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[2019] ZAGPPHC 379
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Swuhana v National Credit Regulator and Another (15121/2018) [2019] ZAGPPHC 379 (8 August 2019)
IN
THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION PRETORIA
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
/NO
(2)
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/NO
(3)
REVISED.
CASE
NO: 15121/2018
8/8/2019
In
the matter between:
TSHILIDZI
PFARELO SWUHANA
Applicant
and
NATIONAL
CREDIT REGULATOR
First
Respondent
DC
PARTNER (PDA)
Second
Respondent
Date
of Hearing
:
03
July2019
Date
of Judgment
:
08 August 2019
JUDGMENT
(application for leave to appeal)
MANAMELA,
AJ
A
: Introduction
[1]
Dissatisfied with the judgment granted in the urgent court on 10
April 2018 in terms
whereof I dismissed (with costs) his application
for interdictory relief against the National Credit Regulator, the
first respondent
in this and the main application, the applicant
immediately launched this application for leave to appeal. However,
administrative
hurdles, including the delay in the transcription of
the extemporaneous judgment and the fact that the applicant has
always appeared
in person, led to the delay in the enrolment and
hearing of this application until last month. This application is
opposed by the
first respondent (the NCR).
[2]
Just
like at the hearing of the main application, the applicant appeared
in person and the NCR was represented by Ms A. Lapan, when
this
application was heard on 03 July 2019. The second respondent is not
taking part in the proceedings.
[3]
After
listening to the submissions from both sides, particularly Mr
Swuhana's, the applicant herein, it became clear to me that
there is
a need to fully or further explain the basis for the order made in
the urgent court on IO April 2018, in respect of which
the applicant
seeks leave to appeal. The extemporaneous judgment handed down under
the circumstances of the urgent court appear
not to have communicated
effectively the basis for the findings made, with respect,
particularly from the point of view of the
applicant, appearing in
person. The elongation of this judgment is, more, for information
purposes. For primarily these reasons,
I decided to rather reserve
judgment in this application and hand down a detailed written
judgment.
[4]
But,
I will only traverse those aspects relevant to the grounds of appeal.
From this introductory part (i.e. A), I will move to
reflect the
background to the maner (i.e. B); followed by material from the main
application and its findings (i.e. C); then proceed
to the
submissions by the parties in this application and a discussion
thereof against the applicable legal principles and make
findings
(i.e. D), and close up with the conclusion and order (i.e. E).
B:
Brief background on relevant aspects
[5]
The
applicant was registered as a debt counsellor on 20 March 2014 in
terms of the provisions of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005
(the
NCA). He, thereafter, practised as such until 21 November 2017, when
he was deregistered by the NCR. It was this decision
of the NCR which
prompted the applicant to approach this Court on an urgent basis in
April last year.
[6]
His
urgent application was opposed and a full complement of three
affidavits was filed. From the affidavits the following facts
are
common cause regarding the events which led to the deregistration of
the applicant or ensued therefrom:
[6.1]
during 2017, presumably in the latter part of that year, the
applicant placed himself under the debt review process
in terms of
the provisions of the NCA;
[6.2]
pursuant to his quest for debt review, the applicant launched an
application in terms of the provisions of the NCA in
the Tshwane
North or Soshanguve Magistrates Court;
[1]
[6.3]
on 12 October 2017, the NCR wrote to the applicant, after it was
alerted to the application's debt review by Wesbank,
one of the
applicant's creditors. The NCR asked the applicant to give reasons
within five days why the applicant should not be
deregistered as a
debt counsellor.
[6.4]
the applicant promptly responded to the NCR's letter on the same date
effectively confirming his over-indebtedness and
pleading for mercy.
I must immediately point out that the applicant disputes the fact
that he is under a debt review process due
to his so-called
withdrawal of the application (referred to below), but the following
extracts from his response to the NCR's letter
is, with respect,
telling in this regard:
"1.
I confirm that l received the notification to deregister me and
request for appeal
on the decision based on the following:
2.
I
[became] over indebted as I took out loan to pay for the advertising
for the debt review services on the SABC, and paying out
agents that
[were]
also
advertising the services for potential client[s] to come in my
office, but it was unfortunate that the respon[se] of the client[s]
I
receive[d] was lower than the amount I have used in the advertising
cost
3.
I
bought assets (car and office equipment to run the business).
4.
The
DC after care fee was reduced from
5%
to
3% [leading] to a
reduction
of income
5.
