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[2019] ZAECMHC 43
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Ngcele v Minister of Safety & Security and Another (1365/14) [2019] ZAECMHC 43 (20 August 2019)
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Certain
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
[EASTERN
CAPE LOCAL DIVISION, MTHATHA]
[Not
Reportable]
CASE NO: 1365/14
Heard
on: 14/06/19
Delivered
on: 20/08/19
In
the matter between:
THANDEKILE
NGCELE
Plaintiff
and
MINISTER
OF SAFETY & SECURITY
First
Defendant
THE
NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
PROSECUTIONS
Second Defendant
JUDGMENT
NHLANGULELA
DJP
[1]
On 22 May 2014 the plaintiff instituted action proceedings against
the Minister of
Safety and Security and the National Director of
Public Prosecutions claiming payment of R650 000,00 as damages
for unlawful
arrest and detention;
contumelia
and malicious
prosecution. The claims are defended.
[2]
To justify a claim for arrest and detention the Minister must prove
that: (a) the person who arrested the plaintiff
was a peace officer; (b) who
entertained a suspicion (c) the
plaintiff committed a Schedule 1 offence; and (d) the suspicion rests
on reasonable grounds.
See:
Duncan v Minister of Law and
Order
1986 (2) SA 805
(A) at 818 G-H;
Minister of Safety and
Security v Sekhoto & Another
2011 (5) SA 367
(SCA)
at
para 6.
[3]
To succeed in a claim for malicious prosecution against the National
Director of Public
Prosecutions the plaintiff must prove that: (i)
the NPA set the law in motion; (ii) the NPA acted without reasonable
and probable
cause; (iii) the NPA acted with malice; and (iv) that
the prosecution has failed. See:
Minister
for
Justice and Constitutional Development v Moleko
[2008] 3 All SA
47
(SCA) para 8.
[4]
On the behalf of
plaintiff, Mrs Akhona
Magwentshu, Mr Machel Mpangele and Mr Mava Mrwebi appeared in the
witness box and testified. Documentary
evidence was also used
at the trial, namely exhibit “A” (summons); exhibit “B”
(the Arrest Statement by
Mr Mpangele dated 21 September 2012);
exhibit “C” (written statement by Mrs Magwentshu);
exhibit “D” (birth
certificate of Ms M[…] M[…]);
exhibit “E” (written statement of Ms M[…] M[…]
dated 7 August
2012); exhibit “F” (the J88 form dated 08
August 2008); exhibit “G” (warning statement); exhibit
“H”
(written statement of Ms M[…] dated 10
December 2012).
[5]
The admitted facts stated in the particulars of plaintiff’s
claim dated 22 May
2014 are that the plaintiff was a 44-year-old male
person. He was
employed as a
Principal of a school (C[…] J[…] S[…] S[…])
and resides at Ncambedlana Extension, Mthatha.
The first defendant is
the Minister of Safety and Security, Republic of South Africa who is
being sued in his representative capacity
for alleged wrongful arrest
and detention of the plaintiff by Mr Mpangele, a Constable employed
as a policeman and attached to
Bityi Police Station, Mthatha.
The second defendant is the National Director of Public Prosecutions
who is being sued in
his representative capacity for alleged
malicious prosecution of the plaintiff by the DPP of Mthatha.
[6]
The factual background of this case revolves, in the main, around the
discovered documents as aforementioned.
[7]
Mr Mpangele testified that he is the policeman who was responsible
for conducting investigation in this
case. He testified that on Thursday 16 August 2012 at mid-day,
he effected arrest of
the accused based on the criminal docket that
had been opened at the instance of Mrs Magwentshu’s written
report that Ms
M[…] had been raped by the plaintiff.
After receiving that report he interviewed Ms M[…] and
obtained a written
statement which confirmed that she had been raped
by the plaintiff. Thereafter, he referred Ms M[…] to
Sinawe Referral
Centre for medical examination which is reflected in
the J88 form.
[8]
Mr Mpangele was accompanied by Mr Ntongana, the Sergeant in the
SAPS
when he arrested the plaintiff at C[…] School. According to Mr
Mpangele the arrest and detention rights under the Constitution
were
read to the plaintiff at the time and place of arrest. The plaintiff
was allowed to drive his motor vehicle and follow the
police van all
the way to Bity Police Station where a charge of rape was made
formally, his right read to him again and thereafter
detained.
