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[2019] ZAFSHC 111
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J V v Road Accident Fund (2135/2017) [2019] ZAFSHC 111 (28 June 2019)
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
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IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA,
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case
No.: 2135/2017
In
the matter between:
J
V
Plaintiff
and
THE
ROAD ACCIDENT
FUND
Defendant
JUDGMENT:
MOENG, AJ
HEARD
ON:
28,
29 AND 31 MAY 2019
DELIVERED ON:
28 JUNE 2019
[1]
The plaintiff claims damages in the amount of R1 421 451.00 from the
defendant arising from bodily injuries she sustained in
a road
accident which occurred on 16 September 2016 at or near Cambridge
Street Bethlehem, between the insured motor vehicle and
a motor
vehicle in which she was a passenger.
[2]
On 6 November 2017 the issues of negligence and liability were
settled and the parties agreed that the defendant would be liable
for
100 % of the plaintiff’s agreed or proven damages.
The
parties could however not agree on the extent of the plaintiff’s
damages. The matter now serves before me for determination
of the
quantum of her claim.
[3]
The plaintiff testified in support of her claim and led the evidence
of
Dr
A.
Van Aswegen (Neurosurgeon), Mrs. Simone Gouws (Occupational
Therapist),
Dr
E.
Jacobs (Industrial Psychologist),
Dr
H.
Roodt (Eye Specialist) and
Mr
Charl
Du Plessis (Munro Actuaries) whereas the defendant did not adduce any
evidence in rebuttal of the plaintiff’s case.
The reports of
Drs
D.
Shevel (Psychiatrist), J.J Schutte (General Practitioner) and L.F
Oelofse (Orthopedic Surgeon) were handed into the record by
agreement
between the parties. A joint minute compiled by Occupational
Therapists,
Mrs
Gouws
and Moagi was also accepted as an exhibit. I will later deal with the
probative value of the joint minute as the defendant
sought to
distance itself from the agreement entered into by its expert.
[4]
It is not in dispute that the plaintiff was employed as a House
Mother at Charlotte Theron Children’s Home prior to the
collision. She returned to her pre-accident work and resigned two
years thereafter. It is common cause that the retirement age
at the
Children’s Home was sixty years. She was due to turn 60 years
and retire in June 2018 but she resigned in July 2017.
She says she
decided to resign as she could not meet the
physical
demands of her work. She gave her erstwhile employer three months’
notice as she had a number of appointments lined
up in preparation of
this case.
She
testified that she was prepared to seek employment after her
retirement from the Children’s Home and was prepared to work
as
long as possible, despite her age. She managed to find employment at
an old age home but she could also not meet the physical
demands of
the work and she resigned.
[5]
Part of her duties at the Children’s Home was to take care of
the children from early morning until the late hours of
the night.
She had to help the children with their homework and school tasks.
She also assisted in transporting them to and from
school and to
their outings and extra mural activities. She had to keep individual
records of the children including daily observations
and information
about their activities, meals that were served and medication
administered.
[6]
It is common cause that she sustained injuries in a motor vehicle
collision. She was transported to hospital by ambulance and
treated
by a doctor at casualty. She testified that she was briefly
unconscious until she was loaded into an ambulance. The
report
compiled by
Dr
Oelofse
reveals that the doctor on duty noted that a CT scan was performed
and it established that her left frontal cheek bone and
the left
lateral wall of her left orbit were fractured. Her left
maxillary antrum lateral wall was also fractured and she
had a 2cm
laceration through her left cornea and sclera. This in short meant
that the bones protecting the eye cavity and frontal
cheek bones were
fractured. She was taken to theatre on the same day for the
laceration to be sutured and was discharged the following
day.
[7]
Dr
Oelofse
diagnosed her with multiple fractures to the head, chronic headaches,
reduced sensation in the left upper side of the face,
painful
temporal mandibular joint (the two joints connecting the jawbone to
the skull), and loss of sight in the left eye and disfigurement
of
the face.
Dr
Roodt
confirmed that her left eye was left permanently blind by the
accident and that an optical prosthesis was fitted over the
injured
eye.
[8]
Dr
Van
Aswegen in turn testified that in his opinion, the plaintiff suffered
a mild traumatic brain injury during the accident. He
testified that
the injuries that she sustained to her head and eye indicated that a
significant amount of force was applied to
her head during the
collision. Such high impact concussion is in his view not reversible.
He confirmed that the plaintiff, as a
result, suffered from cognitive
and emotional sequelae of the injuries which are consistent with
post-concussion syndrome.
