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[2008] ZASCA 90
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Malan and Another v Law Society of the Northern Provinces (568/2007) [2008] ZASCA 90; 2009 (1) SA 216 (SCA) ; [2009] 1 All SA 133 (SCA) (12 September 2008)
Links to summary
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: 568/2007
ANDRé MALAN
1st Appellant
FRANCOIS
MALAN 2
nd
Appellant
and
THE LAW SOCIETY OF THE NORTHERN PROVINCES
Respondent
Neutral citation:
Malan v The Law Society of the Northern
Provinces
(568/2007)
[2008] ZASCA 90
(12 SEPTEMBER 2008)
Coram:
HARMS ADP, STREICHER, CLOETE JJA, LEACH and KGOMO AJJA
Heard:
28 AUGUST 2008
Delivered:
12 SEPTEMBER 2008
Updated:
Summary:
Attorney – striking from the roll –
restatement of approach
ORDER
On appeal from:
High Court, Pretoria
(Botha J and
Murphy J sitting as court of first instance).
1. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
2. The costs are to be paid jointly and severally by the appellants
and are to be taxed on the scale of attorney and client.
JUDGMENT
HARMS ADP (STREICHER, CLOETE JJA, LEACH and KGOMO AJJA concurring):
[1] This is an appeal by two attorneys, the brothers André
and Francois Malan, who had practised in partnership in Alberton
under the name Malan & Partners. Both were removed from the roll
of attorneys and conveyancers (and the first appellant, André,
from that of notaries) by the High Court, Pretoria. They appeal with
leave of the high court on the ground that the high court
had erred
in the exercise of its discretion by deciding to remove them from the
roll. Instead, they say, they should have been
suspended from
practice for a given time, bearing in mind that they had been
provisionally suspended since 10 September 2002.
[2] The leisurely pace of the proceedings needs some explanation. The
appellants did not file affidavits to oppose the application
for
their provisional suspension because, they said, they were so shocked
and traumatised by the allegations that they were unable
to reply.
(Since most of the allegations turned out to be true and of their own
making their shock is somewhat difficult to understand.)
During March
2003, the present respondent, the Law Society of the Northern
Provinces (the Society), filed a short supplementary
affidavit. It
took the appellants more than three years to file their answering
affidavits. The high court delivered its judgment
on 14 May 2007 and
granted leave to appeal on 10 September 2007.
[3] Although the principles applicable to striking off applications
have often been stated, it is necessary to restate them once
more to
emphasise aspects that tend to be ignored or misunderstood. The
Society launched its application under s 22(1)(d) of the
Attorneys
Act 53 of 1979, which provides that ‘any person who has been
admitted and enrolled as an attorney may on application
by the
society concerned be struck off the roll or suspended from practice
by the court. . . if he, in the discretion of the court,
is not a fit
and proper person to continue to practise as an attorney”.
[4] As was said in
Jasat v Natal Law Society
2000 (3) SA 44
,
[2000] 2 All SA 310
(SCA) at para 10, s 22(1)(d) contemplates a
three-stage inquiry:
First, the court must decide whether the alleged offending conduct
has been established on a preponderance of probabilities, which
is a
factual inquiry.
Second, it must consider whether the person concerned ‘in the
discretion of the Court’ is not a fit and proper person
to
continue to practise. This involves a weighing up of the conduct
complained of against the conduct expected of an attorney and,
to
this extent, is a value judgment.
And third, the court must inquire whether in all the circumstances
the person in question is to be removed from the roll of attorneys
or
whether an order of suspension from practice would suffice.
[5] As far as the second leg of the inquiry is concerned, it is well
to remember that the Act contemplates that where an attorney
is
guilty of unprofessional or dishonourable or unworthy conduct
different consequences may follow. The nature of the conduct may
be
such that it establishes that the person is not a fit and proper
person to continue to practise. In other instances the conduct
may
not be that serious and a law society may exercise its disciplinary
powers, particularly by imposing a fine or reprimanding
the attorney
(s 72(2)(a)). This does not, however, mean that a court is powerless
if it finds the attorney guilty of unprofessional
conduct where such
conduct does not make him unfit to continue to practise as an
attorney. In such an event the court may discipline
the attorney by
suspending him from practice with or without conditions or by
reprimanding him:
Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope v C
1986
(1) SA 616
(A) at 638I-639E;
Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope
v Berrangé
2005 (5) SA 160
(C) at 173G-I,
[2006] 1 All SA
290
(C) at 302.
