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[2019] ZAKZDHC 1
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Sewpersad v S (D13878/18) [2019] ZAKZDHC 1 (18 January 2019)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL
LOCAL DIVISION, DURBAN
CASE
NO. D13878/18
In
the matter between:
SACHIN
SEWPERSAD APPELLANT
and
THE
STATE RESPONDENT
O R D E R
The
appellant’s appeal against the refusal to admit him to bail is
dismissed
J U D G M E N T
Henriques
J
Introduction
[1]
This is an appeal against the refusal by Magistrate Coetser
,
presiding in the Ramsgate Magistrate’s Court on 28 November
2018, to admit the appellant to bail. On 10 January 2019, I issued
the order and indicated reasons were to follow in a written
judgment. This is the written judgment.
Offences
[2]
The appellant is charged with fraud, in the matter which formed the
subject matter of the bail proceedings in the court a quo.
Although no formal charge sheet forms part of the record it would
appear from the transcript of the proceedings that the charge
faced
by the appellant was one of fraud in the sum of R350 000.
[3]
At the commencement of the bail proceedings it was agreed with the
appellant’s legal representative that he bore the onus
to
satisfy the court that the interests of justice permit his release on
bail as the offence fell under Schedule 5 of the Criminal
Procedure
Act 51 of 1977 (‘the CPA’).
[4]
During the course of the bail proceedings, the respondent, in
opposing the granting of bail, led the
viva
voce
evidence of the
investigating officers Warrant Officer de Witt and Warrant Officer
van der Merwe. After the respondent presented
evidence, the
appellant elected not to testify and filed an affidavit in support of
his bail application. The original signed
affidavit does not
form part of the record of these proceedings. At the
commencement of the matter, Mr
Winfred
confirmed that the unsigned
affidavit
[1]
is an exact replica of the affidavit used in the court a quo.
[5]
In the judgment in the bail application, the court a quo considered
the affidavit of the appellant and the evidence of the two
investigating officers.
[6]
In her judgment
[2]
the magistrate considered the following:
(a)
the issue for her to decide was whether or not it
would be in the interests of justice for the appellant to be released
on bail;
(b)
that there were three matters pending in which
the complainants are to still make statements for charges to be
opened;
(c)
the fact that in total the appellant faced seven
counts of fraud across the country which are cases pending in court;
(d)
that these
pending fraud matters span a period of time from 2016 to 2018
[3]
;
(e)
that she
did not have to decide whether or not the appellant was guilty
[4]
;
(f)
competing
interests-the appellant’s right to liberty as opposed to the
interests of the community
[5]
;
(g)
that
although she could not find that the appellant would evade trial or
interfere with witnesses, the appellant had a propensity
to commit
fraud offences and faces a number of counts in various courts
[6]
;
(h)
that
although the appellant had not been convicted of the offences, he was
facing several counts across the country and she was
of the view that
if he were to be released on bail the appellant will continue with
his ‘fraudulent activities’
[7]
;
(i)
that there
was a warrant of arrest pending for the appellant which had not
been executed and evidence was led by the investigating
officer,
Warrant Officer van der Merwe, that such warrant of arrest would be
executed
[8]
once the bail
proceedings had been concluded.
[7]
The nub of the court a quo’s judgment is that the magistrate
was of the view that the appellant had not satisfied the
court that
the requirements set out in s 60(11)(b) had been met in that he
had failed to prove on a balance of probabilities
that it would be in
the the interests of justice’
[9]
for him to be released on bail.
The
affidavit of the appellant
[8]
The appellant in his affidavit deals with his personal circumstances,
his lack of previous convictions, his non-attendance at
court and his
adherence to bail conditions. Notably the appellant does not
indicate in his affidavit whether he intends to
plead guilty or not
guilty to the current offence and he also does not deal with the
respondent’s case against him, specifically
the evidence of the
investigating officers relating to the three pending cases; the fact
that he currently faces seven counts of
fraud; the evidence in
respect of the doctors’ certificate; his failure to comply with
the request for him to make a statement
in the current matter, and an
undertaking to repay the complainant.
[9]
The appellant’s affidavit deals to a limited extent with the
requirements envisaged in terms of section 60(4) to s 60(9)
of the
CPA, and, in the last paragraph
[10]
thereof, he submits that he has discharged the onus to show it is in
the ‘interests of justice’ that he be released
on bail.
