Mothabe v Road Accident Fund (3181/2017) [2019] ZAFSHC 206 (7 November 2019)

85 Reportability
Personal Injury Law - Road Accident Fund

Brief Summary

Damages — Quantum of damages — Expert evidence — Plaintiff sustained severe head injury and other physical injuries in a road accident — Plaintiff accepted settlement on merits, with only quantum of damages in dispute — Five expert witnesses provided corroborative evidence of cognitive and behavioral impairments resulting from the injuries — Defendant did not present any expert evidence to counter plaintiff's claims — Court held that the plaintiff suffered severe brain injury, warranting compensation — Award of R900 000.00 for general damages deemed just compensation based on comparable awards and inflation considerations.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings were a Road Accident Fund damages claim in the High Court (Free State Division, Bloemfontein) in which the quantum of damages was the only remaining issue for determination.


The parties were Molelekoa Petros Mothabe as plaintiff and the Road Accident Fund as defendant.


The matter proceeded to trial on 7 and 10 May 2019, with judgment delivered on 7 November 2019. The defendant had made an offer of settlement in which the merits were conceded, and that offer was accepted by the plaintiff. The litigation therefore narrowed to the assessment of compensation, including general damages and loss of earnings, arising from a motor vehicle collision on 16 May 2014.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned the plaintiff’s post-collision sequelae (particularly whether he sustained a severe brain injury and its functional consequences), the appropriate approach to expert evidence, and the appropriate quantification of general damages and loss of earnings. The parties also settled the plaintiff’s claim for past medical expenses in the sum of R67 663.83.


2. Material Facts


It was common cause that the plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle collision on 16 May 2014 and sustained physical injuries which required medico-legal assessment. It was also not in dispute that the merits had been conceded and that past medical expenses were agreed at R67 663.83.


The material factual dispute, as identified in the judgment, related to whether the plaintiff had sustained a brain injury and, if so, the extent and consequences of that injury for his functioning, employability, and retirement prospects. The defendant’s primary contention was that the plaintiff had not suffered a brain injury, while the plaintiff relied on multiple expert assessments to establish the existence and effects of such injury.


The plaintiff’s experts recorded injuries and sequelae including severe head injury, a laceration to the upper left, injury to the right eye, multiple fractured ribs, pneumothorax, and a right tibia-fibula fracture, together with ongoing symptoms described as headaches, restlessness and disrupted sleep, pain in the right knee and lower leg, forgetfulness, irritability, fluctuating concentration, and cognitive difficulty. Collateral information from the plaintiff’s wife (including forgetfulness in daily responsibilities and behavioural changes) was treated as supporting the neurocognitive sequelae described.


On the plaintiff’s case, expert evidence (occupational therapy, clinical psychology/neuropsychology, neurosurgery, industrial psychology, and actuarial calculation) supported that the plaintiff suffered moderate to severe neurocognitive deficits consistent with traumatic brain injury, that he was functioning in what was described as sympathetic employment, and that his working life would likely be curtailed by earlier retirement (the experts referring to retirement around 55 or five years earlier than 60).


No oral or documentary evidence was presented by the defendant at the trial to contradict the plaintiff’s expert evidence. Cross-examination, as described in the judgment, did not yield substantive material undermining the conclusion that a brain injury had occurred.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions concerned the evaluation and acceptance of expert opinion evidence and the consequent quantification of damages. In particular, the court was required to determine whether, on the evidence presented, the plaintiff had established that he sustained a severe brain injury and consequential neurocognitive and behavioural impairments.


A further core issue was the appropriate quantification of general damages by reference to comparable awards, inflation and the value of money, and the judicial discretion involved in arriving at an amount that constituted fair compensation without unfairness to the defendant.


The court also had to determine the appropriate amounts for past and future loss of earnings, including whether to accept the actuarial computation presented on the plaintiff’s case and whether the underlying assumptions (including contingencies and retirement expectations) were justified on the evidence.


These issues involved a combination of the application of legal principles to fact (particularly in relation to expert evidence) and evaluative judgment (particularly in relation to general damages and the fairness of the award), with limited pure questions of law.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the disputed brain injury issue through the lens of established principles governing expert evidence. It treated as trite that an expert’s function is to assist the court on matters outside ordinary knowledge, but that an expert opinion must be supported by reasoning that is acceptable and logically grounded. The judgment emphasised that, in evaluating expert evidence, the inquiry is whether and to what extent the opinion is based on logical reasons, including whether the expert considered the relevant aspects and reached a defensible conclusion.


Applying those principles, the court accepted the plaintiff’s expert evidence as mutually corroborative and logically supported by clinical findings, recorded injuries, and collateral information. The court highlighted that the experts were appropriately qualified and experienced, and that their conclusions aligned with the plaintiff’s current complaints and the medical documentation available to them. The court also treated certain physical indicators (such as facial laceration and eye injury) as supporting an inference that blunt force was exerted to the head area, making it untenable, on the evidence, to deny that a head injury occurred, with the remaining question being the extent of that injury.


A decisive factor in the court’s evaluation was that the defendant led no evidence to contradict the plaintiff’s expert case. The court noted that cross-examination did not elicit anything substantive undermining the existence of brain injury. In the result, the court concluded that the plaintiff had proved that he suffered a severe brain injury, with associated cognitive and behavioural difficulties, and that compensation needed to reflect those sequelae.


On general damages, the court reiterated that there is no fixed method of calculation and that the award entails a judicial discretion exercised with reference to the facts, comparable awards, and the value of money and inflation, while remaining fair to both parties. The court considered three comparable awards addressing traumatic brain injury-related deficits and their impacts on employability and social functioning. Having regard to those awards and expressly factoring an average annual inflation rate of 5.2% to update an earlier award, the court concluded that, in this matter—where there were also severe additional physical injuries (including pneumothorax and fractures)—an award of R900 000.00 for general damages would constitute just compensation.


On past and future loss of earnings, the court accepted actuarial calculations reflecting R10 098.00 (past) and R776 158.00 (future), with stated contingencies applied. The court held that the assumptions underpinning the capitalisation were based on sound principles and, in the absence of contrary evidence, the plaintiff should be compensated in accordance with those calculations. The court’s acceptance of diminished earning capacity was reinforced by the evidence that the plaintiff was employed in a sympathetic environment and that, given his impairments, it was only a matter of time before he would be unable to sustain that employment.


On costs, the court applied the general principle that costs follow success and found no reason to deviate. It indicated that the plaintiff should not be out of pocket due to the defendant’s stance in the litigation and made a costs order on the High Court scale, including specified expert-related costs and pre-trial preparation costs.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court awarded the plaintiff a total amount of R1 753 919.83 as compensation arising from the collision of 16 May 2014, comprised of R67 663.83 for past medical expenses, R10 098.00 for past loss of earnings, R776 158.00 for future loss of earnings, and R900 000.00 for general damages.


The defendant was ordered to furnish the plaintiff with an undertaking in terms of section 17(4)(a) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 for 100% of the plaintiff’s future hospital, nursing home, treatment, services, or goods costs arising from the injuries, payable after the costs are incurred and proved.


The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff’s taxed or agreed party-and-party costs on the High Court scale up to the date of the order, including the costs associated with specified expert witnesses and various litigation preparation items. The order regulated time periods for payment of costs, provided that no interest would accrue if payment was made within stipulated times, and provided for interest at 10.25% per annum, compounded, should payment not be made timeously.


Cases Cited


Menday v Protea Assurance Co. Ltd 1967 (1) SA 565 (E) at 569B.


Michael and another v Linksfield Park Clinic (Pty) Ltd and another 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA) paras 36 and 37.


Pitt v Economic Insurance Co. Ltd 1957 (3) SA 284 (D) at 287E–F.


Du Pisanie NO (obo J G Rabe) v de Jongh 2002 (5B4) QOD 109 (C).


Zarrabi v the Road Accident Fund 2006 (5B4) QOD 231 (T).


Wessels v Road Accident Fund 2010 (6B) QOD 6 (ECP).


Legislation Cited


Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996, section 17(4)(a).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that, on the uncontradicted and logically supported expert evidence presented by the plaintiff, the plaintiff had proved that he sustained a severe brain injury in the collision, resulting in neurocognitive and behavioural deficits affecting daily functioning and earning capacity.


The court held that an award of R900 000.00 for general damages was justified when assessed against comparable awards and inflation, together with the presence of other serious physical injuries.


The court held that the plaintiff should be compensated for past and future loss of earnings in accordance with the actuarial calculations presented, in the absence of any contrary evidence and in light of evidence that the plaintiff was working in sympathetic employment with diminished capacity and likely earlier exit from the labour market.


The court held that costs should follow the result and awarded party-and-party costs on the High Court scale, including the costs associated with the plaintiff’s expert witnesses and litigation preparation items, together with directions concerning payment timelines and interest consequences.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that the purpose of expert evidence is to assist the court on matters requiring specialised skill, training, or experience, and that an expert opinion must be supported by reasons capable of acceptance by the court. The evaluation of expert evidence requires an assessment of whether the opinion has a logical basis and whether the expert reached a defensible conclusion after considering the relevant aspects of the case.


The judgment applied the principle that general damages have no fixed method of computation and involve a judicial discretion exercised with reference to the particular facts, prior comparable awards, and considerations such as the value of money and inflation, while ensuring fairness to both parties.


The judgment applied the approach that, where actuarial calculations for loss of earnings are based on sound assumptions and are not contradicted by evidence, they may be accepted as the basis for quantifying loss, especially where the evidence establishes diminished earning capacity and employment vulnerability.


The judgment applied the general costs principle that costs follow the event, and it treated a costs award as appropriate to prevent a successful plaintiff from being out of pocket due to the defendant’s stance in the litigation.

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[2019] ZAFSHC 206
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Mothabe v Road Accident Fund (3181/2017) [2019] ZAFSHC 206 (7 November 2019)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case
number:   3181/2017
In
the matter between:
MOLELEKOA
PETROS MOTHABE
Plaintiff
and
ROAD ACCIDENT
FUND
Defendant
HEARD
ON:
07
& 10 MAY 2019
JUDGMENT
BY:
MATHEBULA, J
DELIVERED
ON:
07 NOVEMBER
2019
Quantum
of damages – Expert opinion and evaluation – Calculation
of damages and comparable awards.
Introduction
[1]
The only issue to be determined in this matter is quantum of damages.
An offer of settlement
conceding the merits was accepted by the
plaintiff. In an endeavour  to prove his claim, the plaintiff
adduced evidence of
five (5) expert witnesses who had examined and
assessed him. Apart from their oral testimonies they also compiled
detailed medico-legal
reports. No oral or documentary evidence was
placed before me by the defendant.  The parties settled the
claim regarding past
medical expenses in the sum of R67 663.83.
Evidence for the
plaintiff
[2]
Jeanne Morland, a qualified Occupational Therapist, testified that
she obtained a Bachelor
of Occupational Therapy degree from the
University of the Free State. After working for two (2) years at
Baragwanath Hospital in
Johannesburg, she went into private practice
specializing in medico-legal report work. She also did work for Case
Management Trust
Companies post the Road Accident Fund settlement.
[3]
On 16 March 2018 she assessed the plaintiff and compiled the
medico-legal report on pages
119 to 163 of the plaintiff’s
bundle. The plaintiff presented severe head injury, laceration to the
upper left, injury to
the right eye, multiple fractured ribs,
pneumothorax and right tibia-fibula fracture.
[4]
The plaintiff reported that he experiences pain in his right knee and
lower leg, headaches
± twice a week and his sleep is
interrupted by restlessness. He also informed her that he forgets a
lot at work and even
small issues like the pin code of his bank card.
His wife reported that he forgets inter alia to fetch the child from
creche. He
is also reported to be irritable and loud. She concluded
that these were consistent with what is found in persons with severe
head
injury.
[5]
She explained that in assessing the plaintiff she listened to what
was reported to her as current problems
and compared it with
collateral information.  The purpose was to check whether what
was reported to her ties up with her observations.
Accordingly, the
current complaints of headaches and restlessness were consistent with
the neurological damage that the plaintiff
had sustained. As a result
his daily living activities have been altered since the injuries. The
loss of motivation and drive for
self-care were sequelae of his
injuries.
[6]
It was her evidence that the plaintiff was unable to function
properly. During
the assessment his concentration was fluctuating and
displayed cognitive difficulties. The injuries have severely altered
his independence
and activities of daily living which includes his
work. On the basis of the physical and physiological deficits
suffered by the
plaintiff, it was her view that he will have to
retire five (5) years before the retirement age of 60 years.
[7]     On
16 May 2014 Rolene
Hovsha,
a qualified Clinical
Psychologist conducted the psycho-legal screening assessment on the
plaintiff. The purpose was to establish
whether he had suffered any
traumatic brain injury as a result of the accident, and if so, the
sequelae thereof and his mental
state and the emotional impact of the
injuries. She compiled a medico-legal report starting from page 14 to
34 of the plaintiff’s
bundle.
[7]     On
page 20 of her report she noted that the records from Anncron
Hospital in Klerksdorp showed that the plaintiff
suffered a head
injury. Based on collateral information obtained from his wife she
concluded that the plaintiff appears to have
suffered an extended
period of Post Traumatic Amnesia. As a result the plaintiff suffered
from neurocognitive as well as physical
deficits consistent with
those prevalent in persons with traumatic brain injuries. She
emphasised that traumatic brain injuries
was diagnosed in terms of
its outcomes as opposed to initial reported severity at the time of
the injury.
[8]
As a Clinical Psychologist with special interest in neuropsychology,
she conducted various tests
on the plaintiff. This covered attention
and concentration, basic mental tracking, mental control, information
processing as well
as speed of information processing etc. The
conclusion was that the neurophysiological assessment revealed
moderate to severe deficits
in the areas covered. These were absent
prior to the accident.
[9]
A neurosurgeon who assessed the plaintiff namely Dr. Cyril
Lewer-Allen also gave evidence
and substantially confirmed the
contents of his detailed report contained in pages 48 to 93 of the
plaintiff’s bundle. He
also recorded the injuries as noted by
other experts. The current problems conveyed to him were lack of
concentration and memory
as well as irritability and short temper.
[10]
He was extensively questioned on the absence of the Glasgow Scale
Scoring. His response was that the
Glasgow Scale was a management
tool for casualty. It was not designed to determine the long-term
outcomes or as a forecaster of
intellectual functionality.
[11]
Therefore, he concluded that it was probable that the plaintiff
suffered a significant brain injury
rendering him less productive.
This diminished his effectiveness to function independently both at
the workplace and in private
life. Given the head injury, it was his
view that it was not curative even by surgery.
[12]
Louis Linde, an industrial psychologist, conducted an assessment with
the objective to evaluate the
effects of the accident and its
sequelae on the employability and earning capacity of the plaintiff.
He concluded that post the
accident, the plaintiff has been fortunate
to be employed in a sympathetic employment. It was almost imperative
that he should
retire at 55 years of age. The most telling statement
is that the plaintiff has suffered a severe loss of his amenities and
life
enjoyment.
[13]
Gregory Whittaker, an actuary, calculated the capital value of the
loss of income suffered by the plaintiff
as a result of the accident.
He concluded that the net compensation due to the plaintiff was the
sum of R776 158.00. This was after
taking into consideration the
necessary contingencies.
Principles pertaining
to expert evidence and the evaluation thereof
[14]
The primary contention on behalf of the defendant was that the
plaintiff had not suffered a brain injury.
It appears that other
injuries were not disputed because no reference whatsoever was made
to them. I accept that this was the only
injury sustained by the
plaintiff that was disputed. It is for this very reason that the
plaintiff called expert witnesses to establish
this aspect.
[15]
It is trite that the function of an expert witness is to assist the
court in matters that the court
does not have the necessary knowledge
to decide. Over and above the expert opinion, the expert must be able
to satisfy the court
that through special skill, training and
experience, the reasons for the expressed opinion are acceptable.
[1]
In the evaluation of such evidence, it must be determined whether and
to what extent the opinion(s) is/are based on logical
reasons.
The emphasis is that the court must be satisfied that such an opinion
has the logical basis.  This means that
the expert must have
considered all aspects of the matter and reached a “defendable
conclusion”.
[2]
[16]
All experts called on behalf of the plaintiff corroborated each other
that the plaintiff had suffered
a severe brain injury. These are
experts in their field particularly the area concerning head
injuries. They are all highly skilled
and acquired vast experience
over a period of time. Their opinions were based on logical reasons
after a thorough assessment of
the plaintiff. The outcomes fitted the
current complaints, medical notes and collateral information obtained
from credible and
reliable sources.
[17]
The plaintiff had suffered the laceration on the upper left and an
injury on the right eye. The only
conclusion is that some blunt force
was exerted on his face to cause these injuries. To argue otherwise
will be simply to deny
what is an overwhelming evidence that he was
injured on the head. The only arguable issue is to what extent was he
injured.
[18]
The defendant did not call any expert(s) to contradict the ones
referred to in the preceding paragraphs.
I formed the impression that
the opposition/denial was for the sake of it without any factual or
legal basis. Cross-examination
did not elicit anything of substance
about whether the plaintiff had suffered a brain injury or not.
Therefore I conclude on the
basis of the evidence before me that the
plaintiff suffered severe brain injury.
[19]
There is no doubt that the experts are ad idem that the plaintiff
suffered cognitive and behavioural
problems and must be compensated
thereof. Although the defendant is vehemently opposed to it, no
evidence was placed before me
to the contrary. The plaintiff
manifested with the following neurocognitive problems namely
attention and concentration, numerical
reasoning, motor speed, visual
perception, poor problem-solving skills and impaired judgment.
[20]
There is no fixed method in calculating an award for general damages.
It is largely the discretion
that must be exercised judicially based
on the facts of each case. The court in matters of this nature must
have regard to previous
comparable awards, value of money and
inflation among other factors. At all times the court must be fair to
both sides and award
just compensation to the plaintiff.
[3]
Comparable awards for
general damages
[21]
In Du Pisanie NO (obo J G Rabe) v de Jongh,
[4]
the plaintiff presented deficits in the form of severe impairment of
memory, loss of concentration, loss of insight, impulsivity,
slow
work pace, sleeplessness (restlessness), loss of logical thinking,
impairment of executive ability, impairment of grammatical

capabilities, irritability followed by violent outbursts. His social
life and employability was destroyed. There were other multiple

injuries like damage to the right knee and right ankle.  Thring
J awarded him R400 000.00 for general damages.
[22]
De Vos J in Zarrabi v the Road Accident Fund
[5]
awarded R800 000.00 for general damages. A 30 year old trainee
medical specialist had difficulties with executive functions,
sustained
concentration, memory, psychomotor speed and emotional
control. The plaintiff was found to be unemployable as a medical
doctor
or specialist. She would only be accommodated in some form of
employment in a sympathetic environment.
[23]
In Wessels v Road Accident Fund
[6]
a 19 year old male apprentice mechanical engineer was awarded R350
000.00 for general damages. He suffered from regular headaches,

developed amnesia and experienced elevated levels of anxiety and mood
changes. This was found to be having an impact on his social
life and
all its facets.
[24]
Taking into consideration the average yearly inflation rate of 5.2%,
an award of R400 000.00 will be
approximately R965 189.00 in 2019.
These are the closest cases to the matter under discussion. In this
matter there were other
severe injuries like pneumothorax, fracture
of the leg and ribs.  An award of R900 000.00 will be a just
compensation and
by no means at the expense of the defendant.
Calculation of past
and future loss of earnings
[25]
The actuarial calculation in respect of past and future loss of
earnings on behalf of the defendant
were calculated at R10 098.00 and
R776 158.00 respectively. The contingency of 7.5% and 5% for an
injured and injured income had
been taken into consideration. I am
satisfied that the assumption underlying the calculation of capital
values is based on sound
principles. In the absence of any other
evidence to the contrary, I conclude that the plaintiff must be
compensated as per Actuarial
calculations.  The plaintiff is in
a sympathetic employment and it is just a matter of time before he is
pushed out.
This is as a result of his injuries which have
diminished his capacity to function properly.
Costs
[26]
The costs must follow the success and I do not intend to deviate from
the principle. The plaintiff
must not be out of pocket because of the
intransigence on the part of the defendant.
Order
[27]
Therefore
I make the following order:
27.1. The defendant is
liable for payment to the plaintiff in the amount of
R1 753 919.83
(One million seven hundred and fifty three thousand nine hundred and
nineteen rand and eighty three cents)
in respect of the
Plaintiff’s claim resulting from a motor vehicle collision that
occurred on
16 May 2014
calculated as follows:-
(i)
In
respect of Past Medical Expenses    R
67 663.83
(ii)
In
respect of Past Loss of Earnings
R     10 098.00
(iii)
In
respect of Future Loss of Earnings     R
776 158.00
(iv)
In
respect of General Damages
R
900 000.00
R1 753 919.83
27.2.
The
defendant is ordered to furnish to the plaintiff an undertaking in
terms of
Section 17(4)(a)
of the
Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996
,
for 100% of the future accommodation of the plaintiff in a hospital
or nursing home or the treatment of or the rendering of a
service or
the supplying of goods to the plaintiff arising out of injuries
sustained by her in the motor vehicle collision mentioned
above, in
terms of which undertaking the defendant will be obliged to
compensate her in respect of the said costs after the costs
have been
incurred and on proof thereof.
27.3.
The defendant to pay the plaintiff's taxed or agreed party and party
costs on the High Court scale, until date of this order,
including
but not limited to the costs set out hereunder:
27.3.1
The costs attendant upon the obtaining of payment of the amounts
referred to in
this order;
27.3.2
The reasonable preparation / qualifying / accommodation / travelling
and full reservation
fees and expenses (if any) of the following
experts, and the costs relating to the plaintiff attending their
medico legal examinations:
27.3.2.1
Ms R Hovsha (Clinical Psychologist);
27.3.2.2
Dr L Fine (Psychiatrist);
27.3.2.3
Dr CM Lewer-Allen (Neurosurgeon);
27.3.2.4
Dr A H van den Bout (Orthopaedic Surgeon);
27.3.2.5
Ms A Crosbie (Occupational Therapist);
27.3.2.6
Mr L Linde (Industrial Psychologist);
27.3.2.7
Mr G A Whittaker (Actuary);
27.3.3
The
counsels’ costs of preparing for, and attending to pre-trials,
and costs associated with necessary consultations with
the plaintiff,
the plaintiff’s attorneys, the plaintiff’s witnesses and
the plaintiff’s experts;
27.3.4
The attorneys’ costs of preparing for, and attending to
pre-trials, and costs
associated with necessary consultations with
the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s witnesses and the plaintiff’s
experts;
27.3.5
The travelling costs occasioned by the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s
witnesses
to attend to necessary consultation with his attorney and
expert witnesses.
27.4. Payment of the
taxed or agreed costs shall be made within 14 (fourteen) days of
taxation, and shall likewise be effected into
the trust account of
the plaintiff’s attorney;
27.5. No interest will
accrue in respect of any of the aforesaid amounts if payment is made
on or before the stipulated dates;
27.6  Should payment
not be made in respect of any of the aforesaid amounts on or before
the stipulated date(s), interest will
accrue at 10.25 % (the
statutory rate per annum), compounded.
27.7. In the event that
costs are not agreed the plaintiff agrees as follows:
27.7.1
The plaintiff shall serve a notice of taxation on the defendant's
attorney of record;
and
27.7.2
The plaintiff shall allow the defendant fourteen (14) court days to
make payment
of the taxed costs.
MATHEBULA, J
On
behalf of Plaintiff:

Adv. J.L.
Olivier
Instructed
by:

McIntyre & van der
Post
Bloemfontein
On
behalf of
Defendant
:

Adv. J.S. Motloung
Instructed
by:

Maduba Attorneys
Bloemfontein
[1]
Menday v Protea Assurance Co. Ltd
1967 (1) SA 565
(E) at 569B
[2]
Michael and another v Linksfield Park Clinic (Pty) Ltd and
another
2001 (3) SA 1188
(SCA) paras 36 and 37
[3]
Pitt v Economic insurance Co. Ltd
1957 (3) SA 284
(D) at 287 E-F
[4]
2002 (5B4) QOD 109 (C)
[5]
2006 (5B4) QOD 231 (T)
[6]
2010 (6B) QOD 6 (ECP)