Tau v Road Accident Fund (5212/2014) [2019] ZAFSHC 43 (25 April 2019)

75 Reportability
Personal Injury Law - Road Accident Fund

Brief Summary

Damages — Road Accident Fund — Quantum of claim for loss of income — Plaintiff sustained injuries in a motor vehicle accident and sought damages from the Road Accident Fund — Merits settled with defendant liable for 80% of proven damages — Dispute centered on quantum of past and future loss of income — Expert evidence from orthopaedic surgeon, industrial psychologist, and actuary presented by plaintiff, while defendant did not lead any evidence — Court accepted plaintiff's uncontested evidence and expert opinions — Plaintiff entitled to compensation for loss of earnings, with total damages awarded amounting to R4,507,071.42, including past and future loss of income and medical expenses.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This matter concerned action proceedings for damages instituted against the Road Accident Fund in terms of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996, arising from bodily injuries sustained in a motor vehicle collision.


The plaintiff was Ramasimang Alfred Tau and the defendant was the Road Accident Fund (RAF). The plaintiff claimed compensation for losses flowing from the injuries he sustained in a collision involving the vehicle he drove and another vehicle driven by the insured driver, Justice Pakathi.


In the procedural history, the parties had previously settled the merits on an 80/20 apportionment basis in favour of the plaintiff, meaning the RAF accepted liability for 80% of the plaintiff’s proven or agreed damages. During the trial, the plaintiff’s past medical and hospital expenses were also settled. The litigation then proceeded only on the remaining dispute, namely the quantum of damages relating to past and future loss of income.


The dispute was therefore directed at the assessment of patrimonial loss (loss of earnings / earning capacity), including the appropriate contingency deductions, the application of the RAF cap, and the overall computation of the plaintiff’s compensable loss under the agreed apportionment.


2. Material Facts


The accident occurred on 4 June 2011 at approximately 02h00 on the R73 road between Welkom and Virginia, near the Bronville off-ramp. Two vehicles were involved in the collision: one driven by the plaintiff and the other by the insured driver. The occurrence of the collision and the involvement of the two vehicles were treated as established in light of the prior settlement on the merits.


It was common cause between the relevant experts (through joint minutes admitted into evidence) that the plaintiff sustained a head injury, chest injury, left hip injury, and right forearm injury. The court also received joint minutes of occupational therapists, in which there was agreement that the plaintiff would benefit from occupational therapy and other interventions; there was further conditional alignment on the possibility of a hip replacement, depending on which orthopaedic prognosis the court accepted.


The plaintiff’s employment circumstances formed an important factual foundation for the loss-of-income enquiry. Before the accident, the plaintiff was employed at Beatrix Mines (Sibanye Gold) as a section overseer / shift boss. His work involved physically demanding underground duties, including walking, crawling, and carrying items on uneven surfaces, as well as testing and certifying underground areas as safe.


After the accident, the plaintiff stated that he could no longer perform the same underground duties due to his injuries, and he was reassigned to duties at a training centre involving training new recruits and handling safety matters. The plaintiff testified that he had to undergo medical and physical testing to be certified fit for certain work, and that he failed these tests due to his injuries, preventing him from obtaining the “red ticket” required for underground work. The court accepted the plaintiff’s evidence on these issues, noting that it could not be contradicted in cross-examination (save for the cause of a later dismissal).


A fact the court specifically treated as not determinative of permanent unemployability was that the plaintiff was dismissed in July 2018 for reasons unrelated to his injuries (dishonesty). The court noted that this did not mean the plaintiff would never be employed again, and it recorded that the dismissal was the subject of proceedings in another forum that had not yet been finalised.


On the evidentiary posture, the plaintiff testified and called expert witnesses (orthopaedic surgeon, industrial psychologist, and actuary). Although joint minutes existed, the plaintiff still led evidence from certain experts. The RAF indicated an intention to call its own experts due to outstanding disagreements on aspects of the reports, but ultimately closed its case without calling any witnesses. The court treated the plaintiff’s evidence and expert opinions as uncontested and accepted them in the circumstances.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were directed at the quantification of damages for past and future loss of income (loss of earning capacity) in circumstances where the merits had already been settled at an 80% apportionment.


The dispute primarily concerned the application of law to fact and an evaluative assessment inherent in damages quantification, including the court’s discretion to award fair compensation and to select appropriate contingencies. It also involved the use of actuarial calculations based on assumptions grounded in the accepted evidence.