[9]
He testified that the long term cognitive and emotional consequences
of mild traumatic injury include symptoms such as chronic
headaches,
attention deficits, reduced working memory, and impaired executive
functions in the form of lack of concentration. He
testified that the
plaintiff has an increased risk of dementia and provision should be
made for its possible treatment in future.
She will in his opinion
not be able to perform her duties as before.
[10]
He testified during cross examination that the plaintiff’s
Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS), which is a neurological scale that
is used
to determine a patient’s consciousness, should have been
lower than 15 after the collision as she had briefly
lost
consciousness. The GCS is however open to slight variation. The scale
is usually determined by members of the emergency services
(EMS) and
it may later vary as the condition of the patient either improves or
deteriorates. He did not treat the plaintiff himself
but would have,
like the members of the EMS, scored her at a scale of 15 based on the
contents of the report that he was provided
with. He testified that a
scale of 15 is within the range of mild traumatic brain injury.
[11]
The report by Dr Schutte in turn reflects that the plaintiff
sustained a head injury with multiple fractures with severe residual
symptoms, a loss of sight of the left eye, disfigurement,
psychological trauma, post-traumatic stress disorder and a whole
person
impairment of 35%.
Dr
Shevel
diagnosed her with ongoing psychiatric sequelae resulting in a
depressed mood though it has improved to a large extent, difficulties
adjusting to monocular vision, fear to drive and mild impatience and
irritability.
[12]
Mrs
Gouws
testified that she is of the opinion that the plaintiff’s
physical capacity demands sedentary work. This does not include
her
previous work as a House Mother of a children’s home. She is of
the view that although the plaintiff retains the physical
capacity
for sedentary work, she will require a position that allows for
sitting while her head is in a neutral position. She will
thus have
limited choices with regards to the suitable sedentary work and may
be a vulnerable employee should a suitable position
be obtained.
[13]
Considering
the plaintiff’s cognitive and psychosocial limitations she is
of the opinion that the plaintiff is an unfair competitor
for work
within the open labour market and it is unlikely that she will find
suitable employment in future. She is of the view
that the accident
has had a negative impact on the plaintiff’s ability to work
and it has caused a significant loss of income
considering the
plaintiff’s wish to work as long as possible, despite her
current age.
[14]
Mrs
Gouws
and Moagi agree in their joint minute that the
residual
capacity of the plaintiff does not fully meet the physical demands of
her pre-accident occupation and this justified her
decision to
resign. They further agree that, due to a combination of her
orthopaedic, visual, cognitive and psychosocial limitations,
she will
experience reduced efficiency, competitiveness and productivity when
compared to her uninjured peers should she obtain
suitable work.
[15]
Dr Jacobs testified that had it not been for the accident, the
plaintiff would probably have been able to work in her capacity
as
house mother until the age of 60 years at the children’s home
and she could have followed a similar career until the age
of 65
years. He is of the opinion that she will not find suitable work
based on her injuries, skills, experience and age. In his
view, her
injuries affected her capacity to earn an income.
[16]
He was not aware that the plaintiff was employed at an old age home
after her resignation from the children’s home. Her
income of
R12 000.00 for the six months that she worked at the old age home
should therefore be deducted from the amount claimed
for past loss of
income. He took her basic salary, annual leave, annual bonus and
benefits into account in his guidelines to the
Actuary for
calculation of the past loss of income. He excluded the fringe
benefits for calculation of the future loss of income
as it is
uncertain that she would receive such benefits in future.
[17]
Mr Du Plessis
was
instructed to estimate the capital value of the potential loss of
earnings suffered by the plaintiff. His resultant calculations
were
premised on the basis that the plaintiff did not receive an income
from July 2017 until her expected retirement from the children’s
home in June 2018. It was further premised on the basis that she
would receive the same fringe benefits from the date of her
retirement
from the children’s home until the retirement age of
65 years with inflationary increases of her earnings. The
contingencies
that he was instructed to apply were for the uninjured
position at 5% and 10% on past and future earnings respectively and
no contingencies
for the injured position.
[18]
It is common cause that Du Plessis
excluded
the annual leave and annual bonus that Dr Jacobs included for past
loss of income as these amounts were not earned on a
monthly basis.
He conversely included the monthly fringe benefits contrary to the
instruction by
Dr
Jacobs that such amounts be excluded. This prompted a recalculation
of these amounts taking the correct amounts into consideration.
