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[2018] ZAGPPHC 516
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Mothlasedi and Another v S (A91/2017) [2018] ZAGPPHC 516 (6 March 2018)
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH
AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO: A91/2017
6/3/2018
In
the matter between:
STANLEY
MOTHLASEDI
First Appellant
DESMOND
CHRIS
MOTHLASEDI
Second Appellant
and
THE
STATE
Respondent
JUDGMENT
TEFFO, J:
[1]
The two appellants who are cousins, were
arraigned in the Regional Court, Potchefstroom where they faced two
counts of rape in contravention
of section 3 of the Sexual Offences
and Related Matters Act 32 of 2007. They were both acquitted on one
count of rape. The second
appellant was convicted on one count of
rape while the first appellant was convicted as an accomplice to the
rape of the complainant
by the second appellant.
[2]
They appeal against their convictions
with the leave of the trial court.
[3]
The first appellant who was the
complainant's boyfriend at the time, challenges his conviction on the
following grounds: He contends
that the court a
quo
erred in convicting him as an
accomplice to the rape of the complainant by the second appellant in
that there was no evidence presented
that he played any role prior to
the sexual intercourse between the second appellant and the
complainant. He contends that the
Learned Magistrate erred in finding
that he covered up for the second appellant by saying that he was the
person who had penetrated
the complainant. He further contends that
the Learned Magistrate further erred by convicting him on what was
never the State's
case. The State's case was premised on allegations
that both appellants sexually penetrated the complainant on the night
of the
incident. The court a
quo
misdirected itself in that it
accepted that no evidence was presented to the effect that the first
appellant ever penetrated the
complainant that night. The State did
not apply for an amendment of the charge-sheet. In convicting him as
an accomplice, he argues
that the Learned Magistrate implied that he
had a common purpose with the second appellant to rape the
complainant. He was not
warned at the commencement of the trial that
the State intended to rely on common purpose.
[4]
The second appellant criticises his
conviction on the following grounds: He challenges the trial court's
finding that the consent
given by the complainant was not validly
given as she was intoxicated. He contends that the Learned Magistrate
erroneously misdirected
herself by making that finding as that was
not the State's case. By making the finding that there was consent to
the sexual intercourse,
the Learned Magistrate agreed with the second
appellant. She should therefore have acquitted him and not qualify
the consent to
the sexual intercourse. The finding that the
complainant was intoxicated to the extent that she was not able to
see what was happening
around her was not supported by any evidence.
THE
EVIDENCE
[5]
The State called 3 (three) witnesses in
support of its case namely; Ms L l (Ms (l); Ms L X (Ms X); Constable
B Dorah R (Constable
Rampore), while the two appellants also each
testified in defence of their cases.
[6]
Ms l testified as follows: On Thursday,
8 October 2015 she was at home at approximately 18h00 busy doing her
laundry. She received
a telephone call from the first appellant who
asked her to go out with her that evening. She accepted the
invitation and they agreed
that he should come and fetch her at
20h00. The first appellant came to her homestead to fetch her at
20h00 accompanied by the
second appellant. She left with them and
they went to O'Hagans restaurant where they had some drinks. She
consumed three glasses
of vodka and cranberry. They also had a meal
together. They left O'Hagans restaurant between 22h00 and 23h00 and
proceeded to the
first appellant's house. At the first appellant's
house, she and the appellants consumed two glasses of shooters each
and she also
had a glass of wine while they consumed some beers.
After she took a sip of the wine, the first appellant grabbed the
glass of
wine from her hand and spilled it in the sink.
[7]
She became angry and decided to leave
the place. She left the house and proceeded to the vehicle. The
second appellant followed
her and the first appellant also followed.
She entered the motor vehicle after the second appellant had unlocked
it and occupied
the front passenger seat. The second appellant took
the driver's seat while the first appellant sat at the back. She only
remembered
getting into the vehicle and vehicle reversing as the two
appellants told her that they were taking her home.
[8]
When she left the first appellant's house she could appreciate what
was going on around
her until she fell asleep in the vehicle. When
she woke up, she found herself in the first appellant's bedroom and
the second appellant
was on top of her busy sexually penetrating her.
The second appellant was not dressed. Her dress was pulled up and her
panty was
taken off on one leg. The second appellant's penis was
inside her vagina. She pushed him and also screamed. The second
appellant
jumped off her and went to lie on the floor. Surprisingly
the first appellant was lying on the same bed next to her. He was
also
not dressed.