On 20 August 2012 the plaintiff was taken to court. It was on
21 August 2012 that the plaintiff was released
on bail by the
magistrate. The plaintiff’s further attendances in court
culminated in the withdrawal of the charge
on 07 April 2014. Mr
Mpangele merely confirms in his arrest statement that he arrested the
plaintiff based on the rape docket
that he had opened under Bityi Cas
21/08/2012.
[9]
Mrs Magwentshu confirmed that her written statement formed the
basis
upon which the plaintiff was arrested. She stated that the
source of information contained in her statement was the
teacher of
Ms M[…], one Mr Bayanda Nomazele, as well as Ms M[…]
herself. She had first contact with Mr Nomazele
in her office
during July 2012, and was informed that the plaintiff was sexually
abusing Ms M[…]. On her instigation she
requested that Ms M[…]
should be brought to her office for the purposes of confirming the
teacher’s version.
Indeed
,
a meeting took place few days after the
teacher’s report had been received. Ms M[…] gave a
report that the plaintiff
had raped her; whereupon Ms M[…] was
advised to lay a charge of rape against the plaintiff. It came
out of that meeting
that Ms M[…] had reported her ordeal to
her elder sister. But she refused to report the matter to the
police due to
fear that the plaintiff would deny the accusation.
[10]
It bears mentioning at this stage that the first defendant did not
call
Ms M[…] to testify.
Neither were Mr Nomazele, Ms M[…]’s sister and the
doctor, who examined Ms M[…],
called to testify. Yet the
allegation that Ms M[…] was raped by the plaintiff was
evidence of a secondary nature.
These shortcomings were raised
with Mr Mpangele and Mrs Magwentshu when they testified
under
cross-examination. The
reasons why
those potential and necessary witnesses were not called were not
given by the defendant’s witnesses.
[11]
Further issues emerged under cross-examination. They were that
Mr
Mpangele did not investigate the issues
of uncertainty that were raised in the written statement of Mrs
Magwentshu. Mr Mpangele
could not shake-off the version put him
that the reports of Mr Nomazele and Mrs Magwentshu were peddling,
tantamount to a false
claim that Ms M[…] had been raped.
That the J88 form did not disclose of commission of rape was not
disputed by the
defendant’s witness. The defendant’s
witnesses conceded the fact that Ms M[…]’s statement was
not
reliable to the extent that it raised a contradiction as to
whether she was raped on 22 June 2012 or 22 July 2012. They conceded
the fact that the information on Ms M[…]’s statement
that she was a student at Jongibandla JSS in 2012 was incorrect.
They also conceded the fact that it did not make sense for Ms M[…]
to say in her statement that on 25 June 2012 she reported
the rape
(to Mr Mpangele) that took place on 22 July 2012. Consequently,
Mr Mpangele could not advance a plausible reason
as to why he failed
to conduct further investigations on the face of indicators in the
written statements and J88 form that signalled
a need for
verification of the claim of rape before resorting to arresting the
plaintiff.
[12]
The evidence of Mr Mrwebi has a direct bearing on the plaintiff’s
claim based on malicious prosecution.
Indirectly, it also affects the consequent claim for damages
based on
contumelia
.
He testified that he was the prosecutor who was charged with the task
of prosecuting the plaintiff in court. He confirmed
the version
of the plaintiff that prosecution commenced at Bityi Magistrates’
Court on 20 August 2012 and terminated on 07
April 2014 when Mthatha
Regional Court withdrew the charge of
rape
due to lack of evidence. The plaintiff had already pleaded “not
guilty”
at the time when he charge
was withdrawn. I outline herein below the number of occasions
when the plaintiff made appearances
in court without an effort being
made by the DPP to commence the trial:
·
on
20/08/2012 - first appearance and remanded in custody
·
on
21/08/2012 - released on bail and remanded;
·
on
08/10/2012 - appearance
in
regional court
and remanded
on
on bail;
·
on
13/12/2013 - matter struck
from the roll;
·
on
22/07/2013-
re-summoned for trial at the
regional
court
;
·
on 15/08/2013-
remanded on bail;
·
on
07/04/2014- case
withdrawn.
[13]
On each of the occasions when the plaintiff appeared in court Ms
M[..] was not in attendance.
