag
moet ‘n
doel hê, nou ek dink u moet nou ‘n bietjie punt afkom. Ek
wil nie hê elke keer moet ek sê
waarom vra u die vraag
nie maar as hy dit nog ontken het of as u nog vir hom gaan sê
nee maar julle het dit nie gedoen nie,
of julle het dit so gedoen,
dan moet dit nou uitkom asseblief.
MNR VAN HEERDEN
:
Soos die hof behaag. Het Biron sy hand seergemaak toe hy daar by die
gat met die draad gekrap het? --- Nee Mister.
So volgens u was Biron se hand
nie beseer gewees nie? --- Nee.
. . . . .
Kan u vir my ‘n afstand
uitwys wat beskuldigde 1 gehardloop het? Nee daar waar u staan, kan u
vir ons wys hy het sê
nou maar gehardloop tot agter die hof,
dit wat u gesien het, of hy het gehardloop tot hier by mnr Cloete?
--- Nee Mister hier is
die pad nou, toe kom hulle so om, toe loer hy,
daardie een met die geelkop, toe hol hy hier om net so om die hoek,
ek weet nie
waarnatoe hy gaan in nie, toe hol hulle twee, toe
“charge” Jakes vir hulle reeds, ek weet nie tot waar toe
“charge”
Jakes vir hulle nie.
HOF
:
Het u gesien tot waar hulle gehardloop het? --- Nee Mister, ek het
net gesien daar hol hulle, ek het nie nog gekyk waar hol hulle
nie,
toe loop roep ek vir Jakes.
Hoekom kon u nie sien tot waar
hulle gehardloop het nie? --- Hulle is om die hoek Mister.
Hulle is om die hoek? --- Ja.
Nou u is seker beskuldigde 1 het
ook gehardloop? --- Ja Mister.
Want ek [this has to be Mr Van
Heerden and not the Court] wil dit aan u stel en as dit nodig is sal
ek die getuienis roep, dat beskuldigde
1 kan as gevolg van beserings
nie hardloop nie. --- Mister hy het ‘n bietjie stadig gehol
Mister, ek ken van hom Mister.
Ja maar hy kan nie hardloop nie.
--- Ek het gesien hoe hy stadig hol Mister.
HOF
:
Is daardie vraag volledig?
MNR VAN HEERDEN
:
Ekskuus u Edele?
HOF
:
Ek sê die vraag wat u aan hom gevra het is nie volledig nie,
dit kan nie volledig wees nie. Beskuldigde 1 het as gevolg
van
beserings wat hy gister opgedoen het nie kon hardloop nie, ja dit is
wat ... (tussenbei)
MNR VAN HEERDEN
:
Soos die hof behaag, ek verstaan wat die hof sê. Ek stel dit
aan u dat beskuldigde 1 het beserings opgedoen voor hierdie
voorval,
dat dit gevolg gehad het dat hy tydens hierdie voorval nie kon
hardloop nie.
HOF
:
Die stelling aan u is, wat vir u gesê word is hierdie
beserings wat maak dat beskuldigde 1 nie kan hardloop nie, hy het

daardie beserings gekry voor hierdie voorval daar voor daardie stoep.
Wat sê u, kan u enige iets daaromtrent sê? ---
Nee
Mister.
MNR VAN HEERDEN
:
U sê u het hom gesien hardloop? --- Ja hy het stadig gehol
Mister.
. . . . .

Kan u miskien vir ons die
wond teken as ek vir u ‘n papier gee?
HOF
:
Meneer dan regtig waar. Is this intended to show that he was not
there, he did not see it? Did he conduct the post-mortem? What
is
this intended to do? If you are suggesting that he was not there then
it is something else, or if you are suggesting the injury
was not
inflicted at that point then you must make the point. As to whether
the wound was (indistinct) and what not, I am not so
sure what you
are trying to show because you are not showing anything.
MNR VAN HEERDEN
:
U Edele ek gaan vir u aan die einde van die saak betoog dat hierdie
getuie is ‘n leuenagtige getuie, dat hy die getuienis
uit sy
eie duim uitsuig. Net soos wat hy nou uitgesuig het dat hy na die
wond gekyk het, terwyl hy dit nie getuig het nie, dieselfde
dat hy ‘n
tweede keer na die wond gekyk het terwyl hy dit nie gedoen het nie.
HOF
:
Stel dit aan hom.
MNR VAN HEERDEN
:
U Edele ek kan nie ‘n stelling maak en sê jy is ‘n
leuenagtige getuie nie, ek moet vir die hof toespreek op
punte en sê
op hierdie aspek beweer ek dat hy leuenagtig is, op hierdie aspek, en
ek moet kruisverhoor daaroor om dit te
kan doen. Ek kan nie ‘n
algemene stelling aan hom maak en sê hy is leuenagtig en dit
daarby los nie, ek moet sy getuienis
toets.
HOF
:
Jy kan mos in detail kruisverhoor. Maak die punt.
MNR VAN HEERDEN
:
Sê u dat hy nie dit mag teken nie?
HOF
:
Stel dit aan hom.
MNR VAN HEERDEN
:
Soos die hof behaag. Curtis kan jy die wond vir my teken, dit wat u
gesien het, hoe dit gelyk het? --- (Lang pouse terwyl getuie
teken)'
And, second,
apropos
the cross-examination of Jaco Botha;
'
HOF
Ja?
MNR VAN HEERDEN
Soos die Hof behaag. Kon u hulle duidelik sien toe hulle af beweeg
het na die hotel toe? === Dis korrek.
Het hulle op daadie stadium
enigiets in hulle hande gesien? === Nee, niks.
As hulle – een van hulle
'n draad in hul hand gehad het, sou u dit gesien het? === Ja, ek sou
dit gesien het.
Goed. Het u geskree op hulle en
gevra vir hulle waarheen gaan hulle nou?
HOF
Net so 'n oomblikkie. Nou, toe u hulle sien afloop hotel toe, hoe
ver was u van hulle af? === Dis nou sê maar so 20 weer.
So 20? === 20 ja. So 20 meter.
So 20 meter. Nou as iemand 'n
binddraad in sy hand het of hulle het miskien 'n bokdraad – nie
'n rol nie, hoe … (onvoltooied).
=== Staaldraad of reguitdraad
of iets soos dit?
Hoe sien jy dit? === Ek sou dit
gesien het as hy dit gehad het, maar miskien kon hy dit iewers
opgetel het. Toe ek in die winkel
ingaan.
Veral as 'n mens nou nie soek
na iets. As iemand sê kyk daardie persoon het 'n draad in sy
hand, dan let jy most op. Maar
as 'n mens net loop – hoekom wil
u sê hulle het nie 'n draad – of een van hulle het nie 'n
draad in sy hand gehad
nie? === Edele, toe ons opkom het niemand niks
gehad in sy hand nie. En toe is dit wat ons – wat ek mos nou
winkel toe gaan
om kos te gaan koop. Maar daardie tyd toe hulle gaan
sit by Prieska Meubels, toe het niemand nog niks in sy hand nie.
Hulle kon
miskien die draad opgetel het ook iewers.
Ja === Toe ek aaneen geloop
het.
Nee, ek wil dit net mooi reg
kry volgens gewone menslike gedrag === Dis korrek, Edele.
As daar niks snaaks gebeur nie,
soek jy mos nou nie 'n draad in 'n mens se hand nie.
MNR VAN HEERDEN
Mnr Botha, u het nou saam met Byron en Curtis gestap en hulle het
niks in hulle hande gehad nie. Is dit korrek? === Ja, dis korrek.
As een ewe skielik 'n draad
gehad het, sou dit vir u opmerklik gewees het? === Kan u dit nie in
'n manier verduidelik nie?
U sê nou hulle stap. Is
dit reg? === Dis reg.
U wonder seker waarheen stap
hulle? === Ja, ek het gewonder waarnatoe stap hulle.
Julle afspraak is mos nou …
(tussenkoms). === Ons gaan daar sit by Prieska Meubels.
Ons gaan nou daar eet. Toe stap
hulle ewe skielik? === Ja.
Dit was vir u vreemd? === Dit
was vreemd, ja.
As een van hulle nou ewe
skielik 'n lang draad in sy hand gehad het of 'n stuk draad, sou u
dit opgemerk het? Want dit is mos
nou snaakse ding wat hulle dra.
=== Kan u nie net weer vir my herhaal nie?
HOF
Mnr van Heerden, ek hoor nou wat u sê, maar dit blyk ten
minste gemeensaak te wees tussen wat u opdrag is en wat Curtis
gesê
het dat daar 'n draad was. Nou watter soort punt wil u maak met
hierdie langdradige kruisverhoor oor 'n draad wat daar
was volgens
die verdediging in die saak. Watter punt wil u maak?
MNR VAN HEERDEN
Edele, ek is besig om die geloofwaardigheid van die getuie te toets.
Curtis … (tussenkoms).
HOF
Kom op die punt af. Ek gaan u stop as dit die enigste rede is, dan
gaan – u moet u punt maak ek gaan u stop.
MNR VAN HEERDEN
So ek mag nie getuies nou konfronteer oor hulle getuienis …
(tussenkoms).
HOF
Mnr van Heerden, ek sê maak u punt. Ek gaan u stop. En as ek u
gestop het, dan mag u dit nie voortvoer nie. Want ek kan
nie sien
watter punt u maak, want u erken dat die draad daar was. Dit is u
instruksies.
MNR VAN HEERDEN
Edele, met respek. As ek nie begryp .. (tussenkoms).
HOF
As u nie u punt maak nie, dan gaan ek u nou stop.
MNR VAN HEERDEN
Edele, ek versoek die geleentheid om dit met u – te kan
toespreek oor dit wat u vir my sê.
HOF
Ek wil nie hê u moet toespreek nie. Stel die vraag. En maak u
punt.'
[11] The second ground was that defence counsel was not allowed
sufficient time to consult with Mr Emmanuel Bosman (‘Bolla’)

who was only made available to the defence, as a witness, at the
close of the state case. In this regard the record reads:

MNR VAN HEERDEN
Soos
die Hof behaag. Beskuldigde 1 roep as getuie. Mnr Cloete het my
meedgedeel dat die getuie Immanuel Bosman, Bolla, ... (onhoorbaar)
en
nie van Kimberley is nie. En van die getuies is van Prieska en selfs
van Upington so ek weet nie of ... (onhoorbaar). ek dink
dit sal in
elk geval beter wees as ... (onhoorbaar).
HOF
Nou hoe lank wil u ... (onvoltooid).
MNR VAN HEERDEN
Edelagbare, ek wil voorstel daar is nog heelwat tyd ...
(onhoorbaar).
HOF
Nee, daar is nie so baie daar nie. Ek het dit alreeds vir u genoem
dat ons nie op sekere dae gaan sit. U het mos nou die verklarings.