[9]
She asked the first appellant as to what was happening and how could
he let the second
appellant penetrate her sexually while he was
looking. The first appellant said she did not see properly and
alleged that it was
him who had been having sexual intercourse with
her and not the second appellant. She told the first appellant that
she saw the
second appellant properly as the bedroom light was on.
[10]
She stood up and told the first appellant that she did not like what
they both did to her. Her
dress was pulled up and her panty was only
taken off on one leg. She left the first appellant's bedroom and told
the appellants
that she was going to the police station to press
charges of rape against them. They tried to stop her.
[11]
She assured them that she was not going
to the police station, she only wanted her phone. The second
appellant said her phone was
in the car in the garage. She went to
the car, took her phone and shoes and proceeded to lkageng police
station where she reported
the matter.
[12]
On her way to the police station she
phoned the first appellant telling him that she was scared. She also
asked him why did they
do that to her while she was her boyfriend.
The first appellant just said that if she said she was going to the
police station,
then she can go.
[13]
She also phoned her friend, Ms X and
reported the rape to her.
[14]
Even on her arrival at the police
station, she phoned the first appellant telling him that she was
laying a charge of rape.
[15]
After reporting the matter, she was
taken to a doctor. She did not sustain any injuries during the rape
incident. She only had old
injuries on her legs.
[16]
The appellants were arrested the same
morning in her presence.
[17]
She did not remember giving consent to
the first appellant to have sexual intercourse with her on the night
of the incident. She
also did not remember having sexual intercourse
with him.
[18]
She vehemently denied having consented
to the sexual intercourse with the second appellant.
[19]
Under cross-examination she testified
that she was under the influence of alcohol and persisted with her
denial that she consented
to the sexual intercourse with the second
appellant at the time. She maintained that she would not have sexual
intercourse with
someone who is her boyfriend's cousin. She testified
that she did not see the first appellant having sexual intercourse
with her.
She laid a charge of rape against the first appellant
because he was watching when the second appellant was raping her. She
denied
that while she was with the two appellants at O'Hagan after
drinking the vodka and the cranberry, she said she wanted something
stronger and ordered a stroh rum shooter. She did not recall drinking
the stroh rum shooter. She also denied that when O'Hagan
closed, she
wanted to go to Bourbon Street. She denied putting her hand on the
second appellant's leg or flirting with him. She
was adamant that at
some stage she told the first appellant that she did not like the way
the second appellant was touching her
that night before they consumed
liquor.
[20]
She also denied going to the bedroom
with the first appellant from the kitchen after he took a glass of
wine out of her hand and
spilled it in the sink.
[21]
She denied the second appellant's
version that at some stage she was with him on the corridor next to
the toilet where she took
him by his hand and started caressing and
kissing him. She maintained that the last thing she remembered was
that she was in the
motor vehicle and it was reversing. She testified
that if whatever happened did take place, the appellants made her do
it without
her being aware.
[22]
She denied the second appellant's
version that she put her arms around him, walked him into the bedroom
where the first appellant
was sleeping and showed him a condom, that
he put the condom on and had sex with her and that the first
appellant was surprised
by her actions.
[23]
She denied asking the second appellant
to give her money and also screaming at him on the corridor after
they had sexual intercourse
thereby waking the first appellant up.
[24]
She stuck to her version and denied both
appellants' versions.
[25]
Ms X corroborated the evidence of Ms l
that she called her in the early hours of 9 October 2015 and reported
that the two appellants
raped her. She testified that after speaking
to her that day, she spoke to her again on Saturday where she tried
to explain what
happened. She told her to stop as she was becoming
emotional.
[26]
Under cross-examination she testified
that she met with the complainant at her house on Saturday. When she
arrived at her house,
the complainant was crying. She asked her what
was wrong. She told her that the two appellants raped her. She
admitted that she
previously had a love relationship with the first
appellant but it was a long time ago.
[27]
Constable Rampore's evidence was briefly
as follows: She worked in the charge office at lkageng police station
at the time of the
incident. The complainant arrived at the police
station in the early hours of 9 October 2015 after 03h00. She was
crying and holding
her shoes in her hands. She reported that she was
raped by her boyfriend and her boyfriend's cousin. She was also
smelling of alcohol.
