S v Langeveldt (453/07) [2008] ZASCA 81 (2 June 2008)

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
>>
2008
>>
[2008] ZASCA 81
|

|

S v Langeveldt (453/07) [2008] ZASCA 81 (2 June 2008)

Links to summary

THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Not Reportable
C
ASE
NO: 453/07
In
the matter between:
PATRICK
LANGEVELDT
...
APPELLANT
versus
THE
STATE
...
RESPONDENT
____________________________________________________________________________________
CORAM: MPATI AP, STREICHER, HEHER
JJA and LEACH, KGOMO AJJA
Date of hearing: 20 MAY 2008
Date of delivery: 02 JUNE 2008
Summary: Motor collision – factual dispute – no
misdirection on the part of trial court
Neutral citation: P Langeveldt v The State
(453/2007)
[2008] ZASCA 81
(2 June 2008)
____________________________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
____________________________________________________________________________________
KGOMO AJA
[1] The appellant was convicted in the Stellenbosch Regional Court on
22 July 2002 of culpable homicide arising from the alleged
negligent
or reckless driving of a motor vehicle and was sentenced to four
years imprisonment in terms of s 276(1)(i) of the
Criminal
Procedure Act, 51 of 1977. On appeal to the Cape High Court (Louw J,
Zondi AJ concurring) his conviction was confirmed but
the sentence
was altered to one of three years imprisonment in terms of
s 276(1)(i) of the Act. This appeal, with leave of the
court a
quo, is against the conviction only.
[2] It is common cause that a head-on collision occurred on 31
January 1998 between the motor vehicle driven by the appellant and
that driven by Mr Douglas. The appellant was the sole occupant of his
car whereas Douglas had his wife, daughter and son, Marius,
as
passengers in his car. Marius, who was badly injured and hospitalized
for several months, and the appellant were the only survivors
of the
accident.
[3] It was further common cause that the collision took place on
Douglas’s side of the road and the appellant’s wrong side of
the
road. The appellant was driving from his friend’s home out of
Stellenbosch while the Douglas family was driving in the opposite
direction into Stellenbosch.
[4] The appellant’s defence is succinctly captured by his counsel
in his heads of argument:
‘
Gegewe die feite in die onderhawige saak het
Appellant getuig dat hy die oorledene se voertuig waargeneem het op
`n afstand van `n
100 meter, die voertuig het oor beweeg na sy baan,
hy het remme getrap wat veroorsaak het dat sy voertuig oor beweeg het
na die regter
baan terwyl die oorledene op sy beurt weer teruggekeer
het na die linker baan wat `n kop aan kop botsing veroorsaak het.’
[5] The state relied on the evidence of four witnesses. The first was
a Mr Davids, who testified that he was driving his employer’s
vehicle at the Old Helshoogte Road and Kahler Street junction. He had
the right of way. The appellant entered the junction without
stopping. Davids applied his brakes and just managed to avoid a
collision. The appellant, slouched heavily towards the front
passenger’s
seat with his head leaning on one shoulder, simply
drove on as if nothing had happened. Davids was now heading in the
same direction
as the appellant and witnessed him ignoring another
stop sign. He further noticed appellant’s vehicle traveling in a
zigzag fashion
on a straight road. The appellant inexplicably from
time to time accelerated or slowed down. Davids reckoned that the
appellant posed
a danger to other road users and, by way of his
municipal car radio, notified the traffic police accordingly, before
he turned off
in another direction.
[6] Ms Lambrechts and Ms Nel, sisters, testified that they were
driving in Bird Street, Stellenbosch and heading towards Koelenhof.
While waiting at a red traffic light they noticed the appellant
approaching from their right in Bell Street. He turned into Bird
Street and in doing so narrowly missed colliding with the kerb on his
left and with vehicles traveling in the opposite direction
in Bird
Street. The appellant tilted perceptibly towards the passenger’s
seat during his driving. The ladies drove behind him.
They observed
him speed away and then reduce speed for no apparent reason. His
vehicle also swerved from side to side even though
he managed to keep
it in his correct lane. Ms Nel, who was the passenger, noted the
registration of the appellant’s vehicle because
she and Ms
Lambrechts who was driving, realized that they were witnessing an
accident waiting to happen. According to the sisters
the appellant
sped away as they were approaching a bend. They lost sight of him
momentarily at that point and then heard a bang.
When they came
around the bend they realized that a collision had occurred and when
