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[2018] ZAGPJHC 574
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Solidarity Trade Union v National Economic Development and Development Council ('NEDLAC') and Others (2018/32607) [2018] ZAGPJHC 574 (14 September 2018)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO
:
2018/32607
In
the matter between:
SOLIDARITY
TRADE UNION
Applicant
and
NATIONAL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT
COUNCIL (‘NEDLAC’)
First Respondent
THE
PRESIDENCY OF THE
RSA
Second Respondent
THE
MINISTER OF TRADE &
INDUSTRY
Third Respondent
JUDGMENT
ADAMS
J
[1].
This is an
urgent opposed application by the applicant for the review and
setting aside of a decision of the first respondent not
to consider
the applicant’s application in terms of section 77 of the
Labour Relations Act no 66 of 1995 (‘the LRA’).
[2].
In its notice
of motion, the applicant applies
inter
alia
for
an order in the following terms:
‘
1.
Reviewing and setting aside the decision made by NEDLAC, dated 21
August 2018; in terms of which the Standing Committee agreed
on 17
August 2018, that Applicant's notice in terms of section 77(1)(b) of
the LRA be deemed as not being considered in accordance
with section
77(1)(c) of the LRA, and that protest action arising from the
Applicant's notice, would not be protected under the
LRA.
2.
Ordering
that Applicant's Notice and Application in terms of section 77 of the
LRA; dated 25 July 2018; be remitted to NEDLAC for
reconsideration in
accordance with the Procedure for Considering Notices of Possible
Protest Action ("the procedure guideline")
in terms of
section 77 of the LRA.’
[3].
The review
application is based on procedural considerations and substantive
considerations pursuant to the decision.
[4].
As regards
procedural considerations, the applicant contends that the first
respondent, as the custodian of national economic reform,
is duty
bound to follow procedures as outlined in its founding documents and
its own guidelines and protocols, which deals with
the manner in
which it is required to consider notices in terms of section 77(1)(b)
of the LRA. Importantly, so the applicants
contends, in terms of the
first respondent’s procedural guidelines, it is required to
determine whether an issue referred
to it is of a socio –
economic nature. It is the case of the applicant that the process
adopted by the first respondent in
considering, in terms of section
77(1)(c) of the LRA, the section 77(1)(b) notice of the applicant, is
contrary to the peremptory
prescripts contained in section 4 of the
Promotion of Administration of Justice Act, 3 of 2000 (‘the
PAJA’), and is
therefore unlawful, unreasonable and irrational
and stands to be reviewed.
[5].
As regards the
substantive considerations, it is the applicant’s case that the
first respondent’s decision that the
applicant’s section
77(1)(b) referral to it does not fall within its jurisdictional
purview in that it does not have the
powers to deal with the
interpretation, application and implementation of BBBEE legislative
provisions and any schemes based thereon,
is unlawful, irrational and
/ or unreasonable. In particular, the applicant contends that the
first respondent’s failure
to make a pronouncement on whether
applicant’s notice in terms of section 77(1)(b) constitutes a
matter which is socio –
economic in nature. Such failure, so
the applicant alleges, was also unlawful, irrational and / or
unreasonable.
[6].
The very crisp
issue which I am required to adjudicate in this application for
review is whether or not the first respondent had
correctly decided
that it does not have the necessary jurisdiction to consider the
referral to it of the issue by the applicant.
[7].
Central to the
issues in dispute in this review application is section 77(1) of the
LRA, which provides as follows:
’
77
Protest action to promote or defend socio-economic interests of
workers
(1)
Every
employee who is not engaged in an essential service or a maintenance
service has the right to take part in protest action
if-
(a)
the
protest action has been called by a registered trade union or
federation of trade unions;
(b)
the
registered trade union or federation of trade unions has served a
notice on NEDLAC stating-
(i)
the
reasons for the protest action; and
(ii)
the
nature of the protest action;
(c)
the
matter giving rise to the intended protest action has been considered
by NEDLAC or any other appropriate forum in which the
parties
concerned are able to participate in order to resolve the matter; and
(d)
at
least 14 days before the commencement of the protest action, the
registered trade union or federation of trade unions has served
a
notice on NEDLAC of its intention to proceed with the protest action.
(2)
… …
(3)
A
person who takes part in protest action or in any conduct in
contemplation or in furtherance of protest action that complies with
subsection (1), enjoys the protections conferred by section 67.
(4)
Despite
the provisions of subsection (3), an employee forfeits the protection
against dismissal conferred by that subsection, if
the employee - …
… ‘
[8].
On the 25
th
of July 2018 the applicant had served on the first respondent a
notice in terms of the section 77(1)(b) of the LRA and the first
respondent considered the notice and the issues raised therein, as
contemplated in section 77(1)(c), and made a decision on the
17
th
of August 2018.
[9].
The reasons
for and the purpose of the intended protest action, according to the
applicant, was explained in the said notice and
amplified in its oral
submissions to the first respondent during a meeting of the 17
th
of August 2018, convened by the first respondent to ‘clarify’
the contents of the applicant’s section 77(1)(b)
notice. The
applicant expressed the view that certain Employee Share Ownership
Plans (‘ESOP’s’), including those
proposed and
adopted by companies in the Republic of South Africa, such as Sasol
and Vodacom, and which were in the process of
being implemented
shortly, constitute unfair and unlawful conduct, prejudicial to the
members of the applicant, whose socio –
economic rights and
interests, so the applicant claimed in their section 77(1)(b) notice,
were violated. In addition, the applicant
also contended that the
ESOP's are prejudicial to the socio – economic and other rights
of members of the public in general.
[10].
The intended
respondents in the section 77(1)(c) process, and to whom the
applicant, had addressed demands to be heard during the
consideration
of the issue, are the second and third respondents in this
application. They played no part in the proceedings in
this urgent
application and also were not involved in the proceedings before the
first respondent in view of the stance adopted
by the Standing
Committee of the first respondent.
[11].
The applicant
had submitted to the first respondent that, in view of the above, it
is imperative to protect and preserve the rights
of its members and
to prevent further harm and / or potential harm consequent upon the
continued implementation of ESOP's.
[12].
This
application was brought on an urgent because, so it was contended for
on behalf of the applicant, if this matter is not disposed
of
expeditiously the applicant’s rights to embark on protected /
lawful protest action in terms of section 77 of the LRA,
would
effectively be placed on hold for a considerable period of time,
whilst the impact of ESOP's would continue to prejudice
the members
of the applicant.
[13].
I find myself
in agreement in agreement with these submissions, and therefore find
that the application is urgent.
[14].
An important
part of this application relates to the meaning of the ‘socio
–economic’. In that regards; Mlambo
J (as he then was);
in
Government
of Western Province v Congress of South Africa Trade Unions and
Another,
(Case no: C162/98) commented as follows that:
‘
It
is not possible to provide an all – embracing definition of the
phrase 'socio – economic interests of workers’
..........
[l]n my view each matter depends on its particular circumstances. It
should generally be sufficient for a party to place
the matter giving
rise to the protest action squarely within the ambit of the social
status and economic position of workers in
general'; and;
...........[i]t was stated that the LRA had correctly left the ambit
of the scope of socio economic interests wide
open and that to impose
a strict and boxed type definition of socio economic interests would
be “to go against the very grain
of the Act”’
[15].
Section 77 of
the LRA is specifically headed ‘Protest action to promote or
defend socio – economic interests of workers’.
Consequently, the purpose of entrenching the rights of employees to
embark on protest action, within the confines of section 77;
has as
its aim the rights of employees to promote or defend their socio –
economic interests. It is further submitted on
behalf of the
applicant that the issues raised in applicant’s intended
protest action; are issues in the public and national
interest.
[16].
The first
respondent opposes the application for review and persists in its
stance that it lacks the necessary authority to consider
the
applicant’s ‘demands’ as contained in its section
77(1)(b) notice / application addressed to the first respondent
on
the 18
th
of July 2018. This, the first respondent contends, results from a
consideration of the enabling legislation and constitution of
the
first respondent, as well as its founding documents, consisting of a
founding declaration and its protocols. It is clear, so
it was
submitted by Mr Masipa, Counsel for the first respondent, that the
first respondent lacks the power to determine the demands
as
contained in the applicant’s section 77(1)(b) application /
notice. There is no provision in the NEDLAC Act, its Constitution
and
its protocols which confer upon the first respondent the authority or
power to facilitate on issues relating to duly implemented
policies
and/or Acts of Parliament, such as those relating BBBEE. This, so the
argument is concluded on behalf of the first respondent,
is the crux
of the applicant's application herein.
[17].