She appeared to have been under the influence of
alcohol. She corroborated the complainant's evidence that she was
with the two
appellants at O'Hagan restaurant and then they proceeded
to the first appellant's house where they had some drinks. The last
thing
she remembered was that they were leaving, heading towards the
garage. She told her that she does not know if she entered the motor
vehicle or not. Suddenly she was lying on the bed and the second
appellant was on top of her, having sexual intercourse with her.
She
screamed and the second appellant jumped off her and went to sleep on
the floor. The first appellant told her that he was the
person who
was having sexual intercourse with her.
[28]
She also corroborated the complainant's
evidence that when she was at the police station, she called the
first appellant although
she did not know the content of their
conversation.
[29]
She opened a case and because the
complainant was under the influence of alcohol at the time, she made
the A1 statement.
[30]
The complainant mentioned to her that
she was wearing a g-string panty at the time of the incident but the
under part of it was
removed. The top part of the g-string panty was
on her waist, and her vagina was wet.
[31]
Under cross-examination she testified
that she did not take the complainant's statement at the time because
she was not in her sound
and sober senses. The complainant further
told her that she thought they both raped her because the first
appellant told her that
they usually sleep with girls when they are
drunk. She did not tell her what the first appellant did to her.
[32]
Upon questioning by the court she
testified that although the complainant was drunk, she understood her
questions and she was able
to respond even though she was crying.
[33]
The J88 medical report of the
complainant together with a section 212(4) statement from the
Forensic Science Laboratory in Pretoria
were handed in by agreement.
In the section 212(4) statement it was reported that no DNA was
obtained from the exhibits marked
"
Ibiditse "
and no further DNA
analysis would be carried out in the case. That concluded the State
case.
[34]
The first appellant also testified. His
evidence was as follows: He corroborated the complainant's evidence
that she was his girlfriend
for ± 4 months at the time of the
incident. On 8 October 2015 he phoned her and later went to fetch her
accompanied by his
cousin , the second appellant and they went to
O'Hagan where they had drinks. At some stage while they were at
O'Hagan, the complainant
asked for a strong drink. That was when she
ordered a straw rum which she mixed with cranberry. They also ordered
food and the
complainant did not eat. They also drank shooters.
Subsequently they were told that the restaurant was closing. The
complainant
said they should go to a pub. He refused and said there
was liquor at his house. They drove to his house where they continued
drinking.
The complainant drank a wine while they were drinking
Castle Light beers.
[35]
The complainant started smoking. While
she was about to finish the last glass of wine in the bottle, he took
it and poured it in
the sink. He told her that he was going to bed.
They both went to bed. He waited under the blankets and passed out.
As he was sleeping
he heard a commotion on the corridor. It was the
complainant and his cousin, the second appellant. He asked them what
was happening.
None of them responded. He took his car keys and gave
them to the second appellant. He told him to leave. After the second
appellant
had left, he remained with the complainant. She reported to
him that the second appellant had raped her in his bedroom. It was
dark in the bedroom and he did not see and hear anything. The
complainant subsequently phoned her friend, Lindiwe. She thereafter
left the house and told him that she was going to the police station.
[36]
When she was at the police station, she
called him again and said the police said she should come and make a
statement later after
four hours because she was drunk. He told her
that she saw him giving the second appellant his car keys, she should
request the
police to take her home. About 35 minutes later she
arrived at his house with the police. The police said they were
looking for
the second appellant.
[37]
He disputed the complainant's version
that when they left O'Hagan restaurant she wanted to go home. He also
denied her version that
at some stage when they were at his house,
she left the house to the motor vehicle as she wanted to go home. The
complainant never
told him in front of the second appellant that he
raped her. He never raped the complainant on the night of 8 October
2015 and
neither did he have sexual intercourse with her.
[38]
Under cross-examination he testified
that when they left the O'Hagan restaurant to his house, he was drunk
that he could not drive
his own vehicle. The complainant was also
very drunk. He denied the complainant's version that after her wine
was poured in the
sink, she wanted to leave, she walked to the bakkie
and both the appellants followed her and the three of them got into
the vehicle.
He also denied that the vehicle reversed and after that
she could not remember what happened until in the morning when she
woke
up and found the second appellant on top of her. His evidence
was that after he poured her glass of wine in the sink, he told her
that he wanted to sleep. The complainant followed him to the bedroom
and they left the second appellant in the kitchen.