The
respondent’s opposition
[10]
The investigating officers, Warrant Officers De Witt and Van Der
Merwe, in essence testified that the respondent’s basis
for
opposing bail were the following reasons, namely:
(a)
the appellant is considered a flight risk;
(b)
he does not have a fixed address;
(c)
the appellant did not comply with his bail
conditions and failed to make a court appearance submitting a
doctor’s certificate
which prima facie appeared to be false
when compared to cell phone records;
(d)
he has a propensity to commit similar offences as
there are currently seven similar fraud matters pending in various
courts throughout
the country;
(e)
there are currently three fraud matters in
respect of which the complainants, for reasons stated in the record,
have not yet been
able to make affidavits in order for charges of
fraud to be opened;
(f)
since his arrest on 19 November 2018 there have
been similar cases opened for similar offences;
(g)
there is a pending warrant of arrest for the
appellant which has yet to be executed;
(h)
in respect of the
complaint registered in Port Shepstone on 21 August 2018 (Port
Shepstone Cas 346/8/2018),the appellant was requested
to provide a
warning statement prior to a warrant for his arrest being obtained.
He failed to comply with the telephonic
undertakings to provide a
warning statement and promised to repay the complainant the money.
Grounds
of appeal
[11]
The appellant noted an appeal on 12 December 2018 against the refusal
of bail and the grounds for such appeal are recorded
in the detailed
notice of appeal
[11]
.
In addition, the transcript of proceedings containing the court a
quo’s judgment, the viva voce evidence presented
at the
bail hearing and the magistrates’ reasons for refusing bail
were filed simultaneously with the notice of appeal and
a request for
reasons. I am not certain why this was done, nor why a
threatening letter was sent on 14 December 2018
[12]
demanding that the magistrate provide reasons for her ruling on the
same day. Although the section makes provision for the
judgment
and reasons to be requested, it is clear on a mere reading of the
transcript, that an
ex
tempore
judgment including
the reasons was delivered by the magistrate on the day that she
refused to admit the appellant to bail.
[12]
At the hearing of the matter, I raised this with Mr
Winfred
who appeared for the
appellant, and he indicated that the appeal was properly before me
and could be dealt with on the papers and
no further reasons were
required. (In addition the appellant’s legal representatives
indicated as much in the heads of argument
[13]
).
Submissions
of the parties
Appellant
[13]
In his heads of argument, Mr
Winfred
submits that the court a
quo failed to apply its mind to whether or not the appellant would
stand trial. The court a quo
did not apply itself in any manner
as to whether or not grounds existed for the appellant to abscond or
forfeit his bail.
The court did not take into account the
appellant’s emotional state, his occupational status, his
family roots, his assets
and how strong the case against him was, to
determine how much of an inducement it would be for him to stand
trial. Most
importantly the court a quo over-emphasised the
fact that the appellant had pending cases against him and it was
submitted relied
on the investigating officers’
ipse dixit
‘without even a shred of
prima facie
evidence’.
[14]
He submitted that there was no evidence before the magistrate to make
a finding that the appellant had a propensity to commit
offences of
this nature or that the investigating officer intended to execute a
warrant of arrest for the appellant in an unrelated
fraud matter.
At the hearing of the matter he indicated that the state’s case
against the appellant was very weak and
the court a quo ought to have
called for additional evidence to be led. This submission was
made despite the fact that he
conceded that the appellant bore the
onus to show it was in the interests of justice for him to be
released on bail on a balance
of probabilities.
[15]
In addition when it was pointed out to him that the affidavit of the
appellant did not deal with any of the
viva voce
evidence of
the investigating officers, he rather reluctantly acknowledged that
there were some deficiencies in the appellant’s
case. He
submitted however that the court a quo ought to have thus called for
additional evidence in this regard despite
the fact that the
appellant was legally represented in the court a quo and his legal
representatives did not challenge any of this
evidence during the
course of cross-examination and elected not to supplement the
appellant’s affidavit in any way to deal
with these aspects.
Respondent
[16]
Mr
MacDonald
submitted that the court a quo did not err in
refusing to admit the appellant to bail and that although the
appellant had no previous
convictions there are pending matters
against him for similar offences as well as a warrant of arrest which
will be executed.
The undisputed evidence before the court a
quo was that the appellant had defrauded the complainant in the sum
of R350 000
and that the appellant had undertaken to repay the
amount.