Infact, not a single witness was
subpoenaed by the State. Mr Mrwebi testified further that the
decision taken to prosecute the
plaintiff is as valid today as it was
when it was taken in August 2012. He asserted that the State
still intends to pursue
prosecution against the plaintiff. In
my view the assertion remains hollow by reason that Mr Mrwebi could
not tell how and
when the prosecution is intended to be revived.
[14]
The evidence of Mr Mrwebi was shown during cross-examination to be
preposterous. On the
one hand he maintained that there was a
reasonable cause to prosecute the plaintiff, and that a successful
prosecution was probable.
However, on the other hand, he told
the court that the charge of rape was withdrawn by reasons that Ms
M[…] never attended
court for the purposes of trial. The
State did not subpoena Ms M[..] at any stage; and he (Mrwebi) never
had sight of the
police docket during remand days. He conceded
that he personally did not make an effort to order the investigator
to submit
the docket. As a result
,
he did not interview Ms
M[…] at all. He never even met her. Strangely
though, he contended that the J88 form
and written statements of Mrs
Magwentshu and Ms M[…], which are defective, disclosed a
prima
facie
case of
rape. Suffice it to say that the basis for his conclusion
escapes me.
[15]
The version of the plaintiff, as put to the defendants’
witnesses under cross-examination
as well as when he testified, is
that Mr Mpangele had no reasonable grounds to arrest him because the
facts in his possession at
the time of arrest revealed that he
supinely relied on contradicting facts contained in the written
statements of Ms M[…]
and Mrs Magwentshu, together with the
J88 form that did not confirm the claim that rape occurred.
According to the plaintiff
the rape charge was trumped-up by Mr
Nomazele, a rival for the post of Principalship, with the aim of
influencing the Department
of Education to dismiss the plaintiff from
his post and appoint Mr Nomazele into the same post. In doing
so Mr Nomazele used
Ms M[…] to achieve his ultimate
objective. However, the efforts of Mr Nomazele failed in that
the disciplinary action
pursued by the MEC; failed due to
unavailability of witnesses, including Ms M[…], to support the
charge of rape.
[16]
In my view, the contradictions in the documents used by Mr Mpangele
leave much to be desired.
He could not explain in this Court
why he chose to rely on the statements which showed that Ms M[…]
was raped on 22 June
2012 and on 22 July 2012. He ignored the
fact that the place where the alleged rape was committed was not
disclosed in any
of the discovered statements. Yet Ms M[…]
was an intelligent 15-year-old scholar at the time of the alleged
rape who
would have been best positioned to state her case in court.
He could not without conducting an investigation ascertain why
it was
said in one statement that Ms M[…] reported rape to her elder
sister and stated in another that a report was given
to her brother
and sister. He did not bother to verify the claim by Mrs
Magwenthu that she got to know about the alleged
rape from Mr
Nomazele. He did not bother to find out why the doctor dealing
with a victim who was raped on 22 June 2012 decided
to submit to
medical examination on 08 August 2012. The medical report reads
that Ms M[…]’s hymen was absent
signalling a clinical
feature of penetration coupled with absent vaginal and physical
injuries. Such terms in the J88 form
do not mean that Ms M[…]
was raped. But Mr Mpangele had the audacity to conclude that
rape took place without having
sought medical opinion. I add
herein the observations that I have already made concerning the
concessions made by defendant’s
witnesses during
cross-examination.
[17]
On the facts of this case first defendant has proved that Mr Mpangele
was the arresting officer;
and that he entertained a suspicion that
the plaintiff committed an offence of rape as referred to in Schedule
1 to the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
. Therefore, the
jurisdictional facts in
(a), (b) and (c)
as listed in the case
of
Duncan, supra,
have been met. The same cannot be said
about the fourth jurisdictional fact. For that reason, what the
court is called
upon to decide is, firstly, whether the suspicion
held by Mr Mpangele that the plaintiff had committed the offence of
rape was
based on reasonable grounds.
[18]
In
Mabona and Another v Minister of Law and Order And Others
1988
(2) SA 654
(SE) at 658 E-H Jones J said the following about the test
to be applied in determining the jurisdictional fact of “reasonable
grounds”:
“
The
test of whether a suspicion is reasonably entertained within the
meaning of s 40 (1
)(b)
is objective (
S v Nel and Another
1980
(4) SA 28
(E) at 33H). Would a reasonable man in the second
defendant’s position and possessed of the same information have
considered
that there were good and sufficient grounds for suspecting
that the plaintiffs were guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery or
possession
of stolen property knowing it to have been stolen?