Hoe lank kan dit nou regtigwaar neem?
MNR VAN HEERDEN
Edele, dan wil ek voorstel dat ons dan verdaag en dan ...
(onhoorbaar).
HOF Ja. Goed. Sê maar as
u gereed is.
MNR VAN HEERDEN Soos die Hof
behaag.
HOF VERDAAG
MASJIEN AF
_________________________________________________________________________
MASJIEN AAN
STAAT ROEP SAAK
MNR VAN HEERDEN
Soos die Hof behaag, Edele. Ek is nog besig om ... (onhoorbaar). Ek
het nog nie klaar gepraat met enige van die ander getuies
nie.
COURT
Ja, its 50 minutes late, mister. Carry on, call your witness.’
The next day of the trial, as emerges from the following excerpt,
that issue re-surfaced after the defence case had commenced:

MNR
VAN HEERDEN
:
Soos dit die hof behaag Edele, ek sal versoek dat die hof op hierdie
stadium verdaag. Ek het gister vir u geleentheid gevra om
met die
staatsgetuies wat vir my beskikbaar is te konsulteer. Ek was besig om
met die eerste een te konsulteer toe u my teruproep.
HOF
:
En wat het u toe gedoen toe die hof verdaag in die oggend?
MNR VAN HEERDEN: Nee Meneer,
luister maar net klaar na my, u Edele.
HOF
:
Ja ek wil weet, antwoord eers my vraag.
MNR VAN HEERDEN: Ek het klaar
gekonsulteer, maar ek kon nie met beskuldigde 1 praat omdat hy onder
kruisverhoor was nie. So ek
kan nie instruksies by hom kry as gevolg
van my konsultasies, wat is my instruksies, wie moet ek roep nie. So
ek versoek die geleentheid
...
HOF
:
Dit is werklik baie swak Meneer, ek verwag dit nie van ‘n
advokaat nie.
MNR VAN
HEERDEN
:
Verwag u van my om met ‘n getuie te gaan praat wat die staat
besig is om te kruisverhoor?
HOF
:
Meneer, “you are walking a thin line, you are walking a very
thin line.”
MNR VAN
HEERDEN
:
Dit mag so wees u Edele, maar dit is gebruik ...
HOF
:
Ek sê vir u dit is baie swak, ek verwag dit nie van ‘n
advokaat nie.
MNR VAN
HEERDEN
:
Ja, en ek verwag van ‘n voorsittende beampte dat as ‘n
mens ‘n geleentheid vra voor jy jou saak open, om met
alle
getuies te konsulteer, en u wou nie vir my die geleentheid gun nie.
So nou vra ek vir u, ek kan nie getuies roep as ek nie
instruksies
van ‘n kliënt het nie.
HOF
:
En wat het uitgespruit uit wat die getuie gesê het?
MNR VAN
HEERDEN
:
Watter getuie is dit?
HOF
:
Die beskuldigde 1. Wat het uitgespruit van wat Bolle sou gesê
het, want hy is gevra deur die staat, nou was daar enigiemand
wat
daar is. Wat het uitgespruit?
MNR VAN
HEERDEN
:
U Edele, maar verwag u van my om ‘n getuie te roep sonder dat
ek instruksies van ‘n kliënt het?
HOF
:
Mnr Van Heerden, as u vir my weer jy sê, “I will convict
you of contempt of court, right here. You have to apologise
and
withdraw that.”
MNR VAN
HEERDEN
:
Ek ontken dat ek vir u jy gesê het.
HOF
:
Speel bietjie terug, Mevrou. Speel terug. Het u ..?’
To complete the picture,
it needs be mentioned that not only did the tapes prove counsel to be
correct, but the Judge President adjourned court immediately

thereafter without proferring an apology to counsel.
[12] The third and certainly most substantive ground, as I have
already stated, was the questioning of the first appellant by the

learned Judge President at the end of his testimony. It prompted an
immediate recusal application. The record discloses the following

questions put to the first appellant and his answers to them:

HOF
:
Mnr Le Grange, u moet maar net u tyd vat en mooi luister na my vrae
en dit maar antwoord tot die beste van u vermoë. En
as u nie ‘n
vraag verstaan nie, of as u nie mooi hoor nie, sê maar net.
Daar in Prieska, is u betrokke in enige gemeenskapdiens
of
aktiwiteit? --- U Edele nee, volgens die werk wat ek doen het ek nie
tyd om enigiets te doen nie. Ons, en dit by name van my
vrou en .. is
ons by, ek kan u nie die plek se naam gee nie, dit is ‘n
kinderhuis, waar hulle behoeftige kinders versorg,
waar ons periodiek
vir die mense, ons gee nie geld nie, maar ons gee soos byvoorbeeld
voedsel, ons gee vir hulle speel geriewe.
Dit is klein kindertjies
van tot en met so sewe jaar en miskien een of twee wat bietjie ouer
is. Dis al aktiwiteite wat ons op
hierdie stadium by is. Maar ek het
nie tyd, want ek werk op hierdie stadium 12 ure per dag vir ses dae
‘n week.
Ja. Nou gesien u betrokkenheid
daarby en ek vra u omdat u gesê het u het nie die voorval by
die polisie aangegee nie want
hierdie is maar net kinders. Nou wil ek
u vra, as ‘n grootmens, hoekom het u nie sê maar u
burgerlike plig gedoen deur
die kinders dan daar te vang en hulle
ouers ontbied, sodat die ouers kan kom sien wat hierdie mense doen? U
weet daar is probleme
met inbrake ensovoorts. Ek vra u maar net op
grond van wat u self gesê het. U het gesê dit is kinders.
Nou wil ek u
vra, hoekom het u dit nie so gedoen nie? --- U Edele,
baie keer in so geval sit jy met die probleem, as jy twee kinders of
twee
mense, kom ons noem dit, maak nie saak watter ouderdom nie, as
jy hulle vang of arresteer of kom ons praat van vang, nou-nou het
jy
‘n klomp mense om jou wat ek glad heeltemal wil vermy. En ten
tweedens, die ouer van die kinders stel in elk geval nie
belang in
hulle nie.
Ja maar Mnr Le Grange, u kan
mos nou nie al die ouers onder dieselfde kam skeer nie. Ek meen, u
kon darem probeer het. Ek wil net
weet Mnr Le Grange, ek vra u maar
op grond van wat u gesê het dit is net kinders, ek wil hulle
nie vang nie. --- Dit is so
u Edele dat almal kan ‘n mens nie
onder dieselfde kam skeer nie, dit is so. Maar u moet besef dat ‘n
mens, ek wil my
nie graag werklik met iets konfronteer of dat ek deur
iets anders gekonfronteer word nie.
Goed dan, ek wil net vir u lees
wat u eie seun nou gesê het en moet u vir my sê of dat u
wat hy hier sê deel.
Ek lees van paragraaf 16 af, van sy
verklaring wat deel vorm van BEWYSSTUK A:
“Dat my pa toe gesê
het ons moet die polisie bel.”
Het u dit gesê? --- U
Edele, op ‘n stadium het ons almal daarom gepraat. Almal het
gelyk gesê, kom ons bel die
polisie.
Mnr Le Grange, luister, ‘n
kort sinnetjie op die man af. Hy sê
“My pa het gesê ons
moet die polisie bel.”
Ek vra u, het u dit gesê?
--- Ek het dit agterna gesê, kom ons bel die polisie.
Dan gaan die verklaring voort:
“Ons het ongelukkig nie
ons selfone by ons gehad nie en het my pa gesê dan help dit
nie, dat daar niks is wat ons kan
doen nie”
Tot daar, het u dit gesê?
--- Dit is so u Edele, ek het dit gesê.

En het ons die seuns toe
daar gelos en verder gestap tot by die volgende straat,
Heuwelstraat.”
Het dit so gebeur? --- Dit is
so, u Edele.
Nou Mnr Le Grange, dan kan ek
hoegenaamd nie verstaan nie. As u selfone by u gehad het sou u die
polisie gebel het. Dit is wat
hierdie verklaring sê. ---Dit is
reg u Edele, maar ons het nie selfone gehad nie, nie een van ons het
’n selfoon by
ons gehad nie.
Ja maar dan strook dit nie met
wat u gesê het, ons los hulle, hulle is kinders. Sien, dit is
twee teenstrydige goed en ek
wil hê u moet dit vir my opklaar,
want ek moet nou u verstaan. En daar is getuie .. ek moet nou vind
wie praat die waarheid,
wie praat nie die waarheid nie, en dit is u
kans om hier te verduidelik. Hulle is net kinders, kom ons los dit.
Maar as u ‘n
selfoon gehad het sou u die polsie gebel het dat
die polisie hulle arresteer. Nou kan ek nie verstaan nie, wat nou
eintlik, kan
‘n mens maar sê, is die waarheid? Of is
albei hierdie situasies die waarheid? Kan u verduidelik? --- U Edele,
dit is
wat ons gesê het, wat ek gesê het. Die ander punt
is, omdat daar niks, geen goedere uit die winkel uit uitgekrap was

nie, daar was geen artikels buitekant die winkel nie wat uit die
winkel uit uitgehaal is nie, dan sal die polisie gekom het, hulle
sal
geen klagte teen hulle gelê het nie, want hulle het dan mos nou
niks gesteel nie. Wat is die nut om nou te loop en na
‘n plek
toe te gaan en ‘n telefoon te kry en die polisie te bel terwyl
die twee dan nou rêrig op daai stadium
niks uitgehaal het uit
die winkel uit, daar was geen items buitekant die winkel nie.
Maar die verklaring hier sê
nie my pa het gesê kom ons los hulle, hulle is kinders. Dit is
nie wat die .. want hier
word u aangehaal as wat u sou gesê
het. Verstaan u? --- Dis reg.
Wil u nog iets sê
daaromtrent? --- Nee u Edele, dit is wat gebeur het. Ons het hulle
net daar gelos en ons het daarvandaan
geloop, want dit maak geen sin
om nou die polisie te bel en rond te hardloop om ‘n telefoon te
kry en daar is geen goed
regtig uit die winkel uitgehaal wat hulle
kom inkrimineer nie, op daardie stadium nie.
Nou het Mnr Van der Westhuizen
of Pieter u seun vir u gesê, nee maar Pa, daar was ‘n
bloedkol op die t-hemp van die
oorledene, Curtis? --- Op daardie
stadium, nee.
Het hulle dit nie vir u gesê
nie --- Op daai stadium, nee u Edele.
Het hulle het vir .. u sê
op daardie stadium nie, op ‘n latere stadium? --- U Edele, die
eerste wat ek daarvan gehoor
het was toe ek voor die hof kom die
Dinsdag oggend, toe het Mnr Mundus van Niekerk vir my hulle
verklarings, nie gelees nie, maar
toe het hy gesê een van die
verklarings sê dat daar ‘n kol op die, ‘n vlek op
die hemp van een van die
persone was.
Ja, want kyk hier lees ek nou,
en u was daar, en ek lees nog u eie seun se verklaring. 11, paragraaf
11, dat:

Die seun wat tot nou toe
vooroor gebuig het, het regop gekom en het ek opgelet dat daar bruin
bloedkolle op sy hemp se voorkant
was.”
Dit is wat u seun gesien het.
MNR VAN HEERDEN
:
Met respek, daar staan nie bruin bloedkolle nie.
HOF
:
Ekskuus tog, wat het ek nou gelees?
MNR VAN HEERDEN
:
U het gesê bruin bloedkolle.
HOF
:
Ekskuus tog.

. . opgelet dat daar
bruin-rooi kolle op die hemp was.”
Ekskuus tog.

Bruin-rooi kolle op die
hemp se voorkant was.” --- U Edele, ek het dit nie opgelet nie.
Ek weet nie, ek het dit nie opgelet
nie.
Ja, maar dan wil ek dit nou
verstaan, en ek moet dit vir u so vra, u sien bloed op die .. en u
kan kyk na die fotos, dit is ‘n
kind met ‘n bruin kleur,
hy is lig van kleur, is daar BEWYSSTUK D, kan u dit vind? Kyk maar
die fotos 1 en 2. Het u BEWYSSTUK
D voor u? Kan iemand net die getuie
help, asseblief? Ja, BEWYSSTUK D, kyk na fotos 1 en 2. Nou kyk maar
na sy velkleur, nou sien
u bloed aan die hand, die agterkant van die
hand, nie die palmgedeelte nie, dit is waar u die bloed gesien het.
--- U Edele, die
persoon het so gesit met sy elmboë op die
knieë. Ek het opgemerk ‘n merk op sy hand. Daar was nie
bloed en sulks
nie, daar was .. dit was droog, daar het nie bloed
geloop nie, die merk was droog.
Ja ek hoor wat u sê, dit
is so. Maar dit het nie daar geëindig nie. Die seun het
opgestaan en hy wou weghardloop en
u het hom teruggestoot met die
kierie sê u. --- Dis reg, u Edele.
Ja, nou dit is mos die tyd wat
hierdie bloedkol kon gewys het. U seun, ek sê nou bloedkol,
bruin-rooi kol, u seun het dit
gesien, ek wil net weet hoekom het u
dit nie gesien nie? --- U Edele, ek het dit nie opgemerk nie. Ek het
dit rêrig nie opgemerk
nie.
U druk dan juis op sy bors. ---
Ja maar u Edele, ek het hom op die bors gedruk maar ek het nie kolle
opgemerk nie, ek het hom eintlik
in die gesig gekyk, ek het nie gekyk
na sy klere of enigiets nie, ek het niks ingeneem wat die klere of
wat hy aangehad het nie.
Ek sien nou eers hy het ‘n blouerige
hemp aangehad, ek kon dit nie eers onthou nie.
Is dit u verduideliking, Mnr Le
Grange, of wil u nog ’n verdere verduideliking gee? --- Dis al
wat ek vir u kan sê
u Edele.
Goed, nou die dokter het gesê
die voorwerp het ‘n rib deurboor en het die voorwerp ook in die
hart in, tot in die hart
ingedring, het u gehoor? --- Ek het gehoor,
u Edele.
Nou volgens wat Curtis gesê
het en wat Jacob Botha ook gesê het, het hulle nog gesien die
gedeelte waar die wond was
het nog geborrel. Sal dit nie ’n
aanduiding is dat die besering miskien nie so lank gelede toegedien
is nie, as dit nog borrel?
--- U Edele, ek weet nie, my ondervinding,
ek is nie ‘n dokter nie, my ondervinding ..
Nee, niemand is .. ons is nie
dokters hier nie, dis ‘n mens se ervaring, mense slag dinge en
so aan, u het gesê die
bloed was droog, so daardie bloed was
nie, volgens hierdie Curtis-hulle was die bloed nie droog nie, die
bloed het geborrel. ---
Ja u Edele, wanneer bloed borrel is dit
gewoonlik ‘n longwond. Ek weet nie u Edele, ek kan u nie
antwoord nie, ek weet nie
hoe was dit nie, ek het nie gesien nie, en
ek weet nie.
Ek gee u maar kans om net so
vir u te stel wat die getuie gesê het. --- Dis reg, ja.
As u kan. As u nie kan nie,
goed. Nou as u kyk na die bewysstuk, is dit BEWYSSTUK G, die foto
album, as u kyk na enige van daardie
fotos en u ken die plek, kan u
die polisiestasie sien op enige van daardie fotos? Of min of meer
waar die polisiestasie behoort
te wees? --- U Edele, die eerste foto,
as u hierdie gebou hier aan die onderkant waar my huis is, hierdie
gebou ..
Ja, ek sien daar is .. --- As u
hierdie straat wat voor my huis verbyloop reguit volg van die foto af
na die linkerkant ..
So met ander woorde ..? --- Die
polisiestasie is nog omtrent, kom ons sê ‘n driekwart
kilometer daarvandaan.
Daarvandaan, in dieselfde
straat? --- In daai selfde straat, u Edele.
So u bly nie so ver van die
polisiestasie af nie? --- Nee, nie te ver nie, nee. Dis om te loop is
dit ver ja, maar jy kan hom loop
as jy moet. Dis ‘n paar
blokke, ‘n hele paar blokke.
Ja, is dit ‘n driekwart,
is dit sê maar so 700 meter? --- Indien nie verder nie, u
Edele. Ek skat hom maar so.
En om die polisie se nommer te
kry is nie moeilik nie, is dit? U weet hoe om die polisie te bel? ---
Dis reg, u Edele.
Mnr Le Grange, u moet nou mooi
luister wat ek sê, ek wil nie weet wat gesê is by u
prokureur nie, dit is gepriviligeer,
ek wil net dit weet, u het gesê
.. laat ek dit eerder so stel. U prokureur, het hy met u gepraat op
enige stadium in die
teenwoordigheid van beskuldigde 2 en 3? --- Nee
u Edele, ek is die Sondagaand toegesluit, hy het kort nadat al die
papierwerk afgehandel
is, was hy by my gewees en het ons ‘n
kort gesprek gehad van omtrent vyf minute. Die Maandagoggend was ‘n
vakansiedag,
toe was hy weer by my en toe het hy gesê die
kinders versoek dat hy hulle verklaring moet afneem. En dit is in
teenwoordigheid
van Inspekteur Schutte gewees. En nooit het hy
enigiets van die kinders met my gepraat nie, en dit is ook die laaste
wat ek hom
gesien het.
Nee, nee, nee, dis nie wat ek
wil weet nie, en moenie dinge byvoeg wat ek nie vir u vra nie, veral
nie op hierdie aspek nie. So
die verklaring is van hulle geneem nadat
Mnr Van Niekerk u prokureur, met u al gepraat het, gekonsulteer? ---
Hy het, by die polisiestasie
het hy met my gesels ja.
Nou u praat ook van .. of laat
ek dit so stel, Mnr Schutte het gesê u het gesê u wil u
prokureur bel, waarvan het u
u prokureur gebel? --- Nee u Edele, ek
het nooit vir Mnr Schutte gevra om die prokureur te bel nie. Nadat
ons weg is polisiestasie
toe en besig was met die papierwerk, het my
vrou die prokureur uit haar eie uit gebel en hy het toe later, nadat
alles verby was,
het hy by die polisiestasie aangekom.
Maar dit is wat hy gesê
het, en u het gehoor daar is nie gesê nee, dit is nie korrek
vir hom nie. --- U Edele, hoe
bedoel u nou?
Nee u het gehoor wat Mnr
Schutte gesê het --- Dis reg.
Hy het gesê u het gevra
om u prokureur te bel. --- Nee u Edele, ek het hom nie gevra nie, my
vrou het die prokureur uit haar
eie uit gebel nadat ons by die huis
weg is. En ek het nooit ..
Nie in u teenwoordigheid nie?
--- Nie in sy teenwoordigheid, Mnr Schutte se teenwordigheid het ek
nooit die prokureur gebel nie,
ek het ook nie vir hom gevra of ek die
prokureur kan bel nie.
En u vrou ook nie in Mnr
Schutte se teenwoordigheid nie? ---
Nee, sy het dit uit haar eie uit
gedoen.
Goed, nou Mnr Le Grange, die
laaste aspek. Gestel die oorledene is, dat ons maar sê een en
’n half uur beseer voordat
u op die toneel gekom het, voordat u
hom gekry het waar u hom gekry het, hoekom sal hy nou kom sê
daardie persoon wat hom
beseer het los, en dan kom sê u het hom
beseer? “Why pick on you?” Hoekom moet hy nou reeds sê
u het dit
gedoen? --- U Edele, ek kan u nie antwoord nie. Ek kan u
werklik nie antwoord nie, ek is net so verlae as wat enige ander mens
is. Ek weet nie wat om te sê nie. Al wat ek kan sê, ek
was op die verkeerde tyd op die verkeerde plek en kan daai vraag
nie
antwoord nie. Ek weet nie, ek weet nie, u Edele.
En hierdie seun het toe gaan lê
11 en ‘n half meter van waar u hom op die stoep gelos het, 11
en ‘n half meter
vandaar af, dit is waar hy gaan lê het
en dit is waar die polisie hom gekry het. Het u gehoor dit is die
getuienis --- E
het gehoor, u Edele.
Nog iets wat u wil sê oor
die vrae wat ek u gevra het? --- Nee, u Edele.
Enige vrae uitspruitend?
MNR VAN HEERDEN
:
Geen, u Edele
MNR CLOETE
:
Geen dankie, u Edele.
HOF
:
Goed dankie, u kan maar terugstaan.’
[13] The recusal application brought to the fore the question whether
the learned Judge President’s conduct bore the appearance
of
bias. It is settled law that not only actual bias but also the
appearance of bias disqualifies a judicial officer from presiding
(or
continuing to preside) over judicial proceedings. The
disqualification is so complete that continuing to preside after
recusal
should have occurred renders the further proceedings a
nullity.
1
It is not necessary in this case to determine whether the presiding
officer’s conduct, bearing and utterances would have
provided a
reasonable person in the appellants’ position with reasonable
grounds to think that the court might be biased
or whether, by the
time the recusal application was made, sufficient had occurred to
create that impression. That is so because
by the time the appeal
came to be argued before us the main contention advanced on behalf of
the appellants ranged beyond the simple
fact that the recusal
application had been wrongly refused and that the proceedings which
followed constituted a nullity. The principal
thrust of the argument
on appeal was that having regard to the manner in which the learned
Judge President had conducted himself,
the appellants had not had a
fair trial. As it was put by Milne JA in
S v Tyebela
1989 (2)
SA 22
(A) at 29G, ‘[i]t is a fundamental principle of our law
and, indeed, of any civilised society that an accused person is
entitled
to a fair trial. … This necessarily presupposes that
the judicial officer who tries him is fair and unbiased and conducts

the trial in accordance with those rules and principles or the
procedure which the law requires.’ Where the offending
questioning
sustains the inference that in fact the presiding judge
was not open-minded, impartial, or fair during the trial, this court
will
intervene and grant appropriate relief. (See
S v Rall
1982 (1) SA 828
(A) at 833B,
S v Meyer
1972 (3) SA 480
(A) at
484D). In such a case the court will declare the proceedings invalid
without considering the merits.
[14] A cornerstone of our legal system is the impartial adjudication
of disputes which come before our courts and tribunals. What
the law
requires is not only that a judicial officer must conduct the trial
open-mindedly, impartially and fairly, but that such
conduct must be
‘manifest to all those who are concerned in the trial and its
outcome, especially the accused’.
2
The right to a fair trial is now entrenched in our Constitution. As
far as criminal trials are concerned, the requirement of impartiality

is closely linked to the right of an accused person to a fair trial
which is guaranteed by s 35(3) of our Constitution.
3
Criminal trials have to be conducted in accordance with the notions
of basic fairness and justice. The fairness of a trial would
clearly
be under threat if a court does not apply the law and assess the
facts of the case impartially and without fear, favour
or prejudice.
The requirement that justice must not only be done, but also to be
seen to be done has been recognised as lying at
the heart of the
right to a fair trial. The right to a fair trial requires fairness to
the accused, as well as fairness to the
public as represented by the
state.
4
[15] In this case it has been submitted that the conduct of the
learned Judge President sustains the inference that, in fact, he
was
not open-minded, impartial and fair during the trial. It is
accordingly also necessary to examine the record of the proceedings

after the refusal of the recusal application in some detail to
determine whether this submission is well-founded. Like the first

appellant, the remaining two appellants were also subjected to
lengthy questioning at the hands of the learned Judge President
after
having been cross-examined by the state.
[16] In respect of the second appellant the record reads:
'HOF
Mnr van der Westhuizen, net 'n paar aspekte. U moet tog net duidelik
luister na my vrae. Mnr van Niekerk is u prokureur so ek
wil nie weet
wat u vir hom gesê het nie. So op hierdie vraag van my moet u
net antwoord "ja" of "nee".
Ek wil nie weet wat
daar gesê is nie. U sê mnr Van Niekerk, die prokureur het
dieselfde aand by Beskuldigde 1 se huis
gekom. === Ja, U Edele.
Het mnr Van Niekerk met mnr Le
Grange, Beskuldigde 1 vir mnr Van Niekerk gesê wat gebeur het?
=== Ja, U Edele.
En was u en Beskuldigde 3, Le
Grange juniour, was u teenwoordig toe Beskuldigde 1 vir mnr Van
Niekerk gesê het wat daar gebeur
het? === Ja, U Edele.
Daarna het mnr Van Niekerk gesê
– of op 'n stadium het mnr Van Niekerk gesê u moet die
volgende dag kom sodat
u apart, twee aparte verklarings by hom kom
aflê? === Dis reg, U Edele.
Nou, ek is nou nie so seker in
my eie geheue waar het mnr Schutte, wat toe die ondersoekbeampte was,
waar het hy u aangetref toe
hy u gevra het vir 'n verklaring van u en
Beskuldigde 3 af? === Hy het ons in die huis aangetref, U Edele, maar
hy het ons nie
gevra vir 'n verklaring.
Ja, ek weet nie hoe om dit te
stel nie. Nee, maar soos ek verstaan wou hy verklarings van u hê
en u het gesê u verkies
om 'n verklaring voor u prokureur af te
lê of hoe het dit dan – was daar geen sprake tussen u en
mnr Schutte van die
afneem van 'n verklaring nie? === Die aand wat
Oom Joop in hegetenis geneem is, is Schutte en almal polisiestasie
toe. Toe het
Oom – Mundus van Niekerk toe het hy – toe
was hy nog daar by die huis gewees. Toe het hy gesê maar ons
moet volgende
more om ons verklarings by hom te kom aflê. En
toe is hy daarvandaan ook polisiestasie toe.
Is dit nou dieselfde aand? ===
Ja, U Edele.
Hy is toe polisiestasie toe,
ook dieselfde aand. === Ja, U Edele.
Ja maar sê nou maar vir
my mnr Van der Westhuizen – ek wil net weet wanneer en op
watter stadium het Inspekteur Schutte
vir 'n verklaring by julle
gevra? Dat hy u verklaring wou afneem nie? Ek weet nie of u die vraag
verstaan nie? === Nee maar hy
het nie vir ons gevra verklarings nie,
U Edele.
Mnr Schutte het nie vir 'n
verklaring …(tussenkoms)? === Nee, U Edele.
Maar u sê dan vir Adv
Cloete, die Staatsadvokaat, dat u geweet het dat die verklaring gaan
na die polisie toe? Is dit reg?
=== Ja, Edele.
En dat dit ondersoek gaan word?
=== Ja, U Edele.
Maar u het ook gesê toe
die Staatsadvokaat u vra waarom wou u nie 'n verklaring by mnr
Schutte aflê nie, maar by mnr
Van Niekerk, toe sê u nee,
dit is u prokureur, is daar iets verkeerd? === Nee, daar is nie 'n
spesifieke rede nie. Dis maar
net omdat hy prokureur is, Edele.
En mnr – maar u het
gehoor mnr Schutte het ook gesê hy het vir u gevra dat u
verklaring kom aflê en dat u gesê
het u will dit eerder
voor u – u sal dit voor u prokureur aflê en het nie
beswaar daarteen nie? === Ja, U Edele.
Maar dan moes mnr Schutte mos
gevra het vir 'n verklaring? Ek meen nou – as ek nou moet aflei
van wat gesê is. ===
Dis reg, U Edele
Goed, laat ek dit eerder so
stel. Sê u Inspekteur Schutte het nooit vir u gevra om 'n
verklaring voor hom af te lê
nie === Dit kon miskien gewees
het, U Edele, maar ons het ons verklarings by Mundus van Niekerk
afgelê.
Nee, nie kon gewees het nie.
Het mnr Schutte vir u gevra? === Ek kan nie onthou nie.
U kan nie onthou nie. Ja. Nou
die seun wat kaal bolyf was, Jaco, u het saamgestem dat hy gepraat
het. Dat hy iets gesê het?
=== Ja, U Edele.
Nou kan u onthou wat hy gesê
het? === Nee, U Edele.
Kon u hoor wat hy gesê
het === Nee, U Edele. Ek het gehoor hy praat, maar ek kon nie hoor
wat hy gesê het nie.
Ja, maar hoekom vra u hom nie –
Miskien is daar 'n nood. Vra hom is daar 'n problem of herhaal wat …
(tussenkoms).
=== Nadat – nadat … (tussenkoms)
Net so 'n oomblikkie. Ek het
nie gehoor wat jy gesê het nie. Herhaal wat jy gesê het.
Het u nou nie vir hom gevra om
te herhaal sodat u kan hoor wat sy
probleem is of wat sy nood is of wat ookal? === Nadat ek met hom
gepraat het – ek hom
geantwoord het, het hy iets gesê
maar hy het omgedraai en geloop.
Wat het u vir hom gesê?
=== Ek het net vir hom gevra wat soek hy.
Dis al? === Ja, U Edele.
Nou u praat van die draad wat
die seuns daar gehad het daar op die trappies === Ja, U Edele.
Wat word toe van daardie draad?
=== Ek het net gesien die een seun sit hom tussen sy bene op die
onderste trap neer, Edele.
Ja, dit beantwoord nog nie my
vraag nie. Wat word toe van daardie draad? === Ek weet nie, U Edele.
Ek weet nie.
Het u dit daar gelos? === Ja, U
Edele.
Hoekom nou? Dit is reeds die
voorwerp wat u gesien het soos u sê hierdie seun probeer dinge
uitkrap uit die winkel uit. Waarom
los u toe die draad? === As ons
die draad opgetel het, kon daar miskien 'n bakleiery tussen ons en
die kinders uitgebreek het.
Twee kinders van ongeveer 12
jaar oud – nee, laat ek sê Curtis was 12. Die oorledene
was 13. Die oorledene, Byron,
was – het 31,7 kg geweeg. Hy was
1,8 meters lank. En vir Curtis het u gesien. Dunner gebou. Drie groot
mense. Uself, Beskuldigde
1 en 3 en u was bang vir die kinders?
Tussen uself en die kinders – ek wil dit net verstaan. Daarom
gee ek vir u die konteks.
=== Dis reg, Edele.
U was bang vir die kinders? ===
Nee, ek sal nie sê ek was bang vir die kinders nie. As ons nou
– dit kon mos gebeur
het as ons die draad opgetel het en weet
ook nie wat gedoen het met die draad nie, dan kan daar mos bakleiery
gekom het tussen
ons.
Tussen? === Van die kinders se
kant af.
Wil u nog daarop uitbrei? ===
Nee, U Edele.
Nou u het gehoor hoe die
Staatsadvokaat, mnr Cloete wat daar sit, het meer as een keer gepraat
van algemene logiese gedrag. Het
u dit gehoor? === Ja, U Edele.
Algemene logiese gedrag. U moet
nou verstaan wat ek aan u sê. Gestel – verondersel –
ek sê nie dit is wat
gebeur het nie. Verstaan u dit so? === Dis
reg U Edele
U kyk na 'n fliek. Daar kom
iemand. Hy skiet – maak nie saak of 'n kind of iemand daar met
'n vuurwapen. Daarna gaan daardie
persoon weg en hy doen window
shopping of inkopies. Sou u sê dit is algemene logiese gedrag?
=== Daar het mos nou niks gebeur
tussen ons en die kinders nie, U
Edele.
Nee, vergeet van uself. U het
nie 'n vuurwapen gehad nie. Want dit is nie wat ek sê nie. Ek
wil net vra. U kyk nou. Dis 'n
fliek. Kom skiet hom. En dan gaan die
persoon en doen window shopping of doen inkopies en loop maar salig
weg. Is dit – sou
dit algemene logiese gedrag wees? Ek wil net
hê u moet nou mooi verstaan wat die advokaat na verwys na
algemene logiese gedrag.
As u dit nie wil antwoord nie, moet u sê
u wil dit eerder nie antwoord nie. === Ja, ek wil eerder nie antwoord
nie, Edele.
Enige – laat ek eers vir
mnr Cloete vra – enige vrae voortspruitend?
ADV CLOETE
Nee, geen. Dankie, Edele.
ADV VAN HEERDEN
Soos die Hof behaag. Mnr van der Westhuizen, ek wil net seker maak.
Iets wat u na aanleiding van mnr Cloete en die Hof se vrae
beantwoord
het.
HOF
Ja, maar. Nee, as dit mnr Cloete is, is dit iets anders dan moet u
aansoek doen dat u 'n vraag vra na aanleiding van wat mnr Cloete
gesê
het, want u het klaar gesê u het geen herverhoor nie.
ADV VAN HEERDEN
Edele, ek is nou net nie seker nie. Ek kan nie onthou of u gevra het
en of dit mnr Cloete is nie, van … (tussenkoms).
HOF
Goed, ja. Goed. Vra maar, ja.
ADV VAN HEERDEN
Soos die Hof behaag. Ek wil net die verloop van gebeure vasstel. Toe
mnr Le Grange en Schutte by die huis was, toe Schutte nou
daar
aangekom het … (onvoltooid). === Ja, U Edele?
Was Mundus van Niekerk daar?
=== Nog nie, U Edele.
Toe Mundus van Niekerk daar
aankom, waar was mnr Le Grange gewees. === Die Beskuldigde was nog by
die huis gewees.
Toe Mundus van Niekerk daar
aankom? === Nee, hy was by die polisiestasie gewees, want na die tyd
het – tannie Annelise was
geskok gewees. En toe het sy gevra
ons moet net Oom Mundus in die hande kry en toe ons by hom kom het hy
alreeds gelê en
hy het gesê ons moet hom net vyf minute
gee. Ons het vir Oom Mundus gekry saam met hom – of agterna
gery en by die
huis gekom. Hy was – 5 minute was hy die huis
gewees. En toe het hy daarvandaan polisiestasie toe …
(tussenkoms).
Watter huis nou? ===
Arbeckstraat 25.
Op daardie stadium was mnr Le
Grange nie daar nie? === Nee, U Edele.
So eers nadat Schutte vir mnr
Le Grange weggevat het, het mnr Van Niekerk daar aangekom? === Dis
reg, U Edele.
Dis al, dankie, U Edele.
HOF
Ja, mnr Van der Westhuizen. Dan verstaan ek. My vraag – en ek
het vir u gesê u moet baie duidelik luister na my vrae.
Kom ons
vergeet nou van wanneer dit gebeur het. Op enigste stadium –
die 20ste of die volgende dag, die 21ste, het mnr Le
Grange,
Beskuldige 1 aan mnr Van Niekerk, die prokureur, 'n weergawe gegee
van wat daar gebeur het? === Ja, U Edele.
Was u en Beskuldigde 3
teenwoordig toe hy dit gedoen het? === Edele, ek kan nie meer onthou
nie. Dit kan wees dat ons teenwordig
was. Ek kan nie spesifiek onthou
nie.
Dankie, u kan maar afstaan.'
'HOF
Mnr van Heerden, net voor u voortgaan, daar is net iets wat ek wil
opklaar met mnr Van der Westhuizen. Kan u net terugstaan, asseblief.