[17]
Although Mr
MacDonald
rightfully concedes that the appellant
does not have any previous convictions, and that one must assume he
intends to plead not
guilty in respect of this particular matter, it
is undeniable that there is unchallenged evidence which suggests that
between the
period 2016 to 2018 there were a number of similar
offences committed in respect of which the appellant may be charged
and in fact
there are seven counts in respect of which he has already
been charged for fraud. In particular, the two counts in the
Durban
Magistrates’ Court involve approximately R8 million.
[18]
In addition he indicated that despite the submissions of Mr
Winfred
to the contrary, there was a prima facie case which the appellant
failed to address in his affidavit or challenge during
cross-examination,
and submitted that there was no obligation on the
court a quo to call for any additional evidence if the appellant’s
legal
representative failed to do so.
The
bail appeal
[19]
This appeal is brought in terms of s 65 of the CPA and this court
must therefore consider the appeal in accordance with s 65(4)
which
reads as follows:
‘
The
court or judge hearing the appeal shall not set aside the decision
against which the appeal is brought, unless such court or
judge is
satisfied that the decision was wrong, in which event the court or
judge shall give the decision which in its or his opinion
the lower
court should have given
.’
[20]
In applying the provisions of s 65(4) the court hearing the bail
appeal must approach it on the assumption that the decision
of the
court a quo is correct and not interfere with the decision, unless it
is satisfied that it is wrong.
[14]
This is where the court states the following:-
It
is well known that the powers of this Court are largely limited where
the matter comes before it on appeal and not as a substantive
application for bail. This Court has to be persuaded that the
magistrate exercised the discretion which he has wrongly.
Accordingly,
although this Court may have a different view, it
should not substitute its own view for that of the magistrate because
that
would be an unfair interference with the magistrate's exercise
of his discretion. I think it should be stressed that, no matter
what
this Court's own views are, the real question is whether it can be
said that the magistrate who had the discretion to grant
bail
exercised that discretion wrongly'
Schedule
5 offences
[21]
In respect of schedule 5 offences, the onus is on the appellant to
satisfy the court that the interests of justice permit his
release on
bail. In respect of the test for ‘interests of justice’,
the bail application must start on the premise
that the continued
detention of the appellant is the norm.
[15]
This applies equally to both Schedule 5 and 6 offences in my view.
[22]
A presiding officer must weigh up the personal interests of the
appellant against the interests of justice as it appears from
all
the evidence presented. Consequently, this court must consider
whether on the facts and the evidence presented in the court a quo,
the magistrate misdirected herself or erred when she found that the
appellant had failed to satisfy the court on a balance of
probabilities that the interests of justice permitted his release on
bail. The court was required to make a value judgment
and
evaluate the strength of the state’s case.
[16]
[23]
In
S v Yanta
[17]
the court was of the view that on a proper construction of s 60(11)
of the CPA the interests of society and the proper and
effective administration of the criminal justice system are “supreme”
and the personal interests of an accused
are secondary.
[24]
In
S v Hudson
[18]
the court held the following:
‘
.
. . the expectation of a substantial sentence of imprisonment would
undoubtedly provide an incentive to the appellant to abscond
and
leave the country . . .’
And
further that:
[19]
‘
where
an accused applies for bail and confirms on oath that he has no
intention of absconding due weight has of course to be given
to this
statement on oath. However, since an accused who does have such
an intention is hardly likely to admit it, implicit
reliance cannot
be placed on the mere say-so of the accused. The court should
examine the circumstances.’
[25]
In
S v Schietekat
[20]
Slomowitz AJ stated the following:
‘
Bail
proceedings are
sui
generis . . .
The
state is thus not obliged in its turn to produce evidence in the true
sense. It is not bound by the same formality.
The court
may take account of whatever information is placed before it in order
to form what is essentially an opinion or value
judgment of what an
uncertain future holds. It must prognosticate. To do this
it must necessarily have regard to whatever
is put up by the State in
order to decide whether the accused has discharged the
onus
. . .’
