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[2018] ZAGPPHC 249
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Combrink v S (A18/2016) [2018] ZAGPPHC 249 (26 January 2018)
.
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE
NO: A18/2016
DATE:
26/01/2018
In
the matter between
:
WILLEM
ANTONIE
C
OMBRINK
Appellant
and
THE
STATE
Respondent
JUDGMENT
TEFFO,
J
:
[1]
The appellant was convicted on his plea
of gu
i
lty
i
n the
r
eg
i
onal
court
,
Evander
,
on four counts of fraud.
[2]
Before he pleaded to the charges the
prosecutor informed the local court that the appellant was
represented
,
he
intended pleading guilty to all
the
counts and that his legal representative
had prepared a written statement
in
terms of s 112(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977
(“the
Act”)
·
.
[3]
Subsequent thereto the appellant pleaded
guilty to all the counts
.
His
legal representative then handed in the s 112(2) written statement
and
sought
leave of the trial court to read its contents into the
record.
[4]
The charges were not
read with the provisions of s
51
(2)
of
the
Criminal Law Amendment Act of
1997
("CLLA").
[5]
The appellant's written statement was
read into the record. In the statement the appellant admitted all the
material elements of
the various offences as well as
the underlying facts and the amounts
involved
.
[6]
The prosecutor accepted the plea and the
trial court, after satisfying
·
itself that the appellant had correctly
pleaded to the elements of fraud
i
n
all the four counts
,
convicted
him as charged
.
[7]
At the
conclusion of
the
evidence
led
in mitigation of sentence and after both
the defence and the State had addressed the trial court
in
mitigation and aggravation of sentence
,
the trial court called a witness
,
Mr Daniel Petrus Bredenkamp. After his
evidence was heard and after
the
trial
court had set out the principles relevant to sentence
,
it took all counts for purposes of
sentence and sentenced the appellant to a term of 8 years
'
imprisonment.
[8]
This is an
appeal against sentence only
.
The
appellant
appeals
·
.
against his sentence with leave having
been granted on petition
by
this Court.
[9]
The issues raised in the appeal mainly
revolve around the application of the provisions of s 186
of the Act, allegations
that there were material misdirections
committed by the trial court
,
that
the trial court did not
·
.
adequately consider the
importance
of the probation officer
'
s
report
,
and
did not give reasons or gave insufficient reasons
for not
following
the
recommendations
contained
in the report of the probation
officer
.
Further issues were that the trial court
overemphasised the seriousness of the offence and underemphasised the
mitigating
circumstances
,
it failed to give
any or due consideration to the mitigating factors
,
it did not give any consideration to the
fact that the offences were committed 9
to
13 years ago
,
-the case laid dormant for approximately
5 years, during which time the appellant became a productive member
of society and rehabilitated
himself
,
causing
imprisonment
to
be meaningless and focussing on
retribution and deterrence rather than restorative justice and
rehabilitation
.
[10
]
It is not necessary to repeat
the evidence presented during
the
sentencing stage in detail. It suffices to briefly set out the
salient facts. The appellant who was 51 years old at the time
of his
trial
,
was
a senior Engineer and a Project Manager
,
employed by Sasol Synfuel
(Pty)
Ltd (Sasol)
.
At some stage while in
the
employment of Sasol, Sasol sent him to
Germany to study the options of manufacturing bonds of stainless
steel
to
put
around chimneystacks and how to perform
the restoration of a chimney
.
The
appellant
shared his knowledge with Mr Kuhn (the deceased)
and T & A Construct
i
on
and taught them how to manage their operation
.
how to plan
·
and calculate the material necessary for
the project. He and Mr Kuhn were friends
.
Mr Kuhn also worked for Sasol as an
x-ray technician. One day the appellant told Mr Kuhn that the company
that was contracted to
Sasol .to do
:
.
work for it, had become insolvent and
that Sasol will be appointing another contractor
.
Mr Kuhn
'
s
company
,
T
&
A
Construction applied to
Sasol
to
render the services and it was appoin
t
ed
.
[11]
The appellant and Mr Kuhn agreed that
,
because Sasol took
_
the
appellant to Germany to do the work, through his guidance and
training
,
they
will do the job
.
[12]
As they were busy with the project
,
they decided to claim even though the
work was not done. A year passed
,
there was a shutdown and they did
the same
.