Most
client[s] exit debt review as they become no longer indebted which
also lead to reduction of income
6.
Immediately
after I [became] aware that [I] am not supposed to do my own
application I transfer[ed] my file[s] [to]another debt
counsellor to
review them and a transfer letter was sent to au creditors together
with contact details of another Debt counsellor.
7.
Debt
Counselling is the only business that is sustain[ing] my living and I
have beneficiaries that I am supporting through the income
I am
receiving from this business[.] I also have employees I am paying so
if I am deregistered it will have a very bad impact on
our living
expenses.
8.
I
now have debts that credit providers are expecting me to pay them.
9.
I
demonstrate ability to help people becoming debt free by
restructuring their debt, so II]
am
humbl[y] requesting that being on a bad situation like this was not
mv aim but accident as I thought placing [tool much advert
may lead
to eventual growth in the business not leading me to be over
indebted.
10.
I
am humbl[y] requesting that my registration status be kept active and
request
the NCR to apply any other measures or advice on this matter other
than [de- registering] me and I [confirm] that when I
receive more
income again I will increase my repayment amount to creditors so that
l become debt free again.”
[2]
[underlining
added for emphasis]
[6.5]
on 21 November 2017, the NCR deregistered the applicant as a debt
counsellor. It relied on section 46(4)(b)
[3]
of the
NCA
which
disqualifies any person subject to a debt re-arrangement to be
registered as a debt counsellor. Further, the NCR stated that
it in
terms of the provisions of section 46(5)
[4]
of the NCA it "must deregister" any person registered who
had become disqualified in terms of section 46.
[6.6]
The applicant promptly responded to the NCR's letter of
deregistration. He pointed out that ;'there is no court order
declaring [him] over indebted and such
court
application has been withdrawn" and, therefore, requested the
NCR to reverse or withdraw its decision to deregister him.
[5]
Evidently this was in vain. I must interrupt this narration to
remark, with respect, that the applicant did not raise these defences
or issues when he responded to the letter of 12 October 2017.
[6]
Also, the applicant did not include the notice of withdrawal of the
debt review application which is dated 23 August 2017 in his
submissions against deregistration made to the NCR on 12 October
2017. I will deal with this issue later below.
[6.7]
in early December 2017, the applicant launched with the Consumer
Tribunal an application to interdict his deregistration
by the NCR.
But, on 28 February 2018, the Consumer Tribunal dismissed the
application on the basis that it has no jurisdiction
to adjudicate
the matter.
[7]
On 05 April 2018 or there around, the application launched these
proceedings.
C
: Main
application and findings therein
Applicant's
submissions
[7]
In
the urgent court the applicant sought relief as set out in the
following terms in the notice of motion:
"(a)
That the decision of the National Credit Regulator to De-register the
applicant be suspended
pending the review judgment from the National
consumer Tribunal.
(b)
That
the DC PARTNER (PDA) be instructed to release all funds for DC after
care fees, legal fees and restructuring fees to the applicant
pending
the review judgment from the National consumer Tribunal.
(c)
That
the National Credit Regulator be instructed to give the applicant his
registration certificate pending the review judgment
from the
National consumer Tribunal.
(d)
That
the applicant be allowed to continue with his debt counselling duties
and service all his clients pending the review judgment
from the
National consumer Tribunal"
[8]
.
[8]
The
relief sought by the applicant was effectively an interim interdict
pending the outcome of his review of the NCR decision by
the Consumer
Tribunal. As grounds in
support
of the relief sought, the applicant primarily stated the following:
"Justification
of the degree of abridgement and deviation
13.
The
applicant has a clear right not to be unfairly de-registered as a
debt counselor.
14.
The
applicant received a notice of default from Centpret Properties (Pty)
Ltd (the Land Lord of the applicant) demanding a payment
o
f
RI l
437.81
within 7 days from 14 march 2018 and full monthly rental payment at
the last calendar day following this months. Proof is
attached as
Annexure "G". If this order is not granted urgently the
applicant will be kicked out his office by his Landlord.
The
applicant has a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if the
interim interdict is not granted and it has to wait until
the final
relief is obtained -in other words, that the applicant needs the
interdict now and cannot wait for the main court proceedings
to be
completed. The irreparable damages being caused on the applicant and
will continue to be caused if Interim Interdict is not
granted
urgently include but not limited to:
(a)
the
applicant and his family members sometimes sleep with empty stomach
if they are not lucky enough to get any person who can assist
them
with food.
