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[2019] ZANCHC 13
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Mothibi v Minister of Police (730/2015) [2019] ZANCHC 13 (29 March 2019)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTHERN
CAPE HIGH COURT, KIMBERLEY)
CASE
NO.: 730/2015
Date
heard: 28-08-2018
Date
delivered: 29-03-2019
In
the matter between:
Faniki William
Mothibi
Plaintiff
And
Minister
of Police
Defendant
CORAM:
WILLIAMS J:
JUDGMENT
WILLIAMS
J:
1.
The
plaintiff, Mr Faniki William Mothibi, instituted an action for
damages against the Minister of Police (the Minister), arising
from
his arrest by Sergeant K D Zulu on 1 February 2015 without a warrant
and his subsequent detention at the Galeshewe Police
cells until 2
February 2015 and thereafter at the Old Kimberley Prison until his
release on bail on 6 February 2015. The
Director of Public
Prosecutions declined to prosecute and on 8 March 2015 the prosecutor
withdrew the case against the plaintiff.
2.
When
the trial commenced the parties agreed that the merits and quantum be
separated and that the issue of quantum be deferred for
later
determination. The plaintiff, who appeared in person withdrew
his amended particulars of claim and chose to rely instead
on his
original particulars of claim with certain amendments.
3.
The
background to this matter which is mainly common cause or at least
not seriously disputed, is as follows. During 2014
Mr
Kgopodithate, a police officer, took his Toyota Corolla motor vehicle
to the plaintiff’s auto repair shop for certain
mechanical
repairs to be effected. Once the vehicle was repaired Mr
Kgopodithate failed to settle the account for the repairs
in full.
The plaintiff refused to release the vehicle to Mr Kgopodithate until
he was paid in full for his services.
Mr Kgopodithate
thereafter approached the Kimberley Magistrates Court for an
attachment order. An interim attachment order
was granted on 22
October 2014, authorising the Sheriff to attach the motor vehicle
wherever it may be found and to hand it to
Mr Kgopodithate or his
attorneys for safe-keeping, pending an action to be instituted
against the plaintiff for the delivery of
the motor vehicle.
4.
The
Sheriff served a copy of the above court order on the plaintiff on 28
October 2014 and was informed by the plaintiff that he
had sold the
vehicle to defray costs. Mr Kgopodithate thereafter, on 27
November 2914, laid a complaint of motor vehicle
theft against the
plaintiff. Sgt Zulu who was attached to the motor vehicle theft
unit at the time, was the investigating
officer. Mr
Kgopodithate has initially been cited as the 2
nd
defendant but the plaintiff has withdrawn the action against him on
12 August 2016 due to his passing away.
5.
The
issues between the parties, as it unfolded during the trial, appear
to be firstly whether or not the arrest was lawful and if
not,
whether the Minister would be liable for damages as a result of the
plaintiff’s further detention after his first appearance
on 2
February 2015.
6.
The
onus of proving the lawfulness of the arrest and subsequent detention
resting upon the Minister, the first witness called was
Sgt Zulu.
7.
Sgt
Zulu testified that he received a telephone call from the Galeshewe
police station on 1 February 2015 and was informed that
the motor
vehicle in one of the cases he was investigating had been found and
that the suspect was arrested and at the Barkly West
police station.
When he and a colleague arrived at the police station they found the
plaintiff who was detained in one of
the offices. This was the
first time that he had met the plaintiff. He enquired from the
plaintiff whether he knew
why he was arrested. The plaintiff
responded by saying that he knew it was because of the specific motor
vehicle and that
the motor vehicle was at his mother’s place
outside of Barkly West.
8.
The
plaintiff informed him that he took the vehicle to his mother’s
place since the complainant (Mr Kgopodithate) was a police
officer
who had influence over other police officers and he feared that they
could take the vehicle from his workshop, while Mr
Kgopodithate still
owed some money for repairs done on the vehicle.
9.
Sgt
Zulu then requested the plaintiff to accompany him and his colleague
to the plaintiff’s mother’s place. There
they found
the Toyota Corolla motor vehicle parked next to the house. The
wheels of the vehicle had been removed and it had
two different
number plates on it. The back number plate belonged to a
Volkswagen Citi Golf and the front number plate belonged
to the
Toyota Corolla. Sgt Zulu determined that the Volkswagen number
plate did not belong to a stolen car. He enquired
from the
plaintiff why the vehicle had two different number plates but could
not get a clear answer from the plaintiff. He
then informed the
plaintiff that he was detaining him and that he will appear in court
the following day.