[26]
Subsections 60(4)(a) to (e) of the CPA sets out the grounds, which if
established, would not permit the release of the appellant
on bail in
the interests of justice, namely:
‘
(a)
where there is the likelihood
that the accused, if he or she were released on bail, will endanger
the safety of the public or any
particular person or will commit a
Schedule 1 offence;
(b)
where there is the likelihood
that the accused, if he or she were released on bail, will attempt to
evade his or her trial; or
(c)
where there is the likelihood
that the accused, if he or she were released on bail, will attempt to
influence or intimidate witnesses
or to conceal or destroy evidence;
or
(d)
where there is the likelihood
that the accused, if he or she were released on bail, will undermine
or jeopardise the objectives
or the proper functioning of the
criminal justice system, including the bail system;
(e)
where in exceptional
circumstances there is the likelihood that the release of the accused
will disturb the public order or undermine
the public peace or
security’
[27]
Section 60(5) to s 60(9) details the factors to be considered when
having regard to subsections 60(4)(a) to (e).
[28]
I have had regard to the proceedings in the court a quo, the
appellant’s affidavit, the judgment, and the transcript
of the
evidence presented. I cannot find that the court a quo
misdirected itself in any way in reaching the conclusion that
it did.
[29]
In deciding whether the appellant had discharged the onus, one cannot
read his affidavit in isolation and only have regard
to his personal
circumstances. One cannot ignore the evidence under oath of the two
investigating officers in relation to the seven
accounts currently
being faced by the appellant as well as the evidence given under oath
in respect of the matter which is pending
before the Sandton
magistrate’s court and the matters under investigation.
In addition the court cannot ignore the
evidence which has come to
light since the arrest of the appellant on 19 November 2018.
One must weigh this evidence
against the version of the appellant as
deposed to in his affidavit. This must be considered in
deciding whether the appellant
had discharged the onus on a balance
of probabilities before the court a quo.
[30]
In my view, the court a quo was correct in finding that when weighed
against this evidence, the appellant had not discharged
the onus on a
balance of probabilities showing that the interests of justice
permitted his release on bail. The appellant
had a fair
opportunity to deal with the allegations and the
viva voce
evidence of the two investigating officers but elected not to do so.
Apart from indicating that he intended pleading not
guilty to this
particular count, very little if anything was said on oath in
relation to the seven other pending counts.
Nor did he say
anything in respect of the evidence presented concerning the pattern
of activities that were uncovered by the investigating
officers since
his arrest.
[31]
In addition he did not comment on the strength or otherwise of the
state’s case but elected to confine himself to the
following,
namely:
‘
.
. . [8] I state that the State will not be able to present any
objective facts that I committed a planned or premeditated the
offence for which I am charged herein after I was released on bail in
the other matter (the Durban matter).’
‘
[9]
For
all intents and purposes the allegations against me herein occurred
in the same time frame as the other offences (in the Durban
matter)’.
[21]
[32]
In respect of what he refers to as two so-called offences, he submits
the following:
‘
[12]
. . . one in Van der Bijl Park (I submit that I charged the client
R2 800.00 for accounting work, this charge I clearly
have a
defence too) as I performed accounting work for the client
.’
‘
.
.
.
Another
charge emanates from the Sandton area. Here I loaned a guy
money and had taken as security his ring and watch.
These two
matters have no bearing on the charges I currently face.’
[22]
‘
.
. . Further, I believe that a certain Warrant Officer van der Merwe
has a warrant for my arrest. Again, this so-called charge
is an
old charge and was not “committed during my bail in the Durban
matter.’
[23]
[33]
The appellant despite having sufficient opportunity to deal with the
allegations presented in evidence elected not to do so.
This is
surprising given the fact that the state presented its evidence prior
to the appellant presenting the affidavit sworn to
under oath I am
not certain why the respondent presented evidence first. Nothing more
need however be said about the form of procedure
involved as the
proceedings occurred over two days and sufficient opportunity had
been given to the appellant to deal with same.
In addition, the
procedure followed in the court a quo was not an issue raised on
appeal.. He certainly could have utilised
the opportunity to
deal with this either by supplementing the affidavit or during
cross-examination of the state witnesses by his
legal
representative.
[34]
The strength of the state’s case is a relevant factor to be
taken into account
[24]
.
The respondent appears to have had a ‘prima facie’
[25]
case against the appellant. Evidence was placed before the
court which stood uncontradicted in light of the appellant’s
failure to deal with same. The court a quo can therefore not be
faulted nor criticized for the reliance and weight attached
to the
evidence presented by the respondent as opposed to that of the
appellant.
[35]
Insofar as his personal circumstances are concerned the appellant
does not indicate how he is employed and where he is employed,
and no
information further was placed before the court apart from the fact
that he was a qualified financial accountant.
In addition he
appears to have conceded that although he resided in Morningside,
Johannesburg he regarded his parents’ home
in Marburg as his
home. In his affidavit he contents himself with the following
explanation, namely:
‘
I
have never attempted to flee but do concede to living in Johannesburg
for a while, which will now come to an end.
’
[26]
[36]
This appears to lend some credence to the investigating officers’
evidence that the appellant did not have a fixed address
and appeared
to have resided both in Johannesburg and KwaZulu-Natal.
[37]
One of the factors which weighed heavily with the court a quo related
to the propensity of the appellant to commit similar
offences.
This certainly is a factor that must be considered by the court (see
S
v Mathebula
[27]
).
Although this
judgment dealt with a Schedule 6 and not a Schedule 5 offence, this
approach has been endorsed by the Supreme Court
of Appeal in
Sewela
referred to hereinbelow. The failure by the appellant to deal with
the evidence adduced by the respondent can only justify one
conclusion in my view, and that is the prima facie strength of the
respondent’s case. The failure by the appellant to deal
with
this evidence in his affidavit or during cross-examination was a
factor to be considered in determining if the appellant discharged
the onus.
[38]
I am fortified in this view having regard to the decision in
Sewela
v S
(731/10)
[2010] ZASCA 159
(1 December 2010), in which the
court at paragraph 11 said the following:
‘
.
. . The fact that the current offences were allegedly committed
whilst the fraud case in Phokeng was pending suggests that the
appellant either has a propensity to commit fraud or is disrespectful
of law and order. In determining whether an applicant for
bail, may,
if released on bail commit further offences, a court, not being
blessed with some prophetic foresight, can legitimately
rely on the
past alleged conduct of such an applicant. The appellant’s
alleged conduct points to a possibility which cannot
be said to be
remote or fanciful that he is likely to continue to commit further
crimes should he be released on bail. To release
the appellant on
bail under these circumstances would, to my mind, not be in the
interests of justice as it is likely to seriously
undermine the
criminal justice system including the bail system itself. I have no
doubt that it will seriously undermine and erode
the confidence of
the right thinking members of society in our criminal justice system.
See s 60 (4) (d) of the CPA.’
[39]
Fraud is a serious offence. The fact that it is recognised as a
serious offence is demonstrated by the legislature enacting
the
prescribed minimum sentences
[28]
which provides for an accused convicted of corruption or fraud to be
sentenced to imprisonment for a period ranging from 15 to
25 years
depending on whether or not the accused is a first, second, third, or
subsequent offender.
[40]
The number of pending charges faced by the appellant at the time of
the bail application and the uncontradicted evidence presented
that
there are likely to be further charges laid, would in my view,
certainly weigh heavily in the consideration as to whether
or not the
appellant would likely evade his trial. The evidence of the
investigating officer that the number of pending cases
affects the
resolve of the appellant to evade trial cannot be faulted. Such
opinion was not controverted or challenged in
any way
[29]
and the court a quo was on the facts of the current matter entitled
to rely on same.
[41]
In addition, the merits of a further submission made by Mr
MacDonald
cannot be underestimated,
namely that, given the number of counts faced by the appellant; the
pending Sandton case; the possibility
of three further charges being
laid, and the value of the alleged fraud in the two Durban matters
being approximately R8 million,
if the appellant was released on bail
this would undermine or jeopardise the objectives and/or the proper
functioning of the criminal
justice system. In
S
v Patel
[30]
the court referred to an English decision R v Phillips in which
it was held ‘that it was undesirable to grant
bail where
there was a likelihood of a repetition of the offence by the person
asking for bail’
.
In addition at 568A-B of
the judgment, the court noted as follows:
‘
It
seems to me that an applicant’s past record, his actions
immediately prior to the application for bail and particularly
while
he was out on bail in respect of another charge, may be relevant
factors, particularly when they indicate a propensity to
commit a
particular type of crime.
’
It
is a matter of record that the appellant currently faces seven counts
of fraud.
[42]
I am cognisant of the fact that in exercising a judicial discretion,
a court must consider the totality of the evidence
[31]
and decide the matter on the probabilities
[32]
.
This court of appeal, like the court a quo, is fully cognisant that
the Constitution provides that no person ought to be
deprived of his
freedom arbitrarily, and if it is in the interest of justice to do
so, an arrested person is entitled to be released
from detention on
bail.