[6] As pointed out in
Jasat,
the third leg is also a matter
for the discretion of the court of first instance, and whether a
court will adopt the one course
or the other depends upon such
factors as the nature of the conduct complained of, the extent to
which it reflects upon the person’s
character or shows him to
be unworthy to remain in the ranks of an honourable profession, the
likelihood or otherwise of a repetition
of such conduct and the need
to protect the public. Ultimately it is a question of degree. It is
here where there appears to be
some misunderstanding.
[7] First, in deciding on whichever course to follow the court is not
first and foremost imposing a penalty. The main consideration
is the
protection of the public.
[8] Second, logic dictates that if a court finds that someone is not
a fit and proper person to continue to practise as an attorney,
that
person must be removed from the roll. However, the Act contemplates a
suspension. This means that removal does not follow
as a matter of
course. If the court has grounds to assume that after the period of
suspension the person will be fit to practise
as an attorney in the
ordinary course of events it would not remove him from the roll but
order an appropriate suspension. In this
regard the following must be
borne in mind:
‘The implications of an
unconditional order removing an attorney from the roll for misconduct
are serious and far-reaching.
Prima
facie
, the Court
which makes such an order visualises that the offender will never
again be permitted to practise his profession because
ordinarily such
an order is not made unless the Court is of the opinion that the
misconduct in question is of so serious a nature
that it manifests
character defects and lack of integrity rendering the person unfit to
be on the roll. If such a person should
in the years apply for
re-admission, he will be required to satisfy the Court that he is “a
completely reformed character”
(
Ex
parte Wilcocks
1920
TPD 243
at 245) and that his “reformation or rehabilitation is,
in all the known circumstances, of a permanent nature” (
Ex
parte Knox
1962 (1)
SA 778
(N) at 784). The very stringency of the test for re-admission
is an index to the degree of gravity of the misconduct which gave
rise to disbarment.’
(
Incorporated Law Society, Natal v Roux
1972 (3) SA 146
(N) at
150B-E quoted with approval in
Cirota v Law Society Transvaal
1979 (1) SA 172
(A) at 194B-D.) It is seldom, if ever, that a mere
suspension from practice for a given period in itself will transform
a person
who is unfit to practise into one who is fit to practise.
Accordingly, as was noted in
A v Law Society of the Cape of Good
Hope
1989 (1) SA 849
(A) at 852E-G, it is implicit in the Act
that any order of suspension must be conditional upon the cause of
unfitness being removed.
For example, if an attorney is found to be
unfit of continuing to practise because of an inability to keep
proper books, the conditions
of suspension must be such as to deal
with the inability. Otherwise the unfit person will return to
practice after the period of
suspension with the same inability or
disability. In other words, the fact that a period of suspension of
say 5 years would be
a sufficient penalty for the misconduct does not
mean that the order of suspension should be 5 years. It could be more
to cater
for rehabilitation or, if the court is not satisfied that
the suspension will rehabilitate the attorney, the court ought to
strike
him from the roll. An attorney, who is the subject of a
striking off application and who wishes a court to consider this
lesser
option, ought to place the court in the position of
formulating appropriate conditions of suspension.
[9] Third, the exercise of this discretion is not bound by rules, and
precedents consequently have a limited value. All they do
is to
indicate how other courts have exercised their discretion in the
circumstances of a particular case. Facts are never identical,
and
the exercise of a discretion need not be the same in similar cases.
If a court were bound to follow a precedent in the exercise
of its
discretion it would mean that the court has no real discretion. (See
Naylor v Jansen
2007 (1) SA 16
(SCA) at para 21.)
[10]
The appellants relied on
Summerley
v Law Society, Northern Provinces
2006
(5) SA 613
(SCA) for the proposition that unless a court finds
dishonesty during the first leg of the inquiry, it ought not to
remove the
attorney concerned from the roll.