(b)
The
applicant loans that he acquire to finance the marketing of his
business continue to accrue interest and arrears even though
he is
not getting any income, So he need to continue servicing them
urgently.
(c)
The
Office of the applicant continue to accrue interest and arrears and
the applicant will be kicked out of the office premises
if he doesn't
settle the arrears within 7 days from I4/03/2018.
(d)
The
vehicle of the applicant may be repossessed due to arrears and
interest accrued on the account.
(e)
The
applicant may face default judgement on all his accounts.
(f)
The
applicant used to get new clients monthly who increase his monthly
revenue but this benefit will be forfeited if the order is
not
granted urgently
(g)
The
employees who were assisting the applicant in the office and with
marketing need to be paid urgently and may take legal action
against
the applicant and they are also continue to suffer as they don't have
any source of income to support their dependents.
(h)
The
clients of the applicant are advised to seek another debt counsellor
if they don't like the alternative debt counsellor appointed
by the
NCR, considering the fact that the applicant utilises a lot of money
or a huge budget to obtain or attract his clients,
such budget will
not be refunded back to the applicant even if the Tribunal re-instate
him as a debt counsellor.
(i)
The
Applicant is a bread winner at his family and he is very struggling
to provide for his family and even to buy the school uniform
for his
children, so it is very important for the interim relief to be
granted so that the respondent can continue to provide for
his
family.
(j)
The respondent has other debt obligations that needs to be fulfilled
pending the hearing to avoid
default judgement.
(k)
The applicant needs to pay transport, food and accommodation while
attending the main hearing, so if
the interim interdict is not
granted it may be impossible for the applicant to attend the hearing.
15.
There
is no similar protection offered by any other ordinary remedy.
16.
The
interim interdict is Very necessary because the balance of
inconvenience favours the granting of the order in the following
ways:
(i)
The
Applicant and his family also needs daily meal and other needs to be
met pending the main hearing.
(ii)
The
employees of the applicant needs to get paid pending the main
hearing.
17.
It
will create imbalance if the Interim Interdict is not granted and the
applicant will suffer the consequences of such serious,
irreparable
damages that will result in the event that the relief is not
granted.”
[9]
[original
quotation from the founding affidavit]
[9]
The
app
licant
also delivered a replying affidavit, but its contents will be dealt
with jointly with the contents of the NCR's submissions
below as
contained in the answering affidavit.
Submissions
on behalf of the NCR
[10]
The NCR, against the background, significantly as set out above,
stated that pursuant to the
deregistration of the applicant it
transferred all matters handled by the applicant as debt counsellor
to a new debt counsellor,
Ms A P Matodzi. It also instructed the
second respondent in this application to pay all fees due to the
applicant for services
rendered by the applicant up to 21 November
2017. It has received confirmation that an amount of R1 478.06 was
paid to the applicant
as the total fees due to him.
[11]
Regarding
the applicant's alleged withdrawal of the debt review application,
the NCR queried the authenticity or effectiveness of
the notice of
withdrawal. due to mainly the absence of a court stamp and proof that
it was sent to all parties in the debt review
application. Further,
Wesbank, one of the applicant's creditors, did not mention the
withdrawal and, in fact, it said already in
October 2017 that the
applicant's debt review application had been dismissed due to
non-appearance of his attorneys. It is trite
that a dismissal on this
basis does not affects the merits of the application. As at that time
of Wesbank's communication the applicant
was apparently still
attempting to make arrangements regarding payment of his debt to
Wesbank.
[12]
It
is also alleged that the applicant, subsequent to his deregistration,
contacted his erstwhile clients and redirected them to
his business
partner, Mr Chokwe, who is also a registered debt counsellor, away
from Ms Matodzi. Some of these clients ended up
switching to Mr
Chokwe and making significant payments to him, some of which do not
appear to have reached the intended persons.
Ms Matodzi laid a
complaint with the police.
[13]
The
NCR considers this alleged conduct of the part of the applicant to be
fraud, which deprived Ms Matodzi of her legitimate dues.
It also
submits that the same conduct would, on its own, have justified the
deregistration of the applicant in terms of section
44(2) of the
NCA,
[10]
if he had not already been registered. Therefore, the applicant has
approached this Court with the proverbial unclean hands, the
NCR
concluded its submissions in this regard.