It seems to me that in evaluating his information a reasonable man
would
bear in mind that the section authorises drastic police
action. It authorises an arrest on the strength of a suspicion
and
without the need to swear out a warrant, ie something which
otherwise would be an invasion of private rights and personal
liberty.
The reasonable man will therefore analyse and assess
the quality of the information at his disposal critically, and he
will not
accept it lightly or without checking it where it can be
checked. It is only after an examination of this kind that he
will
allow himself to entertain a suspicion which will justify an
arrest. This is not to say that the information at his disposal
must be sufficiently high quality and cogency to engender in him a
conviction that the suspect is in fact guilty. The section
requires suspicion but not certainty. However, the suspicion
must be based upon solid grounds. Otherwise, it will be
flighty
or arbitrary, and not a reasonable suspicion.”
[19]
On the consideration of evidence adduced in this matter, Mr
Mpangele’s decision to effect
arrest, objectively viewed, does
not pass muster. Mr Mpangele ought to have caused him to conduct
further investigations before
effecting arrest. Mr Mpangele
ought to have known that the power vested in him to effect a
warrantless arrest depended on
a reasonable suspicion on his part
that rape had been committed as is envisaged in Schedule 1 of the
CPA. It is stated in
the case of
De Klerk v Minister of
Police
2018 (2) SACR 28
(SCA) that in an objectively doubtful
situation, such as the one obtaining in this case, the arresting
officer must investigate
the circumstances under which the offence
was allegedly committed. The following was said at para 11 of
the
De Klerk
case:
“
What
is clear is that the arresting officer relied on the statement by the
complainant and the J88 only, when she made the decision
to arrest.
Clearly, seen objectively, that was insufficient. The arresting
officer failed to investigate further the circumstances
of the
assault itself, whether the wound was inflicted intentionally or
whether it came about accidentally during the scuffle.
The
nature and the seriousness of the wound were never investigated.
The arresting officer wrongly assumed that the assault
was committed
with intent to do grievous bodily harm and that the offence is listed
in Schedule 1. Arrest without a warrant
in these circumstances
was not lawfully permissible.”
[20]
The issue regarding the exercise of discretion whether or not he
ought to have effected arrest
does not arise in this case. Much
as counsel for the parties were tempted to deal with that issue, the
pleadings in this
case did not warrant that it be judicially
determined by this Court. That much is confirmed in
Sekhoto,
supra,
at paras 50 and 57.
[21]
In this case the detention of the plaintiff from 16-20 August 2012
would have been lawful only
if his arrest was also lawful. In
this regard, it is apposite to mention the statement in
Minister
of Safety and Security v
Tyokwana
2015 (1) SACR 597
(SCA)
at para 38, which read:
“
To
summarise, what was decided
in
Isaacs
[
Isaacs
v Minister van Wet en Orde]
is that the prior lawful arrest of a person is not a prerequisite to
the
provisions
of s 50(1) of the CPA coming into effect. Put differently, it was
held that the fact
,
that
the person may have been arrested unlawfully, does not preclude him
or her from being remanded lawfully in terms of s 50(1)
of the CPA.
However, what was not held in
Isaac
s
is
that an arrested person’s continued
detention,
by
virtue of an order of court remanding him or her in custody in terms
of s 50(1) of the CPA, will automatically render such continued
detention lawful. This was not an issue that the court in
Isaacs
was
called upon to adjudicate”.
[22]
However, the subsequent detention until 21 August 2012 was lawful
because it had been authorised
by the court based on the submission
made by the prosecutor that a trial was necessary. See:
Minister of Police and Another v Du Plessis
2014 (1) SACR 217
(SCA) where the following was stated at para 28:
“
Once
an arrestee is brought before a court, in terms of s 50 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA), the police’s
authority
to detain, inherent in the power of arrest, is exhausted. In
this regard see
Minister
of Safety and Security v Sekhoto and Another
2011
(1) SACR 315
(SCA)
(2011 (5) SA 367
;
[2011] 2 All SA 157)
para 42.