More specifically, the court was required to determine, on the evidence before it, the plaintiff’s likely uninjured career trajectory, his likely injured earnings capacity, whether and how the injuries limited his ability to continue in underground mining work, and the appropriate contingency deductions to be applied to past and future earnings scenarios, culminating in a final amount after apportionment and the RAF cap.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter on the basis that the only remaining issue was quantum for loss of income, given the prior settlement of merits and the settlement of past medical and hospital expenses during the trial. It accepted that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case on a balance of probabilities, emphasising that the evidence presented by the plaintiff and his experts remained uncontested once the RAF elected not to call witnesses.


In addressing the evidentiary status of agreements between experts and litigants, the court relied on authority confirming that where facts are agreed in civil litigation the court is bound by that agreement, and where experts reach agreement on matters of opinion the parties are not free to repudiate that agreement. The court referred to BEE v Road Accident Fund 2018 (4) SA 366 (A) endorsing the approach in Thomas v BD Sarens (Pty) Ltd [2012] ZAGPJHC 161. This informed the court’s willingness to proceed on the joint minutes and the accepted evidential position created when the RAF led no evidence to disturb the plaintiff’s case.


On the plaintiff’s vocational functioning and employability, the court accepted the plaintiff’s evidence that his injuries prevented a return to his physically demanding underground duties. It also accepted the orthopaedic evidence (particularly Dr Oelofse’s views) that the injuries affected the plaintiff’s ability to work underground, that a hip replacement was recommended, and that even with such procedure the plaintiff would still not be able to resume his previous underground job. This conclusion was aligned with the plaintiff’s own description of functional limitations and the loss of the required certification (“red ticket”) for underground work.


In relation to the plaintiff’s later dismissal for dishonesty, the court treated this as a factor not breaking the chain of causation in a way that eliminated loss. It reasoned that dismissal in 2018 did not establish permanent unemployment and noted that the dismissal issue was being addressed elsewhere. The court therefore continued the loss-of-earnings enquiry on the basis of the plaintiff’s diminished earning capacity attributable to the accident-related injuries, while not equating the later dismissal with an accident-caused inability to work in all spheres.


Turning to the quantification methodology, the court reiterated that trial courts have a wide discretion to determine fair and adequate compensation for bodily injuries and their sequelae, referring to AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v Maqula 1978 (1) SA 805 (A) at 809A–B. It also recognised the speculative nature of damages for loss of earning capacity and the permissibility of actuarial calculation based on assumptions supported by evidence, relying on Southern Insurance Association v Bailey NO 1984 (1) SA 98 (A) at 113G–114A.


The court accepted the actuary’s calculations as the basis for its assessment. It specifically endorsed the contingency deductions applied, finding that deductions of 5% (uninjured past earnings), 15% (uninjured future earnings), and 50% (injured future earnings) were correctly applied in the circumstances. The court’s reasoning reflects a discretionary evaluation of contingencies as the mechanism to account for uncertainty, risk, and the inherent speculation in projecting earnings over time.


Finally, the court accepted that after applying the agreed 80% apportionment, the RAF cap, and the relevant contingencies, the plaintiff was entitled to a monetary award intended to place him in the position he would have been in had the accident not occurred, to the extent the law permits through the established damages framework.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted judgment in favour of the plaintiff and ordered the RAF to pay a capital amount of R4 507 071.42 in full and final settlement as broken down into R896 500.00 for past loss of income, R3 556 900.00 for future loss of income, and R53 671.42 for past medical and hospital expenses.


The court ordered the RAF to pay the plaintiff’s taxed or agreed party-and-party costs on the High Court scale up to the date of the order, including (as set out in the order) costs relating to specified experts, counsel and attorney preparation and attendance at pre-trials, and related travel and consultation costs.


The order further regulated payment mechanics, including payment into the plaintiff attorneys’ trust account within specified time periods, and provided that no interest would accrue if payment was made timeously. If payment was late, interest would accrue at 10.25% per annum, compounded, as specified in the order.


Cases Cited


BEE v Road Accident Fund 2018 (4) SA 366 (A)


Thomas v BD Sarens (Pty) Ltd [2012] ZAGPJHC 161


AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v Maqula 1978 (1) SA 805 (A) at 809A–B


Southern Insurance Association v Bailey NO 1984 (1) SA 98 (A) at 113G–114A


Legislation Cited


Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that the plaintiff’s evidence and expert opinions, being uncontested after the RAF closed its case without calling witnesses, established on a balance of probabilities that the plaintiff’s accident-related injuries diminished his capacity to perform his prior underground mining work and affected his earning capacity.


The court accepted the actuarial basis for quantification and held that the contingency deductions applied (5% on uninjured past earnings, 15% on uninjured future earnings, and 50% on injured future earnings) were appropriate. After applying the agreed 80% apportionment and the RAF cap, the court awarded the plaintiff R4 507 071.42, together with party-and-party costs as specified, and made detailed orders regulating payment and interest.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that where parties in civil litigation agree facts, a court is bound by such agreement, and where experts record agreements in joint minutes on matters of opinion, the litigants are generally not at liberty to repudiate those agreements, as endorsed in the cited appellate authority.


It applied the settled approach that assessment of damages for loss of earning capacity is inherently speculative, and that courts may employ actuarial calculations based on assumptions supported by evidence to estimate the present value of the loss, while retaining a discretionary judgment in selecting assumptions and contingencies.


The judgment further applied the principle that a trial court has a wide discretion to award fair and adequate compensation for bodily injuries and their sequelae, with contingency deductions serving as a mechanism to account for uncertainties in life and employment prospects when quantifying past and future earning loss.

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[2019] ZAFSHC 43
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Tau v Road Accident Fund (5212/2014) [2019] ZAFSHC 43 (25 April 2019)

SAFLII Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE
STATE DIVISION,
BLOEMFONTEIN
Reportable:

YES
Of
Interest to other Judges:   YES
Circulate
to Magistrates:        YES
Case
no: 5212/2014
In
the matter between:
RAMASIMANG
ALFRED TAU
Plaintiff
And
ROAD
ACCIDENT FUND
Defendant
JUDGMENT
BY:
MOROBANE, AJ
HEARD
ON:
26 - 27 MARCH 2019 &
2 APRIL 2019
DELIVERED
ON:
25
APRIL 2019
[1]
These are action proceedings in which the plaintiff sued the
defendant in terms of the
Road Accident Fund Act, 56 of 1996
for
damages arising from bodily injuries sustained in a motor vehicle
accident. The action was defended.
[2]
On the 4
th
of June 2011 at approximately 02h00 Mr Tau, the
plaintiff, was involved in a road accident on the R73 road between
Welkom and Virginia
in the immediate vicinity of the Bronville
off-ramp. Two vehicles were involved in a collision, one with
registration [….]
of which plaintiff was the driver and
another with registration [….] driven by Justice Pakathi, the
insured driver.
[3]
The parties had previously settled the merits on the basis that
defendant is liable for
payment of 80% of plaintiff’s proven or
agreed damages. Plaintiff’s past medical and hospital expenses
were settled
during the trial.
[4]
The only issue in dispute is the quantum of plaintiff’s claim
regarding the past and
future loss of income.
[5]
By agreement between the parties, the joint minutes of Drs LF Oelofse
and HL Moloto, Orthopaedic
Surgeons, were admitted into evidence.
Both the experts agreed that plaintiff sustained a head injury, chest
injury, left hip injury
and right forearm injury.
[6]
The same applies to the joint minutes of Mrs Stroebel and Mrs Moagi,
Occupational Therapists,
which were also admitted without having to
lead evidence. Both the experts agreed that plaintiff will benefit
from the occupational
therapy and other interventions. Based on Dr
Oelofse’s opinion, Mrs Stroebel is of the opinion that
plaintiff should undergo
a hip replacement procedure. Mrs Moagi
agrees with her only in the event the court favours Dr Oelofse’s
prognosis.
[7]
Plaintiff testified and led evidence of the following expert
witnesses, namely Dr LF Oelofse
- Orthopaedic Surgeon, Dr EJ Jacobs –
Industrial Psychologist and Mr W Boshoff - Actuary. The defendant did
not lead any
evidence. In my view, the witnesses were honest and
objective. Their evidence was uncontested. I have no reason to doubt
them.
[8]
Plaintiff testified that before the accident he was the section
overseer at the Beatrix
Mines (Sibanye Gold). He was a shift boss and
his duties were to go underground, into the tunnels, to test the area
and certify
it safe. This work entailed a lot of walking, crawling
and carrying items on an uneven surface. After the accident he could
not
perform the same duties due to his hip and right arm injuries. He
was reassigned to work at the training centre to train new mine

recruits and to handle the safety of the mine. In line with this job,
he had to undergo medical and physical tests and be certified
to be
fit to perform his duties. Unfortunately, he failed those tests
because of his injuries. As a result, he could not obtain
the red
ticket which is compulsory for everyone working underground. A red
ticket is a certificate issued by the mine to an employee
who has
successfully undergone and completed the prescribed medical and
physical tests. He testified that it was hard to cope and
had
problems to perform the demonstrations. He was dismissed in July 2018
for reasons unrelated to his injuries.
Plaintiff’s direct
evidence could not be contradicted during cross examination, except
that the reason for his dismissal was
not related to the accident. I
accept his version.
[9]
Dr EJ Jacobs testified on plaintiff’s probable career path by
disregarding and, alternatively,
regarding the accident and the
sequelae
thereof. Plaintiff’s formal qualifications,
experience and skills were used to understand and determine his
earning capacity.
He testified that plaintiff could have progressed
to become a mine overseer, but for the accident. He earned a monthly
salary together
with the housing, pension and medical benefits.
Plaintiff received other incentives for working on Saturdays and
Sundays, among
others. He would have earned on Patterson table C4/5
and retired at the age of 60. On the injured career, Dr Jacobs
further testified
that plaintiff has lost all his work benefits.
Plaintiff can perform sedentary type of work. He concluded that
plaintiff would
have most likely found employment outside the mining
sector and earn on a Patterson table B3–C1/2. As a consequence
of his
work restrictions, plaintiff may remain unemployed for a
lengthy period.
[10]
Dr Oelofse recommends a work re-evaluation to be conducted in order
to establish what type of work
plaintiff can do. He disagrees with Dr
Moloto’s opinion that the injuries sustained by plaintiff have
not affected his ability
to work. He opines that Dr Moloto did not
receive the X-rays or may have received them after completing his (Dr
Moloto’s)
report. Dr Oelofse’s recommended that plaintiff
has to do a hip replacement as soon as possible. He opines that even
if hip
replacement were to be done, plaintiff would still not be
allowed to do his previous job. The ulna can be successfully treated
by the union of the bone if it were the only injury sustained by the
plaintiff. His conclusion is that plaintiff is unable to do

underground work due to his injuries.
[11]
Mr Willem Boshoff based his calculations on the information provided
to him and compiled a report.
He testified that after allocating 80%
apportionment to the plaintiff’s loss of earnings, he applied
the RAF cap which still
left the plaintiff with a huge loss.
[12]
Plaintiff led evidence of his orthopaedic surgeon and the industrial
psychologist even though the joint
minutes of these experts were
handed in by agreement between the parties. The defendant indicated
that it intended to call its
expert witnesses as there was no
unanimity of minds regarding some salient aspects of their respective
reports. At the close of
plaintiff’s case, the defendant closed
its case without calling a single witness. I accept the experts’
opinion under
the circumstance.
[13]
In
BEE
v Road Accident Fund
[1]
the approach by Sutherland J in
Thomas
v BD Sarens (Pty) Ltd
[2]
was
endorsed by the Supreme Court of Appeal that where certain facts are
agreed between the parties in civil litigation, the court
is bound by
such agreement and where the experts reach an agreement on a matter
of opinion, the litigants are likewise not at liberty
to repudiate
the agreement.
[14]
The plaintiff was employed when the accident occurred. His dismissal
from employment in July 2018 does
not conclude that he would never be
employed again. In as much as the reason for his dismissal is one of
dishonesty and not directly
related to the accident, another forum is
seized with the matter which is yet to be finalised.
[15]
Plaintiff has established a
prima facie
case on a balance of
probabilities in that his evidence remains uncontested. In light of
the above, plaintiff is entitled to a
sum of money which will place
him in a position as he would have been had the accident not
occurred.
[16]
In
AA
Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v Maqula
[3]
the court stated that the law is settled in that a trial Court has a
wide discretion to award what it considers to be a fair and
adequate
compensation to the injured party for his bodily injuries and their
sequelae
.
[17]
What remains to be considered is the contingencies that should be
applied to the loss of earnings.
Nicholas JA, in
Southern
Insurance Association v Bailey NO
[4]
stated that any enquiry into damages for loss of earning capacity is
speculative and from which the court can estimate the present
value
of the loss.  The court stated further that one of the possible
approaches was to try to make an assessment by way of
mathematical
calculations, on the basis of assumptions resting on the evidence.
[19]
The calculations by the actuary are the basis on which my
assessment is made. I am of the
view that the contingency
deductions of 5% and 15% on uninjured past and future earnings
respectively and of 50% on injured future
earnings was correctly
applied.
[24]
In comparison, the total loss of earnings is R8 977 915
excluding the RAF cap. That is:
Past Loss of Income
Uninjured
Earnings
Injured Earnings
Loss
of Earnings
R4 258 600

R2 708 600
(R212
930)
___________________________

___________________________

___________________________
R4 045
670
R2 708
600
R1 337 070
___________________________

___________________________

___________________________
Future Loss of Income
Uninjured
Earnings
Injured Earnings
R10 882 700

R3 218 900
(R1 632
405)

(R1 609 450)
_____________________________

_____________________________

___________________________
R9 250
295

R1 609 450
R7 640 845
_____________________________

____________________________

___________________________
[25]
After applying the contingency, apportionment of plaintiff’s
proven damages and the RAF cap,
the total loss of earnings amounts to
R4 453 400.
[25]
In the result I make the following order:
1.
The
defendant is liable for payment to the plaintiff in the amount of
R4 507 071.42 (four million five hundred and seven
thousand
and seventy-one rand, forty-two cents) in full and final settlement,
as set out hereunder:
1.1
R896 500.00
in respect of past loss of income;
1.2
R3 556 900.00
in respect of future loss of income;
1.3
R53 671.42
in respect of past medical and hospital expenses.
2.
The defendant to pay plaintiff’s taxed or agreed party and
party costs on the High Court scale,
until date of this order,
including but not limited to the costs set out hereunder:
2.1
the
costs attendant upon the obtaining of payment of the amounts referred
to in this order;
2.2
the
reasonable preparation, qualifying, accommodation, travelling and
full reservation fees and expenses (if any) of the following
experts,
and the costs relating to the plaintiff attending their medico legal
examinations:
2.2.1
Munro Actuaries;
2.2.2
Dr LF Oelofse (Orthopaedic Surgeon);
2.2.3
Dr E Jacobs (Industrial Psychologist);
2.2.4
Alana Stroebel (Occupational Therapist);
2.2.5
Marleen Joubert (Occupational Therapist).
2.3
The counsel’s costs of preparing for, and attending to
pre-trials, and costs associated
with necessary consultations with
the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s attorneys, the plaintiff’s
witnesses and the plaintiff’s
experts;
2.4
The attorneys’ costs of preparing for, and attending to
pre-trials, and costs associated
with necessary consultations with
the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s witnesses and the plaintiff’s
experts;
2.5
The travelling costs occasioned by the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s
witnesses to attend
to necessary consultation with his attorney and
expert witnesses.
3.    The
payment provisions in respect of the aforesaid are ordered as
follows:
3.1
Payment of the capital amount shall be made without set-off or
deduction, within 30 calendar days
from date of the granting of this
order, directly into the trust account of the plaintiff’s
attorneys of record by means
of electronic transfer, the details of
which are the following:
Honey Attorneys:
Trust Account
Bank:

Nedbank, Maitland Street, Bfn
Branch Code:
11023400
Account Number:
[….]
Reference:
HL Buchner/J03308
3.2
Payment of the taxed or agreed costs shall be made within 14 days of
taxation, and shall likewise
be effected into the trust account of
the plaintiff’s attorney;
3.3
No interest will accrue in respect of any of the aforesaid amounts if
payment is made on or before
the stipulated dates;
3.4
Should payment not be made in respect of any of the aforesaid amounts
on or before the stipulated
date(s), interest will accrue at 10.25%
(the statutory rate per annum), compounded.
4.    In
the event that costs are not agreed, the plaintiff agrees as follows:
4.1
The plaintiff shall serve a notice of taxation on the defendant’s
attorney of record; and
4.2
The plaintiff shall allow the defendant 14 days to make payment of
the taxed costs.
V.M. MOROBANE, AJ
On behalf of the
plaintiff:          Adv.
L Pohl SC
Instructed
by:
Honey Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
On behalf of the
defendant:      Adv. M Mopeli
Instructed
by:
Maduba Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
[1]
BEE v Road Accident
Fund
2018 (4) SA 366
(A)
paras 64-65
[2]
Thomas v BD Sarens
(Pty) Ltd [2012] ZAGPJHC
161
[3]
AA Mutual Insurance
Association Ltd v Maqula
1978
(1) SA 805
(A) at 809A-B
[4]
Southern Insurance
Association v Bailey NO
1984
(1) SA 98
(A) at 113G-114A