another vehicle stopped at the scene they turned
around in order to
report the matter to the police.
[7] The crucial witness for the State was the surviving member of the
Douglas family, Marius. He was accused by the defence of concocting
a
version. The magistrate found him to be an honest and credible
witness. There is no reason to differ from this finding.
[8] Marius’s acceptable and accepted evidence boils down to the
following. His father was the driver of their car and he was the
front passenger. He was 16 years old at that stage. The family was on
their way to have dinner with a relative. They were on time
and his
father drove normally (‘binne perke … en rustig’), although he
was unsure of the exact speed. His father kept to his
correct side of
the road throughout. He became aware of the appellant’s vehicle
when it was practically upon them on their side
of the road. As
Marius was not the driver there was no need for him to have been
vigilant and to have become aware of the impending
danger before he
actually did. Counsel’s criticism of him in this regard is
unfounded. What is certain is that if his father’s
vehicle had
swerved in the violent fashion described by the appellant and at high
speed, he would have been aware of it.
[9] The magistrate also found Davids and the two sisters to be
credible witnesses. It is significant that they all described, in
essentially similar terms, the erratic manner in which appellant was
driving at different locations. All these witnesses alluded
to the
contorted posture that the appellant adopted while driving. This
points to the fact that the appellant, for whatever reason,
was not
fully in control of himself, let alone his vehicle.
[10] On the other hand the appellant stated that he had three or four
glasses of wine over a period of some six hours, during which
he also
had a meal, at his friend’s place. He over-elaborated on how
carefully he drove from his friend’s home and even recalled
how
considerate he was at the stop streets and the robots, what speeds he
travelled at, where he accelerated and why. He denied that
he was
drunk or that he drove in the manner described by the witnesses. He
described his extraordinary posture to a chronic back
problem. He
acknowledged that at one stage he drove on the edge of the road but
explained that he did so to pick up his cell phone
from the front
passenger’s seat when it was ringing.
[11] The appellant blamed Douglas for causing the accident and stated
that all he did was to take emergency evasive action in the
manner
and for the reason described in para 4 above. His counsel submitted
that support for his version is to be found in the brake
marks which
were unbroken for a distance of 15 meters and started on the
appellant’s side of the road leading up to the point of
impact on
his incorrect side of the road.
[12] The magistrate was not impressed with the appellant’s evidence
and rejected it as not being reasonably possibly true. Appellant’s
concession concerning his awkward posture in the vehicle, his driving
on the edge of the road and his erratic driving lends credence
to the
truthfulness of the evidence given by Davids and the two sisters.
[13] The magistrate carefully evaluated the evidence of all
witnesses. He was of the view that appellant’s erratic driving and
awkward posture indicated intoxication. He gave reasons for such
finding and did not misdirect himself in any way. In fact, in his
heads of argument, appellant’s counsel conceded that the appellant
was possibly drunk. He stated:
‘Dit word nietemin toegegee dat die Appellant in die lig van die
getuienis van Davids en die twee susters moontlik onder die invloed
van drank was. Gevolglik moet hy, met respek aan daardie oortreding
skuldig bevind word.’
[14] Appellant’s counsel argued furthermore that there was no
reason for the appellant to have braked, as he did, leaving the
oblique
tyre burn marks across the road, if something untoward had
not been noticeable in the driving of Douglas. There may have been
some
merit in this submission had it not been for the fact that
according to his own evidence the appellant was driving at about 120
km
per hour immediately before the collision and had consistently
shown lack of control over his vehicle; and had it not been for the
credible evidence of Marius to the effect that there was nothing
untoward in the driving of Douglas. In the light of that evidence
we
cannot find that the magistrate was not correct in concluding that
the negligence of the appellant had been established.
[15] I make the following order:
The appeal is dismissed.
________________________
F D KGOMO
ACTING JUDGE OF APPEAL
CONCUR: ) MPATI AP
) STREICHER JA
) HEHER
JA
) LEACH JA