[43]
However, s 60 of the CPA has been promulgated to regulate the
granting or the release from detention in respect of serious
crimes
and must accordingly be implemented with due regard to the guidelines
provided by the Act and the decided cases. As
was held in
S
v Green & another
[33]
:
‘
It
is clear from s 60(10) that the court’s function in a bail
application is intended to be more proactive than in normal
criminal
proceedings
.
As it
was put in the
Dlamini
decision (at para 11
), “
a
bail hearing is a unique judicial function” and the
“inquisitorial powers of the presiding officer are greater”
.’
[44]
Having considered the transcript of the proceedings and the judgment
of the court a quo I am not persuaded on the merits of
the appeal.
I am also unable to find that the court a quo was wrong in the
exercise of its judicial discretion in finding
that the appellant had
failed to discharge the onus permitting his release on bail
[34]
.
[45]
In the result the following order will issue:
‘
The
appellant’s appeal against the refusal to admit him to bail is
dismissed’
.
____________
Henriques
J
CASE
INFORMATION
Appearances:
Counsel
for the Appellant: Mr N G Winfred
Instructed
by: S P Attorneys Incorporated
27
Autumn Street, Waterford, Rivonia, Sandton
Ref:
Mr S Pillay/
Tel:
(081) 306 9009
Fax:
086 675 0734
Email:
sumen@spalaw.co.za
Counsel
for the Respondent: Mr D C MacDonald
Instructed
by: The Director of Public Prosecutions
KwaZulu-Natal
Date
of Argument: 10 January 2019
Date
of Order: 10 January 2019
Date
of Written Judgment: 18 January 2019
[1]
Pages 34 to 39 of the indexed papers.
[2]
Transcript pages 29 to 31 of the indexed papers.
[3]
Transcript page 29 lines 17 to 20 of the indexed papers.
[4]
Transcript page 30 lines 3 to 5 of the indexed papers.
[5]
Transcript page 30 lines 5 to 7 of the indexed papers.
[6]
Transcript page 30 lines 12 to 18 of the indexed papers.
[7]
Transcript page 30 lines 19 to 22 of the indexed papers.
[8]
Transcript page 30 lines 22 to 24 of the indexed papers.
[9]
Transcript page 30 lines 1 and 2 of the indexed papers.
[10]
Appellant’s affidavit page 39 of the indexed papers.
[11]
Indexed papers, pages 42 to 48.
[12]
Transcript page 51 and 52 of the indexed papers.
[13]
Heads of Argument, pages 56-58 of the indexed papers.
[14]
S v Mbele & another
1996 (1) SACR 212
(W) at
221H-I;
S v Barber
1979 (4) SA 218
(D) at 220E-F.
[15]
Section 60(11)(b). See also
S
v Dlamini; S v Dladla & others; S v Joubert; S v Schietekat
[1999] ZACC 8
;
1999
(2) SACR 51
(CC) at 84C-E and 85.
[16]
S v van Wyk
2005
(1) SACR 41 (SCA).
[17]
S v Yanta
2000 (1) SACR 237
(Tk) at 249C-D.
[18]
S v Hudson
[1980] 1 All SA 130
(D) at 131.
[19]
S v Hudson
[1980] 1 All SA 130
(D) at 133.
[20]
S v Schietekat
1998 (2) SACR 707
(C) at 713H-J.
[21]
Appellant’s affidavit,page 35 indexed papers
[22]
Appellant’s affidavit,page 36 indexed papers
[23]
Appellant’s affidavit,page 37 indexed papers
[24]
S v Botha en ‘n Ander
2002 (1) SACR 222
(SCA);
S
v Viljoen
2002 (2) SACR
550
(SCA);
S v Kock
2003 (2) SACR 5
(SCA) para 15
[25]
S v van Wyk
2005 (1) SACR 41 (SCA).
[26]
Appellant’s affidavit,page 37 indexed papers
[27]
S
v Mathebula
2010
(1) SACR 55
(SCA)
[28]
Section 51(2) as read with Part II of Schedule 2 of the
Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1997
.
[29]
S v Faye
2009 (2) SACR 210
(Tk) para 17
[30]
S v Patel
1970 (3) SA 565
(W) at 567E
[31]
S v Stanfield
1997 (1) SACR 221
(C) at 226C-D.
[32]
S v Diale & another
2013 (2) SACR 85
(GNP) para 14.
[33]
S v Green & another
[2006] ZASCA 3
;
2006 (1) SACR 603
(SCA) para 23.
[34]
S v Rudolph
2010 (1) SACR 262
(SCA).