The
appellant supervised the construction and did the repa
i
rs
of the chimneystacks and after the completion of the project
,
the appellant would finalise the
required documentation and sign the
contract
off. He then
.
recommended
the payment as per the invo
i
ce
of the contractors
.
Payment
was scheduled after the appellant shall have given his final
recommendation and s
i
gned
the
contract.
[13]
The appellant and Mr Kuhn agreed that
the appellant would administer projects with fictitious documents
.
Mr Kuhn received money for the false
claimed projects and in return paid the appellant kickbacks out of
them.
[14]
Mr Bredenkamp investigated the
chimneystacks and
·
confronted
Mr Kuhn.
He
also requested
T
&
A
Constructio
n
'
s
financial
statements.
This
·
·
led to the commission of suicide by Mr
Kuhn on 19 February 2007
.
[15]
At some stage Sasol obtained a
restraining order against the
appellant.
Shortly
thereafter several meetings were held between the appellant, his
attorney and the
representatives
of
Sasol. The appellant explained to them how the offences of fraud were
committed
.
He
also gave a comprehensive
.
list
of his assets and agreed to transfer or sell them in order to pay the
proceeds of sale to the account of
Sasol. His pension was
also
attached
.
The appellant's assets were sold and the
sum of R4 700 000
,
00
i
n
total
was
paid to Sasol.
[16]
He left Sasol and found employment
overseas after being unemployed for six months and carried on with
his
life
.
[17]
In October 2012 while he was on
leave
and visiting his wife in South Africa
,
the appellant was
contacted
by Constable Maredi who
informed
him
that Sasol had laid charges against him
.
He was arrested
,
brought before
court
and granted bail. He was subsequently
granted permission to carry on with his duties in Nigeria
.
He
returned
to South Afr
i
ca
in
2013
after being employed by Kentz Engineering and Construction as a
contractor.
[18]
The defence led the evidence of the
appellant
,
a
private probation
officer
,
Ms Catharina Johanna Wolmarans
and
a correctional officer
,
Mr Bheki
Madoa
in mitigation
of
sentence
.
In
essence
Ms
Wolmarans's
evidence related
to
the
pre-sentence report that she compiled. She recommended
that the appellant should be granted a non-custodial
sentence given
the fact that he has been remorseful and paid back
the money that Sasol had
lost
·
.
The crux of Mr Madoa
'
s
evidence also related to the pre-sentence report that h
e
·
had compiled which dealt with the
suitability of the appellant to serve a sentence of correctional
supervision
.
He
recommended a sentence of correctional supervision in terms of
section 276(1
)(h)
of
the Act.
MITIGATING
FACTORS
[19]
The appellant pleaded guilty
.
He was still willing to repay the
difference between the amount he pleaded guilty to and the
amount he
already paid
back
.
The
complainant refused the offer because it
had
recovered substantially more than
the loss
.
The
appellant paid back the amount of R4
,
7
million
.
The
insurance also paid the complainant the sum of R8 million
.
The complainant
recovered
more than the amount of R6
,
5 million mentioned in the charge-sheet.
After the appellant had repaid the money to the complainant
,
he was told to go on with his life
.
Several years later
in
2012
he
was
arrested for the offences
.
The
offences were committed nine
(9)
years prior
to
him be
i
ng
arrested for them
.
Sasol
did not suffer any loss as it was paid back a total amount of R10
,
7 million by the Insurance company and
the appellant. Mr Kuhn
'
s
estate was not pursued together with that of his father and the
appellant's wife, all of whom also benefitted from the
fraudulent
activities
.
[20]
The appellant was remorseful. He
cooperated and explained how and why the offences were committed.
He has lost everything
.
He
did not
have
any previous convictions
.
[21]
The appellant was born on […]
1963. He divorced arid remarried
.
He
is the fourth born child in his family
.
His father and brother
were killed in a road accident. He has a degree in civil engineering
.
He is a father of two children of his
own as well as a stepfather to two children
,
a son and daughter of his current wife
.
His daughter is working for Sasol
in
Secunda
and was studying part-time with Unisa at the time. She was 23 years
old
at
the
time
and
he
was
paying
tuition
fees
and
her
day-to-day
expens
e
s
.
·
His
son was employed by his mother
.
The
appellant was also paying for the
day-to-day
expenses
,
viz
,
medicines, the flat
and living costs of his
stepdaughter who was
diagnosed with narcolepsy
.
He was of good health but suffers from
stress, tension and short memory loss because the case against him
was still pending. His
current w
i
fe
was not permanently employed
.
She
earned a salary of R2 000
,
00
per month at the time
.
She
could not afford the rental of the place where they resided at the
t
i
me
,
the car and everything
.
[22]
The appellant suffers from a feeling of guilt because Mr
Kuhn committed suicide after he was confronted by
the personnel of
Sasol. He was blamed for Mr Kuhn
'
s
death by members of his family and he was not permitted to attend his
funeral. He believes he has damaged h
i
s
image and that of h
i
s
family as a result of his wrongdo
i
ng.
He cannot forgive himself for what he did
.
He has to come to terms with himself for
being involved in the
criminal
activitie
s
.
He cannot overcome his weakness that he
lost
con
t
rol
over himself and got himself in a situation where greed overruled h
i
s
life
and
his
common
sense
.
[23]
The appellant suffered emotionally and
lost his permanent employment.
AGGRAVATING
FACTORS
[24]
Ms Wolmarans
'
report states that Sasol suffered a loss
i
n the sum
of
R6 476 747
,
66
as a result of the appellant's activ
i
t
i
es
.
The appellant was trusted by
the management of Sasol at the time
.
He
was appo
i
nted
as
t
he
Manager of the Project and he mismanaged the funds allocated
for the
project. He
misused
the trust that was placed upon h
i
m
.
He continued w
i
th
his crim
i
nal
behaviour over a period of five years
.
He planned the fraudu
l
ent
transactions with the intention to defraud Sasol and to enr
i
ch
h
i
mse
l
f
,
Mr Kuhn and T
&
A Construction
.
He benefitted an amount R2 200 000
,
00 from the fraudulent
transactions
.
[25]
It was submitted on behalf of the State
at the trial court that fraud committed against compan
i
es
leads to job losses as companies close
d
own
.
The appellant pleaded guilty of fraud
that involved a substant
i
a
l
amount of money to the tune
of
R6
,
4
million
.
Whether
the amount was paid or not
,
it
was the appellant's conduct that led to the commiss
i
on
of the offence
.
Even
though the appellant test
i
fied
that he
stopped
with
the
cr
i
m
i
na
l
act
i
vit
i
es
on
hi
s
own
,
the
period during which offences were committed indicates that he would
not have stopped. He should have thought of the consequences
of his
actions before he committed the offences. Sasol had to pay an excess
amount of over R5 million to succeed with its claim
with the
insurance
company
for the
los$
it
had suffered as a result of the fraudulent transactions.
[26]
Sentencing is a matter pre-eminently
within the discretion of the trial court and a court of appeal will
interfere
with
the exercise of such discretion only on limited grounds
(S
v Sadler
2000
(1)
SACR
331
(SCA);
S v
·
Rabie,
1975
(4) SA 455
(A))
.
[27]
A court exercising
appellate jurisdiction cannot
in
the absence of a
material
misdirection by the trial court
,
approach the question of sentence as if
it were the trial court and then substitute the sentence arrived at
by it simply because
it prefers it. To do so would be to usurp the
sentencing discretion of the trial court. Where the material
misdirection by the
trial court vitiates its exercise of that
discretion, an appellate court is of course entitled to consider the
question of sentence
afresh
.
In
doing so, it assesses sentence as
if it
were a court of first
instance
and the sentence imposed by the trial
court has no
relevance
.
As it is said
,
an appellate court is at large.
However
,
even
in
the
absence of a material misdirection, an appellate court may yet be
justified
in
interfering
with the sentence
imposed
by
the trial court
.
It
may do so when the disparity between the sentence of the trial court
and the sentence which the appellate court would have imposed
had it
been the trial court is so marked that it
can properly be described
as
"
shocking"
,
"startling
"
or
"
disturbingly
inappropriate
".
It
must be emphasised that in the latter situation the appellate
court is not at large in the sense in which
it is at large
in
the
former
.
In the latter situation it may not
substitute the sentence which it thinks
appropriate merely because
it does not accord with the sentence imposed
by
the
trial court or because it prefers it to that sentence
.