[39]
He and the complainant went under the blankets and fell asleep. He
was awaken by the commotion
between the second appellant and the
complainant on the corridor. He did not hear their conversation. He
was still drunk at the
time.
[40]
He tried to speak to the complainant not
go to the police station at that time of the night but she refused.
He could not accompany
her to the police station because he was drunk
and the complainant was aggressive and busy making noise. He thought
if she leaves,
she would come back. There is a pub on his street, he
thought the complainant would go there and come back. Later on the
complainant
came back to his house with the police whom he took to
the second appellant's residence where he and the second appellant
were
duly arrested.
[41]
He denied that the complainant called
him while she was on her way to the police station. He denied ever
seeing the second appellant
on top of the complainant, she pushing
him off her and asking him what was happening. He admitted that he
slept naked that night.
He denied telling the complainant that she
did not see properly, it was him who was on top of her.
[42]
He testified that prior to them going to
bed at his house, there were no problems between him and the
complainant and the complainant
did not also have problems with the
second appellant. He admitted that the complainant was angry when she
left his house to the
police station alone in the early hours of the
morning and that something must have made her angry.
[43]
The second appellant testified in his
own defence and corroborated the evidence of the complainant and the
first appellant that
he was together with them on the night of 8
October 2015 from the time the first appellant went to fetch the
complainant at her
homestead, at O'Hagan restaurant and at the first
appellant's house where they had drinks. He testified that the
complainant was
sitting between him and the first appellant. She
touched him and the two were holding hands at O'Hagan restaurant.
[44]
He corroborated the first appellant's
evidence that they did not go to Bourbon Street as the first
appellant said there was liquor
at his house. At the first
appellant's house while they were busy drinking, the first appellant
took a glass of wine from the complainant's
hand and told her that
they should go to bed. The complainant and the first appellant went
to bed and left him in the kitchen.
15 minutes later as he was
preparing to go to bed, he went to the toilet. While he was inside
the toilet, he suddenly saw the complainant
entering the toilet. When
he turned, she held him. They started kissing. They moved towards the
bedroom. They entered the first
appellant's bedroom. The complainant
pulled a drawer where she took out a condom and gave it to him. He
told him to use it. He
eventually had sexual intercourse with her.
When they were done, they all dressed up. When he left the bedroom,
the complainant
asked him to give him money. He told her he did not
have money. They started fighting over the money. At that time they
were in
the corridor in the house. The first appellant woke up and
came to them. He gave him his car keys so that he could leave. They
did not want to show the neighbours who had a funeral, that there was
a fight in the house.
[45]
He went home and the police came to his
house between 04h00 and 05h00. He was surprised when they accused him
of raping the complainant.
When asked how he had sex with his
cousin's girlfriend while he was also sleeping on the same bed, he
testified that he was surprised
in the manner in which the
complainant approached him. He testified that that could have been
influenced by alcohol because he
would not have done that if he was
sober. It was put to him that the complainant said he had sex with
her without her consent.
He testified that there was never any
conversation between them. The complainant held him in the toilet and
in the bedroom.
[46]
Under cross-examination he testified
that from the toilet, the complainant pulled him into the bedroom
where the first appellant
was sleeping. He could not say anything
because the complainant overpowered his feelings in the manner in
which she was acting.
He could have refused but she was persuading
him to have sex with her. When he had sex with her, the complainant
was fine and not
too drunk because she was even talking to him,
telling him she was enjoying. He was also not too drunk because he
managed to drive
the car.
[47]
He denied that there was a stage where the complainant asked to go
home when they were at the
first appellant's home. He also denied her
version that at some stage they went to the motor vehicle with the
intention of taking
her home: He maintained that the complainant
consented to the sexual intercourse with him.
[48]
He further denied the complainant's
version that he pushed him off her while he was busy having sexual
intercourse with her.
[49]
He could not explain why the complainant
who according to him consented to having sex with him would risk
having sex with him on
the same bed where her boyfriend, the first
appellant, was sleeping and why would she ask for money from him
while the first appellant
was there who could have given her money if
she really wanted it.