The submission
on behalf of the first respondent is furthermore that its
powers and authority are confined to consideration
of all significant
changes to social and economic policies before it is implemented or
introduced in Parliament. Clause 4.1 (d)
of the constitution provides
that its Council shall ‘consider all significant changes to
social and economic policy before
it is implemented or, in the case
of legislation, before it is introduced into Parliament’. This
position, so Mr Masipa submitted,
is reaffirmed in section 5(1)(d) of
the NEDLAC Act. The share schemes, which form the basis of the
applicant’s grievance,
are implemented in pursuance of the
BBBEE and BEE legislation and policies developed around the
legislative provisions. Therefore,
so the first respondent contends,
it does not have the authority to consider any application that has
its effect on the aforementioned
application and/or implementation.
[18].
In deciding
whether or not the approach adopted by the first respondent is
legally valid and sound, one needs look no further, in
my view, than
the provisions of the
National
Economic, Development and Labour Council Act, 35 of 1994
, and in
particular the provisions of
section 5
, which deals with the objects,
powers and functions of the first respondent.
Section 5
provides as
follows:
‘
5
Objects, powers and functions of Council
(1)
The Council shall-
(a)
strive to promote the goals of economic growth, participation in
economic decision – making and social equity;
(b)
seek to reach consensus and conclude agreements on matters pertaining
to social and economic policy;
(c)
consider all proposed labour legislation relating to labour market
policy before it is introduced in Parliament;
(d)
consider all significant changes to social and economic policy before
it is implemented or introduced in Parliament;
(e)
encourage and promote the formulation of co – ordinated policy
on social and economic matters.
(2)
For the purpose of subsection (1), the Council-
(a)
may make such investigations as it may consider necessary;
(b)
shall continually survey and analyse social and economic affairs;
(c)
shall keep abreast of international developments in social and
economic policy;
(d)
shall continually evaluate the effectiveness of legislation and
policy affecting social and economic policy;
(e)
may conduct research into social and economic policy;
(f)
shall work in close co-operation with departments of State, statutory
bodies, programmes and other forums and non – governmental
agencies engaged in the formulation and the implementation of social
and economic policy.
(3)
Nothing in this section shall preclude the Council from considering
any matter pertaining to social and economic policy.’
[19].
In my
judgment, any one of many of the aforegoing provisions in the
enabling Act of the first respondent empowers the first respondent
to
do what the applicant requires it to do in this application. Most
notably is the provisions of section 5(2)(f), which empowers
the
first respondent to work in close co –operation with
departments of State, statutory bodies, programmes and other forums
and non – governmental agencies engaged in the formulation and
the implementation of social and economic policy. On any
interpretation of this provision alone the first respondent is
empowered to consider the request by the applicant as set out in
its
Section 7(7)(b) notice.
[20].
There is
therefore no merit in the contention by the first respondent that it
does not have the power to entertain the applicant’s
section
77(1)(b) application. That decision therefore stands to be reviewed.
[21].
The
application therefore stands to be granted with costs.
Order
In
the circumstances I make the following order:
1.
The
applicant’s urgent review application be and is hereby granted.
2.
The decision
of the first respondent dated the 21
st
August 2018; in terms of which its Standing Committee agreed on the
17
th
August 2018 that the applicant’s notice in terms of section
77(1)(b) of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995 (‘the
LRA’),
be deemed not to have been considered in accordance with the
provisions of section 77(1)(c) of the LRA; and which
resulted in the
protest action contemplated in the applicant's notice, not being
protected under the LRA; be and is hereby reviewed
and set aside.
3.
The
applicant's notice and application in terms of section 77(1)(b) of
the LRA dated the 25
th
July 2018, be and is hereby remitted to the first respondent for
consideration in terms of the provisions of section 77(1)(c) of
the
LRA in accordance with the first respondent’s
Procedure
for Considering Notices of Possible Protest Action
(‘the Procedure Guideline’).
4.
The first
respondent shall pay applicant’s cost of this urgent
application, including the cost relating to the hearing of
the urgent
application on the 11
th
September 2018 and on the 13
th
September 2018 respectively.
_________________________________
L ADAMS
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Local Division,
Johannesburg
HEARD
ON:
13
th
September 2018
JUDGMENT
DATE:
FOR
THE APPLICANT:
14
th
September 2018
Adv
C Goosen
INSTRUCTED
BY:
Serfontein
Viljoen & Swart
FOR
THE FIRST RESPONDENT:
Adv
Relleng Masipa
INSTRUCTED
BY:
T
I Mathoa Attorneys