As pointed out by Campbell AJ in the court below, before the court
makes a decision on the continued detention of
an arrested person
comes the decision of the prosecutor to charge such a person. A
prosecutor has a duty not to act arbitrarily.
A prosecutor must act
with objectivity and must protect the public interest
.
”
[23]
Mr Mrwebi owned up the decision made to prosecute the plaintiff.
He told the court that
his decision was based on docket brought to
him by Mr Mpangele, which contained the written statement of Ms
Mqulo, the J88 form
and the written statement of Mrs Magwentshu.
He did not consider it as necessary to consult the doctor who
produced the J88
form, Ms M[…], Mrs Magwentshu and other
potential witnesses. Neither did he subpoena those persons for
the purposes
of trial. He contented himself with merely keeping
the matter on the roll for trial despite not having made preparations
for it. Strange enough he was adamant that the prosecution will
be re-instated despite the fact that on 07 April 2014 the
regional
magistrate withdrew the charge for lack of evidence. He
regarded his stand-point as being correct to the extent
that his
decision to re-instate the prosecution was an exercise of
prosecutorial prerogative. But sadly, the attitude of
Mr Mrwebi
reflects misunderstanding of his obligations as expressed in
Du
Plessis, supra,
at paras 30-31 as follows:
“
A
prosecutor exercises a discretion on the basis of the information
before him or her. In
S v Lubaxa
2001 (2) SACR 703
(SCA)
(2001 (4) SA 1251
;
[2002] 2 All SA 107)
para
19 this court said the following:
‘
Clearly
a person ought not to be prosecuted in the absence of a minimum of
evidence upon which he might be convicted, merely in
the expectation
that at some stage he might incriminate himself. That is
recognised by the common-law principle that there
should be
reasonable and probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty
of an offence before a prosecution is initiated and
the
constitutional protection afforded to dignity and personal freedom (s
10 and s 12) seems to reinforce it. It ought to
follow that if
a prosecution is not to be commenced without that minimum of
evidence, so too should it cease when the evidence
finally falls
below that threshold.’
Courts
are not overly eager to limit or interfere with the legitimate
exercise of prosecutorial authority. However, a prosecuting
authority’s discretion to prosecute is not immune from the
scrutiny of a court which can intervene where such a discretion
is
improperly exercised. See generally
National Director of
Public Prosecutions v Zuma
[2009] ZASCA 1
;
2009 (1) SACR 361
(SCA)
(2009 (2) SA
277
;
2009 (4) BCLR 393
;
[2008] 1 All SA 197)
para 37. Indeed a
court should be obliged to, and therefore ought to, intervene if
there is no reasonable and probable cause
to believe that the accused
is guilty of an offence before a prosecution is initiated.”
[24]
Even when the second written statement of Ms M[…] dated 10
December 2012 was read to Mrwebi
during cross-examination, in which
Ms M[…] states that in truth the plaintiff never raped her, he
clung obstinately to his
decision to pursue the prosecution at the
expense of the plaintiff’s right not to be deprived of his
freedom arbitrarily
or without just cause as entrenched in s 12 (1)
(a)
of the Constitution. See:
Zealand v Minister of
Justice and Constitutional Development and Another
[2008] ZACC 3
;
2008 (4) SA
458
(CC) where the following was said at para 52:
“
I
can think of no reason why an unjustifiable breach of s 12 (1)
(a)
of the Constitution should not be sufficient to establish
unlawfulness for the purposes of applicant’s delictual action
of unlawful
or
wrongful detention.”
[25]
It is my finding that the second defendant would be liable for the
wrongful detention of the
plaintiff on 20-21 August 2012 had a claim
for unlawful detention in respect of that day been made against it.
[26]
In so far as the claim for malicious prosecution is concerned, the
second defendant is proved
by the evidence to have been liable to
damages arising from it. Mr Mrwebi instigated the prosecution
of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff has also succeeded to prove
that Mr Mrwebi had no reasonable grounds to prosecute him.
Therefore, the test
laid down in the case of
Moleko,
supra,
at
para 64 is met. The test reads:
“
The
defendant must thus not only have been aware of what he or she was
doing in instituting or initiating the prosecution, but must
at least
have foreseen the possibility that he or she was acting wrongfully,
but nevertheless continued to act, reckless as to
the consequences of
his or her conduct (
dolus
eventualis
).”