[50]
Section 208 of Act 51 of 1977
("the
Criminal Procedure Act”
)
provides that an accused person may be convicted of any offence on
the single evidence of a single competent witness. It is however,
a
well-established judicial principle that the evidence of a single
witness should be approached with caution, his or her merits
as a
witness being weighed against factors which might militate against
his or her credibility (S
v Stevens
2005 (1) All SA (1) SCA).
[51]
The correct approach to the
application of the so-called
"
cautionary rule"
was set out by
Diemont JA in
S v Sauls and Another
1981 (3) SA 172
(A) at 180E-G where
he said the following:
"There is no rule or thumb
test or formula to apply when it comes to
a
consideration of
the credibility of
a
single witness
...
The
trial judge will weigh his evidence, will consider its merits and
demerits and, having done so, will decide whether it is trustworthy
and whether, despite the fact that there are shortcomings or defects
or contradictions in the testimony, he is satisfied that the
truth
had been told. The cautionary rule referred to by De Villiers JP in R
v Mokoena
1932 OPD 79
at 80, may be
a
guide to
a
right decision
but it does not mean the 'appeal must succeed if any criticism,
however slender, of the witnesses' evidence, were
well founded
...
'
It has been
said more than once that the exercise of caution must not be allowed
to displace the exercise of common sense."
[52]
The first appellant testified that after
the second appellant had left his house, the complainant told him
that the second appellant
raped her. While the two appellants were
both still at the first appellant's house, the complainant testified
that she told them
that she was going to the police station
immediately after she realised that the second appellant was busy
having sexual intercourse
with her in the presence of the first
appellant and after she asked the first appellant as to why he
allowed such a thing to happen.
She indeed left the first appellant's
house in the early hours of the morning of 9 October 2015 to the
police station and pressed
charges of rape against them. On her way
to the police station and at the police station she phoned the first
appellant asking
him how he could allow such a thing to happen while
he was her boyfriend. She was clear in her evidence that this angered
her.
She also phoned Ms X and reported the rape to her. This conduct
of the complainant is not consistent with the conduct of somebody
who
had consented to the sexual intercourse with someone. She was adamant
in her evidence that she would not have consented to
have sexual
intercourse with her boyfriend's cousin. What makes her version
probable is that the sexual intercourse took place
in the same
bedroom, on the same bed, where her boyfriend was lying at the time.
[53]
She testified that even though she
consumed alcohol on the night in question, she could appreciate what
was happening around her
from O'Hagan restaurant to her boyfriend's
house until the two appellants went with her to the motor vehicle
after she asked them
to take her home. This evidence was strengthened
by the fact that her shoes and her phone were found in the motor
vehicle. How
could they have gone to the motor vehicle if she did not
go to the motor vehicle when she thought she was being taken home? If
she did not go to the motor vehicle as she testified but remained at
the first appellant's house, her shoes and cellular phone would
have
been found in the house. The only reasonable inference to be drawn
under the circumstances is that her shoes and cellular
phone were
left in the motor vehicle at the time she was inside with the
appellants when she thought she was being taken home.
[54]
The evidence of the complainant as a
single witness about the rape finds corroboration in the first
appellant's evidence that she
told him that the second appellant
raped her, the report that she voluntarily made to her friend, Ms X
at her first available opportunity
and what she reported to Constable
Rampore. There was a repeated consistency of her reports about the
rape to various people and
the court. The court
a
quo
correctly found her to have been
a good and credible witness whose evidence could be relied upon. It
also correctly found the evidence
of Ms X and Constable Rampore to
have been credible and reliable.
[55]
As against the evidence of the above
state witnesses, the trial court correctly found the evidence of the
two appellants to be contradictory
and not probable. The second
appellant testified that when he had sexual intercourse with the
complainant, she was fine and not
drunk as she was able to tell him
that she was enjoying. At the same time he testified that the
complainant asked them to buy her
something strong to drink at
O'Hagan and they bought it for her. She was already drunk when they
left O'Hagan restaurant. He further
testified that while they were at
the first appellant's house, as the complainant was busy smoking and
upon realising that she
was too drunk, the first appellant took a
glass of wine from her hand and spilled it into the sink. The
complainant cannot be drunk
and drunk at the same time. Whenever it
suited him the complainant was not drunk, she appreciated what was
going on around her.