[14]
Also,
the NCR disputes the applicant's assertion that he has a right not to
be unfairly registered as debt counsellor. It reiterates
that it was
justified in deregistering the applicant due to the applicant being
under debt review. It did not act unfairly.
[15]
Regarding the applicant's argument that he would suffer irreparable
harm in the form on inability
to pay his debts if the interim
interdict is not granted, the NCR said that the applicant's financial
problems are self-created
and, actually, preceded his deregistration
as a debt counsellor. I agreed. This was contained in the
applications submissions to
the NCR made on 12 October 2017
motivating against his deregistration.11
[11]
Further, the NCR argued that the applicant has alternative remedy in
the form of a damages claims against the NCR for its financial
losses
in the event the deregistration is ultimately found to have been
erroneous.
[16]
The
applicant delivered a replying affidavit. The applicant essentially
argued that the contents of the NCR's answering affidavit
was an
argument on the merits of the application before the Consumer
Tribunal. This is impermissible for an interim interdict,
the
applicant argued. He also disputed that he had been paid all his dues
and argued that there was still more to be paid to him
by way of
fees. He also disputed that he has committed fraud and argued that he
was justified in redirecting his erstwhile clients
to Mr Chokwe
considering that they jointly incurred some expenses in marketing
their business. A greater part of the applicant's
replying affidavit
was essentially a repeat of what was submitted in the founding
affidavit, other than just being a denial of
the NCR's submissions.
Submissions,
applicable legal principles and findings
[17]
I
dismissed the application with costs. The ruling was primarily
located in section 86 of the NCA. This provision reads as follows
in
the material respect, together with its heading:
"Application
for debt review
86.
(1) A consumer may apply to a debt counsellor in the prescribed
manner and form 40 to have the consumer declared over indebted
...
(4)
On receipt of an application in terms of subsection (I), a debt
counsellor must
(a)
provide
the consumer with proof of receipt of the application;
(b)
notify,
in the prescribed manner and form-
(i)
all
credit providers that are listed in the application
...
(6)
A
debt counsellor
who
has accepted an application
in
terms of this section must determine, in the prescribed manner and
within the prescribed time-
(a)
whether
the consumer appears to be over-indebted
...
(7)
If,
as a result of an assessment conducted in terms of subsection (6), a
debt counsellor reasonably concludes that-
(a)
the
consumer is not over-indebted,
the
debt counsellor must reject the application
...
(c)
the
consumer is over-indebted,
the debt
counsellor may issue a proposal recommending that the Magistrate's
Court ...."
[underlining
added for emphasis]
[18]
It
was common cause that the applicant made an application to the
Magistrates Court for his debt review. This obviously suggested,
on
the reading of section 86 quoted above, that either the debt
counsellor that he had approached was satisfied with the fact that
the applicant was over-indebted and approach the Court or the
applicant had approached that Court with its leave in respect of
the
application. An application to the Magistrates Court for debt review
is provided for by section 87 of the NCA, which reads
in the material
part:
"(1)
If a debt counsellor makes a proposal to the Magistrate's Court in
terms of section 86(8)(b), or a consumer applies to the Magistrate's
Court in terms of section 86(9). the Magistrate's Court must conduct
a hearing
and, having regard to the proposal and information
before it and the consumer's financial means, prospects and
obligations, may-
(a)
reject
the recommendation or application as the case may be; or
(i)
an
order declaring any credit agreement to be reckless, and an order
contemplated in section 83(2) or (3), if the Magistrate's Court
concludes that the agreement is reckless; (ii) an order re-arranging
the consumer’s obligations in any manner contemplated
in
section 86(7)(c)(ii); or
(iii)
both orders contemplated in subparagraph (i) and (ii)."
[underlining
added for emphasis]
[19]
I
ruled that a ''mere withdrawal of the [application in terms of
section 87 of the NCA] by an applicant" does not stop the
statutory debt review process already triggered, as there are other
"attendant consequences of such an application".
[12]
It is clear from a reading of both sections 86 and 87 that the
withdrawal of the application made in terms of section 87 does not
automatically affect the determination that the applicant was
over-indebted made in terms of section 86. This is not a
determination
made by the NCR but the involved debt counsellor.
Against this background and the fact that on his own account he was
over- indebted,
[13]
I found no prospects in the applicant's associated review
application. I was also concerned by the fact that granting the
relief
sought by the applicant would expose members of the public
using his services as someone whose involvement in the industry may
be incompetent due to the applicant's disqualification.
D
:
Application for leave to appeal
Grounds
of appeal and submissions (discussed)
[20]
The applicant's main ground of appeal is that I failed to apply or
observe the requirements for interim interdict
when dismissing his
application. The applicant went to great lengths in referring to some
authorities in this regard. The requirements
for an interim interdict
are trite and are as follows: (a) a clear right, which is prima facie
established, even though open to
some doubt; (b) a well-grounded
apprehension of irreparable harm to the applicant if the interim
relief is not granted and he ultimately
succeeds in establishing the
right; (c) the balance of convenience favourable to the granting of
interim relief; and absence of
other satisfactory remedy.
[14]
[20]
But,
I do not deem it necessary to traverse the above stated grounds. It
suffices to state that I was not satisfied that all these
requirements were met, particularly regarding the existence of a
prima
facie
or
right "open to some doubt" for the applicant to be
registered
as a debt counsellor or not to be deregistered. Such right even if it
exists will be subject to compliance with the provisions
of the NCA,
just like attorneys or legal practitioners need to comply with the
provisions of their applicable legislation to earn
the right to
practise o to continue practising.
[15]
This will be impossible where the applicant in his own version is
disqualified to act as a debt counsellor due to his
over-indebtedness.
And allowing such a person to act as a debt
counsellor would expose members of the public to probable adverse
consequences. This
is very likely to be the case where such a person,
as the applicant probably did, has shown that he can go to greater
lengths to
practise as a debt counsellor even after he has been
deregistered.
[16]
[21]
The
applicant also complained that I considered the merits of the review
application in dismissing his application. Preliminary
assessment of
the merits of the applicant's case is essential,
[17]
as authoritatively stated in the following
dicta
from
Olympic
Passenger Service (Pry) Ltd v Ramlagan:
[18]
"It
thus appears that where the applicant's right is clear, and the other
requisites are present, no difficulty presents itself
about granting
an interdict. At the other end of the scale, where his prospects of
ultimate success are nil, obviously the Court
will refuse an
interdict. Between those two extremes fall the intermediate cases in
which, on the papers as a whole, the applicants'
prospects of
ultimate success may range all the way from strong to weak. The
expression
'prima
facie
established
though open to some doubt' seems to me a brilliantly apt
classification of these cases. In such cases, upon proof of
a well
grounded apprehension of irreparable harm, and there being no
adequate ordinary remedy, the Court may grant an interdict-
it has a
discretion, to be exercised judicially upon a consideration of all
the facts.
Usuallv
this will resolve itself into a nice consideration of the prospects
of success and the balance of convenience -the stronger
the prospects
of success. the less need for such balance to favour the applicant:
the weaker the prospects of success. the greater
the need for the
balance of convenience to favour him
."
[19]
[underlining added for emphasis]
[22]
I
obviously did not embark on a final determination of the issues in
the review application, but only preliminarily assessed the
prospects
of the matter. This was all that was required at that moment.
[23]
I
do not get the impression that the leave to appeal is directed
specifically at the
costs
order made when the main application was dismissed. But there was
nothing special there, save for costs of the previous enrolment
on 27
and 28 March 2018. There was clearly no justification why the NCR
should be out of pocket for costs of those two dates. Save
as
aforesaid, I do not consider it necessary to add to what is stated in
the judgment to the main application on this aspect, even
if there is
a ground of appeal in this regard.
E
:
Conclusion and Order
[24]
In
terms of section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013,
[20]
this Court is enjoined to grant leave to appeal when the Court is of
the opinion that the intended appeal "would have a reasonable
prospect of success" or where there are some compelling reasons
why the appeal should be heard.
[25]
Upon
consideration of the submissions made in support of and against the
grounds of appeal, I am of the view that the appeal would
have no
reasonable prospects of success. For completeness, I am also of the
view that there is no compelling reason to grant leave
to appeal.
Essentially, in my view, no other Court at appellate level would come
to a different conclusion than the one arrived
at in terms of the
impugned judgment of 10 April 2018. Consequently, the application for
leave to appeal will be dismissed with
costs.
[26]
In
the premises, I make the following order:
a)
application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
K.
La M. Manamela
Acting
Judge of the High
Court
08 AUGUST 2019
Appearances:
For
the Applicant
TP Swuhana (in
person)
For
the First Respondent Ms A Lapan
Instructed
by
Bazuka and Company Inc
c/o
Mfoloe Attoneys, Arcadia, Pretoria
[1]
See annexure "PWM7" to the answering affidavit on indexed
pp 87-88.