[27]
Consequently, not only has the plaintiff proved that the second
defendant instigated the prosecution,
and that the prosecution had
failed, but he has also proved that Mr Mrwebi acted without
reasonable and probable cause and with
malice.
[28]
In summary, the first defendant is liable to pay damages arising from
unlawful arrest and detention
for a period of four days (16 August
2012-19 August 2012); as well as
contumelia
. The second
defendant is liable to pay damages arising from malicious
prosecution. What remains is the proper assessment
of these
damages.
[29]
Regard being had to the facts of this case, the proper approach to be
applied in assessing damages
is to consider previously decided cases
of comparable values; but without allowing the process to fetter upon
the court’s
general discretion (
Protea
Assurance Co Ltd v Lamb
1971
(1) SA 530
(AD) at pp 535H-536A). It is important for the court
to reflect in the awards of damages preferred the personal liberties
of the plaintiff, the degree in which such liberties have been
undermined and the rising standards of living (
RAF
v Marunga
2003
(5) SA 164
(SCA) at 170F-G). Above all, “it is important
to bear in mind that the primary purpose is not to enrich the
aggrieved
party but to offer him or her some much-needed
solatium
for his or her
injured feelings” (
Minister
of Safety and Security v Tyulu
2009
(5) SA 85
(SCA) at 93F).
[30]
There is no need to recount the personal circumstances of the
plaintiff and those circumstances
surrounding the manner in which his
personal freedom was maliciously undermined by both Mr Mpangele and
Mr Mrwebi. The prison
cell condition that the plaintiff was
subjected to is, generally, as appalling as are those found in most
other prisons situated
in the Transkei area. Filth, poor
service delivery and over-crowding are the common features in those
prisons.
[31]
Suffice is to say that the arrest, detention and prosecution of the
plaintiff lowered his esteem
in the eyes of the school community of
Centuli. The school enrolment dropped. The department was
led to subject him
to a hearing for misconduct. The motive
behind the charge for rape and misconduct was an ulterior one.
He has not received
an apology from his accused up to this day.
However, there is not proven psychological sequelae to the arrest,
detention
and prosecution of the plaintiff in this matter.
[32]
I find helpful guidelines in the case of
Johanna Janse Van
Rensburg v The Minister of Safety and Security
(ECG) unreported
case no: 2344/09 of 17 March 2011 on the legal principles, already
referred to, which apply to this matter.
In that matter damages
were fixed in the sum of R120 000,00 for unlawful police arrest
and detention of a woman for two hours
coupled with inhuman treatment
that led to PTSD. In the case of
Rudolph and Others v
Minister of Safety and Security and Another
2009 (5) SA 94
(SCA)
the court awarded damages in the sum of R100 000,00 for wrongful
police arrest and detention for 4 days in a police
cell. A sum
of R400 000,00 claimed in this case will be way too high.
In my view a sum of R200 000,00 is
an appropriate award to be
made.
[33]
The damages claim for malicious prosecution for which the second
defendant is held liable to
make good would not reasonably be met at
R200 000,00. The falsity of the charge of rape proffered
against the plaintiff
and the suspense that he was placed into
between 20 August 2012 until the charge was withdrawn on 07 April
2014 was caused by a
conduct that was so malicious on the part of the
second defendant that an award of R50 000,00 made in the case of
Rudolph, supra,
in 2009 becomes negligible. I consider
an amount of R100 000,00 to be an appropriate measure of
damages.
[34]
The success that the plaintiff has achieved in the matter entitles
him to the costs of suite.
[35] In
the result the following order shall issue:
1. The
first defendant be and is hereby held liable to pay damages for
wrongful arrest, detention and
contumelia
in the sum of
R200 000,00.
2. The
second defendant be and is hereby held liable to pay damages for
malicious prosecution in the of R100 000,00.
3. Both
the first and second defendants to pay costs of suite jointly and
severally; the one paying and the other
being absolved from
liability.
_________________________
________
______________
Z. M. NHLANGULELA
DEPUTY
JUDGE PRESIDENT OF THE HIGH COURT
MTHATHA
Attorney
for the plaintiff :
Mr S.L. Mgxaji
:c/o Mgxaji & Co Inc
MTHATHA.
Counsel
for the defendant : Adv.
A. Mdeyide
Instructed
by
: Office of the State
Attorney
MTHATHA.