[56]
He also testified that the complainant
started flirting with him at O'Hagan in the presence of the first
appellant suggesting that
she was already drunk while they were
there. The complainant testified that she complained to the first
appellant that she did
not like the way the second appellant was
touching her while they were at O'Hagan. This evidence was not
challenged but instead
when the second appellant testified, it was
the complainant who was flirting with him.
[57]
Even if the complainant could have
pushed the second appellant into the first appellant's bedroom and
had sexual intercourse with
him as he testified, it is not probable
that that could have happened in the same room and bed where the
first appellant was also
lying and that it could have taken place in
his presence. It is also not probable that the first appellant could
not hear the conversation
and movements of the second appellant and
the complainant when they were having sexual intercourse on the same
bed.
[58]
What was also strange in the appellants'
version was that when the complainant realised that the second
appellant was busy having
sexual intercourse with her, when she
screamed and pushed him away from her asking the first appellant what
was happening, the
first appellant told her that she did not look
properly and that it was not the second appellant who had been on top
of her, but
him.
[59]
According to the first appellant's
version, immediately he got under the blankets, he got a blackout. He
does not know what happened
until he heard the noise between the
second appellant and the complainant on the corridor which woke him
up. He hears there was
an argument between the two of them, he
confronts them about it, they do not respond. Strange enough he gives
the second appellant
his car keys and ordered him to leave without
resolving the dispute between him and the complainant. After the
second appellant
had left, the complainant tells him about the rape,
he does nothing and does not say anything. In fact according to his
version
he saw nothing. The magistrate, in my view, correctly
rejected this evidence as not being reasonably possibly true.
[60]
It is my further view the trial court
also correctly found that the complainant could not consent to the
sexual intercourse with
the second appellant, given her state of
sobriety at the time and rejected his version. Counsel for the
defence submitted that
the trial .court accepted the second
appellant's version that the complainant consented to the sexual
intercourse but qualified
the definition of consent in that it found
that she could not give valid consent to the intercourse. This
argument is, in my view,
misplaced and without merit. There is
nowhere in the trial court's judgment where it had accepted the
second appellant's version
that the complainant consented to the
sexual intercourse. The trial court found that there could not have
been a valid consent
to the sexual intercourse between the
complainant and the second appellant given her state of sobriety at
the time.
[61]
The court a
quo
dealt with the definition of an
accomplice and correctly held that the first appellant was guilty as
an accomplice to the rape of
the complainant by the second appellant.
Counsel for the defence argued that the trial court erred in
convicting the first appellant
as an accomplice because whatever the
complainant alleged regarding the first appellant's conduct, only
happened after the alleged
rape by the second appellant had already
taken place.
[62]
At page 142 of the record lines 12 to 20
the trial court said the following:
" Accused 1 covered for
accused 2 by saying that he was the one who penetrated the
complainant. He was not surprised by what
was happening. He was well
aware of the fact that the complainant was drunk before they went to
sleep. He in a way was also aware
of accused 2's intentions. Based on
this afore-mentioned conduct he associated himself with the act of
accused 2 to penetrate the
complainant."
[63]
When one looks at the totality of the
evidence, the first appellant was indeed aware of the actions of the
second appellant. According
to the complainant he was looking and
watching at what the second appellant was doing while he was on top
of her. He did nothing
to stop him until she woke up and was able to
see what was happening. When she asked what was happening, despite
the fact that
the complainant clearly saw that it was the second
appellant on top of her, he denied it and said it was him, she did
not see properly.
From his own version when he realised that the
second appellant and the complainant had an argument, he did nothing.
He did not
care about the complainant. He also did not have any
reason not to accompany her to the police station while it was not
safe for
her to walk alone at night.
[64]
In convicting the first appellant as an
accomplice to the rape of the complainant, the court
a
quo
took into consideration the
totality of the evidence. In my view it correctly rejected the
evidence of the appellants as not reasonably
possibly true. I cannot
therefore find any misdirection on the court
a
quo's
finding. The two appellants
were correctly convicted.
[65]
Consequently the appeal against the
convictions of the first and second appellants is dismissed.
M J TEFFO
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
I
agree:
N DAVIS
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
APPEARANCES
For
the appellants
P M Ramoshaba
Instructed
by
P M Mositsa Inc
For the respondent
Mr Wilsenach
Instructed
by
The Director of Public Prosecutions
Date
heard
26 January 2018
Date
handed down
6 March 2018