[19]
This concluded the plaintiff’s case and the defendant closed
its case without calling any of its expert witnesses despite
a number
of expert notices having been filed. The case was thereafter
postponed at the request of counsel for the defendant for
the filing
of heads of argument. Plaintiff’s heads were filed as agreed on
the 7
th
of June but the defendant failed to file its heads on 14 June as
agreed. I was only provided with the defendant’s heads on
19
June and the plaintiff’s reply to the defendant’s heads
was received on 24 June.
[20]
Counsel for the defendant contended in his heads of argument that
there is no basis to suggest that the plaintiff
suffered
a mild traumatic brain injury and that she
would suffer future loss
of her cognitive abilities. Absent any injury to the brain, so the
argument went, the evidence of all the
other experts is not helpful.
The joint minute by the Occupational Therapists is in his view not
supported by any evidence. He
submits that the only evidence before
court is that the plaintiff sustained an injury to the eye and
nothing more. He lastly reasoned
that the plaintiff resigned and was
not forced to leave her employment.
[21]
Legal representatives, by reason of their lack of special knowledge
and skill in certain fields, may not be sufficiently qualified
to
challenge the testimony of expert witnesses in the absence of
divergent expert opinion. If the court is unable to decide an
issue
without the assistance of someone qualified to do so it may not
replace the opinion of such an expert with its own view without
proper justification. There are certain fields of expertise
where courts cannot form independent opinions in the absence
of
cogent expert evidence.
[22]
It is trite that expert witnesses are required to lay a factual basis
for their conclusions and explain their reasoning to
the court. The
court must satisfy itself as to the correctness of the expert's
reasoning and in the absence of any contrary evidence,
the opinion
should be accepted. Without having led any conflicting expert
evidence, defendant seeks to argue that the evidence
of the
neurosurgeon is unreliable and should be ignored.
[23]
Counsel for the defendant’s suggestion that the plaintiff did
not
suffer
a mild traumatic brain injury is without merit and is contrary to the
evidence of the neurosurgeon,
Dr
Van
Aswegen. Such intimation is not supported by any facts contained in
the defendant’s expert notices and neither did the
defendant
lead evidence to that effect. The defendant conceded that the
plaintiff sustained the head injuries reflected throughout
the expert
notices, including its own expert notices, but disputed the
consequences of such injuries. This argument was persisted
with
despite none of their experts disputing the conclusion reached by
Dr
Van
Aswegen that the plaintiff suffered a mild traumatic brain injury.
[24]
Against defendant’s failure to lead such evidence, the admitted
report of
Dr
Oelofse
reveals that the CT scan disclosed a number of fractures to the
facial bones of the plaintiff.
Dr
Van
Aswegen in turn testified that the significant amount of force that
was applied to her head during the collision caused such
fractures
and the shearing of her brain. Such high impact concussion, he
opined, is not reversible and is therefore permanent.
There is
therefore no factual basis to doubt that the sequelae of the injuries
is consistent with post-concussion syndrome and
will lead to
cognitive impairments.
[25]
Counsel’s reliance on the 15/15 GCS to advance his argument
that
plaintiff
did not
suffer
a mild traumatic brain injury is similarly without merit. The
undisputed evidence of
Dr
Van
Aswegen is that a scale of 15 is within the range of mild traumatic
brain injury as opposed to the more serious score of moderate
and
severe. I am satisfied that a proper factual basis was placed on
record for the conclusion that
Dr
Van
Aswegen reached and he fully
explained
his reasoning to the court. I have no reason to doubt the conclusion
that
the
plaintiff suffered a mild traumatic brain injury and that she
would suffer future loss
of her cognitive abilities.
[26]
The defendant further sought to distance itself from the agreement
reached by its Occupational Therapist in the joint minute.
It
is common cause that the Occupational Therapists agreed that, the
plaintiff does not fully meet the physical demands of her
pre-accident occupation and this justified her decision to resign.
They also agreed that due to a combination of her orthopaedic,
visual, cognitive and psychosocial limitations, she will experience
reduced efficiency, competitiveness and productivity when compared
to
her uninjured peers should she obtain suitable work.
Counsel
argued that
the
joint minute by the Occupational Therapists is not supported by any
evidence. This argument is similarly without merit and should
suffer
the same fate as the argument on the evidence of Dr Van Aswegen. It
cannot be sustained and it is therefore rejected. It
is peculiar that
the defendant questioned its own expert in the absence of any dissent
from another expert in the same field.
