About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
>>
2019
>>
[2019] ZAWCHC 64
|
|
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Das Neves (11999/2018) [2019] ZAWCHC 64 (28 May 2019)
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
Case No:
11999/2018
Before the Hon. Ms Acting Justice Slingers
Hearing: 6 May 2019
Judgment Delivered: 28 May 2019
In the matter between:
SHOPRITE
CHECKERS (PTY)
LTD
Applicant
(Registration Number: 1929/011817.07)
and
DAVID JORGE PAIVA DAS NEVES
Trading as
Burgundy
Fisheries
Respondent
JUDGMENT
SLINGERS AJ
BACKGROUND
[1]
During the latter part
of 2009, the parties entered into a written lease agreement.
The lease agreement was for a two-year
period and commenced on 1
January 2010 and terminated on 31 December 2011.
[2]
The lease agreement was
subsequently renewed on two further occasions. On each occasion
the agreement was renewed for a period
of two years.
[3]
Thereafter, during June
and July 2016, the parties signed another lease agreement. This
lease agreement
(“the
agreement”)
was also for a two-year period with the commencement date being 1
July 2016 and the expiry date being 30 June 2018.
[4]
The agreement was
signed by the applicant on 20 July 2016 and by the respondent on 21
June 2016 and included the following provisions:
4.1 the applicant
was identified as the landlord and the respondent as the tenant;
4.2 the commencement
date was defined as 1 July 2016;
4.3 the expiry date
was defined as 30 June 2018;
4.4 the Consumer
Protection Act
(“CPA”)
determined that the term of
the agreement may not exceed 24 months calculated from the date on
which the respondent signed the
agreement (21 June 2016);
4.5 the agreement
would commence on the commencement date and would continue until the
expiry
date;
4.6 the definition
of the expiry date ensured that the duration of the agreement would
not exceed
the 24 months prescribed by the CPA;
4.7 the applicant
would inform the respondent in writing between 80 and 40 business
days before
the expiry of the agreement:
4.7.1 that it is about to
expire; and
4.7.2 what material
changes would be applicable to the agreement if it
was to be renewed or
may otherwise continue beyond the expiry
date;
4.8 the Magistrate’s
Court would have jurisdiction for all claims which arise from the
agreement, if so chosen by the applicant;
4.9 all notices, consents or
other communications in terms of the agreement must be in writing and
addressed
to the applicant at 11 Union Avenue, Pinelands; and
4.10 all notices, consents other
communications in terms of the agreement will be deemed to have been
received
by the other party on the 7
th
day after posting
and on the day if delivered by hand.
[5]
During 2018 the
respondent received correspondence, dated 11 April 2018, advising him
that the agreement was due to expire and that
the applicant had
elected not to renew same (in other words to terminate the agreement
on the expiry date).
THE APPLICATION
[6]
In this application the
applicant seeks an order:
6.1 confirming the
expiry of the agreement on 30 June 2018;
6.2 an order
evicting the respondent and all those who occupy by, through or under
him from
the premises situated at shop 6, 1 Burgundy Drive, Burgundy
Estate, Bellville
(“the premises”)
and directing
the respondent to give the applicant undisturbed possession of the
premises within 3 calendar days or as soon as possible,
from date of
granting the order;
6.3 authorising and
ordering the Sheriff of the above Honourable Court and/or his deputy,
and/or
the South African Police Services to assist the applicant to
give effect to the order in paragraph 6.2 above; and
6.4 ordering the
respondent to pay the costs of the application.
[7]
In opposing the
application the respondent put forward the following
in
limine
arguments:
7.1 the deponent’s
lack of authority to depose to the founding affidavit;
7.2 the applicant’s
lack of
locus standi
to seek the respondent’s eviction;
7.3 the lack of
jurisdiction of this court to entertain the application; and
7.4 the applicant’s
non-compliance with paragraphs 40, 1.2(c) and (d) of the lease
agreement.
The applicant delivered the notice of termination of
the agreement to and had the Notice of Motion served at the premises
instead
of having it delivered to and served at the respondent’s
contractually chosen
domicilium
of 11 Union Avenue, Pinelands.
[8]
The respondent also
alleged that the application was vexatious, frivolous and vague.