In
Summerley
the following was said in connection with
the exercise of this discretion (at para 21):
‘
The
further argument on behalf of the appellant was that, as a general
rule, striking-off is reserved for attorneys who have acted
dishonestly
,
while transgressions not involving dishonesty are usually visited
with the lesser penalty of suspension from practice. Although
this
can obviously not be regarded as a rule of the Medes and the
Persians, since every case must ultimately be decided on its
own
facts, the general approach contended for by the appellant does
appear to be supported by authority [citations omitted]. This
distinction is not difficult to understand. The attorney’s
profession is an honourable profession, which demands complete
honesty and integrity from its members.’
Obviously, if a court finds dishonesty, the
circumstances must be exceptional before a court will order a
suspension
instead of a removal.
(Exceptional circumstances were found in
Summerley
and in
Law Society, Cape of Good Hope v
Peter
[2006] ZASCA 37
and the court was
able in the formulation of its order in those cases to cater for the
problem by requiring that the particular
attorney had to satisfy the
court in a future application that he or she should be permitted to
practise unconditionally.) Where
dishonesty has not been established
the position is as set out above, namely that a court has to exercise
a discretion within the
parameters of the facts of the case without
any preordained limitations.
[11] As mentioned in
Summerley
(at para 15), the fact that a court finds that an attorney is unable
to administer and conduct a trust account does not mean that
striking-off should follow as a matter of course. The converse is,
however, also correct: it does not follow that striking-off
is not an
appropriate order (compare
Prokureursorde
van Transvaal v Landsaat
1993 (4) SA
807
(T);
Law Society of the Transvaal v
Tloubatla
[1999] 4 All SA 59 (T)).
To the extent that the judgment in
Law
Society of the Cape of Good Hope v King
1995 (2) SA 887
(C) at 892G-894C propagates an ‘enlightened
approach’, requiring courts to deal with misconduct which does
not involve
dishonesty with (in my words) kid gloves, I disagree. In
order to stem an erosion of professional ethical values a
‘conservative
approach’ is more appropriate (
Incorporated
Law Society, Transvaal v Goldberg
1964
(4) SA 301
(T) at 304A-F).
[
12] A court of appeal
has limited powers to interfere with a decision of the court of first
instance. In relation to the first leg
of the inquiry, which is
factual, appeals are subject to the general limitation that courts of
appeal defer to the factual findings
of courts of first instance (
R
v Dhlumayo
1948 (2) SA 677
(A)). This
rule has limited, if any, application if the court of first instance
decided the case on paper, i e, in application
proceedings, because
in such a case the court of appeal is in as good a position to judge
the facts as was the court below. There
are factual disputes in this
case and the high court decided the matter with reference to the
so-called
Plascon-Evans
rule, namely to base its decision on facts that are common cause or
otherwise on the appellants’ (the then respondents’)
version. The high court did not consider the second and important
leg of the
Plascon-Evans
rule namely whether the disputes raised were real, genuine or bona
fide, or whether the allegations or denials were so far-fetched
or
clearly untenable that the court would have been justified in
rejecting them merely on the papers. (
Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634I-635D.) The
application of the ‘rule’ in cases such as this requires
a consideration of the fact that it is a
sui
generis
procedure, and that an attorney
is not entitled to approach the matter as if it were a criminal case
and rely on denial upon denial
and, instead of meeting the
allegations, to deflect them and, as part of the culture of blame,
always blame others (
Prokureursorde van
Transvaal v Kleynhans
1995 (1) SA 839 (T) at 853E-G).
[13] The ‘discretion’ of the court of
first instance in relation to the second and third leg is in the
nature of a value
judgment. In principle, a court of appeal is
entitled to substitute its value judgment for that of the court of
first instance
if it disagrees. However, this Court has held
consistently that the discretion involved is a strict discretion,
which means that
a court of appeal may only interfere if the
discretion was not exercised judicially:
Kekana
v Society of Advocates of SA
,
[1998] ZASCA 54
;
1998 4 SA
649
,
[1998] 3 All SA 577
(SCA);
Vassen v
Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope
[1998] ZASCA 47
;
1998
4 SA 532
(SCA) 537. This means that a court of appeal is not entitled
to interfere with the exercise by the lower court of its discretion
unless it failed to bring an unbiased judgment to bear on the issue;
did not act for substantial reasons; exercised its discretion
capriciously, or exercised its discretion upon a wrong principle or
as a result of a material misdirection. (See also
Mabaso
v Law Society, Northern Provinces
[2004] ZACC 8
;
2005
2 SA 117
(CC) at para 20;
Giddey NO v
JC Barnard & Partners
[2006] ZACC 13
;
2007 (5) SA
525
(CC) at para 20.)
[14] As stated at the outset, the appellants argue
that the high court should not have imposed the ‘ultimate’
penalty
of striking off but should rather have suspended them from
practice. They accept that they are not fit and proper persons to
continue
to practise as attorneys. Because of this it is unnecessary
to deal with the facts in any detail although the essence of the case
against them has to be set out in order to evaluate the alleged
misdirections underlying the exercise of the court’s discretion
on which the appeal is premised.
[15] The practice of Malan & Partners had only
the two partners and it had no other professionals in its employ.
André
conducted a deeds practice while Francois dealt,
exclusively it would appear, with claims against the Road Accident
Fund that fell
within the jurisdiction of the magistrates’
courts. André in addition bore the bookkeeping responsibility,
which he
entrusted to a bookkeeper, Mrs Steyn.
[
16] The problems that
led to the application came to light as a result of the conduct of
the RAF practice. Francois, as the sole
professional, carried between
6000 to 7000 files at any given time. The files were the result of
active touting. The firm engaged
about 18 ‘consultants’.
The consultants (some of whose names Francois could not recollect)
‘found’ RAF
claimants, prepared the necessary
documentation, produced a file and ‘sold’ the file to the
firm. The firm would then
file a claim against the RAF and, if the
case was not settled, issue summons. Francois did not consult with
the claimants and he
provided little, if any, professional services
to the clients. In this regard the business model differed from the
ordinary case
of touting where the tout produces a client and the
attorney provides professional services to the client. One of the
touts, Wilken,
who had no qualifications to deal with such matters,
was later brought into the firm on a more or less permanent basis as
administration
manager, apparently on a commission basis, having been
paid per file ‘sold’ to the firm. His duties were,
according
to Francois, to prepare all the documentation, to process
claims and to submit them to the RAF.
[17] After Wilken had left his post, but while
still selling claims to the firm, Francois became aware during
September 2001 that
Wilken had falsified claims. According to
Francois’s affidavit this was brought to his attention by
Wilken’s successor
as administration manager but according to
an earlier letter of his the problem was brought to his notice when
the local branch
office of the RAF informed him that one of the
plaintiffs had denied any knowledge of the accident on which the
claim was based.
He had also been informed by the RAF on an
unspecified date during 2001 that there were difficulties regarding
the handwriting
and signatures on affidavits and accident reports. He
solved the problem by simply withdrawing all problem claims and
giving an
instruction (to whom, we are not told) that no further
claims should be bought from Wilken and that no further Wilken claims
should
be submitted to the RAF. There were at the time apparently
some 138 fraudulent claims in the pipeline. On 8 January 2002 (maybe
during February), Wilken made an affidavit admitting some fraud while
exonerating the firm. Nevertheless, Wilken was paid by the
firm until
end of January and he had a set of keys of the office during March
when he entered the office and allegedly attempted
to set it alight.
He died shortly afterwards.
[18] Only on 8 March 2002 did Francois write to
the RAF, mentioning the possibility of fraud by Wilken. (The RAF
denied receiving
the letter and it was resent on 28 March.) He did
this as a result of problems he had experienced ‘recently’
with lodged
claims. He thought that some 10 cases could have been
involved. He said that he would lay a charge against Wilken and
magnanimously
undertook to indemnify the RAF against all false
claims. On 11 April 2004, the RAF informed him that they had
appointed a firm
of assessors and investigators to investigate the
firm’s claims. On unspecified dates (probably as a result of
this information)
the firm appointed first one and then another
investigator to investigate the Wilken files. As a result of this
some 600 Wilken
related claims were withdrawn; once again the dates
are not available.
[19] The Society became aware (without the
intercession of the appellants) of the fraud. It also received a
complaint from a client
concerning overreaching and the failure to
account, and it decided to conduct an investigation into the affairs
of the firm, which
commenced on 25 June 2002. The appellants
explained their
modus operandi
to the investigator during which they represented that the
‘consultants’ were paid for assessing quantum and for
‘consultancy’
work. This does not accord with the
admitted
modus operandi
set out above.
[
20] Francois’s
response to the charge of touting in his answering affidavit, which
was made four years after the event, was
that they had been ‘advised’
by their lawyers that their
modus
operandi
could be viewed (‘kan
gesien word’) as ‘pro-aktiewe werwing’ (touting)
and this, he said, may have been
due to naivety or because of the
prevalence of the practice amongst other attorneys. As to the
prevalence excuse, the high court
correctly remarked that wrongdoing
of others does not provide any justification and that reliance
thereon is indicative of ‘hoe
morele waardes verval’.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that touting, in the manner
conducted by the firm, was practised
by others. I shall revert to the
naivety excuse in another context.
[21] The Society’s investigation into the
affairs of the firm opened the proverbial can of worms. The firm’s
bookkeeping
was in a mess and nearly each rule in the book had been
broken. I shall merely list them (the list may be incomplete): the
firm
failed to print quarterly lists of trust creditors since
February 2001 and, accordingly, failed to balance the trust account,
which
made it impossible to determine whether there was a trust
shortfall (contravening s 78(1) of the Act); the firm issued bearer
trust
cheques; trust cheques were cashed at the bank counter; fees
were transferred to the business account in lump sums; it failed to
comply with s 78(2A) when investing trust money on behalf of
individual clients; closing debits are arbitrary; there were
occasional
trust debits; accounting to clients was done improperly
and payments were made late; trust and business funds were commixed;
it
failed to transfer interest on the trust account to the Society in
contravention of s 78(3); it failed to account to clients within
a
reasonable time; it failed to comply with the provisions of s 78(4)
and (6); it failed to exercise proper control over staff;
it kept a
‘slush fund’ to pay touts and other consultants; and it
failed to provide clients with professional services.
[
22] All of this cannot
be gainsaid although there are excuses and explanations, some
unconvincing or unlikely. It is, accordingly,
understandable why the
appellants do not argue on appeal that they are fit and proper
persons to continue practising as attorneys.
I therefore turn to a
consideration of the grounds on which the appellants seek to impugn
the exercise of the high court’s
discretion to remove them from
the roll.
[23] The first ground relied on is that the high
court should have followed the approach adopted in
Law
Society of the Cape of Good Hope v Berrangé
2005 (5) SA
160
(C) where, in a case ‘akin to touting’, the attorney
concerned was suspended from practice and not removed from the
roll.
I have already expressed my serious reservations about the
precedential value of such cases but, in any event, the court
in
that case did not find that the attorney was unfit to continue to
practise and, accordingly, the court could not have struck
him from
the roll. Instead, it exercised its inherent disciplinary
jurisdiction to penalise the attorney by suspending him from
practice. (At 173G-I.)
[24] The court below relied on
Cirota v Law Society Transvaal
1979 (1) SA 172
(A), where striking off was ordered, holding that it
was more comparable than
Berrangé
to the case at hand.
Counsel for the appellants’ submission that the high court
followed this case ‘slavishly’
is without merit because
the court said explicitly that this case is ‘meer vergelykbaar’
with
Cirota.
I have already stated that a factual analysis of
earlier cases is not called for. However, counsel sought to convince
us that in
Cirota
the court had found dishonesty and since no
such finding was made by the high court,
Cirota
was a more
serious case and not less serious as the high court held. Counsel’s
argument has no merit. The ratio for the striking
off is to be found
in this dictum in
Cirota
(at 194E-F):
‘
But, having regard to
what I have said concerning the seriousness of the appellants'
contraventions in both the respects mentioned
above, viz touting and
not keeping proper books, I am of the view that they indeed displayed
a lack of integrity thus rendering
them unfit to be on the roll.’
[25] Although the high court did not find that the appellants were
dishonest in conducting their practice, I question their honesty.
Considering the provisions of
s 19(c)
of the
Road Accident Fund Act
56 of 1996
, namely that the RAF is not obliged to compensate if the
claim concerned has not been instituted and prosecuted by an
attorney,
the procedure followed by the firm in this regard can only
be considered as a dishonest circumvention of the provision. Also,
touting
on the scale and in the manner found here can also only be
ascribed to dishonesty. Only a naïve person would believe that
the
modus operandi
followed was due to naivety as Francois
alleged. It is dishonest to charge a client for professional fees
unless professional services
are rendered. It is dishonest to charge
a client for the cost of a tout under the heading ‘disbursements’.
Finally,
at least part of the explanation for the failure to keep
proper books is also untrue, as was the initial explanation of the
modus operandi
concerning the RAF claims.
[26] The high court found as aggravating the fact that in this case
clients were prejudiced, something absent in
Cirota.
Counsel
sought to attack this finding but, once again, the high court had it
right. Allowing touts to perform professional services
without
oversight was reckless in the extreme and created potential
prejudice. The record contains instances where claims had to
be
withdrawn because of the way the touts had prepared the claims. The
high court also held that the appellants had shared fees
with their
touts. Counsel sought to assail this finding. The facts are these:
the deponent of the Society’s founding affidavit
made such an
allegation and the appellants did not deal with the allegation at
all. But, says counsel, the founding affidavit contained
no
underlying facts to support the allegation and that the appellants
were, accordingly, not called upon to deal with the allegation.
This
reflects a cavalier approach towards a serious disciplinary matter,
which is not an ordinary civil case but, as mentioned
earlier, is
sui
generis
(
Cirota
at 187H). In any event, the underlying
documents provided sufficient grounds for making the allegation and
the allegation had to
be met, even on the ground that there were no
facts to justify it.
[27] The appellants also argue that the high court had failed to take
the extenuating circumstances into account. These in sum
relate to
the steps the firm had taken once the wrongdoings of Wilken became
known. From this it is sought to argue that the high
court had erred
in holding that there was no indication on the papers that the
appellants had any realization of the seriousness
of their
transgressions. It is true that the firm took the steps set out
earlier after it had become aware of Wilken’s fraud.
What is
also true is that it was rather slow in taking those steps. The time
delays in the light of the seriousness of the problem
are
inexplicable. The lack of notification to the Society is
incomprehensible. One cannot but gain the impression that the firm
did little more than damage control. Of greater concern is that there
was at that stage either no appreciation of the risk involved
in the
touting practice or a total recklessness by disregarding the risk.
There is no evidence that the practice was discontinued.
It was only
some years later that the appellants accepted the advice that what
they did ‘could be viewed’ as touting.
If one turns to
the bookkeeping charges, the position is simply that there is no
allegation of a realization of the seriousness
of the offences. They
are brushed off on the basis that the Society had failed to prove a
trust shortage, that the bookkeeper had
erred, that they did not know
the rules, that their auditors had erred, or simply by not dealing
with the pertinent allegations.
Furthermore, instead of dealing with
the merits of the allegations, the appellants conducted a paper war
and they attacked the
Society and its officers, they attacked the
Fidelity Fund and they attacked the attorneys who had to take over
their files –
in short, their approach on the papers was
obstructionist.
[28] These factors are ‘aggravating’ and not extenuating
because they manifest character defects, a lack of integrity,
a lack
of judgment and a lack of insight. The conduct of the practice was
reckless in the extreme. It follows that the high court
did not err
in the exercise of its discretion. Counsel was unable to suggest any
conditions of suspension that could cater for
the situation. Implicit
in the high court’s judgment is a finding (with which I agree)
that the appellants should only be
allowed to practise once they are
able to convince a court that they know and understand professional
ethics and the rules of bookkeeping,
i e, that they are fit and
proper persons to practise as attorneys. This will require an
application for re-admission with the
obstacles mentioned. To let the
appellants loose on the unsuspecting public without that satisfaction
would amount to a dereliction
of duty.
[29] In the result the following order issues:
1. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
2. The costs are to be paid jointly and severally by the appellants
and are to be taxed on the scale of attorney and client.
__________________
L T C HARMS
ACTING DEPUTY PRESIDENT
APPEARANCES:
FOR APPELLANT: L W DE KONING
FOR RESPONDENT: A T LAMEY
(Attorney)
ATTORNEYS:
FOR APPELLANTS: BUITENDAG’S
INC,
c/o BARKHUIZEN DU BUISSON,
PRETORIA
MATSEPES INC, BLOEMFONTEIN
FOR RESPONDENT: ROOTH WESSELS
MALULEKE, PRETORIA
NAUDES INC, BLOEMFONTEIN