Marman v The Road Accident Fund (15233/16) [2018] ZAGPPHC 747 (2 February 2018)

78 Reportability
Personal Injury Law - Road Accident Fund

Brief Summary

Damages — Road Accident Fund — Contingencies in loss of income claim — Plaintiff sustained serious injuries in a motor vehicle accident and claimed damages for past and future loss of income — Defendant conceded merits and general damages but disputed contingencies applicable to loss of income — Court held that Plaintiff's proposed contingencies of 5% and 15% were reasonable and should not be increased, as Defendant failed to provide evidence to justify higher deductions — Judgment awarded in favor of Plaintiff for a total of R1 520 962.27, including general damages and loss of income.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The matter concerned a delictual damages claim instituted against the Road Accident Fund arising from injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The proceedings were heard in the High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Division, Pretoria, before Bam AJ.


The plaintiff, Ms K F Marman, sued the defendant, the Road Accident Fund, for compensation for losses allegedly suffered as a consequence of the collision. The claim encompassed, among other heads, general damages, past medical expenses, future medical expenses, and loss of income and earning capacity.


Procedurally, the dispute was significantly narrowed before the trial commenced. The defendant conceded the merits (liability) and also conceded general damages in the agreed sum of R600 000.00. The remaining dispute did not extend to the existence of loss in principle, nor to the acceptance of the actuarial approach as such, but was confined to the appropriate contingency deductions to be applied to the plaintiff’s past and future loss of income calculations.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was therefore the quantification of damages in a Road Accident Fund matter, specifically the discretionary assessment of contingencies in respect of loss of earnings, in circumstances where the defendant had not filed countervailing expert evidence and sought to argue for increased deductions based on the plaintiff’s own expert material.


2. Material Facts


The accident occurred on 1 November 2014. At the time, the plaintiff was 44 years old and employed in a mine laboratory as a section operator. It was common cause on the material presented that she had been productively employed prior to the collision.


As a result of the accident, the plaintiff sustained serious injuries which necessitated a five-month hospital stay. The court accepted that the injuries were permanent in nature and had ongoing consequences for her work capacity.


The plaintiff returned to work only a year after the accident, and then only because her employer accommodated her by allocating light duties. The plaintiff’s evidence (as presented through expert reports and the actuarial material) indicated that, after her return, she earned less because she no longer received overtime and other allowances, and that the accident-related absence also resulted in a lost opportunity for an earlier promotion.


It was further accepted, on the plaintiff’s material, that the plaintiff’s reduced physical capacity placed her in a vulnerable employment position, including a risk of termination. The evidence also suggested the likelihood of future deterioration, including a probable hip replacement, which would further diminish her capacity to work, and that if she lost her current job she would probably become unemployable. Even if she remained employed, the evidence suggested her retirement could be hastened due to incapacity aggravated by the accident-related sequelae.


Two aspects were raised by the defendant in argument to motivate higher contingencies. First, the defendant pointed to an alleged pre-existing condition of hypertension. Secondly, the defendant relied on the fact that the plaintiff had retained her employment and received a promotion during 2016, asserting that this should reduce the award for loss of earnings. The court recorded, however, that the promotion was “apparently” an automatic one and that the plaintiff’s case was that it should have occurred in 2015, but for the accident-related consequences.


In relation to evidentiary posture, the defendant had not filed any expert reports. The defendant attempted to rely on its own calculations handed up from the bar, but the court rejected these because they were not part of the agreed trial bundle and plaintiff’s counsel had not been afforded an opportunity to consider them.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether the court should accept the plaintiff’s proposed contingency deductions for past and future loss of income, or whether those contingencies should be increased as contended for by the defendant.


The dispute primarily involved the application of law to fact and an element of value judgment/discretion, rather than a pure question of law. The court was required to exercise a quantification discretion in circumstances where actuarial calculations were available, but where contingencies (particularly for future loss) necessarily involve an assessment of uncertainty and probability.


Within that overarching inquiry, two subsidiary questions arose from the defendant’s submissions. The first was whether the plaintiff’s hypertension constituted a material pre-existing condition justifying an increased contingency deduction. The second was whether the plaintiff’s retention of employment and later promotion warranted an increased deduction on the basis that her earning trajectory had not been materially impaired.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter on the basis that, given the concessions made, the only live issue was the proper contingency deductions to be applied to the actuarially assisted earnings calculations. It treated the determination of contingencies as an inherently difficult exercise because it requires speculation about events that may or may not occur, particularly in relation to future loss.


A significant element of the court’s reasoning concerned the evidentiary basis on which the contingency determination had to be made. The court emphasised that the defendant had not presented evidence to disprove or meaningfully challenge the plaintiff’s expert material. In those circumstances, the court stated that it had to rely on the plaintiff’s evidence to the extent that it was “well articulated and probable”. The court also declined to consider the defendant’s calculations handed up at the hearing, because they were not properly introduced as part of the record and had not been disclosed for response.


On the role of comparative awards, the court accepted that reliance on other cases has limitations because each matter turns on its own facts, even where injuries appear similar. Nonetheless, it stated that other cases may serve as guidance and provide acceptable parameters, referring to Road Accident Fund v Marunga 2003 (5) SA 164 (SCA) for that proposition.


Turning to the proposed contingencies, the plaintiff sought to remain within what was described as the “normal contingency” bracket, namely 5% for past loss and 15% for future loss of income. The defendant argued for an increase (in effect, a 20% increase in deductions relative to what the plaintiff proposed, expressed in argument as seeking materially higher contingencies), relying chiefly on hypertension and the promotion.


The court rejected the defendant’s reliance on hypertension, reasoning that there was no evidence that hypertension had affected the plaintiff’s pre-accident performance or ability to perform her tasks. The court treated the plaintiff’s predicament as stemming from the accident injuries, not from the pre-existing condition.


The court also rejected the contention that the promotion undermined the claim for loss of earnings. It reasoned that the promotion was not performance-based and, on the plaintiff’s case, had been delayed by more than a year due to the sequelae of the accident. In that light, the promotion did not displace the plaintiff’s evidence regarding vulnerability in employment, reduced capacity, and the risk of future impairment and early retirement.


Having weighed the submissions, the court concluded that the defendant had offered no adequate basis to justify the requested increase in contingencies. It therefore held that the contingencies proposed by the plaintiff were reasonable and should not be interfered with.


In addition to deciding the quantification issue, the court recorded broader concerns about the Road Accident Fund’s litigation conduct, including lack of preparedness, inadequate instructions, late briefing, and the tendency to settle matters on the “door step” of trial, which the court viewed as disruptive to court roll management. In this context, it referred to prior judicial commentary on similar concerns.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court made an order in accordance with the plaintiff’s draft order (annexure “X”), having concluded that the contingencies proposed by the plaintiff were reasonable and that the defendant had not shown they should be increased.


Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff in the amount of R1 520 962.27, comprising past medical expenses of R834.27, loss of income and earning capacity of R920 128.00, and general damages of R600 000.00. Future medical expenses were addressed through a section 17(4)(a) undertaking, rather than a lump sum.


The defendant was ordered to provide an undertaking in terms of section 17(4)(a) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 for payment of 100% of the costs of the plaintiff’s future accommodation, treatment, services, or goods arising from the injuries, after the costs were incurred and upon proof thereof.


The capital amount would bear no interest unless not paid within 14 calendar days, in which event interest would run at 10.25% per annum from the date of judgment to date of payment.


The defendant was also ordered to pay the plaintiff’s taxed or agreed party-and-party costs on the High Court scale, including specified items such as senior counsel’s fees, translator’s fees, and various expert preparation and reservation costs, together with additional specified litigation-related costs. Provision was made for taxation and for interest on costs at 10.25% if not paid within the stipulated period after allocatur or agreement. The order further recorded that a contingency fee agreement was applicable.


Cases Cited


Road Accident Fund v Marunga 2003 (5) SA 164 (SCA).


Ndlovu v The Road Accident Fund 2014 (1) SA 415 (GSJ).


Motswai v Road Accident Fund 2013 (3) SA 8 (GSJ).


Legislation Cited


Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996, section 17(4)(a).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that, where the defendant had provided no expert evidence to contradict the plaintiff’s actuarial and expert material, and where the defendant’s proposed calculations were not properly placed before the court, the court was constrained to decide the contingency question on the credible evidence presented by the plaintiff.


It held further that the defendant had not established a factual basis to justify an upward adjustment to the plaintiff’s proposed contingency deductions. The plaintiff’s pre-existing hypertension did not, on the evidence, affect her pre-accident work performance, and the post-accident promotion did not undermine the plaintiff’s case because it was not performance-based and had been delayed as a result of the accident sequelae.


Accordingly, the court accepted the plaintiff’s proposed contingencies of 5% for past loss and 15% for future loss, and made the agreed draft order an order of court, including payment of the agreed capital amount, a statutory undertaking for future medical expenses, and costs on the High Court scale.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that comparative awards in other matters may serve as a guide to appropriate parameters in assessing quantum, while recognising that each case must be decided on its own facts and that direct comparison has inherent limitations, as reflected in Road Accident Fund v Marunga 2003 (5) SA 164 (SCA).