[9]
During the hearing of
the matter Mr Sharuh, for the respondent, argued that section 14 of
CPA did not allow the landlord the right
to elect whether or not to
terminate or to renew the fixed term contract on the expiry thereof.
This right was bestowed solely
upon the respondent. Further,
there was no need to give notice of a non-renewal / termination of
the agreement as it would
automatically continue on a month - to -
month basis.
[10]
He further argued that
the applicant could only cancel the agreement if the respondent was
in breach thereof and failed to remedy
the breach after being given
notice to do so. In the absence of a breach on the part of the
respondent the applicant could
not cancel or terminate the lease
agreement, notwithstanding the expiry of the fixed period.
[11]
However, after the
agreement continued on a month – to - month basis, the
applicant could then terminate it by giving the
respondent sufficient
notice of such termination.
SECTION 14(2)(c): NON-RENEWAL OF THE AGREEMENT
[12]
In determining whether
or not the applicant is entitled to the relief it seeks, I deal
firstly with the argument that section 14(2)(c)
of the CPA only
endows the respondent with the election of whether or not to
terminate or renew the agreement on the expiry thereof.
[13]
In interpreting section
14 of the CPA, the court is directed by section 2(1) thereof to
interpret it in such a manner that would
give effect to the
objectives set out in section 3(1).
[14]
Section 3 reads as follows:
“
(1) The purposes
of this Act are to promote and advance the social and economic
welfare of consumers
in South Africa by-
(a)
establishing a legal framework for the achievement and maintenance of
a consumer market
that is fair, accessible, efficient, sustainable
and responsible for the benefit of consumers generally;
(b)
reducing and ameliorating any disadvantages
experienced in accessing any supply of goods or services by
consumers-
(i)
who are low-income persons or persons comprising low-income
communities;
(ii)
who live in remote, isolated or low-density population areas or
communities;
(iii) who
are minors, seniors or other similarly vulnerable consumers; or
(iv) whose
ability to read and comprehend any advertisement, agreement, mark,
instruction,
label, warning, notice or other visual representation is
limited by reason of low literacy, vision impairment or limited
fluency
in the language in which the representation is produced,
published or presented;
(c)
promoting fair business practices;
(d) protecting
consumers from-
(i)
unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable,
unjust or otherwise improper trade practices; and
(ii)
deceptive, misleading, unfair or
fraudulent conduct;
(e) improving
consumer awareness and information and encouraging
responsible and
informed consumer choice and behaviour;
(f)
promoting consumer confidence, empowerment, and the development of a
culture
of consumer responsibility, through individual and group
education, vigilance, advocacy and activism;
(g) providing for
a consistent, accessible and efficient system of consensual
resolution of
disputes arising from consumer transactions; and
(h)
providing for an accessible, consistent, harmonised,
effective and efficient system of redress for consumers.
(2) To better ensure the
realisation of the purposes of this Act, and the enjoyment of the
consumer rights recognised
or conferred by this Act, the Commission,
in addition to its responsibilities set out elsewhere in this Act, is
responsible to-
(a)
take
reasonable and practical measures to promote the purposes of this Act
and to protect and advance the interests of all consumers,
and in
particular those consumers contemplated in subsection (1) (b);
(b)
monitor
and report each year to the Minister on the following matters:
(i)
The availability of goods and services to persons contemplated in
subsection
(1) (b), including price and market conditions,
conduct and trends affecting their consumer rights;
(ii) access
to the supply of goods and services by small businesses and
persons contemplated in subsection (1) (b); and
(iii) any other matter
relating to the supply of goods and services; and
(c)
conduct research and propose policies to the Minister
in relation to any matter affecting the supply of goods and services,
including
proposals for legislative, regulatory or policy initiatives
that would improve the realisation and full enjoyment of their
consumer
rights by persons contemplated in subsection (1) (b).”
[15]
As seen
from section 3, the CPA is aimed at,
inter
alia,
promoting fair business practices, protecting consumers against
unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable, unjust and improper business
practices and establishing a legal framework to achieve and maintain
a fair consumer market which is efficient, sustainable and
accessible.
[16]
This
legislative protection of consumers should not be interpreted as
entitling nor as enabling consumers to themselves engage in
unfair
business practices or to act unscrupulously.
[1]
If consumers are allowed or enabled to act in an unscrupulous manner
or to engage in unfair business practices, then it will
undermine the
establishment and/or sustainability of a fair consumer market.
Further, the objectives of the CPA will more easily
be attained if
both consumers and suppliers act in a manner which would facilitate
and support the objectives of the CPA and not
to engage in any
activity which would undermine or weaken them.
[17]
It is within this
context that section 14(2) of the CPA and regulation 5(1) thereto
should be interpreted. I set out section
14(2) of the CPA and
regulation 5(1) below.
[18]
Section 14(2) reads as
follows:
“
If a consumer agreement is
for a fixed term-
(a)
that term must
not exceed the maximum period, if any, prescribed in terms of section
(4) with respect to that category of consumer
agreement;
(b)
despite any
provision of the consumer agreement to the contrary-
(i)the consumer may cancel the agreement-
(aa)upon the expiry of its fixed term, without
penalty or charge, but subject to subsection (3)(a); or
(bb)at any other time, by giving the supplier 20
business days’ notice in writing or other recorded manner and
form, subject
to subsection (3)(a) and (b); or
(ii) the supplier may cancel the agreement 20
business days after giving written notice to the consumer of a
material failure by
the consumer to comply with the agreement, unless
the consumer rectified the failure within that time;
(c)
of not more than
80, nor less than 40, business days before the expiry date of the
fixed term of the consumer agreement, the supplier
must notify the
consumer in writing or any other recordable form, of the impending
expiry date, including a notice of-
(i)any material changes that would apply if the
agreement is to be renewed or may otherwise continue beyond the
expiry date; and
(ii)the options available to the consumer in terms of
paragraph (d); and
(d)
on the expiry of
the fixed term of the consumer agreement, it will be automatically
continued on a month – to- month basis,
subject to any material
changes of which the supplier has given notice, as contemplated in
paragraph (c), unless the consumer expressly-
(i)directs the supplier to terminate the agreement on
the expiry date; or
(ii)agrees to a renewal of the agreement for a fixed
term.”
[19]
Regulation 5(1) reads
as follows:
“
(1)
For purposes of section 14(4)(a) of the Act, the maximum period of a
fixed term consumer agreement
is 24 months from the date of signature
by the consumer-
(a)
unless such
longer period is expressly agreed with the consumer and the supplier
can show a demonstrable financial benefit to the
consumer;
(b)
unless
differently provided for by regulation in respect of a specific type
of agreement, type of consumer, sector or industry;
or
as provided for in an industry code contemplated in
section 82 of the Act in respect of a specific type of agreement,
type of consumer,
sector or industry.”
[20]
Section 14(2)(a) of the
CPA, read with regulation 5(1) thereto prescribes that the maximum
duration for a fixed term contract is
24 months. This period
may only be extended if the extension thereof was expressly agreed to
with the tenant (the respondent
in this case) and the landlord (the
applicant in this case) could show a demonstrable financial benefit
to the customer.
[2]
[21]
If it is accepted that
section 14(2)(c) of the CPA only allows the tenant, and not the
landlord, the election of whether or not
to terminate the lease
agreement on the expiry thereof, then it has to be accepted that the
agreement would continue pass the legislatively
prescribed period of
24 months in those instances where the lease agreement automatically
continues on a month- to month- basis.
[22]
This would render
section 14(2)(a) read with regulation 5(1) meaningless and would be
contradictory to fixing the maximum period
for fixed term contracts.
[23]
Not only would such an
interpretation result in an irrational situation where landlords are
statutorily forced to continue with
leases at the demand of
tenants,
[3]
it
would also enable tenants to act unscrupulously.
[24]
This interpretation
would be illogical and contrary to sound business practices as it
would compel the landlord to continue with
the lease agreement on a
month- to- month basis as it cannot terminate it on the expiry date,
only then to be allowed to terminate
the lease agreement after it is
automatically converted into a month-to- month agreement.
[25]
If landlords are
statutorily compelled to continue with fixed term contracts pass the
expiry date it may result in increased hesitancy
and /or refusal to
enter into contracts of this nature. Alternatively, it may
result in landlords insisting on detrimental
and prejudicial material
changes to the lease agreement which would apply after renewal simply
as a means of forcing the tenant
to terminate it.
[26]
Neither position would
serve the objectives set out in section 3 of the CPA, nor would it
enhance the protection of consumers.
On the contrary, such an
interpretation would undermine and/or be contrary to the objectives
of section 3, more particularly, those
set out in section 3(1)(a),
(c) and (f).
[27]
Further, the wording of
section 14(2)(c) does not favour the argument that landlords are
prevented from exercising the election
of whether or not to terminate
a fixed term agreement on expiry thereof. Section 14(2)(c)(i)
states that the landlord must
give the tenant notice of any material
changes that would apply
if
the agreement is to be renewed or may otherwise continue beyond the
expiry date
and
the options available to the consumer.
[28]
The word
if
can be used interchangedly with the word
provided.
[4]
By replacing the
word
if
with the word
provided
in section
14(2)(c)(i), it becomes clear that the notice pertaining to material
changes would only be applicable in those circumstances
when the
lease agreement is being renewed or will otherwise continue pass the
expiry date. It follows that section 14(2)(c)(i)
does not
postulate the automatic renewal of the lease agreement. For
completeness, I set out section 14(2)(c)(i) with the
word
provided
instead of the word
if
below:
“
(c)of not more than 80, nor
less than 40, business days before the expiry date if the fixed term
of the consumer agreement, the
supplier must notify the consumer in
writing or any other recordable form, of the impending expiry date,
including a notice of-
(i)any material changes that would apply provided the
agreement is to be renewed or may otherwise continue beyond the
expiry date;
and
(ii)the options available to the consumer in terms of
paragraph (d); and...”
[29]
The use of the word
if
in section 14(2)(c)(i) shows that the landlord has an election to
either renew or terminate the lease agreement on the expiry thereof.
Only in the event that the landlord elects to renew the lease
agreement, then it has to comply with the provisions of section
14(2)(c)(i) and (ii). In the event that it elects not to renew
the agreement, then no obligation exists in terms of section
14(2)(c)(i) and (ii).
[30]
Section 14(2)(c)(i) and
(ii) reflects the consumer’s right to elect whether or not to
renew the lease agreement.
[31]
The lease agreement
would only continue on a month-to-month basis in those circumstances
where the landlord elected to renew the
agreement and when and/or if
the tenant failed to exercise his/her election set out in section
14(2)(d)(i) and(ii).
[32]
The objectives set out
in section 3(1)(a), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of the CPA would be given
effect to by an interpretation of section
14(2)(c) which allows both
the landlord and the tenant the right to either terminate or to renew
the lease agreement on expiry
thereof. Had the CPA only allowed
the tenant this right, it would have hampered and/or skewed fair
business transactions,
with landlords becoming reluctant and/or
refusing to enter into fixed term contracts in circumstances where
they would be forced
remain in such agreements in perpetuity, only
being able to cancel such agreements where the customer breached the
agreement and
failed to remedy same when called upon to do so.
[33]
Section 14(2)(c) makes
it peremptory for the supplier to give the customer notice, of no
less than 40 business days and not more
than 80 business days, of the
impending expiry date of the fixed term contract in writing or any
other recordable form.
[5]
[34]
This notice has to
include
a notice of any material changes that would apply if the agreement is
to be renewed or may otherwise continue beyond the expiry
date; and
the options available to the consumer in such a case. The use
of the word
including
in section 14(2)(c) of the CPA does not connote a limitation but
rather an extension of the circumstances under which the landlord
must give the tenant notice of the impending expiry of the lease
agreement.
[35]
The meaning of the word
including
can also be extracted from the context of the statute in which it is
used.
[6]
As the CPA is aimed at the promotion and advancement of the social
and economic welfare of consumers by
inter
alia
improving
consumer awareness and information and encouraging responsible and
informed consumer choice and behaviour, the use of
the word
including
in section 14(2)(c)
has to be interpreted in such a manner as to ensure that the
consumers are furnished with sufficient and timeous
notice that would
allow them to make informed and responsible decisions pertaining to
the termination and/or renewal and/or their
further conduct
pertaining to the lease agreement.
[36]
Therefore,
section14(2)(c) obliges landlords to give tenants notice of the
impending expiry of the lease agreement, irrespective
of whether or
not the lease agreement is going to be terminated or renewed (with or
without the material changes) on the expiry
thereof.
NON COMPLIANCE WITH CLAUSES 40; 1.2 (C) AND (D) OF
THE AGREEMENT
[37]
On 11 April 2018, the
applicant caused a notice to be hand-delivered to the respondent at
the premises. This notice read as
follows:
“
Dear David
It is recorded that the Agreement of Lease between
yourself and Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd is due expire on 30 June
2018.
This notice serves to advise you of our decision to
not renew this Agreement of Lease. The account remains in
arrears and
the housekeeping is poor. Your last day of
occupation is 30 June 2018.
Please ensure that the premises is reinstated to its
original state including, but not limited to screeded floor, painted
white
walls and an electrical certificate of compliance by 3 June
2018.”
[38]
The founding affidavit states that:
“
On 11 April 2018, I ... hand delivered a
Notice of Termination of the Lease Agreement to the Respondent, and
informed the Respondent
that the Applicant do not wish to renew the
Lease Agreement...”
[7]
[39]
In his answering affidavit, the respondent states
that he received the correspondence during or about 30 May or early
May 2018 at
the business premises
[8]
.
The respondent also denied that he received the notice on 11 April
2018 and stated that he received it on 30 May 2018.
[9]
[40]
However, the respondent does not state how the
notice was brought to his attention or from whom he received it.
[41]
In the circumstances I find that the respondent’s
denial that he received the notice of 11 April 2018 on 30 May 2018 to
be
untenable and/or not genuine and accordingly accept that the
notice was received on 11 April 2018, when it was averred to have
been hand-delivered to him.
[10]
[42]
However, it is common course that this notice was
delivered to the premises whereas the agreement makes provision for
all notices
to be delivered to 11 Union Avenue, Pinelands.
[43]
There is no allegation by the respondent that he
suffered any prejudice as a result of the notice being hand delivered
to him at
the premises instead of being delivered to his
address of 11 Union Avenue, Pinelands. When the notice was hand
delivered
to the respondent, it was pertinently brought to his
attention. Therefore, the objective of the notice was fulfilled
and
the respondent suffered no prejudice.
[11]
[44]
Furthermore, the fact that a
domiciluim
citandi et executandi
has been contractually
chosen is not prohibitive of effective service through one of the
other methods prescribed by the Uniform
Rues of Court. Personal
service is provided for in Uniform Rule 4(1)(a)(i).
[45]
Similarly, Uniform Rule 4(1)(a)(iii) provides for
service by leaving a copy of the document at the place of residence
or business
of the person. Service of the Notice of Motion and
Founding Affidavit was effected in accordance with Uniform Rule
4(1)(a)(iii)
when it was left with a shop assistant at the premises.
[46]
Therefore, there is no merit to the argument that
the application is defective because the notice of 11 April 2018 was
not delivered
to the contractually chosen address of 11 Union Avenue,
Pinelands but was instead hand delivered to the respondent at the
business
address.
[12]
JURISDICTION
[47]
Paragraph 10.9 of the agreement states
that the Magistrate’s Court will have jurisdiction for all
claims arising from the
agreement, if so chosen by the applicant.
[48]
It is clear from paragraph 10.9 that the
applicant had an election whether or not to proceed in the
Magistrate’s Court.
It clearly elected not to.
LOCUS STANDI
[49]
The respondent challenged the
locus
standi
of the applicant to bring the
application. It argued that the Deeds Search showing the
applicant to be the owner of the property
situated at the premises
was insufficient to establish the applicant’s ownership of the
leased property.
[50]
Paragraph 6 of the
founding affidavit reads as follows:
“
The Applicant is the lawful
owner of the immovable property known as:
ERF 161, DE GRENDEL, WESTERN
CAPE PROVINCE
better
known as
SHOP
6, 1 BURGUNDY DRIVE, BURGUNDY ESTATE, WESTERN CAPE PROVINCE
situated in De Grendel in extent of approximately 59.30 (fifty nine
comma three zero) square metres together with the building
thereof
(‘the Premises’). See annexed hereto marked as
annexure “
A”
the Deed Search confirming the aforesaid.”
[51]
In response to
paragraph 6 of the founding affidavit, the respondent stated:
‘
I note the content hereof
save to deny the accuracy of the extent as set out herein, in
particular I deny that the extent of the
shop is 59.30 square meters
as alleged by the applicant and put the applicant to proof
thereof.”
[13]
[52]
Therefore, the
respondent does not dispute the applicant’s allegation that it
is the owner of the leased property.
[53]
The following is common cause:
(i)
the respondent concluded a lease agreement
with the applicant;
[14]
(ii)
the respondent paid rent to the applicant
in respect of the leased property;
[15]
and
(iii)
the respondent
approached the applicant to renew the lease of the property.
[16]
[54]
In light of the above,
I find that the applicant has sufficiently established it’s
locus standi
to
bring this application.
[55]
I have addressed the argument pertaining
to the deponent’s lack of authority to depose to the founding
affidavit in my judgment
on the application to strike and will not
repeat it herein.
CONCLUSION
[56]
In the circumstances I
find that the applicant gave the respondent valid notice of its
intention to terminate the lease agreement
on 18 April 2018 and that
the agreement expired on 30 June 2018.
[57]
Consequently, the
respondent has been in unlawful occupation of shop 6, 1 Burgundy
Drive, Burgundy Estate since 1 July 2018.
[58]
Therefore, I make the
following order:
58.1 it is confirmed that the lease
agreement in respect of shop 6, 1 Burgundy Drive, Burgundy Estate
expired
on 30 June 2018;
58.2 the respondent, who has been in
unlawful occupation of shop 6, 1 Burgundy Drive, Burgundy Estate
since 1
July 2018, is directed to vacate the said premises and to
give the applicant undisturbed possession thereof within 30 days of
the
granting of this order;
58.3 in the event that the respondent
fails and/or refuses to vacate shop 6, 1 Burgundy Drive, Burgundy
Estate
as directed in paragraph 58.2 above, the Sheriff of the above
Honourable Court and/or his deputy and/or the South African Police
Services is authorised to assist the applicant in giving effect to
the order in paragraph 58.2 above; and
58.4 the costs of the application
shall be borne by the respondent.
SLINGERS AJ
Appearances
:
For applicant:
Mr M Van
der Merwe
For respondent:
Mr P Sharuh
[1]
Delport H
Problematic
aspects of the
Consumer Protection Act 28 of 2008
in relation to
property transactions: linked transactions, fixed-term contracts and
unsigned sale agreements
2014 Obiter 60-80
, at page 75
[2]
I have not set out the provisions of
regulation
5(1)(b)
and (c) as they are not relevant to this matter. The
CPA uses the terms
supplier
and
customer
.
In light of the facts of this case, I have used the terms
landlord
and
tenant
in this judgment.
[3]
G Laubscher “
The
Impact of
Section 14
of the
Consumer Protection Act on
fixed term
lease agreements”
at page 157
[Dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of
Magister Legum
at the Potchefstroom Campus of the North-West University, 2016
(Supervisor-Prof SPLR de la Harpe)]
[4]
Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases, 2
nd
edition by R D Claasen, vol 2 at 1-4
[5]
The use of the word “
must”
in
section 14(2)(c)
makes the giving
of notice peremptory.
[6]
De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions,
Witwatersrand Local Division and Others
2004
(1) SA 406 (CC)
[7]
Paragraph 11 of the founding affidavit.
[8]
Paragraph 18 of the answering affidavit.
[9]
Paragraph 77 of the answering affidavit
[10]
Plascon- Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck
Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA 623
(A).
In accordance with the
terms of the lease agreement, it is accepted that the notice was
received on the day of the hand-delivery
thereof.
[11]
Investec Property Fund Limited v Viker X (Pty)
Limited
2016 JDR 0904 (GJ)
[12]
Similarly, the application is not defective as it
was served at the premises and not at the 11 Union Avenue,
Pinelands.
[13]
Paragraph 69 of the answering affidavit
[14]
Paragraphs 8- 12 of the answering affidavit
[15]
paragraphs 13, 16.2, 23, 23.1, 24.2 and 24.3 of
the answering affidavit.
[16]
paragraph 15 of the answering affidavit.