It may do so only where the
difference is so substantial that it attracts epithets of the kinds I
have mentioned (S
v Malgas
2001
(1) SACR 469
(SCA)).
APPLICATION
OF S 186 OF THE ACT
[26]
Section 186 of the Act provides that the
court may at any stage of criminal proceedings subpoena or cause to
be subpoenaed any person
as a witness at such proceedings
,
and the court shall so subpoena a
witness or so cause a witness to be subpoenaed if the evidence of
such witness appears to the
court essential to the just decision of
the case
.
[27]
The learned magistrate was criticised
for calling Mr Bredenkamp as a witness after the appellant had closed
h
i
s case
and both parties had addressed the court in mitigation and
aggravation of sentence
.
It
was submitted that the learned magistrate did not use her discretion
judicially
.
She
used the evidence of Mr Bredenkamp to the prejudice of the appellant.
She indicated to Mr
.
Bredenkamp
that
"
Ek
roep jou
om
sekere
goed op te klaar
."
The
intention of s 186 is not to clear up certain things
.
[28]
It was pointed out that the learned
magistrate misquoted
and
misunderstood
the decision reached in S
v Dlamini
2000
(2)
SACR 266
(T
)
.
It
was
argued that it was never decided that the
magistrate is under a duty to call witnesses to
give a proper sentence
.
What
was decided is that a
judicial
officer
is
obliged
to
interalia
,
call witnesses to
establish whether compelling
circumstances
existed
,
before it imposes a minimum
sentence
.
[29]
It
was
submitted that
the
learned
magistrate was not alive
to
the
fact
.
that she might be taking over the
prosecution
.
The
State wanted
to
call
the witness but abandoned him and that the witness might have been
coached before testifying. The magistrate elicited evidence
beyond
the
amount
that
the
appellant pleaded
guilty
to
.
There
was no misunderstanding as to the
amount that the appellant pleaded guilty
to and for which he accepted responsibility
.
Further to the above
,
it was argued that the tria
l
court
made
an incorrect finding that it was conceded that
the
amount
the
appellant
had
been
.
.
prosecuted
for was
more and
he
pleaded
guilty
to
a
lesser
amount.
[30]
Mr Daniel Petrus Bredenkamp
'
s
evidence was briefly as follows
:
The
loss
suffered
by Sasol as a result of the commiss
i
on
of the offence was in
excess
of
R6
,
4
million. Sasol claimed a higher amount
from
the insurance company. Sasol was
requested to pay an excess amount of R5 638 684
,
00 and only received a pay out of an
amount of R8 113 550
,
48
.
The pens
i
on
money of the appellant was also attached
.
He was not part
of
the discussions between Sasol
,
the appellant and both parties
'
legal representatives. Sasol has
a policy that where an employee
has been
found guilty of
fraud
,
his
pension
money is taken to compensate for the loss it has suffered
.
The appellant was not taken to a
disciplinary hearing. He agreed with
.
his legal representatives that his
pension money should be used to pay for part of the
loss
Sasol suffered as a result of the
offence
.
[31]
The
investigation
started on 20 July
2006. The appellant was
not
immediately confronted directly but
other employees were
interviewed
internally
.
Sasol was not fully compensated for the
loss
.
[32]
When the appellant
resigned,
investigations were already on
.
He
cou
l
d
not have known about them as they first interviewed other
people internally who knew the appellant.
[33]
Sasol was compensated for the loss
taking into account that the
insurance
claim was also
paid
.
[34]
Before Mr Bredenkamp was called by the
trial court as a witness
,
t
e learned magistrate explained that she was calling him in order to
be able to justly adjudicate the case to give a proper sentence
.
[35]
At page 280 of the record line
10
the trial court stated the
following
:
"
In any event it was conceded that the
amount that you would have been prosecuted for was more and that you
pleaded guilty to a lesser
amount that is what the
court
considered. The court is not looking at
the higher amount
.
The
court is only sentencing you and considering you on the amount of
approximately R6.4 million
."
[36]
The issue raised that
the magistrate elicited
evidence from Mr'·
Bredenkamp
regarding an amount in excess of the one the appellant
plead
d
.
guilty
to is
,
in
my view,
not
material in that the trial court was
clear
that
it
,
was
only considering fraud in
the amount of R6.4 million for
the purposes
of
sentence
.
This amount was what the appellant was
charged for and to which he had pleaded guilty
.
The sum of R6.4 million is the
total amount of the fraud that was perpetrated in respect
of the four counts
.
[37]
As regards the issue relating
to the contention that
the
learned
magistrate misquoted and misunderstood the
decision in
S v
Dlamini
,
the
issue
was extensively dealt with on record from line 17
on
page
280. It
is
important
to
note that
the
provisions
of
s
186
are
divided
into
two
parts
,
viz
,
the
"
may
"
and the
"
shall'
part
.
The
“
may”
part is discretional
and the discretion is wide but has to be exercised
judicially and in a limited manner
(R
v
Ganie
1958 (1) SA 102
(A))
.
The second part places a duty on the
court to call the witness once it deems the evidence essential to the
just adjudication
of the case. It is the judicial officer
'
s
responsibility to assess whether the ev
i
dence
i
s
essential.
[38]
In this matter the only evidence before
the court was that of the appellant. The court had to get a full
picture of exactly what
loss did Sasol suffer and how the
i
nsurance
dealt w
i
th
the claim and ended up paying the amount of more than R8
million
.
[39]
The provisions of s 186 of the Act
permits the judicial officer to call any witness at any stage of
the proceedings
if he/she deems the
witness
'
s
evidence essential to the
just adjudication of
the
case.
The learned magistrate clearly stated that she was calling Mr
Bredenkamp in order
to
justly
adjudicate the case to give a
proper
sentence.
[40]
Issues were raised that because the
prosecution initially wanted to call Mr Bredenkamp
,
the learned magistrate was not alive to
the fact that she might be taking over the prosecution and that the
witness might have been
coached
before
testifying.
[41]
In my view I cannot fault the learned
magistrate for the route that she took
.
She needed to satisfy herself on the
facts which were before the court
only
from the appellant's side in order to arrive at a just
decision. I also cannot find any prejudice or
any intention to
prejudice the appellant from the
.
evidence of Mr Brectenkamp
.
There was also no evidence that the
learned
magistrate
took
over
the prosecution and that Mr Bredenkamp was coached
to give
evidence.
In
fact
his
evidence
corroborated
the
appellant's
evidence
.
MISDIRECTIONS
[42]
Allegations were made that the learned
magistrate
misdirected
herself on the element of mercy
,
remorse
,
etc
.
and
that she misinterpreted the evidence
.
The fact that the learned magistrate
speculated about the knowledge
of
the
appellant regarding the investigation whereas
the
undisputed
evidence was that he did not know about the
i
nvestigation
.
.-
Th e fact
that the appellant never testified that he was a childhood friend
or
·
that
they
were ex
-
colleagues
and that Mr Madoa testified that the appellant
,
is staying in a 5- bedroomed flat and
not a 5
-
roomed
flat. It was argued that incorrect evaluation of the evidence leads
to an incorrect decision
to
the detriment of
the
appellant.
[43]
Although I agree that an incorrect
evaluation of the evidence leads
to
an incorrect decision
,
it cannot be argued that the same
appl
i
ed
i
n
this matter
.
The
appellant on his own testified that although he was not aware of the
investigations when he resigned
,
he
resigned after he was told that Mr Kuhn committed suicide. Mr Kuhn
called him a week prior to committing suicide and informed
him that
he was being questioned about the fraudulent transactions
.
There cannot be any doubt that even
though the appellant was not yet confronted at the time
,
he was not aware that something
i
n
relat
i
on
thereto was imminent. It is indeed correct that Mr Bredenkamp
corroborated the appellant's evidence to the effect that when he
resigned he was not yet confronted directly
.
The fact of the matter is that Sasol had
already begun with its investigations as early as 20 July 2006
.
Immediately after Mr Kuhn had told the
appellant that he was questioned
,
and
after his sudden death
,
the
appellant decided to resign
.
He
knew the consequences of his actions
.
Allegations that the appellant stayed in
a five bedroomed flat and not a five roomed flat and that he was a
childhood friend of
Mr Kuhn although
i
ncorrect
,
are
of
no
consequence.
[44]
As regards the issue of
remorse
the argument that the appellant could
·
'
have
pleaded guilty because the evidence
was overwhelming against
him
.
cannot be ruled out. His
explanation that on his last day at work when he was
supposed
to have met the personnel of Sasol, his access card did
not
onger
work as he was busy moving his
belongings and that he had decided to talk
to
his family first does not make sense. If
he wanted to meet the personnel of Sasol at that time and come clean,
he could have remained
at the workplace
.·
and hear them first before he started
moving
his
belongings. Alternatively
,
the
.
minute he realised that he was denied
access
,
he
could have communicated with one of the personnel of Sasol and
explained his situation. They
.
could have allowed him access for
the purpose of
the
meeting. His explanation clearly
indicates
that
he did not want to meet them at the time but decided to first
go
and
discuss
the
matter
with his
family
members
.
[45]
It is clear from the report of Ms
Wolmarans and
the
appellant
'
s
evidence that he definitely appreciated the consequences of his
actions. He testified that after he had resigned
,
he
thought
about the fraudulent activities and realised that he was wrong
.
When he went to his legal
representative
,
he
told
him
that
he
intended pleading guilty
.
[46]
The
plea of
guilty
must
be put on
its
proper
perspective. The reasons
why
the
appellant pleaded guilty are on record.
Before
it
imposes sentence
,
a
court
has
to look at the triad
,
which
consists
of
the nature of the offence
,
the
accused's
circumstances and
the
interest of society. I have considered the appellant's personal
circumstances
.
Not only are they relevant, the
nature
of
the
offences the
appellant
has
been convicted of and the
interest
of
society, are also factors to be considered when passing sentence. The
appellant
was
convicted of very serious offences and the value involved
is
magnificent although he was able to pay
back some of the amount. What counsel for the appellant loses sight
of
,
is
that
it
is not all about the appellant. It is
about
him
,
the nature of the offences he has been
convicted of and the
intere
sts
of society
.
All these factors should be equally
balanced. None should be weighed above
the
other
.
[47]
The record reflects that there was
extensive planning and the appellant
knew what he was doing. He knew that what he was
doing
was wrong but
persisted
with it until it came too light. From his own evidence he stated that
they
succeeded
with the first transaction and continued
.
It was clear that
the offences were motivated by greed. He
had a good salary at
the
time
of the
commission
of
the offences
.
He
did not
have
any
reason to steal
from his
employer
,
the mouth that fed him and entrusted him
with a project worth
of
millions.
He ended up mismanaging the funds allocated for the
project. Sasol invested in him by taking
him overseas
to
learn
the job but he abused
the
position
of trust it had
on
him and misused it.
[48]
As regards to other
issues
relating to his dependants, his current
wife and the
children
,
the appellant already
knew
about the pending case against him. He
was prepared to take the risk by
marrying
another wife after the divorce
.
It is also not clear for how long his
wife
'
s
current salary will continue and whether there was a chance of
her obtaining a permanent
employment
or
not. The appellant is
not obliged to maintain his daughter
from
the
.
first marriage
.
She is a major and
already
working
.
He is also not obliged
to
·
maintain his stepchildren
.
[49]
In my view the fact that Mr Kuhn with
whom the appellant committed the offences
,
committed suicide
,
is more
aggravating.
[50]
The fact that Sasol never pursued the
estate of Mr Kuhn
,
his
father
and
the appellant's former wife
,
is
neither here nor there
.
It
is only the appellant who is before court
.
[51]
The issues raised
i
n
the appeal basically suit the appellant only
.
When one considers the principles of
sentence and the triad
,
in
particular, the sentence imposed must suit the offence
,
the offender and the interests of
society
.
[52]
It is my view that when all factors,
aggravating and mitigating are considered
,
there is no misdirection on the part of
the trial court calling for this Court to interfere in the decision
of the trial court.
The learned magistrate in my view considered all
the factors
.
[53]
I therefore do not agree that the
sentence is shockingly harsh or inappropriate
.
[54]
Consequently I make the following
order
:
54
.
1
The appeal against the sentence of
the
appellant is dismissed
.
.
_______________________________
M
J TEFFO
JUDGE
OF HE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION,
PRETORIA
I
agree:
_______________________________
A
SASSON
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
APPEARANCES
For
the appellant
P J Johnson
Instructed
by
Vos
,
Viljoen
&
Becker
Inc
For
the respondent
C Pruis
Instructed
by
The Director of Public Prosecutions
Date
of judgment
26 January
2018