10.
The
plaintiff was then taken to the Galeshewe police station where his
rights were explained to him, his fingerprints taken, a warning
statement taken and all of the required processes followed. The
plaintiff stated that he did not want legal representation.
11.
The
plaintiff was detained at the Galeshewe police station overnight and
on the Monday, 2 February 2015, Sgt Zulu attended court
for the
plaintiff’s bail application.
12.
Sgt
Zulu testified that he did not oppose bail since he had verified the
plaintiff’s address and also due to the nature of
the case.
He stated that it was a civil case and that he was not supposed to
arrest the plaintiff, but that the plaintiff
was already arrested
when he met him. As a result he did not oppose bail.
13.
The
prosecutor however informed Sgt Zulu that the plaintiff had previous
convictions and that the matter would have to be postponed
for a
formal bail application on 6 February 2015. On that day Sgt
Zulu was present in court when the plaintiff was released
on bail and
the matter was postponed for further investigation. Thereafter
the case against the plaintiff was withdrawn and
according to Sgt
Zulu, referred back to the civil court by the Magistrate.
14.
Sgt
Zulu testified that the plaintiff was not arrested unlawfully and
that there were reasonable grounds to arrest. That the
plaintiff had moved the vehicle from point A to B and changed the
number plates and in doing so had fraudulently and intentionally
misled the people and the police. According to Sgt Zulu there
was no need for a warrant of arrest because everything pointed
to the
plaintiff as a suspect – the vehicle was left with him for
repairs and Mr Kgopodithate had identified him. However,
he
stated, had he found the plaintiff first, he would have seized the
vehicle and have the court decide where the vehicle should
go.
15.
During
cross-examination, the plaintiff put it to Sgt Zulu that he would
have known the plaintiff’s particulars e.g. where
he worked and
resided and his contact numbers ever since he received the docket
during November 2014, but that Sgt Zulu had never
made the effort to
contact him. That it was only when the vehicle was found that
Sgt Zulu showed an interest in the case.
Sgt Zulu denied this
and stated that he had on at least three occasions visited the
workplace of the plaintiff but had always found
the premises locked
and that he had not noticed the plaintiff’s contact numbers in
the docket.
16.
These
particulars of the plaintiff were provided by Mr Kgopodithate, when
he laid the complaint and were included in the docket.
The
shoddy investigation into the matter by Sgt Zulu confirms the
plaintiff’s version that he had not known until 1 February
2015, that Mr Kgopodithate had laid a charge of motor vehicle theft
against him.
17.
When
the plaintiff put it to Sgt Zulu that he had arrested him for no good
reason, Sgt Zulu responded by saying that the police
do not lock
people up for nothing. That they realised that this was a civil
matter and that there were no grounds upon which
to arrest the
plaintiff. He, Sgt Zulu, was instructed by his supervisor to
get a warning statement from the plaintiff and
to present it to the
prosecutor for a decision. However since the crime prevention
officers had already arrested the plaintiff,
all Sgt Zulu could do
was to process the plaintiff for court.
18.
Sgt
Zulu continued to deny having arrested the plaintiff during
cross-examination until I asked him who exactly had arrested the
plaintiff. He then admitted that he had arrested the
plaintiff. When the plaintiff asked why he had arrested him
contrary
to his supervisor’s instructions, Sgt Zulu answered
that by the time he found the plaintiff, it was the right thing to
do.
19.
This
version of Sgt Zulu also changed during cross-examination. He
later stated that he had acted on the instructions of his
supervisor
who had instructed him to go ahead and arrest the plaintiff. He
testified that the instruction from his supervisor
was reasonable
since he had given the instruction after he was informed of the
circumstances. Sgt Zulu identified his supervisor
as Lt Col
Rooza, now retired.
20.
During
re-examination Sgt Zulu stated that he had arrested the plaintiff
because the motor vehicle was found at the plaintiff’s
mother’s
place and the number plates had been changed. He was of the
opinion that the plaintiff had committed an offence
because he had
removed the vehicle and had placed a wrong number plate on the
vehicle and that no one had the right to have stolen
goods in their
possession.
21.
Two
further witnesses were called in the Minister’s case, Constable
RW Blom and Captain C Roman. Const Blom was doing
patrol duty
on 1 February 2015. He was the police officer who noticed the
Toyota Corolla parked at the plaintiff’s
mother’s house
in Phelindaba, outside of Barkly West. He had become suspicious
because three wheels of the vehicle
were missing. He checked
the back number plate with their control room and discovered that it
belonged to a Volkswagen vehicle.
He then went into the
premises where he met Mrs Mary Mocho, the plaintiff’s mother.
She informed him that her son had
brought the vehicle there. He
checked the front number plate and found out that it belonged to a
stolen Toyota Corolla.
22.
He
then called Capt Roman to the scene. He states that he was on
the scene when the plaintiff arrived there in the company
of a man
and a woman but that he was not involved in the arrest or processing
of the plaintiff.
23.
Capt
Roman confirmed that he was called to the scene by Const Blom.
He had asked the plaintiff’s mother to call him
to come to her
house. When the plaintiff arrived he was accompanied by a man
and a woman. According to Capt Roman the
plaintiff had not
given him a reason for the vehicle being at his mothers’ place
and in that condition. He had asked
the plaintiff to go to the
Barkly West police station since a crowd had gathered at the mother’s
home and he wanted to avoid
conflict. The plaintiff then went
to the police station with Capt Roman and was asked to wait in the
victim friendly room
while Capt Roman contacted Sgt Zulu.
24.
Capt
Roman denied having arrested the plaintiff and stated that he was not
at all involved in the bail application or the criminal
case.
25.
The
plaintiff testified in his own case. He explained that he was a
business man trading under the name of Faniki’s
Auto Electrical
and that a dispute had arisen between him and Mr Kgopodithate when he
demanded his motor vehicle back without having
made full payment for
the repairs effected by the plaintiff. The plaintiff explained
that Mr Kgopodithate had arrived at
his business premises, where he
also resided, on several occasions in the company of a number of his
police colleagues and demanded
the return of his vehicle. To
avoid further harassment by Mr Kgopodithate and his police colleagues
he towed the vehicle
to his mother’s place near Barkly West.
He put a different number plate on the back of the vehicle so that Mr
Kgopodithate
and his friends would not identify the vehicle while he
was towing it. At his mother’s place he removed the
wheels
so that the vehicle could not be removed from there. He
explained that he had merely exercised his right of retention over
the vehicle until payment for the repairs.
26.
The
plaintiff testified that he did not know that Mr Kgopodithate had
laid a criminal case against him until he received a telephone
call
from his mother on the morning of 1 February 2015. His mother
informed him that there were police officers at her home
who wanted
to see him about the vehicle which had been reported stolen.
27.
He
then went to his mother’s place with his lady friend Ms Lerato
Maduo and a male friend Mr Kgosikai Maduo. He took
the
documents relating to the civil case between him and Mr Kgopodithate
with him.
28.
When
the plaintiff arrived at his mother’s place he found Capt Roman
in charge and explained to him the background of the
vehicle and why
it had different number plates etc. He states that he showed
Capt Roman the civil case papers, but Capt Roman
told him that all he
knew was that the vehicle had been reported stolen and that he had
better wait for the investigating officer
at the Barkly West police
station.
29.
The
plaintiff testified that when Sgt Zulu approached him at the police
station he explained to him also why the vehicle was at
his mother’s
place, why the wheels had been removed and why the number plates had
been changed. He also showed Sgt
Zulu the documents in the
civil case.
30.
Sgt
Zulu however informed him that he was going to arrest him and
explained his rights. He made a warning statement and Sgt
Zulu
then took him to Kimberley. On the way they stopped at his
mother’s place, where the Toyota motor vehicle was
removed in
his presence.
31.
Upon arrival in Kimberley he was detained in the police cells until
his court appearance the next day.
There the prosecutor
informed him that since motor vehicle theft was a Schedule 1 offence
and he had previous convictions, he would
have to oppose any bail
application and the matter was thus postponed for a formal bail
application on 6 February 2015.
32.
On
6 February 2015 he explained to the magistrate about the civil
dispute and denied stealing the motor vehicle. According
to the
plaintiff Sgt Zulu appeared for the state to oppose bail on the basis
of his previous convictions. The magistrate
however granted him
bail. I pause at this stage to mention that the magistrate in
his judgment in the bail application mentions
that Sgt Zulu opposed
bail also on the basis of the risk of the plaintiff interfering with
the state witnesses.
33.
The
plaintiff stated that he understood that the prosecutor only followed
the prescribed procedure and cannot be faulted for his
detention.
He laid the responsibility for his detention until 6 February 2015
squarely upon Sgt Zulu who did not exercise
his discretion properly
whether or not to arrest in the light of all the circumstances.
He also questioned the evidence of
Sgt Zulu that he had formed a
reasonable suspicion.
34.
The
cross examination of the plaintiff elicited no concessions. Ms
Stanton’s statement to the plaintiff that the civil
matter
between him and Mr Kgopodithate was no longer pending at the time of
his arrest due to Mr Kgopodithate having obtained default
judgment in
his favour, was shown by the plaintiff not to be correct. From
the bundle of documents placed before me by both
parties, the
magistrates’ notes show that Mr Kgopodithate withdrew the
application for attachment of the motor vehicle on
20 March 2015.
The default judgment which Mr Kgopodithate obtained in his favour on
24 April 2015 was rescinded on 2 November
2015. So, at the time
of the arrest on 1 February 2015, the civil matter was still very
much alive, a fact which was also
recognised by the magistrate
presiding over the bail application on 6 February 2015.
35.
The
plaintiff called Ms Lerato Moduo and Mrs Mary Mocho to testify in his
case. Ms Moduo is the ex-lady friend of the plaintiff
who had
been with him in Barkly West on 1 February 2015. She testified
that she was in the presence of the plaintiff at Barkly
West police
station when he explained to Sgt Zulu why he had changed the number
plates of the motor vehicle and that the plaintiff
had also shown Sgt
Zulu the documents relating to the civil case.
36.
Mrs
Mocho is the plaintiff’s mother. Her evidence does not
take the matter any further except that the plaintiff had
asked her
if he could leave the motor vehicle at her place and that she had not
suspected anything untoward since he was in the
business of fixing
motor vehicles. She also testified that the plaintiff had
arrived at her house after she had called him
on 1 February 2015,
with some documents in a bag.
37.
That
was the evidence led in the trial.
38.
Sec
40(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (the Act) provides
that:
“
40(1) a peace
officer may without warrant arrest any person –
. . . . . .
(b)whom he reasonably
suspects of having committed an offence referred to in Schedule 1,
other than the offence of escaping from
lawful custody,"
39.
Ms
Stanton referred to
Minister
of Safety and Security v Sekhoto and Another
[2011] 2 All SA 157
(SCA), where the Supreme Court of Appeal
confirmed the four jurisdictional facts to be present for an arrest
under section 40(1)(b)
of the Act to be:
(i)
the
arrestor must be a peace officer;
(ii)
the
arrestor must entertain a suspicion;
(iii)
the
suspicion must be that the suspect (the arrestee) committed an
offence referred to in Schedule 1; and
(iv)
the
suspicion must rest on reasonable grounds.
40.
It
is trite that the onus rest on a defendant to show the existence of
the above four jurisdictional facts to justify an arrest
under sec
40(1) (b) of the Act. The main dispute between the parties
relating to the jurisdictional facts is whether the
suspicion formed
by Sgt Zulu was reasonable. The test whether a suspicion is
reasonably entertained within the meaning of
sec 40 (1) (b) is
objective: i.e. would a reasonable man in the position of the
arrestor and possessed of the same information,
have considered that
there were good and sufficient grounds for suspecting that the
arrestee had committed the offence for which
he sought to arrest
him. See
Manase
v Minister of Safety and Security and Another
2003(1) SA 567 (CkHC) at 574 H-J.
41.
Ms
Stanton argued that despite Sgt Zulu’s reluctance to admit that
he arrested the plaintiff, his evidence relating to the
grounds for
the arrest is clear and reasonable. She refers in this regard
to the fact that the vehicle had been reported
stolen, that the
plaintiff admitted he had taken the vehicle to his mother’s
place and that the plaintiff had admitted changing
the number plate.
These facts she submits, are sufficient to render the suspicion
entertained by Sgt Zulu reasonable.
Ms Stanton argued further
that the plaintiff’s contention of a pending civil case cannot
be used as a defence against the
arrest and that in any event Sgt
Zulu denied that the plaintiff had told him about the civil case or
that he had shown him any
documents to that effect.
42.
The
argument that Sgt Zulu had not been informed about the civil case
cannot stand. Sgt Zulu himself admitted that the plaintiff
had
told him so. What Sgt Zulu denied was that the plaintiff had
shown him the documents in this regard
43.
This
denial by Sgt Zulu is in my view highly questionable. Why would
he at one stage during his evidence say that if he had
seen the
plaintiff first, he would have seized the vehicle and have left it to
the court to decide where it should go, if he did
not know of the
interim attachment order. In any evident, Ms Moduo’s
evidence, that the plaintiff had shown the documents
to Sgt Zulu in
her presence has not been attacked. Ms Moduo, at the time of
the trial, was no longer in a relationship with
the plaintiff and had
no reason to fabricate evidence to his advantage.
44.
I
do not think that an argument can be made realistically that Sgt Zulu
was a credible witness. I counted at least five different
reasons that he gave for arresting the plaintiff (leaving aside for
the moment his denial of arresting the plaintiff until halfway
through his cross-examination). Firstly, because the plaintiff
was already detained by the crime prevention officers; secondly,
because the vehicle was reported stolen; thirdly, because his
supervisor instructed him to arrest the plaintiff; fourthly,
because it is an offence to possess stolen property and fifthly, the
plaintiff had committed an offence by removing the vehicle
and
changing the number plates.
45.
Whether
the fifth reason above even constitutes an offence is not clear.
The fourth reason is not an offence under Schedule
1. The third
reason above is a second version of what Sgt Zulu testified his
supervisor had instructed him to do. It
will be remembered that
Sgt Zulu first said in this regard that his supervisor had told him
to get a statement from the plaintiff
and to leave it to the
prosecutor to make a decision as to an arrest. It is in any
event the arrestor who must have reasonable
grounds and not his
supervisor some 40 km away from the scene. The second reason
above on its own does not constitute reasonable
grounds and the first
reason above borders on the absurd.
46.
Even
if one has regard to the reasons given by Sgt Zulu cumulatively, with
the information he had in the docket and that given to
him by the
plaintiff, he could not have entertained a reasonable suspicion that
the plaintiff had committed the offence.
He in fact admitted as
much when he at first denied that he had arrested the plaintiff since
it was a civil matter.
47.
That
being said, the Minister has failed to show the existence of the four
jurisdictional facts justifying an arrest without a warrant
and as
such the arrest of the plaintiff on 1 February 2015 was unlawful.
I do not intend to deal with the plaintiff’s
contention that
Sgt Zulu did not exercise his discretion properly to arrest, since
this discretion only arises once the jurisdictional
facts have been
shown. See
Sekhoto
,
para 28.
48.
Mrs
Stanton has argued that should I find that the arrest was unlawful,
nothing prevented the plaintiff from requesting police bail
before
his first appearance, in terms of sec 59 (1) of the Act. This
argument cannot stand since a person charged with theft
does not in
terms of sec 59(1) qualify for police bail.
49.
The
alternative argument by Ms Stanton is that the Minister cannot be
held liable for the detention of the plaintiff beyond his
first
appearance, and in any event, the plaintiff did not even oppose the
postponement of the bail application on 2 February 2015.
50. I
deal with the latter contention first.
In casu
the
position was as follows. The plaintiff had previous convictions
for other Schedule 1 offences. As a result the offence
he was
arrested on resorted under Schedule 5 of the Act. In terms of
sec 60 (11) (b) of the Act, where an accused is charged
with an
offence referred to in Schedule 5, the court shall order that the
accused be detained in custody, unless the accused, having
been given
a reasonable opportunity to do so, adduces evidence which satisfies
the court that the interests of justice permit his
release. A
more stringent measure is thus applicable to bail applications where
the offence falls under Schedule 5 than less
serious offences, where
an accused person is entitled to be released on bail if the court is
satisfied that the interest of justice
so permit.
51.
The
plaintiff was made aware by the prosecutor that his release on bail
was not a simple matter and that a postponement for a formal
bail
application was necessary. This much at least was also the gist
of Sgt Zulu’s evidence in this regard. The
plaintiff
cannot be blamed in these circumstances for not opposing the
postponement.
52.
The
argument that the Minister cannot be held liable for the detention of
the plaintiffs after his first appearance, is based on
what the SCA
held in the
Sekhoto
case at paragraphs 42 to 44 thereof where the following is stated:
“
[42]
While it is clearly established that the power to arrest may be
exercised only for the purpose of bringing
the suspect to justice the
arrest is only one step in that process.
Once
an arrest has been effected the peace officer must bring the arrestee
before a court as soon as reasonably possible and at
least within 48
hours (depending on court hours). Once that has been done the
authority to detain that is inherent in the power
to arrest has been
exhausted. The authority to detain the suspect further is then within
the discretion of the court.
[43]
The discretion of a court to order the release or further detention
of the suspect is subject to wide-ranging
─ and in some cases
stringent ─ statutory directions. Indeed, in some cases the
suspect must be detained pending his
trial, in the absence of special
circumstances. I need not elaborate for present purposes save to
mention that the Act requires
a judicial evaluation to determine
whether it is in the interests of justice to grant bail, that in some
instances a special onus
rests on a suspect before bail may be
granted and the accused has in any event a duty to disclose certain
facts, including prior
convictions, to the court. It is sufficient to
say that if a peace officer were to be permitted to arrest only once
he is satisfied
that the suspect might not otherwise attend the trial
then that statutory structure would be entirely frustrated. To
suggest that
such a constraint upon the power to arrest is to be
found in the statute by inference is untenable.
[44]
While the purpose of arrest is to bring the suspect to trial the
arrestor has a limited role in that
process. He or she is not called
upon to determine whether the suspect ought to be detained pending a
trial. That is the role of
the court (or in some cases a senior
officer). The purpose of the arrest is no more than to bring the
suspect before the court
(or the senior officer) so as to enable that
role to be performed. It seems to me to follow that the enquiry to be
made by the
peace officer is not how best to bring the suspect to
trial: the enquiry is only whether the case is one in which that
decision
ought properly to be made by a court (or the senior
officer). Whether his decision on that question is rational naturally
depends
upon the particular facts but it is clear that in cases of
serious crime – and those listed in Schedule 1 are serious, not
only because the Legislature thought so – a peace officer could
seldom be criticized for arresting a suspect for that purpose.
On the
other hand there will be cases, particularly where the suspected
offence is relatively trivial, where the circumstances
are such that
it would clearly be irrational to arrest. This case does not call for
consideration of what those various circumstances
might be. It is
sufficient to say that the mere nature of the offences of which the
respondents were suspected in this case ─
which ordinarily
attract sentences of imprisonment and are capable of attracting
sentences of imprisonment for 15 years ─
clearly justified
their arrest for the purpose of enabling a court to exercise its
discretion as to whether they should be detained
or released and if
so on what conditions, pending their trial.”
(Own highlighting)
53.
The
discussion by the SCA on the relevant principles in the paragraphs
quoted above, is based on the discretion which a peace officer
has as
to whether to arrest or not once the jurisdictional facts for an
arrest in terms of sec 40 (1)(b) are present. It
does not have
any bearing on the situation where an arrest is unlawful because of
the absence of the required jurisdictional facts
as
in
casu.
In
such a case and in a matter very similar to the present, Nepgen J
held in
Mthimkhulu
and Another v Minister of Law and Order
1993(3) SA 432 (ECD) at 438 C thereof, that:
“
I do not see
how the mere fact that the further detention of the plaintiffs
occurred pursuant to an order made by the magistrate
in terms of s
50(1) of Act 51 of 1977 can render such detention lawful where the
arrest, which resulted in such detention being
ordered, was
unlawful.”
I agree with the approach
followed by Nepgen J.
54.
In
conclusion and to sum up, I find that the arrest of the plaintiff was
not justified in terms of sec 40(1) (b) and that it was
unlawful.
His subsequent detention until his release on bail is accordingly
also unlawful.
The following orders
are made:
a)
Judgment is granted in favour of the plaintiff on the merits.
b)
The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff’s proven or
agreed damages as a result of his
unlawful arrest and detention until
his release on bail on 6 February 2015.
c)
The defendant is ordered to pay the costs of the action.
CC
WILLIAMS
JUDGE
For
Plaintiff:
Adv A Stanton
The State Attorney
For
Defendant: Mr Faniki
William Mothibi
(In Person)