[27]
It goes without saying that the purpose of a joint
minute
is to limit
the
issues to be tried and which expert evidence has to be presented.
In
the absence of a timeous indication from the defendant that it did
not wish to be bound by the agreement entered into by its
expert, the
plaintiff was entitled to assume that the matters agreed to between
the experts were not in dispute. The plaintiff
however elected to
call
Mrs
Gouws
despite the agreement in the joint minute. This was also done
notwithstanding the defendant’s initial indication that
it did
not dispute the contents of her reports. It was only after the
plaintiff insisted in calling the witness that the defendant
decided
to dispute the contents of her report and resultant joint minute. It
is not clear why the report was initially admitted
but later
disputed.
[28]
Where experts in a joint minute reach an agreement on an issue, they
signify that such an issue need not be adjudicated upon
as the
initial dispute simply does not exist. They in essence simply agree
that a fact or opinion is not in dispute and it will
in the normal
course of events not be open for a court to cut the veil of such an
agreement and question the veracity of the facts
or opinion contained
therein. By having reached an agreement, they put the dispute beyond
the need for adjudication. See
Jacobs
v The Road Accident Fund
(4558/2012)
[2019] ZAFSHC 42
(2 May 2019)
[29]
Sutherland J succinctly sets out the position regarding the
effect of such agreements between experts in
Thomas v BD Sarens
(Pty) Ltd
(2007/6636) [2012] ZAGPJHC 161 (12 September 2012)
at para 11 and 12:
‘
Where the experts
called by opposing litigants meet and reach agreements about facts or
about opinions, those agreements bind both
litigants to the extent of
such agreements. No litigant may repudiate an agreement to which its
expert is a party, unless it does
so clearly and, at the very latest,
at the outset of the trial. In the absence of a timeous repudiation,
the facts agreed by the
experts enjoy the same status as facts which
are common cause on the pleadings or facts agreed in a pre-trial
conference’.
[30] The majority in
Bee
v Road Accident Fund
2018 (4) SA 366
(SCA)
held
that ‘effective case management would be undermined if there
were an unconstrained liberty to depart from agreements
reached by
the litigants' respective experts. There would be no incentive for
parties and experts to agree on matters because,
despite such
agreement, a litigant would have to prepare as if all matters were
in issue’. An approach, similar to the
one taken up by the
defendant in this case, goes against the grain and spirit of
efficient case flow management. With the known
pressures our courts
face with case management, precious court time is occupied with
non-existent disputes.
[31]
The
majority in
Bee
v RAF
further held that ‘the position where experts in the same field
reach an agreement differs from the position where experts
differ on
their respective opinions. In cases where they differ in
opinion, a court must determine whether the factual basis
of a
particular opinion, if in dispute, has been proved and must have
regard to the cogency of the expert's process of reasoning’.
Logic dictates that where they agree, a court will in exceptional
circumstances reject the cogency of their opinion and agreement.
It
is only where their agreement goes against the grain of the evidence
in totality that it may be rejected. There is in my view
no factual
basis upon which I may reject the agreement reached by the
Occupational Therapists in their joint minute.
[32]
Counsel further
reasoned
that the plaintiff resigned and was not forced to leave her
employment. This argument is simply not supported by the evidence.
What ran like a golden thread through the evidence of the plaintiff
and all the witnesses and reports that were submitted, is that
the
physical demands of her position at the Children’s Home forced
her to resign as she could not cope. Counsel’s contention
that
she resigned because she wanted to move to Bloemfontein to be closer
to medical facilities is nothing but a piecemeal approach
to her
evidence. Though she wanted to move to Bloemfontein, the primary
reason for her resignation was the physical demands of
her job.
[33]
I am satisfied that she resigned due to the injuries caused by the
collision and same led to her loss of past income. Such
injuries in
my view impacted her capacity to earn an income and reduced her
estate, thereby causing her patrimonial loss. Her injuries
admittedly
led to past medical expenses and her condition will require future
medical treatment. She admittedly also suffered pain,
discomfort and
loss of amenities of life. What is left to be determined is the
amount that has to be awarded.
[34]
The defendant objected to the plaintiff using documents relating to
her past medical expenses as copies of such documents were
not
provided to them. These documents were admittedly discovered. Once
discovered, the defendant was at liberty to request that
plaintiff
make available for inspection and request copies of any documents
disclosed in the discovery affidavit. This was admittedly
not done
and nothing, in my view, precluded the plaintiff from using these
documents.