It applied the principle that contingency deductions are a discretionary tool used to account for the uncertainties inherent in predicting past and especially future loss, and that the determination of contingencies is informed by actuarial assistance but ultimately depends on the specific facts placed before the court.


The judgment further reflected that where a party seeking an adjustment to actuarially supported figures provides no countervailing evidence to disprove or undermine the opposing party’s expert case, and where proposed figures are not properly introduced into the evidentiary record, the court may justifiably rely on the properly presented evidence before it in making the contingency assessment.

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[2018] ZAGPPHC 747
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Marman v Road Accident Fund (15233/16) [2018] ZAGPPHC 747 (2 February 2018)

THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
(1)
NOT REPORTABLE
(2)
NOT OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES’
(3)
REVISED
CASE
NO: 15233/16
2/2/2018
In
the matter between:
KF
MARMAN

PLAINTIFF
And
THE
ROAD ACCIDENT
FUND

DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
BAM
AJ
[1]
The
Plaintiff instituted a damages claim against the Defendant for
injuries and loss suffered as a result of a motor vehicle accident

that occurred on 1 November 2014. At the time of the accident, she
was employed in a mine laboratory as a section operator. She

sustained serious injuries that necessitated a five-month stay in
hospital. She was only able to return to work a year later where
she
was accommodated to perform light duties. Due to the gratuitous
nature of her current foreman, she has not only retained her
position
(despite her physical shortcomings to perform all the tasks) she also
got a promotion during 2016 - which apparently,
she should have
gotten during 2015 because it is automatic.
[2]
Before
the trial could commence, the parties addressed the court to the
effect that the Defendant had conceded the merits of the
case as well
as the general damages portion of the claim in the amount of R600
000.00 (six hundred thousand rand). It also appeared
that the
Defendant did not wish to argue against the remaining calculations
regarding past and future loss of income and indeed
counsel confirmed
that the only issue in dispute was the contingencies applicable to
the amounts claimed thereunder .
[3]
Counsel
for the Plaintiff referred the court to sections of various expert
reports in a bid to clarify how the claimed amounts were
reached and
why the contingencies were proposed to be 5 percent and 15 percent in
respect of past and future loss of income respectively.
The Defendant
on the other hand had not filed any expert reports and sought to
argue in favour of increased contingencies on the
basis of
information contained in the expert reports handed in by the
Plaintiff. In short, the argument was that there should be
a 20
percent increase in the contingencies to be deducted from the amounts
presented by the Plaintiff - at 10 percent more per
proposed award.
Counsel for the Defendant justified this deduction by pointing out
that:
(i)
the
plaintiff had a pre-existing condition of hypertension before the
accident and this should be taken into account in determining
the
award due; and
(ii)
the
Plaintiff not only got her job back, she also got a promotion, which
of necessity should lead to a reduction in the amount to
be awarded
for loss of earnings.
[4]
The
Defense counsel had referred to own calculations which were handed up
from the bar. The court cannot accept these because not
only were
they not part of the bundle, the Plaintiff's counsel had not seen
them and therefore could not even argue on their reasonableness
or
otherwise. Thus, at the end of the day, the only evidence that was
available to the court was the Plaintiff's, in the form of
various
expert reports and as well as guidance from the actuarial
calculations.
[5]
The
aforesaid evidence of the Plaintiff painted the following picture:
5.1
at
44 years of age, she was productively employed before the accident;
5.2
due
to the accident, she suffered serious injuries of a permanent nature;
5.3
her
5-month stay in hospital and subsequent return to work a year later
caused her to earn less due to no overtime and other allowances
and
also to lose an earlier opportunity to get a promotion;
5.4
her
inability to perform her tasks as before places her in a vulnerable
employment position of possible termination;
5.5
future
deterioration and probable hip replacement will diminish her capacity
to work even further;
5.6
if
she were to lose her current job, it is highly probable that she will
become unemployable;
5.7
even
if she were to remain in her current employment, her retirement has
been hastened due to probable incapacity aggravated by
the injuries;
The Plaintiff's heads of argument
also cited different cases in a bid to indicated to the court that
plaintiffs who suffered similar
serious injuries were awarded damages
in the range of what the plaintiff is claiming.
[6]
Counsel
for the Plaintiff reiterated that the pre-existing condition was not
what placed his client in the predicament facing her,
it was the
accident. There was no evidence to the effect that because of
hypertension, she could not perform her tasks previously
- in fact,
she could in spite thereof.
[7]
Having
listened to argument from both sides, the court has to decide whether
the contingencies, in light of the facts placed before
court, need to
be increased as requested by the Defense or accepted as presented by
the Plaintiff. Reliance on the other cases
presents its own problems
as each case has its own peculiar facts even if the overall
circumstances may appear similar. However,
one can rely on other
cases insofar as they provide acceptable parametres and serve as a
useful guide to making an appropriate
award. (see
Road
Accident Fund v Marunga
2003 (5) SA 164
SCA at 169
G-H).
Where, as in this case, the defense
has provided nothing to disprove any of the evidence presented by the
Plaintiff, the court has
to rely on that evidence to the extent that
it is well articulated and probable. Applying contingency deductions
to future loss
or expenses awards is a problematic exercise because
it is informed by speculation regarding relevant events which may or
may not
eventuate. The use of professional services such as those of
actuaries assists the courts to follow a certain generally acceptable

standard in determining personal injury related awards . But at the
end of the day, the specific facts of the case in front of
the judge
must be taken into account.
[8]
The
Plaintiff in this case has resolved to stay within the "normal
contingency " bracket of 5 and 15 percent in respect
of past and
future loss of income respectively. The Defendant on the other hand
wants to have these percentages increased but offers
no basis upon
which this increase can be justified. The issues of pre-existing
condition and promotion by themselves do not assist
the court and
more importantly, do not displace any of the evidence tendered by the
Plaintiff. The hypertension did not affect
the Plaintiff's
performance and the promotion; which is not performance based; was
delayed by over one year as a result of the
sequelae of the accident.
It is my view that the contingencies applied by the plaintiff's
counsel are reasonable and should not
be interfered with.
[9]
I
now wish to join the chorus of concerns raised by courts over and
over regarding the conduct of cases of this nature by the Road

Accident Fund's legal representatives. On top of the list is lack of
preparedness. Most of the attorneys seem to attend pre-trial

conferences without having obtained instructions on the well-known
issues that are to be addressed there. The normal responses
noted in
the minutes vary from "Noted", 'W ill revert", to
"Yes, but rights are reserved". In a majority
of cases,
this remains the position until the date of trial. Counsel is often
briefed late and comes to court to find that the
instructions are
inadequate and do not afford him or her any room to challenge the
plaintiffs case. One would like to think that
attorneys have ample
time to take instructions on the known aspects of the litigation
process. A prudent attorney should be in
a position to advise his
client when their case is weak and offer legal solutions which will
result in reduction of costs.
[10]     It is
also a fact that attorneys struggle to get instructions from the
claim processors and are often
left red faced when they have to apply
for a postponement which if granted comes with a heavy costs order.
Often this is due to
the last minute realisation that the merits are
weak and/or quantum is likely to be successfully negotiated. This
practice of settling,
especially RAF matters, on the door step of the
trial court should be discouraged because it disrupts the smooth
running of the
judicial processes and clogs the roll with matters
which collapse on the trial date which date could have been allocated
to other
matters. I hope the court's bid to bring this untenable
situation to the attention of the Fund's Chief Executive Officer will
bear
fruit soon. [ (see Spilg J's comments in
Ndlovu v The Road
Accident Fund
2014 (1) SA 415
(GSJ)
at 434E - 437G) and those of
Satchwell J in
Motswai v Road Accident Fund
2013 (3) SA 8
(GSJ)]
[11]      The
Plaintiff handed up a draft order which I had to hold in abeyance
pending my determination
of the contingencies argument. In light of
the fact that the Defense has failed to satisfy the court that the
contingencies proposed
by the Plaintiff were unreasonable and liable
for an upwards adjustment means that the draft order is in line with
my findings
in this matter. The costs have already been addressed and
included in the draft order.
In
the premises I make the following Order:
1.
The
draft order annexed hereto and marked "X" is hereby made an
Order of Court and the contents thereof are to be read
as if
incorporated herein.
LJN
BAM
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT, GAUTENG DIVISION
APPEARENCES:
AD
CASE NUMBER: 15233/16
PLAINTIFF
Counsel
for the applicants: JP van den Berg
Instructed
by: Adams & Adams
4
Daventry Street
Lynwood
Manor, Lynwood Bridge
Pretoria
Tel:
012- 432 6000
Ref: NK/hns/P1811
DEFENDANT
Counsel
for the Defendant: Mr Singo
Instructed
by: Mkhonto & Ngwenya Inc.
471
Belvedere Street
Arcadia,
Pretoria
Tel:
012 - 323 7210/645 1039 Ref: DLAMIMNI/RAF/001854/np
Date
of hearing:      29 January 2018
Date
of judgement: 2 February 2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH
AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
HELD
AT PRETORIA ON THIS THE 29
TH
DAY OF JANUARY 2018 AT COURT
ROOM 8G BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE BAM, AJ.
CASE NO: 15223/2016
In
the matter between:
MARMAN,
K,
F
Plaintiff
and
ROAD
ACCIDENT
FUND
Defendant
DRAFT
ORDER OF COURT
HAVING HEARD COUNSEL
for
the Plaintiff and Defendant and by agreement between the parties
THE
COURT GRANTS JUDGMENT
in
favour of the Platintiff against the Defendant in the following
terms:
1.1        The
Defendant shall pay the sum of
R 1 520 962.27 (ONE MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-TWO RAND AND
TWENTY­ SEVEN CENTS)
to the Plaintiff in settlement of the
Plaintiff’s claim to the Plaintiff' s attorneys, Adams &
Adams, payable by direct
transfer into their trust account with the
following details:
Nedbank
Account
number      : 160 431 8902
Branch number
: 198765
Pretoria
Ref: NK/P1811
1.2.       The
aforementioned total amount of
R 1 520 962.27 (ONE MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-TWO RAND AND
TWENTY­ SEVEN CENTS)
is comprised of as follows:
1.2.1
Past medical expenses
R834.27
1.2.2
Future medical expenses

Section 17 (4)(a) Undertaking
1.2.2
Loss of income and earning capacity
R920 128.00
1.2.3
General damages
R600 000.00
R1 520 962.27
1.3
The
total amount referred to in paragraph 1.2 above will not bear
interest unless the Defendant fails to effect payment thereof
within
14 (FOURTEEN) calendar days of the date of this Order, in which event
the capital amount will bear interest at the rate
of 10.25 % per
annum calculated from and including the date of judgment to and
including the date of payment thereof.
1.4
The Defendant shall forthwith provide to
the Plaintiff an Undertaking in terms of Section 17(4)(a) of the Road
Accident Fund Act
, 1996 , for the payment of 100% of the costs of
KELEBOGILE FLORENCE MARMAN's
future
accommodation in a hospital or nursing home or treatment of or
rendering of a service or supplying of goods to her resulting
from
the injuries sustained by her in the motor collision which occurred
on 1 November 2014, after such costs have been incurred
and upon
proof thereof.
2.
The
Defendant must make payment of the Plaintiff's taxed or agreed party
and party costs on the High Court scale which costs shall
include the
following:
2.1
All
the fees of Senior Counsel on the High Court Scale ;
2.2
All
fees of the translator, Mr Mphela Mogaladi.
2.3
The
reasonable taxable costs of obtaining any further expert/
medico-legal and actuarial reports from the Plaintiff's experts which

were furnished to the Defendant, if any;
2.4
The
reasonable taxable preparation and reservation fees, if any, of the
following experts:
2.4.1
Dr. J J Du Plessis;
2.4.2
Dr M Mazabow;
2.4.3
Dr K Truter;
2.4.4
Dr VM Close;
2.4.5
Dr F Greet;
2.4.6
Dr I J Van Heerden;
2.4.7
Dr BP White;
2.4.8
Mr L Randall
2.4.9
Mr E Noble; and
2.4.10
Mr G Whittaker.
2.5
The costs incurred in obtaining payment
of the amount mentioned in paragraph 1.2 above;
2.6
Reasonable
travelling costs incurred by the Plaintiff in attending medico-legal
appointments with the parties' expert s;
2.7
The
costs of a consultation between the Plaintiff and her attorney to
discuss the settlement offer received from the Defendant and
the
terms of this order;
2.8
The
above costs will also be paid into the aforementioned attorneys trust
account.
3.
The
following provisions will apply with regards to the determination of
the aforementioned taxed or agreed costs:-
3.1
The
Plaintiff shall serve the notice of taxation on the Defendant's
attorney of record;
3.2
The
Plaintiff shall allow the Defendant 7 (SEVEN) court days to make
payment of the taxed costs from date of settlement or taxation

thereof;
3.3
Should
payment not be effected timeously, the Plaintiff will be entitled to
recover interest at the rate of 10.25 % on the taxed
or agreed costs
from date of allocatur to date of final payment.
4.
Contingency
fee agreement is applicable.
BY ORDER OF THE COURT
Counsel
for Plaintiff:
Adv.
J Van den Berg
012
452 8725
Brooklyn
Chambers
Counsel for Defendant:
Adv. H Singo
078 869 2976