Mnr van der Westhuien, net 'n aspek wat my ontgaan het na aanleiding
van die Staatsadvokaat se vraag toe hy u gevra het toe hy
aan u gesê
het dat hy u die kans gun om die waarheid te praat en ek sê nie
u het nie die waarheid gepraat nie, maar
wat ek toe nou by u verneem
het – mnr Van Niekerk is steeds u prokureur?
BESKULDIGDE 2
Ja, U Edele.
HOF
En is dit die prokureur van al drie van julle?
BESKULDIGDE 2 Ja, in Prieska, U
Edele.
HOF
En was u op enige tydstip geadviseer dat u die reg het om u eie
prokureur aan te stel? Ek praat nou net u alleen.
BESKULDIGDE 2
Ja, U Edele, maar dit is die enigste prokureur in Prieska.
HOF
Nee, ek wil nie weet waat daar gesê is nie. Ek wil net weet of
u op enige stadium so geadviseer was.
BESKULDIGDE
2
Ja, U Edele.
HOF
En u besluit was toe dat u by mnr Van Niekerk wil bly?
BESKULDIGDE 2
J, U Edele
HOF
Goed nou, as u dit geweet het, so geadviseer is en so besluit het is
dit goed. Is daar enige vrae uitspruitend?
AANKLAER
Nee, U Edele.
ADV VAN HEERDEN
Geen, Dankie, Edele.
Soos die Hof behaag. Met u
verlop roep ek dan vir Beskuldigde nommer 3, Pieter Le Grange’
[17] And, in respect of the third appellant the record reads:
'HOF
Mnr Le Grange, wat se rol het hierdie rolskaatse gespeel – die
rollerblades, wat – wat het dit gedoen? Het dit enigiets
te
doen gehad met wat u daar gedoen het – of nie gedoen het nie –
die rolskaatse? === U Edele, die oorledene het een
van die rolskaatse
aangehad. Die ander rolskaats het voor hom gelê op die trappie.
Toe ons by hulle weg was, daar word melding
gemaak dat Curtis Maritz
wel met die rolskaatse in sy hand gestaan het deur die
hotelbestuurder wat op hierdie stadium oorlede
is. Die polisie sê
hulle het glad geen bewyse – of niemand het dit opgemerk nie.
As die polisie dit nie opgemerk het
nie, wat kon alles verwyder word
van die toneel af? Dis 'n vraag wat ons onsself afvra.
Ag, … (onhoorbaar)
verwyder net daardie .. (onhoorbaar). Moenie weggaan nie. === Nee,
nee.
Beskryf bietjie vir my daardie
rolskaatse. === Dis nie gewone rolskaatse nie. Dis rollerblades.
Rollerblades. Goed. Ek weet
nie. Wat dit ookal mag wees. Beskryf dit vir my. === Dit is soos
rolskaatse is met wieletjies. Dis
skoene met wieletjies aan met die
wieletjies is reg agtermekaar. Dis nie soos die ou rolskaatse wat
vier wieletjies het wat langs
mekaar loop nie. Die wieletjies is reg
agtermekaar. Hulle is smal wieletjies en dit is 'n tipe van 'n skoen
wat soos 'n "boot"
sit. Hy kom tot by jou – amper by
jou knie. Hy gaan ver verby jou enkels. Hy word met drie sulks
straps, party van hulle
het vier straps wat die voete vashou. Wat jou
bene in die "boot" vasstrap.
En dit wat die oorledene …
(onvoltooid). === Die oorledene het van hulle aangehad,
Nou hoe trek 'n mens dit aan?
Net met kouse of kaalvoet of hoe werk dit? === Jy kan dit met kouse
aantrek. Baie mense skaats met
dit kaalvoet. Hulle het 'n baie dik
lining in die binnekant soos spons wat hy in die binnekant het.
Kan 'n mens dit met skoene
aantrek? === As hulle voete baie klein is en die rolskaatse is groot,
dan kan jy 'n skoen dalk binne
in hom trap, maar ek sal self nie weet
nie. My voet is 'n bietjie aan die groot kant. As ek rolskaatse koop,
sal ek … (onvoltooid).
Het u al ooit iemand gesien –
dit is basies 'n skoen binne 'n skoen. Het u al ooit iemand gesien
wat 'n skoen dra in 'n rolskaats?
=== Nee, Edelagbare.
Nou kyk 'n bietjie na Bewysstuk
"D". Ja Kyk na foto 2. Dit is die oorledene. Kyk langs sy
linkervoet. Wat sien jy langs
sy linkervoet. === Ek sien hy het 'n
skoen aan.
Hy het 'n skoen aan. === Sy
regterskoen is uitgetrek.
Ja. Nou dit lyk dan vir my dat
hy – hy het nou sy skoene aan, hoe sou hy dan nou die
rolskaatse aangehad het. === U Edele,
my eerlike opinie, ek weet nie
hoe het hy dit gedoen nie. Dit kon dalk een van die ander mense
gewees het wat die rolskaatse uitgetrek
het by hom en vir hom skoene
aangetrek het. Ek was nie op die toneel gewees na ons daar weg is
nie. Op daardie stadium het hy op
die trappie gesit en volgens my
beter wete het hy niks makeer nie.
Ja maar u sien dis nie net een
skoen was daar was nie. Altwee tekkies is daar. Kyk daar langsaan
daardie trui – sien daar
is die ander tekkie. Is dit nie. Kyk
net na dit. === Ek sien die regtertekkie lê langsaan.
So daarom het ek u gevra watter
rol speel die skaatse ensovoorts en hoe verklaar u dit nou? ===
Edele, hy het die skoene aangehad
het op die geleentheid. Hy kon dit
self dalk uitgetrek het en sy skoene aangetrek het, maar dit bewys
net ons was nie betrokke
by wat gebeur het met hom later die aand
nie. Ons het gesien hy het die skoene aangehad en as hy wel die
rolskaatse nie –
hy het dit definitief aangehad maar as ene dit
vir hom uitgetrek het en hy was gesteek, hoekom sou hulle die
rolskaatse uitgetrek
het terwyl hy besig is om dood te gaan. Dis 'n
vraag wat ons vir onsself vra want ons weet self nie die antwoord
daarvan nie, U
Edele.
Dit is wat die Staatsadvokaat
vir algemene logiese … (onvoltooid). === Ja.
Sê vir my – daar is
nou gestel dat daar 'n voorval was wat miskien so 1 en 'n half uur
plaasgevind het voor u op die
toneel gekom het. Hoor u wat ek sê?
=== Ja, ek hoor u sê daar was 'n voorval 'n uur en 'n half voor
die tyd.
Ja. Nou sê vir my hierdie
seun is sy hart deurboor is met 'n swaard, sal hy nou vir 'n uur en
'n half daar sit? Algemene
logiese gedrag. Daar sit, niks doen nie en
later nog probeer dinge uitkrap uit die winkel uit. Onthou net my
vraag is met sy hart
deurgeboor soos wat die dokter getuig het. Dr
Isaacs. Verstaan u? === Ek verstaan wat u sê.
U moet nou mooi sit en uitdink.
Hierdie seun, noodlottig beseer. 'n Uur en 'n half later. Miskien
minder as een en 'n half uur.
Gaan hy nou daar sit, 'n draad vat,
dinge begin uitkrap? === U Edele, dit was nie Byron Phetlo wat die
draad gehanteer het nie,
dit was Curtis Maritz gewees. Maar Byron
Phetlo het wel op die trap gesit. Hy kon dalk beseer gewees het in 'n
vorige bakleiery.
Ek weet nie. Hy het vooroor gebukkend gesit soos hy
op die trap gesit het het hy so gesit, met sy hande so op sy knieë.
Dit
kon gewees het. Hy het ook nie 'n poging weer aangewend om weg te
hardloop nie. Na my pa hom teruggedruk het met die kierie het
hy
gebly sit. So dit kon wees dat hy wel wonde gehad het, maar dit was
nie aan ons bekend dat hy wonde gehad het nie. Dit was nie
asof ons
sy hemp opgetel het en gesien het maar hy het 'n wond gehad nie. Dit
kon gewees het dat hy na die tyd gesteek is.
Goed. Miskien het hy nie die
draad gehanteer nie. Miskien het Curtis dit gehanteer, maar sy
getuienis was dat die twee van hulle
was stout en dit is wat hulle
saam gedoen het nog. === Dit is sy getuienis.
Sou hy daar saam gesit het. Die
goed uithaal. Sy hart is gedeurboor. Sit hy daar en hy wag en wat hy
in belangstel is om die goed
daar uit te kry en nie om mediese
behandeling te kry nie? === Wel, u Edele, al antwoord wat ek daar kan
gee is hy het dalk seker
nie geweet hoe ernstig sy wond was nie, want
baie kere sny jy jouself raak en jy weet self nie hoe ernstig is die
wond nie.
Wel, Curtis sê self Byron
het hom geskel en vir hom gesê hy moet hulp kry. Hy was kwaad
vir hom. === Wel, ek het gehoor
dat Curtis gesê het dat hy hom
gevloek het en geskel het, maar ek het nie gehoor dat hy gesê
het hy moet hulp kry vir
hom nie. Maar die rede hoekom sou een vriend
'n ander een vloek en skel? Dis ook 'n vraag wat na ons toe opgekom
het. Ek kan nie
antwoord hoekom Curtis gevloek en geskel is deur
Byron nie.
En as hy nou vroeër beseer
is, 'n uur vroeër of so, hoekom begin hulle nou skree so –
'n uur so later juis nadat
u nou weg is. Nou begin hulle skree. Nou
soek hulle vir hulp. Toe hardloop Curtis ook en hy wil vir Jaco roep
=== U Edele, volgens
Curtis se getuienis was daar nie 'n geskreeuery
gewees nie.
Wel Miskien nie 'n geskreeuery
gewees nie, maar wat het hy gesê? === Hy het net gesê
Byron het hom gevloek.
Nee, hy het gepraat van geroep
of geskree. === Hy het gesê hy wat Curtis is het die eienaar
van die hotel geroep.
` Ja, en die einaar het dit van
bo af afgekyk. === Ja.
Ja. Of ons dit nou roep of
skree maak nie saak nie, maar dit het aandag getrek. === Ek kan nie
getuig hoekom hy geskree het nie.
Ons het hom nie gehoor nie. Ons was
nie in Stewartstraat toe hy geskree het of iets nie. Andersins sou
ons hom gehoor het.
Ja. Goed. Sê vir my, hoe
laat was Inspekteur Schutte by u ouerhuis op die aand van die voorval
– die aand wat u pa
polisiestasie toe geneem het? === Ek kan
nie presies onthou nie. Die TV nuus was weer aan gewees. Dis al. Ek
het deur my ma-hulle
se kamer gestap. Ek het op die stoep gesit. Ek
het fliek gekyk. Ek het deur my ma-hulle se kamer gestap. Ek het
gesien dat die
TV nuus is weer aan.
Watter TV nuus? Die 19:00 nuus?
=== Nee, die 19:00 was alreeds verby gewees. My suster-hulle het
seker net na die 19:00 nuus het
hulle by ons aangesluit. Die 19:00
het net klaargemaak toe sluit hulle by ons aan.
Ja, ek wil net weet u praat van
die nuus. Watter nuus praat u van? === Ek kan self nie onthou nie.
Hulle sê mos die nuustyd.
18:00 nuus, 19:00, 22;00 nuus? === Dit kan of – ek kan nie
getuig daarvoor nie. Ek weet regtig
nie, Edelagbare.
Ja, maar – mnr Le Grange.
Nou vra ek u u praat van die nuus was aan of die nuus was net klaar.
Watter nuus? === Dit kan of
die 8 uur nuus of die 10 uur wees,
Edelagbare. Ek het regtig nie gekyk vir tyd daardie aand nie.
Was dit nuus op die Afrikaanse
kanaal? === Dit was op SABC 3 gewees. As ek dit reg het.
Ja maar, SABC 3 het nuus 19:00
en 22:00. === Dan kan dit seker die 10 uur of die 8 uur nuus wees, ek
is nie doodseker nie.
Want dan volg daar ander tale –
praat u van die ander een se tale? Luister u – na een van die
ander tale se nuus geluister?
=== Edelagbare, ons het nie – my
pa-hulle het opgestaan en hulle het nie 'n problem met inheemse tale
op die TV nie.
Nee, ek praat nie daarvan nie.
U praat van nuus. Ek probeer nou verstaan. Goed. Is dit nou die 19:00
nuus? Is dit u antwoord? 19:00
nuus of 22:00 nuus? === Ek kan nie
daardie antwoord nie.
Was dit Afrikaanse nuus gewees?
=== Dit was nie die Afrikaanse nuus gewees nie. Ek kan onthou dit was
nie die Afrikaanse nuus nie.
As ek reg is was dit die Engelse nuus.
Dit was of op TV 3 of op e tv.
Maar die verklaring sê
18:40 die aand min of meer het u by die huis gekom? === Dis korrek,
Edelagbare.
En dan na die nuus geluister –
is dit nou nie die 19:00 of die 22:00 nuus nie .. (onhoorbaar).
Afrikaanse nuus is op SABC
2. Ek wil u net reg help. === Ja, dit was
op TV 2. My pa-hulle het Afrikaanse nuus gekyk. My suster is –
net na daardie Afrikaanse
nuus was hulle by die huis gewees.
Inspekteur Schutte en Inspekteur Kosie Botes het eers later die aand
by ons aangesluit. Maar
daar was weer nuus op die TV gewees.
Goed. So u kan nie sê hoe
laat Inspekteur Schutte daar was nie en u weet nie watter nuus u van
praat nie? === Ek kan nie
met doodsekerheid praat nie en ek wil ook
nie raai nie. want ek is onder eed.
Nou sê vir my besit u pa
'n selfoon – nee, het u pa 'n selfoon besit tydens hierdie
voorval? === Tydens die voorval?
Nee, Edelagbare.
Nie by hom gehad nie, 'n
selfoon besit? === Sy selfoon … (tussenkoms).
Dink nou net bietjie mooi. Het
hy 'n selfoon besit? === Ek dink, Edelagbare. My ma het selfoon
gehad. Ek het 'n selfoon gehad.
My susters en … (onhoorbaar).
My pa het nie op daardie stadium 'n selfoon gehad nie. Sy selfoon
was gesteel op daardie
stadium in Upington.
Daar is iets wat ek ook nie
verstaan nie, mnr Le Grange. Nou sê die Staatsadvokaat vir u
hoekom het u nie by een van hierdie
plekke wat oop was om daarvandaan
te bel nie. Nou sê u u sou nie kon kommunikeer met die Chinese
nie. Hoekom sê u dit
nou? === U Edele, hulle het 'n tolk daarso
wat nie altyd daar is nie. Hulle praat nie Engels vlot nie. Daar is
een van hulle wat
Engels praat. Die ander praat nie Engels nie. Hulle
praat in Chinese. Ek weet nie presies wat is die taal wat hulle praat
nie.
Ek is verbaas. Hulle is oop.
Mense kom in en uit. Hoe verkoop hulle aan die mense dan? === Die
pryse word reeds op die goed getape
en hulle het 'n ou wat by die
deur staan en as 'n ou iets steel dan vang hulle hom, maar jy kan nie
'n prys met hulle gaan redeneer
nie en sê hulle moet vir jou
minder vra nie, want hulle verstaan jou nie. Dit is hoe die
gemeenskap in Prieska is. Hulle
… (onvoltooid).
En sê net vir my –
soos ek u nou verstaan en ook Beskuldigde 1 en 2 verstaan, dit lyk my
daar was geen rede vir julle
– niks wat u enige rede gegee het
of daar was geen rede waarom hierdie kinders aangeval moes word nie?
=== Edelagbare, ons
het hulle op geen manier aangeval nie.
Nee, dit is nie wat ek sê
nie. Was daar enigiets – provokasie of iets dat hierdie kinders
u aangeval het – enigiets
wat aanleiding gegee het –
enigiets wat enigeen 'n rede sou gegee het om enige van die kinders
daar aan te val? === Edelagbare,
daar was nie 'n rede dat ons hulle
by enige geleentheid hoef aan te geval het nie. En ons het hulle op
geen geleentheid aangeval
of enigsins beseer op enige manier nie.
En laastens mnr Le Grange. Is u
op enige stadium geadviseer dat as u dit sou wou verlang, u u eie
prokureur of advokaar kan aanstel?
=== Wel, ek gebruik van ons eie
prokureur. As ek seker wou dan kon ek my eie kry.
U het gehoor wat Beskuldigde
nommer 2, mnr Van der Westhuizen gesê het. Ek wil net weet is u
so geadviseer of weet u dat
u dit kon doen? === Die polisie het, toe
hulle vir my en Hendrik gearresteer het, het hulle vir ons gesê
dat ons ons eie
regsadviseurs kon kry en op daardie stadium het ons
alreeds vir Mundus van Niekerk gekry omdat hy ons huis prokureur is.
Ja, maar u weet u kon 'n ander
prokureur kry as u hom nie wil hê nie. Ek sê nie u wil
hom nie hê nie ek wil net
vra wat u weet. === Ek weet dit.
U weet dit. Goed. Enige vrae,
uitspruitend? Kom ek begin sommer hier.'
[18] Let me immediately state that I recognise that presiding over
criminal trials is a difficult task. Where, as here, the killing
of
the deceased quite clearly served to polarise that community and
there is the added state of acute public interest, the burden
on the
presiding judge would have been all the greater. Furthermore, one
knows all too well how cross-examination can sometimes
appear
protracted and seemingly irrelevant.
Impatience,
though, is something which a judicial officer must, where possible,
avoid and in any event always strictly control.
For, it can impede
his perception, blunt his judgment and create an impression of enmity
or prejudice in the person against whom
it is directed, particularly
when such person is an accused person. It may serve to undermine the
proper course of justice and
could lead to a complete miscarriage of
justice. A judicial officer can only perform his demanding and
socially important duty
properly if he also stands guard over
himself, mindful of his own weaknesses (such as impatience) and
personal views and whims
and controls them.
5
[19] The locus classicus in respect of the questioning, by a
presiding officer, of a witness including an accused, is
S v Rall
1982 (1) SA 828
(A), in which Trollip AJA laid down three principles
of proper judicial behaviour, namely:
(i) A judicial officer must ensure not only that justice is done but
in addition that it is seen to be done. He must therefore
so conduct
the trial that his open-mindedness, impartiality and fairness are
manifest to all concerned with the trial and its outcome,
especially
the accused.
(ii) A judicial officer should refrain from questioning witnesses or
the accused in such a way or to such an extent that it may
preclude
him/her from detachedly or objectively appreciating and adjudicating
upon the issues.
(iii) A judicial officer should refrain from questioning a witness or
the accused in a way that may intimidate or disconcert him/her
or
unduly influence the quality or nature of his/her replies and thus
affect his/her demeanour or impair his/her credibility.
[20] I have quoted the passages
in extenso,
without any gloss,
because it illustrates, I do believe, that the conduct of the
learned Judge President breached all three canons of good judicial

behaviour. Whilst the questioning of each of the appellants was
lengthy, a purely quantitative analysis does not by any means tell

the whole story. Many of the questions were indeed legitimately put
to the appellants for elucidation or supplementation, but the
record
is also replete with questions that were intended to discredit the
appellants, compounded in many instances by disbelief
and scepticsm.
The nature, content and manner of the questioning leads one to the
conclusion that far from merely clarifying matters
or assisting the
appellants to elucidate their defence, the questioning sought to pick
holes in their story. Invariably the series
of questions, which, from
the perspective of the appellants, must have bore all of the
hallmarks of cross-examination, seemed to
be designed to produce an
answer favourable to the State. It failed to produce that result but
the fact remains that the attempt
was undertaken. It is well to
remember that it remains counsel’s job, not the trial judge's,
to explore inconsistencies.
The questioning was to my mind, a strong
indication that the Judge President had, at an early stage made up
his mind that the state
witnesses were telling the truth and the
appellants lying. The language may in many instances be described as
unjudicial language
that is readily susceptible to an interpretation
that the learned Judge President was hostile to the appellants to the
extent that
he was not able to bring an unclouded mind to bear on the
adjudication of the issues before him.
[21] It must never be forgotten that an impartial judge is a
fundamental prerequisite for a fair trial.
6
The integrity of the justice system is anchored in the impartiality
of the judiciary. As a matter of policy it is important that
the
public should have confidence in the courts. Upon this social order
and security depend.
7
Fairness and impartiality must be both subjectively present and
objectively demonstrated to the informed and reasonable observer.
Impartiality can be described – perhaps
somewhat inexactly – as a state of mind in which the
adjudicator is disinterested
in the outcome, and is open to
persuasion by the evidence and submissions. In contrast, bias denotes
a state of mind that is in
some way predisposed to a particular
result, or that is closed with regard to particular issues.
8
Bias in the sense of judicial bias has been said to mean ‘a
departure from the standard of even-handed justice which the
law
requires from those who occupy judicial office’.
9
In common usage bias describes
‘a leaning, inclination, bent or predisposition towards one
side or another or a particular result. In its application to
legal
proceedings, it represents a predisposition to decide an issue or
cause in a certain way that does not leave the judicial
mind
perfectly open to conviction. Bias is a condition or state of mind
which sways judgment and renders a judicial officer unable
to
exercise his or her functions impartially in a particular case.’
10
[22]
Partiality has both an attitudinal and
behavioural component.
Before us it was argued that the Judge President’s
conduct throughout the trial, including his interjections, tone
(which
it was suggested was rough, hostile and intimidating) and
comments make it plain that he had prejudged the matter. That view,
it
is contended, is bolstered by certain comments and observations by
the learned Judge President during the course of his judgment
both on
the merits and sentence. Amongst the many passages to which we were
referred by counsel, it is only necessary to mention
the following
four, which make counsel’s contentions clear. They are:

What is more disturbing
is that the attorney, an officer of this Court, who ought to know
better than the police inspector, agreed
to take down accused 2 and
3’s statements knowing that there is a clear conflict of
interest with his client. As the evidence
has turned out, it is
axiomatic that if accused 2 and 3 were truthful they would have
implicated accused 1 in the murder of the
deceased. The attorney knew
what the allegations against accused 1 were and of the fact that
accused 2 and 3 were in his company.
If accused 2 and 3 are
convicted, as it seems inevitable, the attorney must know that he
played no small part in their fate. Conduct
like this cannot be
tolerated.

.
In addition, I make bold to say
a prudent and astute counsel would have refrained from representing
accused 2 and 3, having regard
to what I have already stated. Another
counsel may have been more detached and may even have clinched a deal
with the State to
use accused 2 and 3 as so-called Section 204
Criminal Procedure Act witnesses.

Why Mr Van Heerden called Mr
Eckherd at the death of the trial to literally perjure himself when
it was already evident to the reasonable,
discerning, right-thinking
audience which way the case was drifting is beyond me.’

.
'
All
the accused have suggested that Curtis Maritz murdered the deceased.
On record there is absolutely no grain of evidence to remotely

justify this suggestion. All the accused have repeated this
preposterous accusation in the reports to the social workers, the

correctional services officer and clinical psychologist, ….
They did this despite my finding (at paragraph 31 of the judgment)

showing why the accusation was absurd. The accused are adamant even
in the light of the deceased’s stepmother, Ms Moliena
Phetlo,
who brought him up, testifying that Curtis and deceased were related,
grew up as brothers, were inseparable friends and
would never resort
to violence against each other. This evidence remains uncontroverted
and was not challenged at all in cross-examination,
let alone
discredited.
I take a dim
view of the fact that Curtis Maritz was accused by the accused of
being the murderer. Counsel should not in good conscience
have argued
this point. I have no doubt that it is defamatory of Curtis Maritz
and an aggravating factor against the accused. In
LAWSA
:
vol 14 at p 276, under legal practitioners the following is stated,
but is appposite to criminal cases as well:

An
advocate will not be held liable for defamation if he sets out in a
pleading allegations in the truth of which he has no belief,
unless
he knows that he will not be able to support them by evidence at the
trial. Counsel who has no belief in the truth of an
assertion and
knows he has no evidence to support it is not entitled to put it to a
witness during cross-examination. ...”.’
[23
] In my view all the
passages can be dealt with together. Whilst, no doubt, all judicial
officers can and do form provisional views
particularly on the
credibility of witnesses, it remains the fundamental duty of every
presiding officer not to close his/her mind
to changing those
provisional impressions, until the last word has been spoken. What
else, one asks, can the comments in question
mean but that the
learned Judge President had decided long before the conclusion of the
cross-examination of the state witnesses,
long before the State case
had closed, let alone before hearing the evidence of the appellants,
that the State case was the truth?
So too, he appears to be
suggesting should counsel and the attorney. There was no conflict.
None was evident when the attorney
first consulted, nor emerged
during the course of the trial. All of the appellants advanced the
same version – one that amounted
to a denial of the charge and
was thus consistent with innocence. What foundational basis was there
for the foresight displayed
by the Judge President, one must ask,
and, more importantly, when did it become so manifestly evident to
him that all concerned
with the trial should have been aware of it.
The only basis for contending that counsel and the attorney should
not have acted
for all three appellants is if they, at inception,
disbelieved their instructions. But there could not possibly have
been any warrant
for that. Language, particularly in this context, is
important and in this case it has been singularly unfortunate. In
effect the
learned Judge President appears to be saying I never,
right from the outset, believed the version of the appellants, nor
should
their legal representatives. Unintended though it may have
been, the spectre that it raises is that the learned Judge President,

in his approach to the appellants’ case was not objective and
impartial. It is certainly suggestive of one who has certain

preconceived biases and who allows those biases to affect his
judgement.
[24] Limitations of time and money often force early strategic
choices by counsel. More often than not those choices are based

initially solely on consultations with an accused person. If more
than one plausible line of defence exists, counsel, it seems
to me,
would be duty-bound to investigate each line substantially during the
course of the trial. As it was put in
Strickland v Washington,
11
‘[b]ecause advocacy is an art and not a science, and because
the adversary system requires deference to counsel’s informed

decisions, strategic choices must be respected in these circumstances
if they are based on professional judgment’. Judicial
scrutiny
of counsel’s performance must thus be highly deferential.
12
On the appellants’ version, an alternative theoretical
hypothesis presented itself as the cause of the deceased’s
death, namely, Curtis Maritz. In those circumstances the appellants’
legal representatives were obliged to explore it.
None
of the passages in question are suggestive of an open judicial mind.
What is more, is that the language is excessively strong
and the
condemnation of the appellants’ counsel and attorney
unjustified and harsh.
[25]
The law will not
lightly suppose the possibility of bias in a judge. But, there is
also the simple fact that bias is such an insidious
thing that even
though a person may in good faith believe that he was acting
impartially, his mind may unconsciously be affected
by it.
13
Benjamin Cardozo recognised this when he stated:

We are
reminded by William James in a telling page of his lectures on
Pragmatism that every one of us has in truth an underlying
philosophy
of life, even those of us to whom the names and notions of philosophy
are unknown or anathema. There is in each of us
a stream of tendency,
whether you choose to call it philosophy or not, which gives
coherence and direction to thought and action.
Judges cannot escape
that current any more than other mortals. All their lives, forces
which they do not recognize and cannot name,
have been tugging at
them – inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired
convictions; and the resultant is an outlook
on life, a conception of
social needs, a sense in James’s phrase of “the total
push and pressure of the cosmos”,
which, when reasons are
nicely balanced, must determine where choice shall fall. In this
mental background every problem finds
its setting. We may try to see
things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see
them with any eyes except our
own.’
14
[26] Cardozo, whilst affirming the importance of
judicial impartiality, recognized that true objectivity was
impossible because
judges, like other humans, operate from their own
perspectives. As the Canadian Judicial Council noted in
Commentaries
on Judicial Conduct
(1991) at p 12,
‘[t]here is no human being who is not the product of every
social experience, every process of education,
and every human
contact’. What is possible and desirable, they note, is
impartiality:
‘.
. . . the wisdom required of a judge is to recognize, consciously
allow for, and perhaps to question, all the baggage of
past attitudes
and sympathies that fellow citizens are free to carry, untested, to
the grave.
True
impartiality does not require that the judge have no sympathies or
opinions; it requires that the judge nevertheless be free
to
entertain and act upon different points of view with an open mind’.
15
[27] Notwithstanding that a judge’s own
insights into human nature will play a role in credibility findings
or factual determinations,
judges must make those determinations only
after being open to, and giving proper consideration to the views of
all the parties
before them. ‘The reasonable person, through
whose eyes the apprehension of bias is assessed, expects judges to
undertake
an open-minded, carefully considered, and dispassionately
deliberate investigation of the complicated reality of each case
before
them.’
16
In the end the only guarantee of impartiality on the part of the
courts is conspicuous impartiality.
17
[28
] I might remark that
in the present case both parties were represented by what on the face
of it were competent counsel and a perusal
of the record shows that
the issues of fact which required determination were not of an unduly
complicated nature. It is therefore
a matter that occasions some
surprise that in this matter the learned Judge President should have
found it necessary to intervene
to the extent apparent from the
record. He, no doubt with good intentions, appears to have been
anxious to ensure that a case,
which at the outset did not appear to
him to present any real difficulties, should not drag on. He sought,
it would seem, from
time to time to expedite the hearing of the
matter by virtually taking over the prosecution from counsel for the
State. In doing
so, it appears that he may at times have overlooked
the judge’s usual role in a trial and to have associated
himself too
closely with the conduct of the case, thereby denying
himself the full advantage enjoyed by a trial judge who, ‘as
the person
holding the scale between the contending parties, is able
to determine objectively and dispassionately, from his position of
relative
detachment, the way the balance tilts’. A judge, as it
was put in
Yuill v Yuill
,
18

who
observes the demeanour of the witnesses while they are being examined
by counsel has from his detached position a much more
favourable
opportunity of forming a just appreciation than a judge who himself
conducts the examination. If he takes the latter
course he, so to
speak, descends into the arena and is liable to have his vision
clouded by the dust of the conflict. Unconsciously
he deprives
himself of the advantage of calm and dispassionate observation. It is
further to be remarked, as everyone who has had
experience of these
matters knows, that the demeanour of a witness is apt to be very
different when he is being questioned by the
judge from what it is
when he is being questioned by counsel, particularly when the judge's
examination is, as it was in the present
case, prolonged and covers
practically the whole of the crucial matters which are in issue
'.
[29] It may well be that some of the
irregularities complained of, would in themselves, not be a
sufficient indication that the
appellants did not have a fair trial.
Taken cumulatively though, I have no doubt that they compel the
conclusion that in fact the
learned Judge President was not fair and
impartial during the trial. In these circumstances the proceedings
are invalid and the
convictions and sentences imposed on the
appellants cannot stand.
[
30] One final aspect
remains. Section 35(3)(m) of the Constitution provides that an
accused person has the right not to be tried
for an offence in
respect of any act or omission for which that person has previously
been acquitted or convicted – a right
that entrenches the
common-law right expressed in the maxim
nemo
debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa
.
This is the right against double jeopardy which gives rise to the
defences of
autrefois convict
or
autrefois acquit
.
19
Irregularities vary in nature and degree. As it was put by Holmes JA,
in
S v Naidoo
:
20

Broadly
speaking they fall into two categories. There are irregularities
(fortunately rare) which are of so gross a nature as
per
se
to vitiate the trial. In such a case the Court of Appeal sets aside
the conviction without reference to the merits. There remains
thus
neither a conviction nor an acquittal on the merits, and the accused
can be re-tried in terms of sec 370(
c
)
[now s324]
21
of the Criminal Code. That was the position in
Moodie’s
case,
22
in which the irregularity of the deputy sheriff remaining closeted
with the jury throughout their two hour deliberation was regarded
as
so gross as to vitiate the whole trial.
On the other
hand there are irregularities of a lesser nature (and happily even
these are not frequent) in which the Court of Appeal
is able to
separate the bad from the good, and to consider the merits of the
case, including any findings as to the credibility
of witnesses. If
in the result it comes to the conclusion that a reasonable trial
Court, properly directing itself, would inevitably
have convicted, it
dismisses the appeal, and the conviction stands as one on the merits.
But if, on the merits, it cannot come
to that conclusion, it sets
aside the conviction, and this amounts to an acquittal on the merits.
In such a case sec 370(
c
)
of the Code does not permit of a re-trial.’
[31] Plainly, the irregularity encountered here
falls into the first category alluded to by Holmes JA in
Naidoo
.
The possibility of double jeopardy thus does not arise and the
institution of a new trial will not infringe s 35(3)(m) of the

Constitution. There remains a pressing societal demand for and
compelling public interest in, what after all is a case involving
a
most serious charge. The right of an accused to a fair trial, as the
Constitutional Court has observed in
S v
Jaipal
,
23
‘requires fairness to the accused, as well as fairness to the
public as represented by the State. It has to instil confidence
in
the criminal justice system with the public, including those close to
the accused, as well as those distressed by the audacity
and horror
of crime’. There will accordingly be a miscarriage of justice
should a proper trial not ensue. It follows that
the matter must be
remitted to the High Court for retrial in accordance with s 324 of
the Criminal Code.
[32]
In the result:
1
The appeal succeeds.
2
The convictions and
sentences imposed on each of the appellants are set aside.
3
It is ordered that
proceedings in respect of the same offence may again be instituted
either on the original charge, suitably amended
where necessary, or
upon any other charge as if the appellants had not previously been
arraigned, tried and convicted: provided
that the judge before whom
the original trial took place shall not take part in such
proceedings.
____________________
V M PONNAN
JUDGE OF APPEAL
APPEARANCES:
For
Appellants: B C Bredenkamp SC
Instructed
by:
Haarhoffs
Inc
Kimberley
Honey
Attorneys
Bloemfontein
For
Respondent: J J Cloete
Instructed
by:
Director
of Public Prosecutions
Kimberley
Director of Public
Prosecutions
Bloemfontein
1
Take and Save Trading CC v Standard Bank of SA
Ltd
2004 (4) SA 1
(SCA) para 5.
2
S v Roberts
1999 (2) SACR 243
para 25.
3
Section 35(3) of the Constitution provides that ‘Every
accused person has the right to a fair trial’.
4
S v Basson
2007 (3) SA 582
(CC) para 26.
5
S v Sallem
1987
(4) SA 772
(A).
6
President of RSA v South African Rugby Football Union
[1999] ZACC 9
;
1999
(4) SA 147
(CC) para 48.
7
BTR Industries SA (Pty) Ltd v Metal &
Allied Workers’ Union
[1992] ZASCA 85
;
1992 (3)
SA 673
(A) at 694F.
8
R v S (R.D.)
151
DLR (4
th
)
193 para 104 and 105.
9
Roberts
para 25.
10
R v S (R.D.)
151
DLR (4
th
)
193 para 106.
11
Strickland, Superintendent, Florida State
Prison et al v Washington
[1984] USSC 146
;
466 US 668
at 681.
12
Strickland
at
689.
13
R v Gough
[1993] UKHL 1
;
[1993]
2 All ER 724
at 728.
14
B N Cardozo
The
Nature of the Judicial Process
(1921)
p 12-13.
15
Cited from
R v S (RD)
151 DLR (4
th
) 193 para 35.
16
R v S
para 40.
17
BTR Industries SA (Pty) Ltd v Metal and Allied
Workers’ Union
[1992] ZASCA 85
;
1992 (3) SA 673
(A) at 694G.
18
[1945] 1 All ER 183
(CA) at 189A.
19
Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v
Mtshweni
2007 (2) SACR 217
(SCA) para
28.
20
[1962]
4 All SA 322
(A) at 325.
21
S
324
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
,
headed, institution of proceedings
de
novo
when
conviction set aside on
appeal, reads:
'Whenever
a conviction and sentence are set aside by the court of appeal on
the ground -
(a) that the court which
convicted the accused was not competent to do so; or
(b) that the indictment on which the accused was convicted was
invalid or defective in
any respect; or
(c) that there has been
any other technical irregularity or defect in the procedure,
proceedings in
respect of the same offence to which the conviction and sentence
referred may
again be instituted
either on the original charge, suitable amended where necessary, or
upon any
other charge as if
the accused had not previously been arraigned, tried and convicted:
Provided
that no judge or
assessor before whom the original trial took place shall take part
in such
proceedings.'
22
S v Moodie
1962 (1) SA 587
(A).
23
[2005] ZACC 1
;
2005 (4) SA 581
(CC) para 29.