[2]
See annexure "PWM3" to the answering affidavit on indexed
p 74.
[3]
3 Section 46, including its heading, reads as follows in the
material part: "Disqualification or natural persons
46.
(1) ... (3) A natural person may not be
registered as a credit provider or debt counsellor if
unrehabilitated insolvent. that
person-{a) is under the age of 18
years; (b) as a result of a court order, is listed on the register
of excluded persons in terms
of
section 14
of the
National Gambling
Act, 2004
{Act NO. 7 of2004); (c) is subject to an order of a
competent court holding that person to be mentally unfit or
disordered; (d)
has ever been removed from an office of trust on
account of misconduct relating to fraud or !he misappropriation of
money, whether
in the Republic or elsewhere; (e) has ever been a
director or member of a governing body of an entity at the time that
such an
entity has- (i) been involuntarily deregistered in terms of
a public regulation; (ii) brought the consumer credit industry into
disrepute; or (iii) acted with disregard for consumer rights
generally; or has been convicted during the previous IO years, in
!he Republic or elsewhere, of- (i) theft, fraud, forgery or uttering
a forged document, perjury, or an offence under the Prevention
and
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004 (Act No. 12 of 2004), or
comparable legislation of another jurisdiction; (ii) a
crime
involving violence against another natural person; or (iii) an
offence in terms of this Act, a repealed law or comparable
provincial legislation, and has in terms of this Act, a repealed law
or comparable provincial legislation, and has been sentenced
to
imprisonment without the option of a fine unless the person has
received a grant of amnesty or free pardon for the offence.
(4)
In addition to the disqualifications set out in subsection (3), a
natural person may not be registered as a debt counsellor
if that
person is- (a) ... (b) subject to debt re-arrangement as
contemplated in sections 86 and 87".
[underlining added for
emphasis]
[4]
Section 46(5) reads: "The National Credit Regulator must
deregister a natural person if the registrant becomes disqualified
in terms of this section at any time after being registered''.
[5]
See annexure "PWMT' to the answering affidavit on indexed p 86.
[6]
See the contents of the letter quoted under paragraph 6.4 above;
annexure "PWM3'' to the answering affidavit on indexed
p 74
[7]
See annexure "H" 10 the founding affidavit on indexed pp
24-28.
[8]
See notice of motion on indexed p 3.
[9]
See pars 13·17 of the founding affidavit on indexed pp 6-7.
[10]
Section 44(2) of the NCA reads: "A person must not offer or
engage in the services of a debt counsellor in terms of25 this
Act,
or hold themselves out to the public as being authorised to offer
any such service, unless that person is registered as
such in terms
of this Chapter."
[11]
See par 6.4 above; annexure "PWM3" ta the answering
affidavit on indexed
p
74.
[12]
See par 8 of the judgment of 10 April 2018
[13]
See par 6.4 above.
[14]
See
Se1logelo v Serlogelo
1914 AD 22I.
See further
Herbstein and Van Winsen The Civil Practice of the High Courts of
South Africa. 5lh edition (Juta Cape Town 2009)
et ch44 pp 1456·1457
end the authorities cited there, particularly under footnote 17
[15]
In Van Dijkhorst K and Church J
legal Practitioners
(Volume
14(2) 2
nd
edition in
law of South Africa
(LexisNexis,
online version as at 31 July 2007) at 306.
[16]
See pars 12 and 13 above.
[17]
Ferreira
v
Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO
1995 (2) SA
813
(W) at 8171-8188, 8241- J
[18]
Olympic Passenger Service (Pty) Ltd v Ramlagan
1957 (2) SA
382
(D) at 383C-G, approved in
Beecham Group Ltd v B-M Group
(Pty) Ltd
1977 (I) SA 50 (T) at 54-55 and
Ferreira v Levin
NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO
1995 (2) SA 813
(W)111 S3 IE- 832B.
[19]
Ferreira,,
Levin NO, Vryenhoek
1•
Powell NO
1995 (2) SA 813
(W)
at 833A- 8
(per
Hcher J). See also
Knox D'Arcy Ltd
v
Jami.zson
1995 (2) SA 579
( W) at 60 IE—G.
[20]
"Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges
concerned are of the opinion that-
(a)
(i) the appeal would
have a reasonable prospect of success; or (ii) there is some other
compelling reason why the appeal should
be heard, including
conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration".