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[2019] ZAFSHC 169
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Van der Walt v Murray and Another (2554/2019) [2019] ZAFSHC 169 (10 September 2019)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case
No: 2554/2019
In
the matter between:
SAREL
JACOBUS VAN DER
WALT
Applicant
and
CLOETE
MURRAY
First
Respondent
RUWAYNE
SMITH
Second
Respondent
JUDGMENT
CORAM:
NAIDOO J
HEARD
ON:
22 August 2019
DELIVERED
ON:
10 September 2019
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The applicant withdrew the “main” application and an
application for a postponement and tendered the respondents’
costs on a party and party scale. The respondents refused to accept
this and indicated that they seek costs against Mr FJ Senekal,
the
attorney of the applicant, on the scale as between attorney/own
client. Arguments on costs ensued, and this is the ruling on
the
costs relating to this matter. Adv Coetzer represented the applicant
and Adv Smith represented the respondents.
BACKGROUND
[2]
I set out a brief summary of the history of this matter, in order to
contextualise the submissions made by counsel in respect
of costs.
The applicant is an un-rehabilitated insolvent, whose estate was
finally sequestrated by an order of this court. The
first and second
respondents are the duly appointed trustees of the insolvent estate.
There is also a long and acrimonious history
between the parties. On
Thursday 6 June 2019, the applicant issued an urgent application out
of this court for hearing on Tuesday
11 June 2019 before the duty
judge of this Division, seeking an order,
inter
alia
, in the following terms:
“
1. That the
Uniform Rules of Court relating to service and process be
dispensed with in order that this application be heard
as one of urgency in
terms of Rule 6(12).
2. That a rule nisi
issued
(sic)
calling on the
Respondents on
25 July 2019
at
9h30
or so soon
thereafter as the matter may be heard to show cause why
the
following order should not be made final:
2.1 That the Respondents
be interdicted and restrained from proceeding with
the
administration of the Applicant’s insolvent estate (“
the
estate
”)
and
the
Second Meeting of Creditors be postponed for
a period of 3 months:
2.1.1 pending the
decision of the Master of the High Court in respect of the
request to remove the Respondents as trustees of the
estate;
2.1.2
alternatively, should the Master of the High Court decide against
such
removal, pending the finalisation of the
Applicant’s intended application
to Court
for the removal of the Respondents as trustees of the estate.
2.2 That the Respondents
pay the costs on a scale as between attorney and
own
client in their personal capacities.
3. That paragraphs 2.1 to
2.1.2 above serve as an interim interdict with
immediate
effect pending the final determination of the application.”
[3]
The application was served on the respondents’ attorneys via
email at 17h00 on 6 June 2019. The respondents opposed the
application and delivered their opposing affidavit by 10 June 2019,
pointing out a number of defects in the application and specifically
in the Notice of Motion, such defects being inter alia, the
non-joinder of material parties and the absence of dates by which the
respondents should indicate their intention to oppose the application
and file their Answering Affidavit. In the late evening of
10 June
2019, the applicant’s attorney agreed that the order sought in
the application could be varied. A draft order was
presented to court
on 11 June 2019 and the following order was granted:
“
1. The application
is postponed to 22 August 2019.
2. The application
(sic)
does not persist with the relief sought in paragraph 2.1
insofar as it relates to the second
meeting of creditors of 12 June 2019.
3. The relief sought in
paragraph 2.1, insofar as it relates to the administration
of
the insolvent estate, will proceed in the ordinary course.
4. The applicant will
deliver his replying affidavit in accordance with the Rules
of
Court.
5. The respondents
reserve the right to supplement its
(sic)
answering affidavit
of
10
June 2019
”
[4]
The applicant did not file his Relying Affidavit in accordance with
the Rules of Court, as directed by the court order, or at
all. If the
court order were adhered to, the applicant ought to have filed his
Replying Affidavit by 25 June 2019, being 10 days
(as prescribed in
the Rules of Court) from the date of the court order. There was a
large amount of correspondence that passed
between the parties in the
interim. The applicant’s attorney advised the respondents’
attorney that he was awaiting
further information from the applicant
in order to finalise the Replying Affidavit. It later transpired that
the applicant wished
to interrogate the respondents, amongst others,
in terms of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (the
Insolvency Act).
>
[5]
The applicant’s attorney, via a letter requested the
respondents’ attorney to consent to a postponement of the
application pending the finalisation of the insolvency enquiry. The
latter declined to do so and requested the applicant to file
a formal
application for postponement by 12 August 2019, so that they could
respond by 15 August 2019. In the interim, the respondents
filed an
opposing affidavit on 16 August 2019, in anticipation of the
application for postponement, which in essence set out the
history of
the matter and especially the correspondence that passed between the
parties.
The
application for postponement by the applicant was filed on 19 August
2019. On 21 August 2019, the applicant filed a supplementary
affidavit to the Founding Affidavit in the postponement application.
[6]
I pause to mention that the application for postponement was not
filed in the court file, nor was the court file indexed and
paginated, as required by the relevant Practice Directive of this
Division. The deponent to the supplementary affidavit in the
postponement application was the applicant’s attorney, Mr
Senekal, and the affidavit was, furthermore, filed without leave
of
the court. I pointed out to both counsel in Chambers that the
founding papers were not in the court file, and in spite of my
Registrar searching for same, it was not found. Mr Coetzer requested
an opportunity to investigate the matter, and when the matter
was
called for hearing, Mr Coetzer advised that his instructions were to
withdraw both the main application and the application
for
postponement with a tender for the respondents’ costs on a
party and party scale.
[7]
The arguments on costs that I have alluded to then followed and court
adjourned at 11h30. At approximately 12h35, a clerk of
court
approached me in Chambers, with the application for postponement in
hand. She advised that it was not apparent from the papers
that the
application for postponement was scheduled for hearing on 22 August
2019 and was therefore placed in a box for general
filing. I
requested my Registrar to contact both counsel immediately and advise
them of the turn of events and enquire if they
wished to make further
submissions before the court makes a ruling. Both declined to make
any further submissions.
ISSUES
[8]
The issue that this court is tasked with
determining are
8.1 Whether the applicant
should pay the costs of the matter on a party and party scale or
whether the applicant’s attorney
should be ordered to pay such
costs on the scale as between attorney and own client.
THE
LAW
[9]
In the unreported case of
IE Van Reenen v Dr
PG Lewis +1 Case number 2302/2014, delivered on 14 May 2019
,
I dealt extensively with the legal position regarding costs,
especially a punitive order for costs. I repeat, in part, what was
said in that matter. It is well established in our law that the
general rule regarding costs is that the unsuccessful party pays
the
costs of the successful party on the party and party scale. The
determination of an appropriate costs order is in the discretion
of
the court, which discretion is usually informed by a number of
factors in order that such discretion be exercised judiciously.
Erasmus in Superior Court Practice, D5-6,
states it succinctly as follows: “
In
leaving the court a discretion, the law contemplates that it should
take into consideration the circumstances of each case, carefully
weighing the issues in the case, the conduct of the parties and any
other circumstance which may have a bearing on the issue of
costs and
then make such order as to costs as would be fair and just between
the parties”
.
This is particularly so if the court intends to depart
from the general rule. There is a duty on a litigant to avoid
conducting
litigation in such a manner that it unduly protracts a
case or unduly causes an escalation in costs.
[10]
It is also well established that vexatious conduct, even if it was
not intended to be vexatious but has the effect of being
vexatious,
may well be the basis for an order awarding costs on an attorney and
client scale. Where a litigant was able to, but
fails to take steps
to curtail proceedings and thus causes an escalation in costs, he may
similarly face the prospect of paying
costs on the attorney and
client scale, on the basis that his conduct was unreasonable.
(See
LAWSA, Volume 10, Third Edition, 284).
In this regard, the dictum
of the court in
Johannesburg City Council v Television &
Electrical Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Another 1997(1) SA 157 (A),
is
apposite. The court, citing with approval the remarks of the courts
in the matters, amongst others, of
In re Alluvial Creek Ltd 1929
CPD 532 at 535 s
aid:
“
It was not
disputed that in appropriate circumstances the conduct of a litigant
may be adjudged ‘vexatious’ within the
extended meaning
that has been placed upon this term in a number of decisions, that
is, when such conduct has resulted in ‘unnecessary
trouble and
expense which the other side ought not to bear’. Naturally one
must guard against censuring a party by way of
a special costs order
when with the benefit of hindsight a course of action taken by a
litigant turns out to have been a lost cause”.
[11]
In the in the
Alluvial Creek
case Gardiner JP remarked as
follows at p535:
“
An order is asked
for that he pays the costs as between attorney and client. Now
sometimes such an order is given because of something
in the conduct
of a party which the Court considers should be punished, malice,
misleading the court and things like that, but
I think the order may
also be granted without any reflection upon the party where the
proceedings are vexatious, and by vexatious
I mean where they have
the effect of being vexatious although the intent may not have been
that they should be vexatious”.
[12]
The purpose of an award of costs on the attorney and
own
client scale was the subject of the court’s remarks in
Sentrachem Ltd v Prinsloo 1997 (2) SA 1 (A)
, The court said
that an award of costs on an attorney and own client scale against
the unsuccessful party must be seen as an attempt
by the court to go
a step further than the usual order of costs between attorney and
client, in order to ensure that the successful
party is relieved of
the burden of paying all the reasonable costs of litigation. The
court cited with approval the matter of
Nel v Waterberg
Landbouwers Ko-operatiewe Vereeniging 1946 AD 597 at 607
, where
Tindall JA said:
“
The true
explanation of awards of attorney and client costs not expressly
authorised by statute seems to be that, by reason of special
considerations arising either from the circumstances which give rise
to the action or from the conduct of the losing party, the
court in a
particular case considers it just, by means of such an order, to
ensure more effectually than it can do by means of
a judgment for
party and party costs that the successful party will not be out of
pocket in respect of the expense caused to him
by the litigation.
Theoretically, a party and party bill taxed in accordance with the
tariff will be reasonably sufficient for
that purpose. But in fact a
party may have incurred expense which is reasonably necessary but is
not chargeable in the party and
party bill. Therefore in a particular
case the Court will try to ensure, as far as it can, that the
successful party is recouped.
I say “as far as it can”
because there may be a considerable difference between the amount of
the attorney and client
bill which a successful party is bound to pay
his own attorney and the amount of an attorney and client bill which
has been taxed
against the losing party”
[
See
also
Friederich Kling GmbH v Continental
Jewellery Manufacturers 1995 (4) SA 966 (C),
where the court cited with approval the cases of Alluvial Creek and
Nel v Waterberg above]
[13]
In view of the prayer for costs against the applicant’s
attorney, it is useful to cite the standard of conduct expected
of an
attorney.
Although the learned
author,
JR Midgley
,
in his work “
Lawyers’
Professional Liability”, First Edition 1992, p84,
deals the duty of an attorney to his client, the standard of conduct
expected of an attorney, in my view, extends to his conduct
in
respect of third parties as well, and he will be held to account,
particularly in respect of those who are negatively impacted
by such
conduct. Midgley cites the dictum of De Villiers CJ in the case of
Van Der Spuy v
Pillans (1875) 5 Buch 133
where he said
“
every
attorney is supposed to be reasonably proficient in his calling, and
if he does not bestow sufficient care and attention,
in the conduct
of the business entrusted to him, he is liable.”
Midgley
continues and refers to an extract from
Honey
and Blanckenberg v Law 1966(2) SA 43 (R) at 46 F-G
where
the court said
“
In
the performance of his duty or mandate, an attorney holds himself out
to his clients as possessing adequate skill, knowledge
and learning
for the purpose of conducting all business that he undertakes. If,
therefore, he causes loss or damage to his client
owing to a want of
such knowledge as he ought to possess, or the want of such care he
ought to exercise, he is guilty of negligence
giving rise to an
action for damages by his client”
This
appears to be the generally accepted guiding principles in an
attorney-client relationship. The duty to exercise care, skill
and
diligence is the duty not to be negligent. In my view, it goes
without saying that where a failure to act in accordance with
this
duty causes harm or loss to another, a court may well consider
sanctioning such failure by an appropriate order for costs
against
the attorney. I will deal further with this later in the judgment.
[14]
In support of his contention that the applicant’s attorney
should pay the costs in this matter, Mr Smith submitted that
Mr
Senekal had ample notice that the respondents intended to seek a
costs order against him personally, and failed to react to
the many
instances when they directly indicated their intention to do so. He
referred to the Answering Affidavit in the main application.
In
paragraph 52.2 thereof the respondents indicated that in view of Mr
Senekal’s conduct, they intended to rely on
section 74
of the
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936
, which provides as follows:
“
74
Improper advising or conduct of legal proceedings
If
it appears to the court that any attorney or counsel has, with intent
to benefit himself, improperly advised the institution,
defence or
conducting of legal proceedings by or against an insolvent estate or
has incurred any unnecessary expense therein, the
court may order the
whole or part of the expense thereby incurred to be borne by that
attorney or counsel personally”.
[15]
Mr Smith also referred to the history of this matter from the time
the applicant launched the application on an urgent basis
and the
many instances when Mr Senekal was informed that the respondents
would seek an order for costs against him personally.
As indicated
above, this was largely dealt with in the Answering Affidavit filed
by the respondents in anticipation of the application
for
postponement of this matter by the applicant. Mr Coetzer was in the
unenviable position of having been briefed to appear in
this matter
at the proverbial eleventh hour, leaving him no time even to prepare
Heads of Argument. All he was able to do was advise
the court that he
was instructed to withdraw both applications and tender costs on a
party and party scale. He thereafter attempted
to justify the defect
in the Notice of Motion by submitting that the return day of the
Rule
Nisi
served as the date by which the
respondents should oppose the matter.
In
my view, this argument cannot be sustained to cure a fatal defect in
the papers. The rest of his arguments centred around the
merits and
as valiant as his attempts were to rescue the situation for the
applicant and his attorney, these arguments also cannot,
in my view,
be sustained.
EVALUATION
[16]
This court’s task is to determine a just and equitable costs
order. Such an exercise must, of necessity, involve traversing
the
history of the matter as far as may be necessary, the conduct of the
parties and, if necessary, the merits of the matter. As
alluded to
earlier, a great deal of correspondence flowed between the legal
representatives of the parties in this matter, dealing
largely with
the application, the further conduct of proceedings and the issue of
costs.
[17]
On 11 June 2019, the day the application was heard and an order
granted by agreement between the parties, the respondents’
attorneys addressed a letter to Mr Senekal, the applicant’s
attorney recording the sequence events leading up to the grant
of the
order. It emerged from the letter that, based on the agreement
reached with Mr Senekal, the respondents their attorney and
counsel
would not travel to Bloemfontein. Although it was agreed that Mr
Senekal was to draw the draft order to be presented in
court, he did
not do so. Several attempts were made by the respondents’
attorney between 8h30 and 14h00 on 11 June to obtain
the draft order,
without success, in spite of discussing it with an attorney from Mr
Senekal’s office, who alleged that he
had no instructions in
this regard.
[18]
The respondents’ attorneys eventually drew the draft order
which was presented in court. The respondents were obliged
to brief a
local advocate to appear in court for the hearing at the scheduled
time of 14h00.
The
same attorney, Mr Coetzee, who earlier indicated that he had no
instructions appeared in court, without counsel on behalf of
the
applicant. The court stood the matter down for Mr Coetzee to find Mr
Senekal and take instructions. He did so and eventually
the court
order was granted. The letter on 11 June 2019 ended by indicating
that a personal costs order (against Mr Senekal) would
be sought for
the wasted costs of briefing counsel in Bloemfontein.
[19]
The applicant’s Replying Affidavit was never filed, nor did he
proceed with the application to remove the respondents
as trustees of
the insolvent estate as envisaged in paragraph 3 of the court order
dated 11 June 2019. A further letter was
addressed to Mr
Senekal on 28 June 2019, pointing out that the applicant’s
Replying Affidavit was not filed and should he
wish to do so, he was
required to bring an application for condonation to do so. Mr Senekal
was again notified in this letter that
an order for costs
de
bonis propriis
will be sought against him. Mr
Senekal responded to this letter on 28 June 2018, and advised that he
is still awaiting information
from his “clients” to
enable him to draft the Replying Affidavit. The tone of his letter
was clearly discourteous and
hostile, where he said of the
respondents That they
“
cannot even deal
with the elementary aspects of the administration of estates…”
and
“
your clients manage to
make another amateur mistake by not advertising the second meeting of
creditors in the required newspaper..’’
[20]
Mr Senekal’s response to the respondents’ assertions that
he had not complied with the Rules of Court, and that
they would seek
the punitive costs order I have mentioned, is perhaps indicative of
his attitude to Rules of court.
He
said
“
As to your thread
(sic)
for cost order de boins
(sic)
propriis, please don’t embarrass yourself
by making allegations which is
(sic)
frivolous, disingenuous and without merit
”
.
In
my view, Mr Senekal, as an attorney of many years’ experience,
does not appear to see the necessity to comply with the
Rules of
Court and when his non-compliance is pointed out, he deems such
complaints as lacking merit. Such an attitude can only
stem from a
disrespect for the Rules of Court and the convenience of the court
and his opponents.
[21]
In a letter dated 3 July 2019, the respondents’ attorneys again
pointed out that the Rules of Court have not been complied
with. Mr
Senekal responded to this letter only on 16 July 2019, despite his
indication that he was out of office and returned on
8 July 2019.
Clearly he saw nothing wrong in waiting 8 days after his return to
the office to respond to a letter addressed to
him by a colleague in
respect of a matter already scheduled for hearing in court. In his
reply, he, instead, attacks the authority
of the trustees to oppose
the application. This type of correspondence, with similar responses
continued right up to a few days
before the hearing on 22 August
2019.
[22]
No application was made to court for an extension of the period to
file the applicant’s Replying Affidavit, no explanation
was
given for why the affidavit was not filed and no explanation or
indication was given for why the application to remove the
respondents as trustees was not prosecuted in the ordinary course, or
at all. The perception that Mr Senekal conducted himself
in this
manner to cause as much offence and inconvenience to the respondents
as possible, is hard to avoid. The respondents’
attorneys
refused to consent to a postponement of the matter on 22 August 2019
and advised in no uncertain terms that if the applicant
persists with
such an application, he should bring a timeous substantive
application in respect thereof. This was not done by the
date
stipulated by the respondents’ attorney, which then caused them
to serve a Notice of Set Down for enrolment of the matter
for hearing
on 22 August 2019.
[23]
An application for postponement was filed on 19 August 2019, which
initially did not reach the court file. On 21 August 2019,
a day
before the hearing of the matter, the applicant filed a Supplementary
Affidavit in support of the application for postponement,
which was
merely delivered to my Registrar. The application for postponement
was not indexed or paginated as required by the relevant
Practice
Directive of this Division, nor was the leave of the court sought to
file the additional affidavit. If the Mr Senekal
had taken the
trouble to ensure that the Practice Directives were complied with, he
would have discovered that the founding papers
relevant to the
postponement application were not in the court file. In any event, it
was not clear why a postponement was being
sought, as the reasons for
bringing the application to court on 6 June 2019, on an urgent basis,
had already fallen away,
There
was no reason whatever for the application to remain on the court
roll and no reason to keep alive an interim order which
had no
effect. The applicant did not file Heads of Argument, as required by
the Practice Directives of this Division, and briefed
counsel only on
19 August 2019.
[24]
An attorney, and especially one of Mr Senekal’s experience, is
expected to be well acquainted with the Rules of Court
and the
requirements of the Practice Directives of a Division in which he
chooses to litigate. The respondents are the duly appointed
trustees
of the applicant’s insolvent estate, and as such, need to
protect the interests of the creditors of the insolvent
estate.
Litigation of this nature and conduct such as I have described have
the only consequence of incurring unnecessary costs,
which the
insolvent estate must bear, to the prejudice of the creditors. Mr
Senekal is a seasoned insolvency practitioner of many
years, with an
intimate knowledge of the
Insolvency Act and
its requirements. It is
clear that in matters of a procedural nature, involving the Rules of
Court, a lay person who approaches
an attorney for assistance (as in
the case of the applicant), relies on the skill and expertise of such
an attorney to guide him
through the maze of litigation in the most
expeditious and cost-effective way. Put differently, the attorney is
required to conduct
himself according to the standards mentioned in
the Van Der Spuy and Honey cases cited by Midgley above. As I
indicated, the same
standard of care, diligence and professionalism
is required when dealing with third parties, in order that loss or
prejudice is
not occasioned to them in the conduct of the attorney’s
business on behalf of his client.
[25]
Mr Senekal failed to conduct himself with the requisite degree of
care and diligence expected of him. He brought an urgent
application
on behalf of his client, where there was no urgency, he then failed
to act in accordance with a court order which he
had agreed to, and
failed to seek condonation for such failure. In addition, he ignored
the cardinal Rules of Practice relevant
to this Division, which in my
view displays disrespect for this court. It is clear that he did not
prepare the matter for meaningful
argument, and instead withdrew both
the main application and the postponement application at the start of
proceedings on 22 August
2019.
[26]
He indicated in a letter to the respondents’ attorneys, dated
16 July 2019, that the insolvent (applicant) is not funding
this
litigation, without saying who is. Bearing in mind Mr Senekal’s
experience with such matters, and that the respondents
did not give
consent to the applicant to institute proceedings, as required by the
Act, he must surely have been aware that the
professional thing to
have done was to give full details of who is funding the litigation.
This would have been a clear indication
that the applicant is not
concealing monies which should rightfully be dealt with in the
administration of the insolvent estate.
[27]
The tender of party and party costs will, in any event, not address
the irrecoverable costs that would necessarily have been
incurred by
the respondents on behalf of the insolvent estate and creditors, in
opposing this matter. I agree with Mr Smith that
Mr Senekal was given
fair and ample warning that the respondents would seek a punitive
order for costs against him personally.
Not
once did he respond by saying that he is acting under instructions
and that application for such an order would be inappropriate
and
would be opposed. He also failed to deal with the provisions of
section 74
of the
Insolvency Act which
was pertinently raised by the
respondents in their Answering Affidavit to the main application, and
in which they warned that thy
will seek a punitive order for costs
against Mr Senekal. Instead, he high-handedly dismissed such warnings
as frivolous, disingenuous
and without merit.
[28]
The tone of his correspondence and the pleadings in this matter speak
of his lack of respect for his colleagues, a disregard
for the Rules
of Court and for the court itself. I see no reason for the
respondents or the insolvent estate to be mulcted in costs
they had
to unnecessarily incur. Due to the conduct of Mr Senekal, they were
not spared the trouble and expense of litigation,
and I am of the
view that he should bear those costs.
[29]
The case of
Pheko and Others v Ekurhaleni City 2015(5) SA 600 (CC)
bears mention. The court held that the failure on the part of the
attorney of the relevant municipality to notify his clients and
the
registrar of that court, of a change of address, amounted to gross
negligence. The court also held that the attorney concerned
was not
only an attorney but an officer of the court. The evidence showed a
gross disregard for his professional duties. The court
held at
paragraph [51] that
“
Costs
de
bonis propriis
are
costs which a representative is ordered to pay out of his or her
own pocket as a penalty for some improper conduct,
for example, if he
or she acted negligently or unreasonably. Whether a person
acted negligently or unreasonably must be decided
in the light of the
particular circumstances of each and every case.”
[30]
Similar sentiments were expressed by the Constitutional Court in the
matter of
South African Liquor Traders’ Association and
Others v Chairperson. Gauteng Liquor Board and Others 2009(1) SA 565
(CC).
The court held at paragraph [54] that:
“
An
order of costs
de
bonis propriis
is
made against attorneys where a court is satisfied that there has been
negligence in a serious degree which warrants
an order of costs
being made as a mark of the court's displeasure. An attorney is an
officer of the court and owes a court an appropriate
level of
professionalism and courtesy.”
In
my view, the conduct of Mr Senekal, with regard to the manner in
which these proceedings were dealt with, fell far short of the
high
standard expected of an attorney. His conduct can be described
negligent, unreasonable and lacking in diligence. There is
ample
justification for him to be ordered to the costs, and he should be so
ordered.
[31]
In the circumstances, I make the following order:
An
order for costs
de bonis propriis
is made against the applicant’s attorney, Mr FJ Senekal, who is
directed to pay the respondents’ costs of this matter,
including all reserved costs, on the scale as between attorney and
own client.
________________
S. NAIDOO, J
On
behalf of Applicant: Adv. Coetzer
Instructed
by: FJ Senekal Inc
42
President Steyn Ave
Westdene
Bloemfontein
(Ref:WAS/MAT/1647)
On
behalf of the 1
st
&
2
nd
Respondents: Adv. JE Smith
Instructed
by: Werksmans Inc
Sandton,
Johannesburg
c/o
Webbers Attorneys
Webbers
Building
96
Charles Street
Bloemfontein
(Ref:
ADW/lvs/WER3/0008)