Sahle v Chuma Resources (Pty) Ltd and Another (24686/2017) [2018] ZAGPJHC 555 (11 October 2018)

80 Reportability
Contract Law

Brief Summary

Debt — Acknowledgment of debt — Liability of surety — Applicant claimed EUR 82 937 from Respondents based on an acknowledgment of debt (AOD) and a loan agreement; Respondents raised defenses including lack of locus standi and disputes of fact regarding the agreement's terms. Court held that the Respondents were liable for the debt as they acknowledged their indebtedness in the AOD, and the defenses raised did not establish a bona fide dispute of fact sufficient to defeat the claim.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings were an application for final relief on motion in which the applicant sought payment of a debt in the amount of EUR 82 937, together with interest and costs. The relief was sought on the strength of a written acknowledgment of debt (AOD) concluded between the applicant and the first respondent, with the second respondent having bound himself as surety and co-principal debtor.


The parties were Sven Sahle as the applicant, and Chuma Resources (Pty) Ltd (first respondent) together with Sean Shipalana (second respondent) as respondents. The dispute arose from the respondents’ alleged non-compliance with the payment obligations recorded in the AOD, which incorporated a repayment plan and contained an acceleration clause.


Procedurally, the matter came before the Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg as motion proceedings, with the respondents resisting the claim on several grounds, including alleged lack of locus standi, alleged disputes of fact, alleged oral agreements said to affect the debt, and an assertion that the AOD did not reflect the true position.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned the enforceability of the AOD (and the suretyship) as the basis for liability, and whether the respondents could avoid payment by relying on allegations relating to the underlying loan arrangement and alleged further oral arrangements.


2. Material Facts


It was common cause that the applicant and the first respondent concluded an AOD recording that the respondents were “truly and lawfully indebted” to the applicant in the sum of EUR 82 937, together with interest and an additional amount of R10 000 for legal fees and disbursements incurred in seeking to claim and recover the debt. It was also common cause that the second respondent signed in terms that bound him as surety and co-principal debtor for the first respondent’s indebtedness as recorded.


The AOD recorded that the debt, interest and costs were owing as a result of a loan agreement entered into on or about 6 April 2016, and that repayments had not been made as agreed. It was further common cause that following a letter of demand dated 14 February 2017, the first respondent proposed a payment plan describing how it would liquidate the indebtedness, and that this payment plan was incorporated into and formed an integral part of the AOD.


The AOD contained an acceleration clause entitling the applicant, upon non-compliance with the stipulated repayments, to claim immediate payment of the whole amount due, even if some instalments had not yet fallen due. The applicant also undertook that if the first respondent made all payments strictly in accordance with the repayment plan, he would waive specified later instalments and the respondents would not be liable for costs of recovery; however, the court treated the respondents’ liability as turning on the enforceability of the AOD and the compromise embodied in the payment plan.


The court identified as further common cause that the applicant provided a certificate of balance, contemplated by the AOD, reflecting the amount owed.


The respondents raised several matters as disputes or defences, including an allegation that the applicant lacked locus standi because a company on whose behalf he allegedly acted should have been the applicant; an allegation that the AOD did not reflect the factual circumstances or the correct amount; and allegations of oral agreements said to show the money was for services rendered or that the AOD was security for other services. The court treated these allegations as inadequately supported, inconsistent with the written terms of the AOD (including its non-variation clause), and insufficient to establish genuine disputes of fact on the papers.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether the respondents were liable to the applicant for EUR 82 937 on the basis of the AOD and suretyship, and whether the respondents had raised a real, genuine and bona fide dispute of fact sufficient to defeat final relief in motion proceedings.


A connected issue was whether the respondents could avoid liability by contending that the debt should be determined by reference to the underlying loan agreement (or alleged oral arrangements) rather than by the AOD, and whether the alleged invalidity or illegality of the underlying loan agreement played any role where the parties had subsequently concluded an AOD incorporating a payment plan that the court characterised as a compromise.


The dispute therefore primarily concerned the application of legal principles to largely common-cause facts (particularly the existence and content of the AOD, suretyship, payment plan, and certificate of balance), and the evaluation of whether the respondents’ allegations created genuine disputes of fact or were bare and untenable on the papers. It also implicated legal questions concerning the effect of a non-variation clause, the requirements for rectification, the effect of a compromise, and the evidentiary significance of a certificate of balance clause.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter on the basis that, in motion proceedings for final relief, factual disputes are to be resolved in accordance with the rule in Plascon-Evans Paints (Pty) Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd as developed in subsequent authority. The court relied on the guidance in Wightman v Headfour (Pty) Ltd, emphasising that a genuine dispute of fact requires a party to engage seriously and unambiguously with the facts said to be disputed, and that bare or ambiguous denials—particularly where the disputing party should be able to provide a meaningful answer—will not readily meet that standard.


On the respondents’ contention that the applicant lacked locus standi because he allegedly acted on behalf of a separate corporate entity, the court held that the allegation was naked and unsupported. The respondents failed to provide the name of the alleged company or other details supporting the assertion. The court reasoned that unsupported allegations could not, without more, establish that the applicant lacked standing, and the absence of particulars suggested that no such company had been involved as alleged.


The respondents’ reliance on alleged oral agreements (including that the money advanced was in truth for services rendered, or that the AOD was concluded to provide security for further services) was rejected as sketchy, unreliable, and lacking documentary support. The court further held that these allegations were in any event inconsistent with the non-variation clause in the AOD, which stipulated that the AOD constituted the entire agreement and could not be varied or altered unless reduced to writing and signed. The court treated this clause as excluding reliance on extrinsic material to assert inconsistent terms, with reference to Yarram Trading CC t/a Tijuana Spur v ABSA Bank (Pty) Ltd.


In relation to the respondents’ assertion that the AOD did not reflect the true position, the court characterised the argument as, in substance, a contention that the AOD required rectification. The court set out the requirements for rectification (as formulated with reference to Propfokus 49 (Pty) Ltd v Wenhandel 4 (Pty) Ltd) and found that the respondents had made only a bare allegation of incorrectness without pleading and proving the necessary elements, including the true common continuing intention, the drafting mistake, and the wording that should have appeared. In the absence of a properly founded rectification case, the court treated the AOD as standing as the written reflection of what the parties intended.


A significant element of the court’s reasoning was the characterisation of the repayment plan (provided by the first respondent in response to the letter of demand and incorporated into the AOD) as a compromise. The court stated that a compromise is a contract aimed at preventing, avoiding, or terminating litigation and has the effect of res iudicata, constituting an absolute defence to an action on the original claim. Relying on Gollach & Gomperts (Pty) Ltd v Universal Mills & Produce Co (Pty) Ltd, the court reasoned that a party to a compromise accepts an element of risk inherent in settlement. Consequently, the respondents were barred from reverting to or relying on the original cause of action (whether the initial loan agreement or alleged oral arrangements) to avoid the obligations undertaken in the AOD.


The court also relied on the AOD’s certificate of balance clause. It held that, in line with Senekal v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd, a certificate of balance constitutes prima facie proof of the debtor’s indebtedness, and where not meaningfully challenged it becomes sufficient proof at the close of the case. The court found that the first respondent’s silence in the face of the certificate meant the applicant had demonstrated entitlement to payment of the claimed amount. The second respondent’s attempt to confine the effect of the certificate to the first respondent was rejected as untenable, given that the second respondent had bound himself as surety and co-principal debtor; the court considered it inconsistent to accept the certificate’s evidentiary function against the principal debtor but deny it against the surety.


Finally, although the judgment discussed the scope of the National Credit Act (including the exclusions and thresholds for juristic persons and “large agreements”), the court concluded that the validity or invalidity (and associated allegations of illegality) of the underlying agreement in terms of which EUR 38 000 was initially advanced was immaterial to the outcome, because the liability enforced arose from the AOD (and, for the second respondent, from the suretyship) and because the payment plan embodied a compromise.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court held that the respondents were jointly and severally liable to the applicant for EUR 82 937, the one paying the other to be absolved. It further held that the first respondent’s indebtedness arose in terms of the AOD, while the second respondent’s indebtedness arose from the suretyship he had signed.


The application succeeded. The court ordered payment of EUR 82 937, together with interest at the prescribed legal rate a tempore morae until final payment, and ordered the respondents to pay the costs of the application.


Cases Cited


Plascon-Evans Paints (Pty) Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd [1984] ZASCA 51; 1984 (3) SA 623 (A)


Wightman v Headfour (Pty) Ltd (66/2007) [2008] ZASCA 6 (10 March 2008)


Ripoll-Dausa v Middleton NO [2005] ZAWCHC 6; 2005 (3) SA 141 (C)


Yarram Trading CC t/a Tijuana Spur v ABSA Bank (Pty) Ltd 2007 (2) SA 570 (SCA)


Gollach & Gomperts (Pty) Ltd v Universal Mills & Produce Co (Pty) Ltd 1978 (1) SA 914 (A)


Senekal v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1978 (3) SA 375 (A)


Propfokus 49 (Pty) Ltd v Wenhandel 4 (Pty) Ltd 2007 3 All SA 18 (SCA)


Legislation Cited


National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (including section 7(1) and the thresholds applicable to juristic persons and large agreements)


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that the respondents were liable to the applicant for the amount of EUR 82 937 as recorded in the acknowledgment of debt, with the second respondent liable as surety and co-principal debtor. The respondents’ defences based on alleged lack of locus standi, alleged oral agreements, alleged disputes of fact, and assertions that the AOD did not reflect the true position were rejected as unsupported on the papers, inconsistent with the non-variation clause, and insufficient to found rectification or a genuine dispute of fact. The court further held that the incorporated payment plan operated as a compromise, rendering disputes about the underlying loan agreement immaterial to enforcement of the AOD. The certificate of balance issued by the applicant constituted prima facie proof of indebtedness and, not being rebutted, was sufficient proof of the amount due.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that in applications for final relief on motion, factual conflicts are determined in accordance with the Plascon-Evans rule, and that a respondent must raise a real, genuine and bona fide dispute of fact by seriously and unambiguously engaging with the disputed facts; bare or ambiguous denials will generally not suffice, particularly where the respondent should be able to provide detail.


It applied the principle that a non-variation clause stipulating that amendments must be in writing and signed limits reliance on alleged extrinsic terms inconsistent with the written agreement, and that allegations of oral variations or collateral arrangements inconsistent with such a clause may be rejected.


It applied the requirements for rectification of a written instrument, including proof of a common continuing intention not reflected in the writing, a drafting mistake (whether common error or attributable to the other party), and the specific wording that should replace the incorrect terms. A bare assertion that the document is incorrect, without alleging and proving these requirements, is insufficient.


It applied the principle that a compromise (settlement) is a contract intended to prevent, avoid, or terminate litigation, and has the effect of res iudicata, barring reliance on the original cause of action once the compromise has been concluded.


It applied the principle that a certificate of balance clause may create prima facie proof of indebtedness; if not rebutted by the debtor, such prima facie proof becomes sufficient proof of the indebtedness in the amount stated.

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[2018] ZAGPJHC 555
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Sahle v Chuma Resources (Pty) Ltd and Another (24686/2017) [2018] ZAGPJHC 555 (11 October 2018)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: 24686/2017
Date
of Hearing: 04 September 2018
Date
of Judgment: 11 October 2018
In
the matter between:
SVEN
SAHLE                                                                                                        Applicant
And
CHUMA
RESOURCES (PTY)
LTD                                                           First

Respondent
SEAN
SHIPALANA                                                                             Second

Respondent
JUDGMENT
MASHILE
J:
INTRODUCTION
[1]
Central to this matter is an amount of EUR 82 937 that is
allegedly due to the Applicant by the Respondents jointly and

severally the one paying the other to be absolved. The amount arises
in terms of an acknowledgment of debt (‘AOD’)
concluded
between the Applicant and the First Respondent. The Second Respondent
stood surety and also signed as a co-principal
debtor for all amounts
due to the Applicants by the First Respondent.
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
[2] It is common cause
that the material terms of the AOD were that:
2.1 The Respondents
acknowledged that they were truly and lawfully indebted to the
Applicant in the sum of EUR 82 937 (‘the
Debt’);
2.2 Interest would accrue
on the Debt at the rate of 10% (Ten Percent) of the outstanding Debt
for every month that the Debt, or
any portion thereof, remained
outstanding (‘Interest’);
2.3 The Interest on the
outstanding balance of the Debt would continue each month as long as
the Debt or any portion thereof remained
outstanding;
2.4 The Respondents
further acknowledged that they were truly and lawfully indebted to
the Applicant in the sum of R10 000 for legal
fees and disbursements
incurred by the creditor in order to claim and recover the Debt
(‘Costs’);
2.5 The Debt, Interest
and Costs are owing to the Applicant as a result of a loan agreement
(‘the agreement’) entered
into between the Applicant and
the First Respondent on or about 6 April 2016 of which the
Respondents failed to make repayments
as agreed;
2.6 The Respondents
irrevocably undertook to make payment of the Debt, Interest and Costs
as from signature date of the Agreement.
[3]
The First Respondent failed to adhere to the terms of the agreement
as a result of which the Applicant addressed a letter of
demand to
the First Respondent dated 14 February 2017 requiring it to observe
the agreement. In response to the letter of demand,
the First
Respondent hatched a payment plan, which the Applicant accepted. In
the payment plan, the First Respondent undertook
to liquidate its
entire indebtedness to the Applicant as follows:
3.1 EUR 10 000 on or
before 9 March
2017;
3.2 EUR 5
000 on or
before 20 March
2017;
3.3 EUR 5
000 on or
before 3 April
2017;
3.4 EUR 5
000 on or
before 17 April
2017;
3.5 EUR 10
000 on or
before 1 May
2017;
3.6 EUR 5
000 on or
before 15 May
2017;
3.7 EUR 10
000 on or
before 29 May 2017;
3.8 EUR 10 000 on or
before 12 June
2017;
3.9 EUR 10
000 on or
before 26 June 2017;
and
3.10 EUR 12 973 plus the
Costs on or before 10 July 2017.
[4]
The payment plan was incorporated and became an integral part of the
AOD. The AOD has an accelerated clause in terms of which
if the First
Respondent failed to make payments of the amount and on the days as
per the stipulated repayment plan,
the
Applicant would be entitled to claim immediate payment of the whole
amounts due and payable notwithstanding that at the time
of claiming
payment some of them would not have fallen due as yet.
[5]
The Applicant made an undertaking that if the First Respondent made
all of the payments exactly as per the payment plan in the
correct
amount and on or before due date, he
would
waive the last three payments mentioned at paragraphs 3.7, 3.9 and
3.10 above and the Respondents would not be liable for
the Costs of
recovery of the Debt.
[6] The First Respondent
confirmed and acknowledged that its chosen representative had read,
considered and understood the AOD and
that by appending his signature
thereon, the Respondents unequivocally agreed, accepted and
acknowledged its liability to the Applicant
arising in terms of the
Debt, Interest and Costs. At the time of the signing of the AOD, the
First Respondent had already defaulted
on payment and the amount that
it owed to the Applicant was already EUR 82 937.
[7]
To resist the Applicant’s claim, the Respondents have raised
the following:
7.1 The Applicant lacks
locus
standi
as the company on whose behalf he acted when he concluded both the
agreement and the AOD ought to have been cited in these proceedings

as the applicant;
7.2 The AOD does not
reflect the factual circumstances and the amount reflected therein is
different to the amount actually advanced
in terms of the agreement;
7.3 The money advanced
under the loan agreement was advanced in terms of an oral agreement
for services rendered and accordingly
the debt is extinguished;
7.4 The AOD was concluded
for purposes of providing security for further services rendered in
terms of a further oral agreement;
7.5 There exists material
disputes of fact pertaining to the following:
7.5.1
who loaned and advanced the money to the First Respondent?
7.5.2
who concluded the agreement with the First Respondent?
7.5.3
what amount was loaned to the First Respondent?
7.5.4
does the AOD arise from the agreement for EUR 38 000? and
7.5.5
does the AOD correctly reflects the factual position and
circumstances?
ISSUES
[8]
Primarily, the issue concerned here is to decide whether or not the
Respondents are liable in the amount claimed. Secondly,
and as a side
issue, is the question whether or not the Respondents liability
arises in terms of the agreement or the AOD. Thirdly,
it is whether
or not the illegality of the agreement should play any role in
determining whether or not the AOD  ought to
be observed.
LEGAL
BACKGROUND
[9]
The approach on how a court ought to resolve disputes of fact was set
out in
Plascon-Evans
Paints (Pty) Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA 623
(A) and has since been followed. In this regard it
could be instructive to refer to
Heher
JA in Wightman v Headfour (Pty) Ltd
(66/2007)
[2008] ZASCA 6
(10 March 2008) at paragraphs 12 and 13:

[12] Recognising that the truth
almost always lies beyond mere linguistic determination the courts
have said that an applicant who
seeks final relief on motion must in
the event of conflict, accept the version set up by his opponent
unless the latter’s
allegations are, in the opinion of the
court, not such as to raise a real, genuine or bona fide dispute of
fact or are so far-fetched
or clearly untenable that the court is
justified in rejecting them merely on the papers: Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck
Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA 623
(A) at
634E-635C. See also the analysis by Davis J in Ripoll-Dausa v
Middleton NO
[2005] ZAWCHC 6
;
2005 (3) SA 141
(C) at 151A-153C with which I
respectfully agree. (I do not overlook that a reference to evidence
in circumstances discussed in
the authorities may be appropriate.)
[13] A real, genuine and bona fide
dispute of fact can exist only where the court is satisfied that the
party who purports to raise
the dispute has in his affidavit
seriously and unambiguously addressed the fact said to be disputed.
There will of course be instances
where a bare denial meets the
requirement because there is no other way open to the disputing party
and nothing more can therefore
be expected of him. But even that may
not be sufficient if the fact averred lies purely within the
knowledge of the averring party
and no basis is laid for disputing
the veracity or accuracy of the averment. When the facts averred are
such that the disputing
party must necessarily possess knowledge of
them and be able to provide an answer (or countervailing evidence) if
they be not true
or accurate but, instead of doing so, rests his case
on a bare or ambiguous denial the court will generally have
difficulty
in finding that the test is satisfied. … If that
does not happen it should come as no surprise that the court takes a
robust
view of the matter.”
[10]
The non-variation clause in the AOD provides that the AOD constitutes
the entire agreement between the parties and that its
terms cannot be
varied, consensually cancelled, waived, suspended or substituted
unless such variation, consensual cancellation,
waiver, suspension or
substitution is reduced to writing and signed by the parties. The
significance of the clause is of course
that no extrinsic material or
evidence can be countenanced to prove a term of the agreement to
eliminate possible disputes of fact.
See
Yarram
Trading CC t/a Tijuana Spur v ABSA Bank (Pty) Ltd
2007
(2) SA 570
(SCA).
[11]
The NCA applies to all credit agreements, except the following types
of credit agreements:-
11.1 A credit agreement
in terms of which the consumer is a juristic person whose asset value
or annual turnover, together with
the combined asset value or annual
turnover of all related juristic persons equals or exceeds the
threshold determined in Section
7(1);
11.2 A large agreement,
in terms of which the consumer is a juristic person whose asset value
or annual turnover is below the threshold
determined in Section 7(1).
[12]
A credit agreement is a large agreement if ‘… the
principal debt under that transaction or guarantee falls at
or above
the higher of the thresholds established in terms of section
7(1)(b).’  The higher of the thresholds established
in
terms of section 7(1)(b) is R250 000.
[13]
The Respondents have also contended that the AOD does not reflect the
true intention of the parties and the correct state of
affairs. The
general rule is that the party alleging that a contract does not
capture the common intention of the parties must
allege and prove
that the contract or document does not record the common intention of
the parties, that there was a mistake in
the drafting of the contract
and what wording should have been in the contract.
[14]
To the extent that the First Respondent’s response to the
letter of demand dated 14 February 2017 was a payment plan
describing
how it intended to liquidate its indebtedness to the Applicant, it
constitutes a compromise. A compromise or settlement
is a contract
which has as its object the prevention, avoidance or termination of
litigation. It has the effect of
res
iudicata
whether or not it is embodied in an order of court and is an absolute
defence to any action based on the original claim.
[15]
The following was stated in
Gollach
& Gomperts (Pty) Ltd v Universal Mills & Produce Co (Pty) Ltd
1978
(1) SA 914
(A):

Voluntary acceptance by parties
to a compromise of an element of risk that their bargain might not be
as advantageous to them as
litigation might have been is inherent in
the very concept of compromise. This is a circumstance which the
Court must bear in mind,
when it considers a complaint by a
dissatisfied party that, had he not laboured under an erroneous
belief or been ignorant of certain
facts, he would not have entered
into the settlement agreement.’
[16]
The AOD provides for the production of a certificate signed by the
Applicant bearing the amount owed as prima facie proof that
the
amount is what the debtor owes notwithstanding that the amount so
stated thereon could be illiquid. It was held in
Senekal
v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd
1978 (3) SA 375
(A) that:

At the end of the case, when
all the evidence (which includes the certificate) is in, the Court
must decide whether the party upon
whom the onus rests has discharged
it on a proper balance of probabilities… If the prima facie
evidence or proof remains
unrebutted at the close of the case, it
becomes ‘sufficient proof’ of the fact or facts (on the
issues with which it
is concerned) necessarily to be established by
the party bearing the onus of proof.’
[17]
This matter can and must be decided on the following common cause
facts:
17.1 The parties entered
into the agreement in terms of which the Applicant would advance a
loan of EUR 38 000  to the First
Respondent;
17.2 Subsequent to the
conclusion of the agreement and upon the First Respondent’s
failure to perform in terms of the agreement,
the parties
entered into the AOD;
17.3 In terms of the AOD
the Second Respondent bound himself as surety and co-principle
debtor;
17.4 The First Respondent
provided the Applicant with a payment plan in terms of which they
undertook to repay the outstanding balance
of EUR 82 937;
17.5 The Applicant
provided the First Respondent with a proper certificate of balance.
THE
APPLICANT’S LACK OF
LOCUS STANDI
[18]
The argument that the Applicant lacks
locus standi
because he
concluded the agreements with the First Respondent as a
representative of a legal entity with separate personality is,

without more, naked and stands to be rejected. A party cannot make
wild allegations and hope that they will, on their own, be adequate

proof of what they purport. Thus lack of details such as the name of
the company  with which the First Respondent contracted,
among
others,  suggests that no such company ever existed.
EXISTENCE
OF DISPUTES OF FACT
[19]
It is notable that the First Respondent has made no effort, either by
furnishing more details or supplying documentary proof
to support its
claim that it entered into an oral agreement that the money advanced
under the agreement was for services rendered.
The allegation that
the AOD was also concluded in respect of an oral agreement to supply
security services to the Applicant must
suffer the same fate.
[20]
Like in the case of paragraph 18
supra
,
the rule that a party who alleges must prove remains relevant and
finds application here. The conclusion of oral agreements in
the
terms described by the Respondents has been denied. In the light of
the allegation of the oral agreements being sketchy and
unreliable,
the court rejects it as unworthy of merit.
[21]
In any event, the allegation of the conclusion of oral agreements is
offensive to the ‘non-variation clause’ contained
in the
AOD, which the First Respondent has signed. That clause specifically
provides that the AOD will not be altered unless such
change is
recorded in writing and signed by both parties. The significance and
applicability of the Shifren principle was underscored
in the
Yarram
Trading CC
case
supra
.
Once I have rejected the oral agreements, it follows that there
cannot be a claim that disputes of fact exist.
RECTIFICATION
[22]
The Respondents assert that the AOD is incorrect in that it does not
describe the correct state of affairs.
In
essence, therefore, the contention must be that it requires
rectification. For an application for rectification to succeed the

following must be alleged and proved:
22.1
An agreement has been concluded between the parties and reduced to
writing;
22.2
The written document does not reflect the true intention of the
parties. This requires that the common continuing intention
of the
parties, as it existed at the time when the agreement was reduced to
writing, be established;
22.3
A mistake in drafting the document, which mistake could have been the
result of an intentional act of the other party or a
bona
fide
common error; and
22.4
The actual wording of the true agreement.
See
Propfokus
49 (Pty) Ltd v Wenhandel 4 (Pty) Ltd
2007
3 All SA 18
(SCA).
[23]
The allegation pertaining to the incorrectness of the AOD without
demonstration of the above requirements that must be alleged
and
established is too bare. In the absence of application for
rectification, the AOD must stand as a true reflection of what the

parties had intended to achieve.
COMPROMISE
[24]
The payment plan which the First Respondent presented to the
Applicant and subsequently incorporated into the AOD is a compromise.

It was proposed and presented with the objective of settling the
dispute that had arisen between the parties. Accordingly and in
line
with what was held in the
Gollach & Gomperts
case
supra
,
the Respondents’ are accordingly barred from relying on the
original cause of action, being the loan agreement or any alleged

oral agreement for services rendered.
CERTIFICATE
OF BALANCE
[25]
The AOD provides that a certificate of balance signed by the creditor
constitutes
prima
facie
proof of the amount of indebtedness of the debtor to the creditor. It
was held in the
Senekal
case
supra
that
prima
facie
evidence of a certificate of balance would, unless challenged,
be sufficient proof of what it purports to be. The First Respondent’s

silence on the face of that
prima
facie
proof of indebtedness to the Applicant means that the latter has
demonstrated that he is entitled to payment in the amount claimed.
[26]
The Second Respondent’s assertion that the certificate of
balance is only valid as against the First Respondent is untenable

especially in view of the suretyship that he has signed in favour of
the Applicant. If the certificate issued against the First
Respondent
is sufficient proof of the amount due to the Applicant by the First
Respondent then it is preposterous for the Second
Respondent to
expect it not to apply to him. The certificate is sufficient for the
purpose for which it was designed to accomplish.
CONCLUSION
[27]
The Respondents are jointly and severally liable to the Applicant,
the one paying the other to be absolved, in the amount of
EUR 82 937.
The indebtedness of the First Respondent arises in terms of the AOD
while that of the Second Respondent is in
terms of the suretyship
agreement that he signed. In view of what a compromise is, the
validity or invalidity of the agreement
in terms of which the amount
of EUR 38 000 was advanced is immaterial to the outcome hereof.
ORDER
[28]
The application succeeds and I make the following order:
28.1 The Respondents are
ordered to pay to the Applicant the sum of EUR 82 937 (Eighty
two thousand nine hundred and thirty
seven Euros), jointly and
severally, the one paying the other to be absolved;
28.2 The Respondents are
further liable for payment of interest on the abovementioned amount
at the prescribed legal rate
a
tempore morae
until date of final payment;
28.3 The Respondents are
ordered to pay the costs of the application.
______________________________________
B
A MASHILE
Judge
of the High Court of South Africa
Gauteng
Local Division, Johannesburg
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant: Adv.
Laughland
Instructed
by:  Schindlers Attorneys
For the Respondent: L
Pillay
Instructed
by: Amiraj Bauchoo Attorneys