[35]
In respect of the past hospital and medical expenses, the plaintiff
claimed payment in the amount of R35 626 00. The amount
of R7 277 65,
was in respect of medical expenses at a state hospital. Plaintiff is
admittedly not entitled to this amount. The
invoice issued by
Dr
Staples
for R600 00 was for services rendered in respect of the right
uninjured eye. Such an amount should also be subtracted from
the
claim amount. The fact that the plaintiff has not yet paid some of
the service providers is neither here nor there. What remains
is that
she is responsible for the outstanding accounts and the expenses have
been incurred.
[36]
It is not in dispute that the Industrial Psychologist incorrectly
included the annual bonus and leave payment as part of the
monthly
earnings in his instruction to the Actuary. Du Plessis corrected this
error. He in turn, contrary to the instruction of
the Industrial
Psychologist, included the fringe benefits that the plaintiff
received from the age of 60 years to 65 years in his
calculation for
future loss of income.
This
prompted a recalculation of these amounts taking the correct amounts
into account.
[37]
I am satisfied that the actuarial calculations that
ignored
the fringe benefits from the age of 60 years, as provided for by the
Industrial Psychologist, will be a just and fair reflection
of the
damages which the plaintiff has suffered with regards to her future
loss of earnings. I am also satisfied as to
the
reasonableness of the respective contingencies.
[38]
I am satisfied that considering (i)
her
injuries,(ii) that she completely lost vision in her left eye,(iii)
that she endured acute pain at the time of the collision,
(iv)
that
she suffered a mild traumatic brain injury, (v) that she has an
increased risk of dementia, (vi) that she lost her amenities
of life,
(vii) her emotional state and (viii) comparable cases that I have
been provided with, an amount of R400 000.00 will be
reasonable under
the circumstances.
[39]
Counsel for the plaintiff sought an order of costs on a punitive
scale. He argued that the defendant disputed a number of issues
and
that plaintiff had to obtain various expert opinions in order to
proof her case. He submitted that these reports were served
on the
defendant’s Attorney as early as 23 June 2017 and the defendant
as such had ample time to consider the contents of
the reports to
reconsider
its
denials. The defendant, so the argument went, could have timeously
determined whether the reports can be accepted, thereby eliminating
the need to call witnesses.
[40]
It is common cause that the defendant agreed that a number of reports
be accepted into evidence without the need of calling
the experts
concerned. The defendant also admitted that the expert report of Mrs
Gouws be accepted but the plaintiff insisted to
lead her evidence.
This led to her evidence not being completed on the first day of
trial. The defendant did not dispute that the
plaintiff suffered
permanent blindness to her left eye but sought to dispute that she
suffered
mild
traumatic brain injury.
[41]
It transpired during cross examination, justifiably so or not, that
counsel for the defendant’s concern related to the
fact that
the plaintiff’s GCS was 15/15 and that she received no further
treatment for her brain injury. Though
Dr
Ngqandu,
the defendant’s neurosurgeon, was not called, he indicated in
his expert report that the plaintiff’s cognitive
functions were
well orientated. Defendant was in my view therefore justified to
challenge the evidence of
Dr
Van
Aswegen. It is however not clear why the defendant’s
neurosurgeon was not called. This, in my view, does not detract from
the defendant’s decision not to accept the neurosurgeon’s
report. It is common cause that the actuarial report
was
challenged. The initial actuarial calculations were admittedly based
on incorrect assumptions and the defendant was in my view
within its
rights not to accept the report.
[42]
The importance of proper pretrial negotiations and proceedings should
be
emphasised
.
The rule 37 conference lasted for 15 minutes and no effort was made
to deal with issues that would shorten the proceedings. No
specific
admissions were sought save for the issue relating to whether the
plaintiff qualifies for general damages. It is common
cause that this
was not disputed and the plaintiff did not lead such evidence. This
was clearly a run of the mill conference which
did not achieve the
purpose of shortening the proceedings and curbing unnecessary costs.
Legal representatives run the risk of
having the fees
charged to their clients
for
such conferences disallowed.
[43]
There is no indication from the pre-trial minute that any other
specific admissions were sought from the defendant. The pre-trial
minute does not reflect that the issue relating to joint minutes to
shorten the proceedings was discussed nor is there any indication
that there was an effort to shorten the proceedings.
[44]
There was an obligation on both parties to ensure that costs are not
unnecessarily incurred and this issue cannot squarely
be placed on
the door of the defendant. This obligation started during the
pre-trial proceedings. Legal representatives’
similarly run the
risk of having the fees
charged
to their clients disallowed for having failed to take a course that
would curb unnecessary costs being incurred.
The
plaintiff’s prayer for a punitive cost order is in my view
therefore without merit.
[45]
In
the result the following order is made:
1.
The
defendant is liable for payment to the plaintiff in the amount of
R843 178.88
(eight hundred and forty three thousand one hundred and seventy eight
rand and eighty eight cents)
in
full and final settlement, as set out hereunder:
1.1
R
169 385.00
in respect of past loss of income;
1.2
R
252 540.00
in respect of future loss of income;
1.3
R
400 000.00
in respect of general damages;
1.4
R
21 253.88
in respect of past medical and hospital expenses
resulting
from a motor vehicle collision that occurred on
16
September 2015
.
2.
The defendant is ordered to furnish to the Plaintiff an undertaking
in terms of
Section 17(4)(a)
of the
Road Accident Fund Act 56 of
1996
, for 100% of the costs of the future accommodation of the
Plaintiff in a hospital or nursing home or the treatment of or the
rendering
of a service or the supplying of goods to the Plaintiff
arising out of injuries sustained by her in the motor vehicle
collision
mentioned above, in terms of which undertaking the
defendant will be obliged to compensate her in respect of the said
costs after
the costs have been incurred and on proof thereof.
3.
The defendant to pay the plaintiff's taxed or agreed costs on the
scale as between party and party until date of this order,
including
but not limited to the costs set out hereunder:
3.1 The costs attendant
upon the obtaining of payment of the amounts referred to in this
order;
3.2 The reasonable
preparation / qualifying / accommodation / travelling and full
reservation fees and expenses (if any) of the
following experts, and
the costs relating to the plaintiff attending their medico legal
examinations:
3.2.1 Dr JJ Schutte
(General Practitioner);
3.2.2 Dr LF Oelofse
(Orthopaedic Surgeon);
3.2.3 Prof R. Lurie
(Facial & Oral Surgeon);
3.2.4 Dr J. Vos (Eye
Specialist);
3.2.5 Dr H Roodt (Eye
Specialist);
3.2.6 Dr A van Aswegen
(Neurosurgeon);
3.2.7 Ms. Simone Gouws
(Occupational Therapist);
3.2.8 Dr DA Shevel
(Psychiatrist);
3.2.9 Dr E Jacobs
(Industrial Psychologist);
3.2.10 Munro Actuaries.
3.3 The counsels’
costs of preparing for, and attending to pre-trials, and costs
associated with necessary consultations with
the plaintiff, the
plaintiff’s attorneys, the plaintiff’s witnesses and the
plaintiff’s experts;
3.4 The attorneys’
costs of preparing for, and attending to pre-trials, and costs
associated with necessary consultations
with the plaintiff, the
plaintiff’s witnesses and the plaintiff’s experts;
3.5 The travelling costs
occasioned by the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s witnesses to
attend to necessary consultation with
his attorney and expert
witnesses.
4.
The payment provisions in respect of the aforegoing are ordered as
follows:
4.1 Payment of the
capital amount shall be made without set-off or deduction, within 30
(thirty) calendar days from date of the
granting of this order,
directly into the trust account of the plaintiff's attorneys of
record by means of electronic transfer,
the details of which are the
following:
Honey Attorneys
-
Trust Account
Bank
-
Nedbank, Maitland Street, Bfn
Branch Code
- 11023400
Account No.
- [...]
Reference
-
HL Buchner/J03437
4.2 Payment of the taxed
or agreed costs shall be made within 14 (fourteen) days of taxation,
and shall likewise be effected into
the trust account of the
plaintiff’s attorney;
4.3 No interest will
accrue in respect of any of the aforesaid amounts if payment is made
on or before the stipulated dates;
4.4 Should payment not be
made in respect of any of the aforesaid amounts on or before the
stipulated date(s), interest will accrue
at 10.25 % (the statutory
rate per annum), compounded.
5.
In the event that costs are not agreed the plaintiff agrees as
follows:
5.1 The plaintiff shall
serve a notice of taxation on the defendant's attorney of record; and
5.2 The plaintiff shall
allow the defendant fourteen (14) court days to make payment of the
taxed costs.
_______________
L.
B.J MOENG, AJ
On
behalf of the plaintiff: Adv. J.C Coetzer
Instructed
by: Honey Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
On
behalf of the defendant: Adv. S.E Motloung
Instructed
by: Maduba Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN